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Abstract. 
Thirty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the number 
of member States of the European Community has increased from 
six to twelve. In 1987, the Community is a more heterogeneous 
group than it was in 1957. The policies established to meet the 
needs of the 'original' six have to be adapted to meet the 
additional demands of the 'new' six. 
The process of adaptation is most evident in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the policy which has been described as 
the 'motor of European integration'. The need to adapt the CAP 
arises from criticisms of the operation of the policy by some 
member States and the Community's taxpayers. However, these 
criticisms should not dictate the process of adaptation. The 
interests, social, economic, and political, which lie behind the CAP 
must also be considered. The Community Institutions, therefore, 
have a delicate balancing out to perform as they adapt the policy 
in the light of these diverse interests. 
One element which is missing from this balancing act is the 
demands of other countries. These countries are affected by the 
impact the CAP has on the international trading environment and 
the agricultural concessions they obtained by concluding 
agreements with the Community. The reason why these demands 
are not considered is that the Community does not have an 
explicitly formulated agricultural trade policy. 
The absence of this policy lessens the impact of a range of 
external Community policies and retards the full development of 
other internal policies. Through an analysis of the international 
trading environment, the association and development co- 
operation policies of the Community, this paper outlines the 
negative impact which the CAP has externally. To counter this, 
the paper develops a Common Agricultural Trade Policy which 
will allow the Community to, maintain the benefits of integration, 
enhance the development of other common policies and have a 
positive impact on agricultural trade and external policies. Just as 
the CAP has been described as the motor of integration, the 
common agricultural trade policy may be described as the vehicle 
for growth, internally and externally. 
Acknowledgements. 
Many people have helped me since I began work on this paper. 
I would particularly like to thank the following: John Usher for 
his kind assistance during my first year in Edinburgh. 
Everyone at the Centre of European Governmental Studies for 
their friendliness and especially, Margaret. Professor Edward, 
my supervisor, for the many hours devoted to reading the 
drafts of this paper and his helpful suggestions for changes. I 
would also like to express my gratitude to Faye who has spent 
many long hours typing this paper and trying to read my 
writing. 
Finally I would like to thank my wife who kept me going and 
endured my absences with great fortitude. 
Declaration. 
In accordance with Regulation 2.4.15 of the 
Postgraduate Regulations I hereby declare that, 
(i) I have composed this thesis, and 
(ii) the work is my own. 
JOSEPH A. McMAHON 
Dedication 
To Eilish and Connor 
"Forever." 
i 
EUROPEAN TRADE POLICY 
IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION: 1 
PART I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY. 
CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE. 4 
From free trade to protectionism 
The crisis of the 1930's 
From food shortage to food surplus 
CHAPTER 2: AGRICULTURE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. 10 
The Green Pool Proposal 
From Messina to Rome 
The Treaty of Rome 
CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAP. 19 




Criticisms of the CAP 
CHAPTER 4: THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT. 42 
PART II. THE EEC IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ARENA. 
INTRODUCTION: 46 
Section 1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT): 
CHAPTER 1: HISTORY 1945 -60. 48 
From Havana to GATT 
The Structure of GATT obligations 
- Article I:1, the mfn clause 
- Article XXIV, the customs union exception 
- The Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) 
Agriculture and the GATT, the US waiver 
CHAPTER 2: THE PROVISIONS OF GAIT RELEVANT TO 
AGRICULTURE. 
Article XI, Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions 
Article XVI, Subsidies 
Article XIX, Emergency Action on Imports 
Article XXVIII - Modification of schedules 
The GATT and a CATP 
ii 
65 
CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND GATT. 100 
the nature of the problem 
GATT attempts to influence domestic 
agricultural policy 
- the Harberler Report 
- Committee II 
- the Leutwiler Report 
Multilateral Trade Negoliations 
- the Dillon Round 
- The Kennedy Round 
- the Tokyo Round 
- Beyond the Tokyo Round 
CHAPTER 4: A NEW BEGINNING. 121 
APPENDIX A PROVISIONS OF THE GATT 127 
Section 2 Commodity Policy: 
INTRODUCTION: 
CHAPTER 1: A TYPOLOGY OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS. 
the Multilateral Contract System 
the Export Quota System 
the Buffer Stock System 
CHAPTER 2: THE HAVANA PERIOD. 
Chapter VI of the Havana Charter 
the GATT and Commodity Policy 
the Baumgartner- Pisani Plan 




CHAPTER 3: THE UNCTAD PERIOD. 149 
From Geneva to Nairobi 
The Integrated Programme 
Beyond Nairobi 
CHAPTER 4: COMMUNITY POLICY AND THE WAY AHEAD. 160 
AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT. 
GATT 
UNCTAD 
A Hint of Realism 
The Role of the European Community 
176 
iii 
PART III. ASSOCIATION POLICY. 
INTRODUCTION: 184 
CHAPTER 1: THE MEDITERRANEAN ARENA. 
The early period 
Towards a global policy 
The Agreements in the GATT 
Agricultural Concessions 
The impact of enlargement 
EEC reaction to enlargement 
A new Mediterranean Policy 
Final remarks 
185 
CHAPTER 2: THE EUROPEAN ARENA. 215 
A. EFTA 
The Agreements 
The Agreements in GATT 
Agricultural Trade, Concessions or 
Restrictions? 
The future 
B. The State Trading Countries 
The early period 
De facto recognition 
Towards de jure recognition 
The future 
An Overview 
CHAPTER 3: THE DEVELOPED COUNTRY RELATIONS 





The United States 
An overall appraisal 
CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPING COUNTRY RELATIONS, 
"THE NON -ASSOCIATES ". 
A. Latin America 
The Agreements 
Recent developments 
The impact of enlargement 
B. Asia 
ASEAN 
India Bangladesh Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
The future for Latin America and Asia 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
"The Pyramid of Privilege" 
The impact of enlargement on the CAP 






PART IV: THE DEVELOPMENT CO- OPERATION 
POLICIES OF THE EEC. 
INTRODUCTION: 280 
CHAPTER 1: THE ROAD TO LOMÉ. 
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome 
The Yaoundé Conventions 
The end of Association 
283 
CHAPTER 2: LOMÉ, A NEW MODEL FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN 
DEVFT .OPED AND DEVELOPING STATES? 296 
Trade Provisions 
The Stabilization of Export Earnings System 
The Protocols 
Other Provisions 
CHAPTER 3: BEYOND LOMÉ - AN EVALUATION OF THE LINK. 321 
The Development of Trade 
Stabex, an analysis of an Innovation 
Sugar, problems with the Protocol 
The future of the Lomé link 
CHAPTER 4: HUNGER IN THE WORLD. 
Food aid as an adjunct to agricultural policy 
Food aid as development aid 
Answering questions 
CHAPTER 5: THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES. 
The origins of the GSP 
The Evolution of the EEC's GSP 
An Assessment of the GSP 
Abolition or Reform? 




PART V: TOWARDS A COMMON AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE POLICY. 
INTRODUCTION: 401 
CHAPTER 1: THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY. 403 
Criticisms of the CAP 
The Adaptation of the Policy 
The Impact of Adaptation 




A COMMON AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICY (CATP). 416 
Council Regulation on the Principles 
and Mechanisms of the Common 
Agricultural Trade Policy 





The most visible symbol to third countries of the existence of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) is the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The CAP has also proved to be one of the most 
controversial aspects of European integration not only for 
consumers and taxpayers of the member States but also for 
agricultural exporters throughout the world. Despite the existence 
of a fully fledged CAP for quite a substantial period, it is not yet 
possible to state with certainty that the EEC has developed a 
Common Agricultural Trade Policy. The need to examine the 
external impact of the operation of the CAP arises for various 
reasons: - internal debate on the possible reform of the CAP is 
continuous, it is important to examine the effects of any 
such reform on the trade relationships established by the 
EEC; - the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EEC, both 
significant producers of agricultural products, will 
necessitate a re- appraisal of the policy. It is essential that 
this re- appraisal is not carried out at the expense of third 
countries; - despite continual efforts to include agriculture in trade 
negotiations conducted under the auspices of GATT, 
continued failure to effect a genuine liberalization of 
agricultural trade constitutes a significnt threat to the 
stability of economic relations between developed countries; - given the demands of developing countries for a New 
International Economic Order and specifically for an 
Integrated Programme for Commodities, it is important that 
the EEC makes continual efforts to stabilize commodity 
markets, especially agricultural commodity markets; - the recent conclusion of the Lomé III agreement indicates 
the EEC's willingness to help in the development of these 
2 
signatory countries. It is essential that agriculture should be 
dealt with as generously as possible; and, 
given the recent famine in the Sahel region of Africa, it is 
important to assess the strength and weaknesses of the EEC's 
food aid policy. 
The absence of an explicitly formulated agricultural trade policy is 
in marked contrast with the EEC's policy in relation to industrial 
products. In this latter area the EEC follows a policy of free trade 
based on comparative advantages of production. The policy in 
relation to agricultural products is one of market insulation. The 
continued economic recession and the accession of the EEC to the 
new Multi -Fibre Agreement may be evidence of the rise of 
protectionism within the EEC in relation to industrial products. It 
is, perhaps, reasonable to assume that this policy of 'Fortress 
Europe' will be matched by increased protectionism in the 
agricultural sphere. 
This paper will examine the methods chosen by the EEC to 
conduct its agricultural trade relations with third countries. 
Attention will focus on the following areas: 
(1) The European Community in the international arena. This 
covers; 
(a) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). An examination of the effectiveness of 
this organization vis -a -vis agriculture and how it 
could be used either for the promotion of 
protectionism or liberalism; and, 
(b) the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development(UNCTAD). An inquiry into the 
Integrated Programme for Commodities and the 
call for greater use of International Commodity 
Agreements. 













European Free Trade Association (EFTA); 
countries of Eastern Europe; and 
relations established with certain developed 
developing countries. 
will focus on the agreements concluded by the 
with these groups of countries and an 
of the concessions given in the agricultural 
The Development Co- operation Policy of the EEC. This 
includes; 
(a) the ACP. An examination of the Lomé Convention 
provisions in so far as they pertain to agriculture ; 
(b) food aid. An appraisal of the scope of the EC food 
aid programme; and, 
(c) the Generalized Scheme of Tariff Preferences. An 
examination of the effectiveness of this scheme in 
to the agricultural concessions given. 
An attempt will be made in the conclusion to formulate an 
agricultural trade policy for the EEC based on the results of the 
examination of the areas outlined above. 
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PART I. INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMON 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
CHAPTER 1: THE HISTORY OF AGRICULTURE IN WESTERN 
EUROPE. 
Virtually every developed country in the world today has an 
agricultural policy. The rationale given for intervention in this 
sector of the domestic economy by governments may be 
characterised as an interaction of the following variables:1 
socio- economic; a concern with the provision of adequate 
food supplies for the entire population of the country; 
politico- economic; a concern with the promotion of an 
adequate rate of economic growth. The approach in this 
area is dependent on whether the country concerned is 
either an importer of agricultural products, in marginal or 
substantial amounts, or an exporter of agricultural products, 
through the achievment of limited or extensive self - 
sufficiency; and, - socio- political; a concern with the welfare of the rural 
population. While recognising the income elasticity of 
demand for agricultural products in developed countries, it 
is considered desirable, or even necessary, to ensure an 
adequate level of income for the farming community. 
The development of these variables can be traced to the history of 
agriculture in the developed countries. Within Western Europe it 
is possible to differentiate three periods when one or more of 
these variables held prominence. 
1 See El- Agraa, The Economics of the Common Market 141; Marsh & 
Swanney, Agriculture and the EC, 12 -16. 
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From free trade to protectionism. 
From 1860, free trade ruled for all products in Western Europe. 
The Anglo- French Treaty of Commerce (the Cobden Treaty)2 
paved the way for similar bilateral trade agreements, which 
together achieved this free trade. However, the practice of free 
trade was not enough to curtail a protectionist reaction, by some 
countries, to the arrival of American grain in the late 1870's. 
This relatively short period of agricultural free trade in Western 
Europe was ended by the re- imposition of tariffs on agricultural 
products in 1878 by France3 and similar reactions followed in 
Germany4 and Italy. Whilst these countries met the threat from 
overseas competition by trying to protect their farmers, a 
different reaction was evident in the UK, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. In these countries, the threat was met by structural 
readjustment, thereby reaffirming their belief in the value of free 
trade. 
Tracy5 recognises that the reaction of France, Germany and Italy, 
was to some extent predictable given the earlier social and 
economic development of these countries. Their reaction is also 
attributable to the structure of agriculture in these states. The 
revolution in France freed farmers from the seignioral privileges 
system, because of this agricultural holdings remained small and 
the farming community economically backward. A similar 
situation prevailed in Germany and Italy. In the UK the enclosure 
movement had led to a dramatic increase in the size of 
agricultural holdings and an equal decline in the level of 
2 A.Briggs, The Age of Improvement ,490. Tracy, Agrictulture in 
Western Europe ,68. 
3 Ibid, 69 et seq. 
4 Ibid, 95. 
5 Ibid, 34. 
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agricultural employment. This first wave of protectionism in 
agriculture in Western Europe is illustrative of the socio- political 
considerations which give rise to agricultural policies. 
The countries of continental Europe, excluding Denmark and the 
Netherlands, sought to shield their farmers from the worst effects 
of the depression by imposing barriers to trade. The resort to 
protectionism in these countries, however, also led to a delay in 
the structural adjustment of their agriculture, thereby 
perpetuating the need for some form of protection. The 
consequences of this were to have a profound effect on the future 
of Western European agriculture. 
The crisis of the 1930's. 
The effects of the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Hawley - 
Smoot tariff in the United States of 19306 were to set off a series 
of reactions in the states of Western Europe. Whereas during the 
first period considered the reactions of the European states varied 
considerably, during this second period there was a rough 
equivalence in the reactions of all states. The tariffs which had 
prevailed from the first period were no longer effective, given the 
need for balance of payment equilibrium. Efforts were now made 
to sell as much as possible abroad whilst ensuring that the 
domestic market was saved for the domestic producers. The 
economic disadvantages of tariffs were removed as prices became 
irrelevant in the search for overseas markets. This necessitated a 
move towards non -tariff measures.? 
6 The Hawley -Smoot tariff imposed a high protective tariff on all 
goods coming into the United States. 
7 For example - the milling ratio which ensured a certain 
percentage of domestic production had to be used in milling. 
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In France,8 import quotas were introduced and licence fees for 
their use were required. The licence fee served to eliminate the 
difference between the world price of a product and its domestic 
price, thereby acting as a variable import levy. This period also 
led to the direct involvement of governments in agriculture. For 
example in 1936,9 France introduced an organization to control 
the market in wheat and wine. In the UK,IO besides the use of 
import quotas, agricultural marketing boardsl1 were established 
and a deficiency payments scheme introduced. Government 
intervention to organize domestic markets was justified by 
reference to the high level of protection accorded to industry, as a 
result of the depression. 
Intervention in this period is illustrative of the politico- economic 
considerations which give rise to agricultural policies (i.e. a 
concern with balance of payments). As with the first period, the 
measures introduced in this period remained, thereby 
perpetuating the need for their existence and inhibiting the 
process of structural adjustment. Farm output was encouraged 
rather than inhibited. Speaking of this period in the history of 
european agriculture Tracy concludes,l2 
"The 1930's were characterised by the growth of 
political consciousness among farmers and by the 
development of farm organizations whose demands 
centred on protectionist measures. Neither they nor 
their governments showed much interest in basic 
reforms. In this period as in the late nineteenth 
century, the response to challenge was above all 
defensive and conservative." 
8 Tracy op cit n2 p181. 
9 Ibid, 185 -187. 
10 AJP Taylor English History 1914 -45 ,333 -340. 
11 E.g. Sugar Industry Reorganization Act 1935. The Wheat Act 1932. 
12 Tracy op cit n2, 150. 
8 
The 1930's were to have a profound influence on the future 
development of the CAP. It was a period of substantial 
government intervention, the introduction of non -tariff measures 
and the colonial preferences systems.13 The growth of political 
consciousness within the farming community indicated that a 
return to the free trade policies which had characterised the first 
period in the history of european agriculture would not be easily 
accomplished. 
From food shortage to food surplus. 
The food shortages experienced during the second World War, and 
especially after the war, led to increasing governmental 
intervention in the agricultural sector. Whilst actuated by the 
desire to ensure adequate food supplies for their populations, a 
concern which had been to the fore in Germany and Italyl4 
before the war, balance of payments problems also dictated an 
increase in governmental intervention. 
To achieve increased production, income guarantees were given to 
farmers, either through deficiency payments schemes or internal 
price support measures. In France,15 the Fonds de Soutien et de 
Garantie Mutuelle was introduced to support agricultural markets; 
all important products were the subject of market intervention. 
Even in the UK,16 the government sought to increase agricultural 
production through the re- introduction of the deficiency 
13 Ottawa Agreements Act 1932. 
14 Both these countries while aiming for a balance of payments 




Tracy op cit n2, 238. 
Ibid, 237. 
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payments scheme and the marketing boards. In West Germany,17 
Import and Export Boards were introduced to stabilise the prices 
of the main agricultural products. As world production increased 
and prices fell relieving the food shortages, there was no 
equivalent decline in the degree of intervention. Politically and 
economically committed to their farming communities a decline in 
the level of agricultural support could not be contemplated. It has 
been noted that,18 
"From about 1953 there was a change in emphasis as 
agricultural production caught up with demand. The 
aim was no longer to raise production at all costs but 
to achieve selective expansion and to raise 
agricultural efficiency. At the same time, concern 
with the relatively low level of farm incomes was 
increasingly felt and governments were placed in a 
quandary as the price guarantees they offered 
farmers tended to stimulate excess production." 
The emphasis in agricultural policy now shifted to the question of 
farm incomes and structural reform. It is against this background 
of governmental involvement in agricultural policy, the resulting 
low prices and excess production, that the EEC had to formulate an 







CHAPTER 2: AGRICULTURE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. 
The Messina Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the 
six member States of the ECSC, declared their intention,19 
"to work for the establishment of a united Europe by 
the development of common institutions, the 
progressive fusion of national economies, the creation 
of a common market and the progressive 
harmonization of their social policies." 
In this fusion of national economies leading to the creation of a 
common market, it is trite to remark that agriculture had to be 
included. Yet before considering this point in further detail, it is 
important to realise that an attempt had been made before 1957 
to establish a European organization for agricultural products. 
The Green Pool Proposal (The Charpentier Plan)20 
This proposal was developed from a study initiated by the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.21 The aim of the 
study was to decide how Western European countries could 
commonly organize their agricultural markets. The resulting plan 
became known as the Charpentier plan, after the French delegate 
who drafted it. The plan provided for : 
(1) the creation of a High Authority with supranational 
powers; 




Lorette L. Le Marché Commun,17. 
For a fuller account of this plan of Tracy op cit n2, 263 -265. 
21 For a discussion of the Council of Europe see A.H.Robertson, 
European Institutions Ch.2. 
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(3) the elimination of all restrictions on the free flow of 
agricultural products between its members; and, 
(4) the harmonization of the costs of production, through 
compensatory taxes to be paid to those members with 
high costs of production. 
Although laudable as a first attempt to integrate European 
agriculture, the Plan stood no realistic chance of acceptance. The 
structural diversity of European agriculture and the varying 
methods of support used by different states militated against its 
acceptance. A subsequent plan introduced by the French, just 
before the Schumann proposal, was also rejected (The Pflimlin 
Plan, this was based on the same general principles as the 
Charpentier Plan).22 
From Messina to Rome 
Spaak, when speaking to the Intergovernmental Committee 
establishmed by the Messina Resolution, declared, 
"On ne peut concevoir l'éstablissement d'un marché 
commun général en Europe que l'agriculture s'y 
incluse. C'est l'un des secteurs où le progrès de 
productivité qui résulteront d'un marché commun, 
c'est -à -dire de la spécialisation progressive des 
productions et de l'élargissement des débouchés, 
peuvent avoir les effets les plus importants sur le 
niveau de vie des producteurs aussi bien que les 
consommateurs. En outre, cette inclusion de 
l'agriculture dans le marché commun est une 
condition d'équilibre des échanges entre les 
différentes économies des États membres.... "23 
22 Tracy op cit n2, 265. 
23 Cited in Lasok and Bridge Introduction to the Law and 
Institutions of the EC ,373. 
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As Spaak recognised, it would have been inconceivable to establish 
a common market which excluded agriculture from its ambit. The 
inclusion of agriculture was necessary to balance the advantages 
expected from the formation of a common market. Consider the 
position of France and Germany. On the one hand the prospect of 
free -trade in industrial products would mean free access for 
competitive German industrial producers to the French market. On 
the other hand, free trade in agricultural products would mean free 
access for competitive French agricultural producers to the German 
market. If this had been denied to French producers, the attraction 
of the proposed common market would have been considerably 
reduced. 
Even if all the member States had agreed to join an industrial 
common market, it is extremely doubtful whether this market 
could have succeeded, given the distortions of competition which 
would have arisen between member States. Recognising that 
agriculture should be included within the Common Market, did not 
answer the question of what type of policy was to be pursued. The 
Spaak report24 recognised that agriculture held a very special 
position in all the member States, a point recognised when 
considering the history of agriculture in Western Europe. However 
the report was ambiguous on the type of policy to be adopted, and 
on the type of support which it envisioned. The report merely 
indicated that, as with other products, barriers must be gradually 
reduced within the member States during the transitional period, 
while a common policy was to be negotiated. This common policy 
would replace national regulations of the market, except in so far as 
the members could prove that national measures did not or would 
not affect the operation of the common policy. (This point is 
important when considering the development and functioning of 
the Community's agricultural structural policy). 
24 Part 1 Spaak Report, The Merging of Markets. 
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The report left essential questions unanswered, perhaps this is not 
surprising given the variegated pattern of national support 
measures and the problems encountered by the Charpentier Plan. 
However, it was obvious that the member States would seek to 
promote the same aims for agricultural policy within the EEC as 
they had in their respective national policies. Recalling these aims, 
the CAP, to be developed over the transitional period, would have 
to: 
(i) secure adequate food supplies for the population of 
Europe (a socio- economic objective); 
(ii) contribute to the overall economic growth of the member 
states, both jointly and individually (a politico- economic 
objective); and 
(iii) ensure an adequate standard of living for the farming 
community of all the member States (a socio- political 
objective). 
The challenge facing the nascent EEC, in formulating a common 
agricultural policy was enormous. The ambiguity of the Spaak 
report and the generality of the Treaty provisions merely served to 
underline the enormity of the task. Yet that very ambiguity and 
generality also left considerable scope for the development of a 
mutually acceptable policy. Before going on to discuss the 
development of the policy, it is important to discuss the relevant 
Treaty provisions. 
The Treaty of Rome 
While the Treaty of Rome confirmed the inclusion of agriculture, 
the relevant provisions were very general. This is in marked 
contrast with the provisions of Title I of Part II, relating to free 
movement of industrial products. Whereas Title I lays down 
detailed rules for the establishment of a common market, Article 
38(1) of Title II merely states that, 
14 
"The common market shall extend to agriculture and 
trade in agricultural products. "25 
A further source of difference between the treatment accorded to 
industrial and agricultural products by the Treaty is evident from 
the provisions of Article 38(4), 
"The operation and development of the common 
market for agricultural products must be accompanied 
by theestablishment of a common agricultural policy 
among the member States." 
The common market in agricultural products necessitated a 
common policy, whereas the common market for industrial 
products required no such policy. The distinction thereby 
established between these two types of products serves to 
illustrate both the lack of agreement in the Spaak Committee on 
the role of agriculture in the process of European intergration and 
the importance of agriculture within the member States. 
The objectives set for the CAP, listed in Article 39(1), are,26 
"(a) to increase agricultural productivity by 
promoting technical progress and by ensuring 
the rational development of agricultural 
production and the optimum utilization of the 
factors of production, in particular labour; 
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community, in particular by 
increasing the individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture; 
(c) to stabilise markets; 
(d) to assure the availability of supplies; 
25 Agricultural products are listed in Annex II to the Treaty as 
amended by Reg.7a (JO 1961 71). 
26 In case 5/73 Balkan v.HZA Berlin -Packhof [1973] ECR 1091,1112 
the ECJ recognising the conflicting nature of these objectives,allowed 
the Community institutions to accord 'temporary' priority to one of 
these objectives. 
15 
(e) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at 
reasonable prices:' 
It is important to ask the question; what type of policy is 
envisaged by these objectives? Article 39(1)(b) is, perhaps, the 
central objective (a fair standard of living for farmers). However, 
this is qualified by the word 'thus', thereby connecting Article 39 
(1)(b) with Article 39(1)(a). Clearly, the intention was to create 
some type of structural policy to ensure the rational development 
of agriculture. This conclusion can be supported on two grounds. 
Firstly, as already has been noted, since 1953 there had been a 
change of emphasis in agricultural policy, food shortages had been 
replaced by food surplus. It was realised that the price 
guarantees given to farmers had stimulated excess production 
without raising the level of farm income. The orientation of 
agricultural policy was beginning to shift towards a structural 
policy.27 
Secondly, Article 39(2) indicates that in developing the policy, 
account should be taken of the nature of agricultural activities, 
especially its structural nature. The policy to be implemented 
would gradually seek to remove the natural disadvantages of 
various agricultural areas. This structural orientation of the 
proposed common agricultural policy is further supported by the 
reference in Article 39(1)(b) to the "individual earnings of persons 
engaged in agriculture" rather than the agricultural community as 
a whole. Although this discussion of the proper orientation of the 
policy may be of little significance when consideration is given to 
the operation of the policy today, it is important in any discussion 
of the new directions which the policy may take. The discussion is 
especially significant when consideration is given to the 
formulation of a Common Agricultural Trade Policy. 
27 Tracy op cit n2, 235. 
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The objectives of Article 39(1)(c), (d) and (e) also constrain the 
central objective of a fair standard of living for farmers. The 
objectives listed in Article 39(1)(c) -(e) are subject to several 
interpretations. For instance, do they relate solely to the internal 
market? If they do not, do they establish the objectives for the 
external effects of the CAP? Does stability of markets refer to the 
internal market or the world market? The internationalization of 
these objectives could form the basis for an agricultural trade 
policy, to internalise these objectives could lead to an unduly 
protectionist policy. Support for the thesis that these objectives 
are external may be inferred from the interpretation of Article 
39(1)(a) and (b) being directed towards a structural type policy, 
thereby necessitating some form of control of imports and exports. 
In the analysis of the objectives of the CAP, it is important to 
consider them in the light of the Treaty as a whole.28 The 
preamble of the Treaty recognises the desire of the member 
States to create improved social and economic development by, 
"deciding to contribute, by means of a common 
commercial policy, to the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade." 
This, the sixth recital of the preamble, is reaffirmed in Article 3(b) 
and Articles 18 and 110. Article 18 states, 
"The Member States declare their readiness to 
contribute to the development of international trade 
and the lowering of barriers to trade by entering into 
agreements designed on a basis of reciprocity and 
mutual advantage, to reduce customs duties below 
the general level of which they could avail 
themselves as a result of the establishment of a 
customs union between them:' 
28 Case 83/78 PMB v Redmond [1978] ECR 2547 at 2368, the ECJ 
recognised that provisions relating to the CAP have precedence over 
other rules relating to the establishment of the common market where 
the latter are less stringent than the former. 
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Article 110 states, inter alia, 
"By establishing a customs union between themselves 
Member States aim to contribute, in the common 
interest, to the harmonious development of world 
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade and the lowering of customs 
barriers: 
The question to be asked is; what is the relationship between the 
provisions on the CAP and Articles 18 and 110. Article 38(2) 
states that the rules laid down for the establishment of the 
common market are equally applicable to agricultural products 
unless Articles 39 to 46 provide otherwise. Prima facie, Article 18 
is applicable to the CAP, however, Article 40(3) states that 
common organization established to attain the objectives of the 
CAP may include machinery for stabilising imports. This implies 
that custom duties and other more restrictive measures can be 
used in the common organizations established. This renders 
Articlel8 inapplicable in so far as agricultural products are 
concerned.29 
If Article 18 is inapplicable, what about Article 110? The 
relationship between Article 38 et seq and Article 110 et seq is 
adequately demonstrated by their position in the Treaty. 
Whereas Article 38 is included in Part Two (the Foundations of 
the Community), Article 110 is in Part Three of the Treaty (the 
Policy of the Community), thereby emphasising the importance of 
the articles. The CAP, according to Article 40(1), was to be 
progressively established during the transitional period and to be 
brought into force by the end of that period. Article 111 lists the 
transitional arrangements to be applied and the Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) itself comes into its own after the end of 
the transitional period. It could be argued that the member States 
29 Idem. 
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realised the development of the CAP was more important to their 
union than the CCP. 
A further source of difference relates to the wording of these 
provisions. Whereas Article 39 lists the aims which the CAP shall 
have, Article 110 merely notes that the member States should aim 
to contribute, in their common interest, to the harmonious 
development of world trade. The difference in their places in the 
Treaty and the respective wording indicate that the CAP has 
precedence over the CCP, and in the event of conflict the former 
shall always prevail.30 
In conclusion, the interpretation of the objectives which the 
common agricultural policy would seek to attain suggest a 
preference for a structurally orientated policy with reasonably 
open access for third countries. In relation to the objectives of the 
CAP and other provisions of the Treaty, it is suggested that the 
interpretation shows a tendency towards the isolation of 
agriculture from provisions relating to the development of world 
trade. The next section will address the question of whether these 
nuances of interpretation are reflected in the evolution of the CAP. 
30 The aims expressed in Art.110 do not prohibit the Community 
from enacting provisions which may affect trade with third countries. 
The measures adopted will be valid if legally justified by provisions of 
Community Law (e.g. Art.39). 
Cf case 112/80 Durbeck v HZA Frankfurt -am -Main [1981] ECR 1095 
case 245/81 Edeka u FRG [1982] ECR 2745. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CAP. 
From Stresa to common organizations. 
Article 43 (1) states that, 
"In order to evolve the broad lines of a common 
agricultural policy, the Commission shall, 
immediately this Treaty enters into force, convene a 
conference of the member States with a view to 
making a comparison of their agricultural policies, in 
particular by producing a statement of their 
resources and needs." 
The Conference was duly convened at Stresa in July 1958.31 
Rather than clearing up the ambiguities of the Spaak report and 
concretising the generality of the Treaty provisions on agriculture, 
the Conference added to the confusion, by prescribing further 
objectives which the CAP should seek to attain. 
It was perhaps inevitable that the final resolution of this 
Conference would be general and vague, a reflection of the 
diversity of existing agricultural policies in the member States. 
The Conference did reach a number of important conclusions: 
the structure of European agriculture was to be reformed. 
This would occur without prejudice to family character of 
agricultural holdings; 
Community -wide prices were to be established which would 
settle slightly above world prices. This would lead to the 
adequate remuneration of farmers without encouraging 
over -production; and, - the Community should aim not at total self- sufficiency, but 
remain open to world trade, with the necessary measures to 
31 For a fuller discussion of the Stresa Conference cf El Agraa op cit 
n1,147 ff: Tracy op cit n2, 269 -70. European Documentation 6/82 The 
Agricultural Policy of the EC,14. 
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be taken to prevent distortions of competition of external 
origin. 
Taking account of the conclusions of the Stresa Conference, the 
Commission 32 continued its preparations of the proposals to 
implement the CAP. The slow rate of progress on implementation 
led to disputes between the Netherlands and Germany over the 
speed of industrial tariff cuts.33 To resolve the dispute it was 
agreed that the implementation of the CAP should be expedited.34 
The original Commission proposals of November 1959 were 
revised and submitted to the Council. In December 1960, the 
Council made its first substantive decision on the CAP, a decision 
which would pave the way for the introduction of a common 
policy.35 This first decision is significant in that it established the 
three basic principles of the CAP. These are; 
(i) common prices, through the elimination of barriers to 
trade and distortions of competition between the member 
States; 
(ii) common financing , member States would be called on to 
contribute to the financing of future common 
organizations of the market; and, 
(iii) community preference, to ensure that member States 
enjoyed the advantages of integration foreshadowed by 
the Treaty. 
The threat of France and the Netherlands vetoing the progress of 
the Community to the second stage of the transitional period, was 
sufficient to lead to significant progress in the implementation of 
32 The Commission is charged under Art.43(2) with taking into 
account the conclusions of the Conference and with the submission of 





Tracy op cit n2, 270. 
i.e. the final Commission proposals were to be ready by the end of 
Council of EC Resolution, December 1960. 
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the CAP in 1961.36 The original decisions taken on the CAP, in 
the midst of a crisis, were to have a profound effect on the future 
development of the policy, it has been noted that,37 
"(a) countries with high levels of price support wanted high 
common prices; 
(b) the range of products covered by the policy was 
expanded because each country had special interests in 
particular commodities; 
(c) there was less pressure on individual countries to limit 
price increases because of common financing; and 
(d) there was less pressure on member States to carry out 
structural reforms because of common prices and 
common financing." 
In a decade where the main interest of the member States was 
the establishment of a common market, economic considerations 
of the practicability and flexibility of the policy were subjugated 
to the need to establish a Common European Policy for agricultural 
products. It is important to determine how the Community 
Institutions chose to implement the three basic principles of the 
CAP. 
Common Prices. 
Article 40(2) states, 
"In order to attain the objectives set out in Article 39 
a common organization of agricultural markets shall 
be established. This organization shall take one of 
the following forms, depending on the product 
concerned: 
(a) common rules on competition; 
(b) compulsory co- ordination of the various 
national marketing organizations; 
36 
37 
Tracy op cit n2, 272. 
Heidheus et al Common Prices and Europe's farm policy ,7. 
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(c) a European market organization. 
In establishing common organizations, the Community Institutions 
have chosen option (c). It is possible to differentiate four 
categories of market organizations:38 
(a) internal price support and external protection; (this 
covers about 70% of the Community's agricultural 
production); 
external protection only (25% of Community 
production); 
Additional product aid (2.5% of Community 
production); and 
flat rate aid (0.6% of Community agricultural production). 
agricultural 
agricultural 
By far the largest type of common organization of the market 
(COM) is one based internal price support and external protection. 
A large number of the COMs are based on the first and most 
important of the common market regimes, the cereals 
organisation. The price structure of this COM involves the fixing 
of the following prices; a target price, a threshold price and an 
intervention price.39 
The target price is the "lynchpin" of the market organization, it is, 
in effect, the price which it is hoped cereal producers will be able 
to attain on the open market within the Community.40 In fixing 
this common price account is taken of the objective contained in 
Article 39(1)(b) (to ensure a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community). For the cereals market, the target price 
is fixed for Duisburg, which is recognised to be the area of greatest 
39 Euro. Doc 6/82 op cit n31, 18 -20. 
39 Reg.16 /62 /EEC (JO 1962 2553) established the first COM in cereals, 
the current regulation governing this COM is Reg.2727/75 /EEC (OJ 1975 
1975 L 281/1) as amended. 
40 Reg 2727/75/EEC Art.3(5). 
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cereals deficit. The setting of the target price does not guarantee 
that producers within the Community will obtain this price. If the 
market situation is one of excess supply, and hence falling prices, 
a minimum price is fixed, this is the intervention price.41 This is 
the price at which official intervention agencies must buy the 
products offered to them. It is, usually set between ten and 
twenty percent below the target price. To protect the Community 
market a threshold price42 is set which prevents imports from 
entering the market below the target price. Due to the variable 
nature of import prices a levy may be charged to bring the price 
up to the level of the threshold price (the variable import levy).43 
Article 40(3) provides that common machinery shall be 
established for stabilising imports or exports. While the variable 
import levy and the threshold price serve to stabilise imports, an 
export refund44 is provided to enable Community producers to 
sell to the world market, when the price on that market is below 
the price prevailing on the Community market.45 As Usher has 
noted;46 
"The price structure rests to a very large degree on 
the premise that the product is one in which the 





43 Case 17/67 Neuman v HZA Hof [1967] ECR 441. The ECJ declared 
that import duties were not equivalent to customs duties. 
44 In times of shortage an export levy may be imposed so that world 
prices do not adversely affect Community prices. In case 95/75 Effem u 
HZA Luneberg, the ECJ held five regulations imposing export levies to 
be invalid. 
45 Euro Doc 6/82 op cit n31 ,17 gives an excellent diagram 
explaining the interrelationship of the components of the price 
structure. 
46 Usher J. "Agricultural Markets. Their Price Systems and 
Financial Mechanisms" (1979) ELRev.147 , 150. 
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Community production is to be encouraged and that 
imports will be the exception and must not be 
allowed to disturb Community prices." 
The system of price support entails the setting of a Community 
wide price level, the policy therefore requires a common 
denominator for the currencies involved. This common 
denominator was the agricultural unit of account as defined by 
Reg.129 /62/EEC,47 Article 1 of which adopted the 1934 value of 
gold in terms of the US dollar as the value of the unit of account. 
The adoption of this dollar /gold standard and the principle of 
fixed exchange rates, through the Bretton Woods Agreement, was 
to act as the foundation stone for the establishment of the CAP.48 
By virtue of Article 2(1) each amount whose value had been fixed 
in units of account, would be expressed in national currency, 
according to the exchange rate for that currency as recognised by 
the IMF.49 
Reg.129/62 /EEC demonstrated the confidence of the member 
States in the IMF system by making it impossible for any 
alteration of an exchange rate which exceeded the limits set down 
by the IMF. This confidence was all too soon to be shattered. 
Reg.653 /68 /EEC50 on the conditions for alteration to the value of 
the agricultural unit of account, filled the gap left by Reg.129, in 
the event of one or more member States changing their rate of 
exchange. The principle of automatic readjustment was applied 
only once in the manner envisaged by Article 3 of Reg.129, as 
amended. This occured at the time of the French devaluation and 
the German revaluation of 1969. 
47 OJ Special Ed. 1952 -67, JO 1962, 2553. 
48 Braakman "Monetary Evolutions and the CAP" (1978) CML Rev.157, 
162. 
49 The International Monetary Fund was established by the Bretton 
Woods Agreement 1944. 
50 OJ Sp.Ed. 1968 
25 
The application of these rules to the respective devaluation and 
revaluation would have entailed an increase and decrease in 
agricultural prices. France, unwilling to countenance such a 
drastic change, was allowed a transitory period during which the 
realignment of agricultural prices to the Community level would 
take place. Germany was allowed a similar transitory period. To 
avoid foreign trade being affected by these measures, the Council 
provided for a system of import refunds and export fees in the 
case of France and import levies and export refunds in respect of 
Germany. This was to all intents and purposes the end of the 
phenomenon of common prices. 
In May 1971, the German and Dutch governments decided to float 
their respective currencies, this led to the introduction of 
Reg.974/71 /EEC ,51 introducing monetary compensatory amounts 
(MCAs). The floating of the US dollar in August 1971 and the 
decision of Italy, Belguim and Luxembourg to float their 
respective currencies plus the decision of France to adopt a 
system of multiple exchange rates led to the extension of the MCA 
system to these countries.52 Reg.2746/72 /EEC integrated the 
system of MCA's into the CAP,53 by rendering their application 
obligatory in cases where deviations from the par value of the 
currency of a member State, as communicated to and recognised 
by the IMF, occured. 
Further devaluations of the US dollar led to a basic revision of the 
system established by Reg.974/71, Reg.1112 /73 /EEC54 achieved 
51 JO 1971 L 106/1. 
52 Reg.509/73 /EEC (OJ 1973 L50 /1) extended the MCA system to 
depreciating currencies. 
53 OJ 1972 Oct.- Dec.64: Art.1(1) of this Regulation replaced the legal 
basis of Reg.974/71. It is now based on Arts. 28, 43 and 235 EEC rather 
than Art.103 EEC. 
54 Reg.1112/73/EEC. OJ 1973 L 114/4. 
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this revision by introducing an agreement by some of the member 
States (Germany, Benelux and Denmark, known as 'the snake') into 
the calculation of MCA's for those states. The MCA's for these 
currencies were calculated on a fixed basis, because of the 
requirements of the joint float (i.e. the currencies were required 
to maintain as between themselves a maximum spread of 2.25% at 
any one time). The value of the agricultural unit of account was, 
therefore, linked to the snake. Since less than half of the 
Community's agricultural business was conducted in snake 
currencies, this value became increasingly arbitrary and could not 
give a true indication of the level of common prices within the 
Community. 
MCA's were introduced to avoid the disruption of the system of 
intervention laid down by Community rules and to prevent 
abnormal movement of prices from jeopardising the normal trend 
of agricultural business. Their effects and application are strictly 
neutra1,55 as they are limited to the amounts necessary to 
compensate for the effects of monetary fluctuations on the prices 
of basic products covered by the intervention arrangements56 
and applicable only in those cases where these effects would lead 
to difficulties.57 MCA's cannot be characterised either as import 
55 Cf case 4/79 Providence Agricole de la Champagne v ONIC [1980] 
ECR 2823, 2845. 
56 Reg.974/71, Art.1(2)(b) states that the charging or granting of 
MCA'S is authorised for products which fulfil two conditions - 
(a) their price must depend onthe price of products covered by 
interventionarrangements under the COM's; 
(b) the products in addition be governed by a COM. See case 8/78 
Milac v HZA Saarbrucken [1978] ECR 1041. 
57 If MCA's are fixed at such a level so as to lead to over- 
compensation, the neutrality of MCA's is loskt and they may be delcared 
invalid. see Providence Agricole op cit n55. 
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levies or export refunds58 (import refunds or export levies) since 
they serve a totally different purpose. 
A resolution of the European Parliament59 has characterised 
MCA's as, a breach of the unity of the common agricultural 
market; disruptive of trade in agricultural products; as a distortion 
of competition and as such they cause resources to be misallocated 
on an artificial basis. The existence of the MCA system thus 
threatens the very existence of the CAP by encouraging a return 
to national agricultural policies. 
The European Court of Justice, has upheld the MCA system,60 
"These measures, intended to compensate 
temporarily for the harmful effects of national 
monetary measures, so that the process of economic 
integration may meanwhile continue its progress, are 
of an essential transitory nature." 
In a later case, the Court observed,61 
"Diversion of trade caused solely by the monetary 
situation can be considered more damaging to the 
common interest bearing in mind the aims of the 
CAP, than the disadvantages of the measures in 
dispute:' 
Commentators on the CAP have been divided on the effects of the 
MCA system on the CAP. One author has stated,62 
58 Reg.509/73 /EEC (OJ 1973 L 501 /1) Art.3: Reg.1386/75 /EEC (OJ 1975 
L 139/37) Art.6. Both these provisions emphasise the difference 
between MCA's and customs duties and expect levies. 
59 OJ 1980 C 97/33. 
60 Case 5/73 Balkan v.HZA Berlin Packhof [1973] ECR 1091, 1111. 
61 Case 9/73 Schluter v.HZA Lorrain [1973] ECR 1135, 1159. 
62 Heidheus et al op cit n37, 33. 
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"[The] MCA system ... allows member States 
considerable freedom in determining the level of 
their domestic farm product prices and in general 
bring about inter -country transfers which are 
politically acceptable and economically reasonable." 
Yet others have stated,63 
"Ever since their introduction, MCA's have 
represented the non -attainment of the objectives set 
by the Communtiy. They have enabled countries to 
enjoy somewhat different price levels for agricultural 
products, despite the declaration of common prices 
each year . The unity of the various produce markets 
have been broken up into partial markets with 
different prices, linked by the MCA." 
The conversion of agricultural units of account into national 
currencies at representative rates (commonly referred to as green 
rates), was generalised by Reg.475/75/EEC.64 However the choice 
of the rate has often been such that MCA's are introduced almost 
immediately. This has been recognised by the Commission, indeed 
in a proposal relating to the fixing of 'green' rates the Commission 
has stated,65 
"the development of the currency of certain member 
States has several times led to MCA's of such a 
nature as to turn the system from its original 
objectives." 
The Commission were rightly concerned that due to inappropriate 
green rates for the currencies of some member States MCA's, 
63 Buckwell et al. The costs of the CAP, 91 -92. 
64 OJ 1975 L 52/28 has been continuously amended; see Reg.1223/83; 
OJ 1983 L 132/33. 
65 OJ 1976 C 274/3 Proposal for a Council Regulation. 
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instead of stablising the functioning of the common agricultural 
market, might actually cause its disturbance.66 There has been 
considerable reluctance on the part of some member States to 
eliminate unduly artificial green rates. It has been recognised that 
an unduly artificial green rate does provide an element of 
stabilization for domestic farmers.67 
The importance of MCA's has been reduced owing to introduction 
of the European Monetary System (EMS) and the introduction of 
the European Currency Unit (ECU) into the agricultural sector.ó8 
The EMS69 has established a central rate for each currency in the 
system (all member States except the UK and Greece) against the 
ECU (the new unit of account). The system, which limits the 
permitted fluctuations of a currency against the basic rate to a 
margin of 2.25 %,70 determines the basic rate through a series or 
grid of bilateral exchange rates for each participating currency 
against the other currencies.71 As a result of the relative 
monetary stability achieved through the EMS and the introduction 
of the ECU into the CAP, the high level of MCA's have receded. This 
gives rise to the belief that as economic convergence between the 
66 Cf Advocate General Warner case 138- 139/79 Roquette [1977] ECR 
1854 and Schluter op cit n61, 1158: Grant "The Politics of the Green 
Pound'.' (1981) 19 JCMS 313 at 314. 
67 Buckwell et al op cit n63, 92. 
68 Reg.652/79 /EEC (OJ 1979 L 84/1) Art.1 states that amounts fixed in 
units of account for the purposes of the CAP shall be expressed in ECU 
by means of a co- efficient of 1.208953. 
69 Cf Reg.3180/78 (OJ 1978 L 379/1). This regulation in conjunction 
with Reg.3181/78 /EEC establishes the EMS. 
70 Italy has a margin of fluctuation of 6 %. 
71 The method of calculation is similar to that used to calculate the 
rate and weighting of the IMF's Special Drawing Rights. 
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member States continues, MCA's may be phased out altogether. 
Moreover, as the Commission has stated,72 
"Since the EMS was introduced and the ECU applied 
in the CAP, important progress has been made 
towards the re- establishmnt of price unity by 
amending the representative rates ... these 
amendments to the representative rates have 
automatically led to a reduction in the MCA's of the 
member States concerned. These measures have 
made it possible since the application of the ECU in 
the CAP, to reduce by about two times the difference 
between the lowest and highest national agricultural 
prices for most products." 
Despite continual efforts to totally eliminate MCA's73 they still 
prevent the establishment of a common price throughout the 
Community. However, they are a problem of declining 
significance, MCA expenditure falling from about 14.5% of the 
expenditure of the Agricultural Fund in 1977 to circa 2% in 
1984.74 This expenditure is financed through the Community 
budget and it is this aspect of the CAP which the next section 
examines. 
Common financing. 75 
Article 40(4) states, 
"In order to enable the common organization 




EPWQ 694/79 ( OJ 1980 C 206/1). 
E.g. Reg.855/84/EEC (OJ 1984 L 90/1). 
EC Bulletin Supp.4 /83 Adjustment of the CAP Annex II, 
Agricultural Situation in the Community 1984 Report Table 43. 
75 See generally ,Strasser The Finances of Europe Ch.11 Financing 
the CAP. 
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one or more agricultural guidance and guarantee 
funds may be set up." 
Reg . 2 5 / 6 2/EE C 7 6 duly established a single fund, the European 
Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee fund (commonly referred to 
under its French acroynm, FEOGA). The fund was subdivided by 
Reg. 17/64/EEC77 into two sections: 
a Guarantee Section for market expenditure; and 
a Guidance Section for structural expenditure. 
Reg.25 affirmed the principle of common financial responsibility 
by providing in Article 2(2), 78 
"Since at the single market stage price system will be 
standardised and agricultural policy will be on a 
Community basis, the financial consequences thereof 
shall devolve upon the Community." 
From the implementation of Reg.25 until Reg.729/7079 the 
finance operation of the Guarantee Section was based on the 
reimbursement of the member States for their expenditure under 
the section. By virtue of Article 1 of Reg.729/70 /EEC, FEOGA 
formed part of the Community budget and Article 1(2) of this 
regulation states that the role of the Guarantee section was to 
finance refunds on exports and intervention arrangement.80 
76 JO 1962 991. 
77 JO 1964 586. 
78 Idem. 
79 JO 1970 L 94/13. 
80 See Arts.2 and 3(1), Reg.729/70. 
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- The Guarantee Section 
As stated above the Guarantee Section finances81 expenditure 
which arises from common agricultural markets and price policy. 
A major element of this expenditure is the intervention 
arrangements of the various COM's. Under these COM's member 
States must intervene on the market to ensure that farmers 
obtain the minimum guaranteed price for their production. This 
intervention also ensures that supplies are available to the 
consumer. Two differing types of intervention are practised, first 
category intervention and second category intervention. Under 
the former the Community provides for uniform amounts of 
expenditure, for example, aid for the private storage of butter. 
Second category intervention is by far the most important type of 
intervention since it involves the buying in, storing, processing, 
even marketing, of products which the intervention agencies are 
obliged to take. Intervention in this category leads not to uniform 
expenditure as under the first category intervention, but to 
expenditure which is dependent on the costs of physical storage 
(for example, the difference between the buying in price and the 
selling price of goods in intervention). So the economic 
consequences of intervention under the COM's is not limited to 
storage but also extends to the disposal of these stocks. It is in 
this area that export refunds are relevant. 
As previously indicated the price structure of the COM's makes 
provision for the granting of export refunds, which reflect the 
difference between the price on the Community market and the 
prevailing world price. Expenditure in this area is financed by the 
Guarantee Section, the level of expenditure is variableas it is 
determined by the level of world prices. The Guarantee Section is 
also responsible for several other items of expenditure. For 
example, expenditure on obligations under other policies, such as 
81 Reg.1883/78 (OJ 1978 L 216/1) laying down general rules for the 
financing of interventions by the EAGGF, Guarantee Section. 
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the obligation contained in Protocol 3 of the first Lomé Convention 
which obliges the Community to purchase a certain amount of 
sugar from signatories to this convention.82 The Community food 
aid policy is another of the policies where the Guarantee Section 
incurs expenditure.83 As previously indicated above, the section 
is responsible for the payment of accession compensatory 
amounts and MCA's. 
It would be incorrect to assume that the CAP is self- financing 
since there is no correlation between income and expenditure. 
Indeed a high level of expenditure by the Guarantee Section 
indicates that there has been high production leading to an 
increased level of intervention. As a consequence of the high level 
of domestic production the level of imports will decline hence 
fewer import levies will be collected. So, the level of income 
declines whilst the level of expenditure increases.84 
- The Guidance Section 
As already stated, Reg.17 /64 indicated that the Guidance Section 
would finance the structural programme. Whereas in relation to 
the price and market policy developments were aimed at the 
replacement of the diverse national policies by one common 
policy, a different approach was evident for structural policy. For 
the structural policy, there would be no common policy. Instead 




See Part IV of this paper. 
Idem. 
84 Art.3 Co Dec 70/243/EEC (JO 1970 L 94/19) total revenue from 
agricultural levies is entered in the budget of the Communities. 
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Projects to be financed under Reg.17 /6485 had to further the 
basic objectives of the CAP, to improve either the structure of 
agricultural production or the marketing structure of products 
subject to a common organization of the market. Community 
contributions to the financing of the projects submitted by the 
member States under Reg.17 /64 was subject to a maximum 
amount of forty per cent. Progress towards the co- ordination of 
the various national measures led only to limited changes in the 
agricultural structures of the member States. In an attempt to 
formulate a truly common structural policy, a plan was drawn up 
by the Commission in 1968, it became known as the Mansholt 
Memorandum.86 
The memorandum aimed at a comprehensive reform of 
agricultural structures. This entailed a reduction in the total 
agricultural area and marketing improvements; the new 
agriculture structure would be based on the formation of 
enterprises of an adequate size. Two types of measures were 
anticipated; measures to help people take up alternative 
occupations or to retire; and, measures to help those who 
remained modernise their farms.87 The proposals, when made 
public, provoked severe criticisms and it was not until 1972 that 
any action was taken on the plan. The directives issued were a 
considerable retreat from the thrust of the original memorandum. 
Dirs. 72/159- 161 /EEC encouraged the cessation of farming and 
the reallocation of agricultural land, for the purpose of structural 
improvement and the improvement of the occupational skills of 
farmers . 8 8 Several factors obstructed any substantial 
85 Reg.17 /64 Art.2 states that the action to be taken by the Guidance 
Section action under this article has been replaced by Reg.355 /77 /EC OJ 
1977 L 51/1. 
86 EC Bull Supp 1/69. 
87 Ibid p7. 
88 Dir. 72/159 -161 OJ Sp Ed 1972 (II) 324 -344. 
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improvement in agricultural structures, in particular the recession 
slowed down the exit of farmers to industry. 
The economic recession of the early 1970's necessitated a 
reappraisal of the structural policy. Since 1973 measures have 
been directed to those adversely affected by the decline in 
economic activity and the policy as a whole has become more 
regionally orientated. Examples of this include Dir. 75/268/EC89 
which is directed to mountain and hill farming and farming in 
other less -favourd areas and Regs.1361- 1362/78/EEC,90 the start 
of the Mediterranean package. These regulations recognised that 
special measures were necessary to alleviate the problem 
inherent in Mediterranean agriculture.91 It has been recognised 
that,92 
"In following the development of structural policy in 
the EC, it becomes clear that the concept of 
agricultural policy has broadened to embrace social 
considerations. The main focus of the CAP has 
become more overtly the welfare of the farmer in 
relation to their counterparts in other sectors of the 
economy. As well as broadening to encompass social 
considerations, structural policy has become 
concerned with rectifying the divergence of regional 
agricultural income levels within the Community. To 
this end measures designed to tackle the particular 
problems of certain areas have come to the fore." 
The accession of Spain and Portugal necessitates a further 
reappraisal of the structural policy. This reappraisal should aim 
89 OJ 1975 L 128/1 
90 OJ 1978 L 166/1 and 9 
91 See Green Eruope no.181 A New Common Agricultural Structural 
Policy : Green Europe no.197 The Integrated Mediterranean Programme 
and Barbero G. "Towards a better structural policy" 11 
Eur.Rev.Agric.Econ.245. 
92 Marsh and Swanney op cit nl, 47. 
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to achieve a lasting improvement in the productivity of all 
agricultural producers, while recognising the constraints imposed 
by the current economic climate and attempts to reform the price 
policy. To perform a vital role structural policy will require more 
funds. The re- establishment of an equitable relationship between 
expenditure under the Guarantee and the Guidance Sections of 
FEOGA would be a positive step.93 
Community Preference 
Community preference means that domestic producers are given 
priority over all other suppliers. This principle of the CAP has 
three aspects; total freedom of trade within the Community; 
external protection to ensure imported products do not enter at 
prices below those prevailing on the Community; and finally 
safeguard provisions to ensure that disturbances on the world 
market do not adversely affect the objectives of the CAP as 
enumerated in Article 39. 
The first of these aspects (total free trade) is shared with 
industrial products. For agricultural products as for industrial 
products, tariffs on trade between the member States were to be 
progressively removed over the transitional period. A similar 
obligation exists for quantitative restrictions (Article 44). The 
Treaty also provided for the conclusion of long -term agreements 
or contracts between the member States until the separate 
national organizations of the market were replaced by a common 
organization (Article 45). If common organizations of the market 
are not established by the end of the transitional period, then the 
national organizations, if they exist, are subject to the Treaty rules 
on the free movement of goods and even the rules on 
93 The original ratio was set in 1964 (2:1). See also E.C.Commission 
The Importance and Functioning of FEOGA (1977). 
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competition.94 Even if a common organization exists, this is no 
guarantee that there will be no restrictions on trade, non -tariff 
barriers such as national health legislation still have to be 
harmonised. Progress towards full free trade has been slow given 
the prevalence of non -tariff measures of protection in member 
States. Yet the Community maintains its goal of total 
harmonization. One further factor which could lead to the 
distortion of free trade within the Community is national aids 
granted by the member States.95 While the Treaty does not 
prohibit them, such aids must be in conformity with the 
provisions of the Treaty. Since national aids are kept under 
review by the Commission, it is unlikely that aids which cause a 
distortion of competition will be permissible.96 
The second aspect of Community preference noted above is one of 
the more obvious signs to third countries of the existence of the 
CAP. When discussing the price structure of COM's, it was noted 
that a threshold price was set and a variable levy imposed to 
ensure that third country producers do not disturb the internal 
market through cheap imports. The use of the variable import 
levy ensures that Community producers are insulated from 
disturbances on the world market. 
As a supplement to the variable import levy most COM's provide a 




Case 337/82 St.Nikolaus Brennerei v. HZA Krefeld [1984] ECR 1051. 
Arts.92 and 93 EEC. 
96 Art.93(1) EEC. State aids which interfere with a common 
organization of the market are prohibited: case 177/78 PBC v McCarren 
[1979] ECR 2161, 2190. 
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"... the Community market ... is threatened with 
serious disturbance which may endanger the 
objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty. "97 
So long as the choice of product and third country is based on 
objective criteria, it is not possible to challenge the validity of the 
measures taken by the Community. Community institutions 
rarely invoke these clauses since negotiations are entered into 
with the "alleged" offender, which result in an agreement between 
the Community and the third country which effectively limits 
future exports by the latter. The disturbance on the Community 
market is remedied without recourse to the safeguard clauses of 
the COM's.98 
What type of agricultural policy has developed from the 
application of these three basic principles? For some the CAP is a 
"considerable success ", for others it is "the cornerstone of 
European integration ", yet for others it raises more problems that 
it solves, creating surpluses, depressing world trade without any 
structural readjustment within the Community. 
Criticisms of the Common Agricultural Policy 
This section does not attempt to show how the EEC has coped with 
criticisms of the CAP, it serves merely to outline some of the 
problems encountered by the policy and how the Community 
proposes to deal with these problems. 
It is often asserted that the main problem associated with the CAP 
is the lack of sufficiently effective regulatory mechanisms which 
97 Based on Art.20 Reg.2727/75 op cit n39. 
98 see Sack. "The Commission's Power under the Safeguard Clauses 
of the COMs:' (1983) 20 CML Rev 757. 
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gear production to demand.99 This criticism stems from two 
sources. Firstly, it is claimed that the open -ended nature of the 
intervention system does not inhibit production. The intervention 
system means that farmers have a ready market for their 
production which they can sell to regardless of price. Secondly, 
the CAP in its effort to achieve the central objective of Article 39, 
a fair standard of living for the farming community, was 
implemented by means of a price policy. Although it is politically 
acceptable to raise prices, decreases or marginal increases of price 
encounter severe criticisms from farmers. Since politicians are 
acutely aware of the role played by the farming community, they 
are unwilling to countenance a reduction in prices. 
Further criticisms relate to the operation of the price policy within 
the COMs,100 it is argued that the CAP benefits the large producers 
who have the most favourable production structures. Equally, it is 
maintained that the nature of the COM's lead to a North -South 
dichotomy within the Community. Northern producers (i.e. in 
Germany, Benelux and Northern France) benefit from 
advantageous organizations in milk, sugar and cereals, products 
recognised as the core of the CAP. Southern producers do not have 
equally advantageous COM's for their main products. 
The most frequent criticism of the CAP in recent years relates to 
the budgetary consequences of the policy. 1o1 It is alleged that the 
burden which agriculture imposes on public funds is too large. As 
a result some member States are net contributors to the budget 
whilst others are net beneficiaries. The ever increasing resources 
99 Green Europe, March 1980: Agriculture and the Problem of Surpluses. 
100 COM (80) 800 Reflections on the CAP ,8: see Bergeman D. «North - 
South balances and conflicts within the Community" (1986) 
11 Eur.Rev.Agr.Econ.151. 
101 Ibid, 10. see Larsen A." Major factors behind the problems of the 
CAP" (1986) 11 Eur.Rev.Agr.Econ.121. 
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directed towards structural surpluses created by the operation of 
the price policy are another source of criticism. 
The Commission recognises that any adjustment to the CAP must 
reconcile four main objectives,102 
"(1) to maintain the positive aspects achieved, (i.e. 
consumer security of supply, income of farmers, free 
trade and the contribution of farming to external 
trade); 
(2) to set up mechanisms whereby the budgetary 
consequences of production surpluses may be held 
in check and so public funds better used; 
(3) to ensure better regional distribution of the benefits 
derived by farmers from the CAP; and, 
(4) to organize the financing of the CAP on sound 
foundations which will not cause disputes in future 
between member States." 
It has to be noted that none of these objectives meet the most 
persistent criticism of the CAP by third countries;103 that the 
policy unnecessarily hampers trade by establishing too great a 
level of protection for the domestic market. The high level of 
protection excludes those countries who have a comparative 
advantage in the production of agricultural products from 
deriving maximum benefit from this advantage. 
When the Community discusses external agricultural policy,104 it 
is from the point of view of either, acquiring instruments similar 
to those enjoyed by other exporters of agricultural products, or, 
from the point of view of limiting imports to achieve domestic 
stabilization. It is important that the Community carry out 
102 Ibid, 14. 
103 House of Lords Select Committee on the EC: 2nd Report 1981 -82 
Agricultural Trade Policy, 9. 
104 COM (80) 800 op cit n100,19. 
41 
reforms on the CAP. However, this reform should not be at the 
expense of third countries. The CAP was formulated at a time 
when the EEC, as a whole, was still a net importer of agricultural 
products and not a significant exporter, although the former is still 
true, the EEC has become a very significant exporter of 
agricultural products. Future reform of the CAP should not only 
take account of this fact but also the impact which reform will 
have on third countries. 
It is to the external environment to which Chapter 4 turns for a 
brief analysis of the Community's import measures and the 
structure of trade concessions. 
42 
CHAPTER 4: THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT. 
As indicated in the introduction, despite the existence of a fully - 
fledged CAP for some period, the EEC does not have an explicitly 
formulated agricultural trade policy. The relations which the EEC 
has with third countries, insofar as these relations concern 
agriculture, revolve around attempts by these third countries to 
secure access for some or all of their agricultural products to the 
Community market. As a result of these attempts the EEC has 
established a network of relations in which agriculture 
preferences are given. 
The scope of these preferences is directly related to the 
importance of the product within the framework of the CAP. 
Table 1 summarises the position.105 For those products which 
form the core of the CAP, cereals and dairy products, variable 
levies are applied which effectively protect Community 
production of these products. The result of this external 
protection is that third countries are denied the opportunity of 
expanding their trading opportunities and are pushed into the role 
of residual suppliers of the Community market. This occurs even 
if the third country has a comparative advantage in the 
production of this product. Protection tends to lessen as the 
product becomes of less significance to the CAP. 
This product analysis can be brought a stage further when 
considering the structure of agricultural concessions granted by 
the EEC. The network of trading relations is illustrated in Table 
2.106 
105 Harris, Swinbank and Wilkinson The Food and Farm Policies of 
the EC ,262. 
106 Ibid, 265. 
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Table 1: NETWORK OF IMPORT MEASURES 
Products 
1. Cereals, Sugar, Dairy Products, 
Olive Oil. 
Pigmeat, poultry, meat & eggs. 




3. Wine, fresh and preserved 
fruit and vegetables. 
4. Second stage processed 
agricultural products (not 
in Annex II) derived from 
group 1 above. 
5. Oilseeds, tobacco and 
miscellaneous products 
in Annex II. 
Manioc. 
6. Potatoes, ethyl alcohol 
and cork. 
7. Agricultural raw materials 




Variable levies plus additional 
levies if necessary. 
Variable levies including a 
fixed element for processor 
participation. 
Ad Valorem duties plus variable 
levies (related to the domestic 
price as a proportion of the 
guide price). 
Variable levies, subject to a GATT 
binding and supported by VRA's. 
Ad valorem duties but with 
provision for use of counter- 
vailing duties to ensure 
minimum import prices are not 
undercut. Some fresh product 
duties are raised or lowered 
according to a seasonal calendar. 
Fixed levies based on (normally) 
quarterly averages of variable 
levies applied to the basic 
products in a previous period, 
plus a fixed element for 
processor participation. 
Ad valorem duties with 
provision for use of a 
safeguard clause if necessary. 
VRA. 
Products not yet subject to the 
CAP market system, member 
States may use national 
measures additional to the CCT. 
Treated as industrial products 
with low rates of ad valorem 
duties. 
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Table 2. THE NETWORK OF TRADE CONCESSIONS 
Countries 
1. The Lomé Convention 





2. Mediterranean Agreements 
(All the Mediterranean, 
save Albania and Libya; 
the EEC Lebanon 
agreement is defunct.) 
3. Generalized System 
of Preferences. 
4. Ad hoc arrangements 
Range of co- operation 
agreements with most 
countries or groups of 
countries. 
Some trade concessions 
for industrial countries 
(NZ, Canada, US). Such 
concessions result from 
bilateral negotiations 
under the GATT. 
5. The EFTA Countries 
Concessions 
Exemption from import duties 
for all industrial and virtually 
all agricultural products. Some 
concessions on leviable 
agricultural products in the 
form of a reduction in levies. 
Special import arrangements 
sugar, rum and beef, 
concessions are however 
limited by quotas. 
Reduction in import duties for 
most industrial and 
agricultural products. Very 
few concessions on leviable 
agricultural products, if granted 
are limited by seasonal 
calendar quotas and /or 
minimum import price. 
Exemptions or reduced rates of 
duty for many industrial and 
some agricultural products. 
Very few products sensitive to 
domestic EC interests are 
covered. 
Agreements here may give no 
trade preferences at all, or only 
apply to a few key products for 
the country /countries 
concerned (e.g. concession for 
NZ dairy products, Canadian 
cheese). 
Virtually complete industrial free 
trade throughout Western Europe, 
except for agriculture. Few 
concessions given (eg cheese from 
Switzerland and Finland). 
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Marsh and Swanney distingish four ways in which the CAP affects 
other countries,107 
"(1) Agricultural duties and valuable import levies 
ensure internal producers enjoy a measure of 
protection from external competition. The 
justification for such a policy stems in part from the 
problems of agricultural adjustment within the 
Community and in part from the residual character 
of international trade in agricultural products. 
(2) The CAP encourages the substitution of imports by 
home production. (Especially where the level of 
protection accorded different products varies.) 
(3) Where Community production exceeds domestic 
consumption the CAP provides for export 
restitutions (thereby disrupting agricultural 
markets for third countries). 
(4) In trade negotiations, the CAP is regarded as non- 
negotiable." 
Considerable scope exists for the Community to grant further 
trade concessions and to lessen the restrictive trade impact of its 
price policy, for the benefit of third countries. It is however, 
equally possible for the Community to remove the concessions 
granted and to tighten its import policy. 
The next section is directed to attempts to regulate the 
international trade in agricultural products either through the 
GATT or under the auspices of UNCTAD. 
107 Marsh and Swanney op cit nl, 48 -50. 
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PART II: THE EEC IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ARENA 
INTRODUCTION: 
Any attempt to develop a Common Agricultural Trade Policy by 
the EEC will have to take into account the international 
environment in which the policy will operate. 
One aspect of this environment is the international arena, where 
efforts have been made, in the GATT and UNCTAD, to establish a 
framework for the conduct of world trade. This part of the paper 
seeks to ascertain not only the nature of these two organizations 
and the obligations inherent in membership of each but also how 
these matters will affect the formulation of a Common 
Agricultural Trade Policy. One needs to ask whether there should 
be some form of international framework for the conduct of world 
trade. Recalling the effects of the absence of such a framework in 
the 1930's, hopefully everyone should agree that it is essential. 
Mere recognition of the need for such a framework, is not 
sufficient. The specific contents and the degree of flexibility 
inherent in this framework are also essential considerations. At a 
time when the world is faced with the spectre of protectionism, it 
is imperative that efforts towards liberalization should be made. 
The GATT and UNCTAD provide a forum for these discussions and 
it is important that the EEC contribute as fully as possible to these 
discussions. As Brandt states,* 
"Under the prevailing circumstance Europe is seen by 
many as the only possible hope and the only political 
power potentially able to fill the leadership gap. 
Among all industrialised countries, Europe probably 
has the greatest immediate economic interest in 
reducing the constraints caused by scarcities and 
unstable modes of behaviour." 
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The good intentions of the twelve member States are insufficient 
for the Community to fulfil this role. What is needed is a political 
commitment to match the undoubted economic strength of the 
Community. A time for action has arrived, let us hope the 
Community is not found wanting. 
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Section I. The General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 
CHAPTER I: HISTORY 1945 -60 
From Havana to Gatt 
Determined to prevent a return to the policies of the 1930's which 
had led to the detrioration of the international trading 
environment, the Allies,1 after the war, set about constructing a 
"Charter for World Trade ".2 To this end the recently established 
United Nations convened a Conference on Trade and Employment. 
The deliberations of this Conference led to the formulation of the 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO).3 
The ITO Charter envisaged the ordered reconstruction of all 
aspects of international trade, encompassing such matters as 
economic development and reconstruction,4 commercial policy,5 
* Brandt, "A Challenge for Europe.' (in ed. Stevens C. The EEC and 
the Third World, A Survey. Vol.IIl The Atlantic Rift ). 
1 Primarily the United States and the United Kingdom; the Atlantic 
Charter 1942 formed the basis for these post -war organizations. 
2 See Wilcox C. A Charter for World Trade (1949). 
3 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment. Final 
Act and the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization 
with related documents. Cmd Paper 7375 (1948). 
4 
5 
Havana Charter, Chapter III Articles 8 -15. Cmd Paper 7375, 11 -20. 
Chapter IV Articles 16 -45, ibid 21 -51. 
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restrictive business practices6 and inter -governmental commodity 
agreements.7 
However, the failure of the United States Congress to ratify the 
Charter effectively sounded its death -knell.$ In an effort to 
salvage something from the negotiations, Chapter IV of the ITO 
Charter on Commercial Policy became the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The structure of Chapter IV was 
altered to accord with the more limited purpose of the GATT. 
Whereas the Charter had been concerned with establishing a 
framework for the conduct of all aspects of international trade, 
the GATT was limited to a reduction in tariffs and other barriers 
to international trade.9 
The failure of the ITO and the emergence of a much more limited 
alternative, the GATT, were to have a profound effect on the 
future of world trade management.10 However, before going on to 





Chapter V Articles 46 -54, ibid 51 -56. 
Chapter VI Articles 55 -70, ibid 56 -63. 
Wilcox op cit n2, 53. 
9 Preamble to the GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 
(BISD) Vol.IV (1969), 1. 
10 Note for example that the failure to implement Chapters III and 
VI of the Havana Charter had an adverse impact on the development of 
the less advanced countries. 
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The Structure of the GATT Obligations, Article 1:1 
The preamble to the GATT states the intention of the Contracting 
Parties to raise their standards of living, to ensure full 
employment, to develop the full use of world resources and to 
expand the production and exchange of goods. The means to 
achieve these objectives was the conclusion of, 
"...reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the 
elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce." 11 
The method chosen to ensure a substantial reduction in tariffs was 
the general most -favoured -nation (mfn) clause which forms the 
core of the Contracting Parties obligations. Article 1:1 GATT 
provides, 
"with respect to customs duties and charges of any 
kind imposed on or in connection with importation or 
exportation ... any advantrage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating in or destined for any other 
country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or 
destined for the territories of all other contracting 
parties." 12 
Articlel:1 imposes two obligations on all Contracting Parties, 
reciprocity and non- discrimination.13 These obligations were 
thought to be the most efficacious method of ensuring that 
11 
12 
BISD Vo1.IV (1969) 1. 
Ibid, 2. 
13 Espiell H.G. - "The mfn clause:Its present significance in GATT." 
(1971) 5 JWTL 29. 
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distortions of competition would be abolished and that trade 
would take place on the basis of comparative advantage. This 
would further the objectives of the GATT. 
However, Article 1:1 is not an isolated rule, the two obligations of 
reciprocity and non -discrimination must be examined in the light 
of the whole Agreement. For example, Article 1:2 allows for the 
continuation of existing preferences, thereby forming an 
immediate exception to the non -discrimination obligation.14 For 
the purposes of this paper, it is important to look at two further 
exceptions to the mfn principle; ArticleXXIV, the customs union 
and free trade area provision and the Protocol of Provisional 
Application (PPA), which has a considerable effect on the role of 
the GATT in the regulation of international agricultural trade 
Article XXIV, The Customs Union Exception15 
Article XXIV establishes an exception to the mfn principle for 
regional arrangements that satisfy the criteria detailed in 
paragraphs (4) to (10) of that Article. Article XXIV:4 states, 
"The contracting parties recognize the desirability of 
increasing freedom of trade by the development, 
through voluntary agreements, of closer integration 
between the economies of the countries parties to 
such agreements. They also recognise that the 
purpose of a customs union or a free trade area 
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent 
14 This provision was necessary to ensure the continuing legal 
acceptability of British and French colonial preferences. 
15 See generally, Huber J. "The practice of GATT in examining 
regional arrangements: (1981) 19 JCMS 281; Haight F.A. "Customs Union 
and Free Trade Areas under GATT; a Reappraisal:' (1972) 6 JWTL 391; 
Dam K. "Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT" (1962 -63) 30 
Univ. of Chicago L.Rev.615. 
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territorities and not to raise barriers to the trade of 
other contracting parties with such territories." 16 
The Contracting Parties first dealt with the EEC Treaty at the 
eleventh session of GATT in late 1956, at a time when the Treaty 
of Rome was still in the negotiating stages. Between this and the 
next session, an inter -sessional committee was established to 
examine the Treaty. At the twelfth session the Contracting Parties 
launched a full -scale discussion on the compatibility of the Treaty 
establishing the EEC and the GATT.17 
It soon became obvious that a fundamental difference of opinion 
existed between the representatives of the six member States and 
the other members of the Working Party established to examine 
the agreement. One source of friction was the proper 
interpretation of Article XIV:4. The representatives of the 
member States maintained that paragraph 4 should be 
interpreted independently of the other paragraphs. So, if the 
proposed customs union satisfied the requirements of paragraphs 
5 -9, it would automatically satisfy the requirements of paragraph 
4. However, the other members of the Working Party asserted 
that paragraph 4 established the basic principle with which a 
customs union must accord before it can be considered compatible 
with the GATT.18 
It is submitted that the interpretation advocated by the latter 
group is correct, as Article XIV:4 states that the regional 
arrangement should facilitate trade and not raise barriers to the 
trade of other Contracting Parties. Indeed, the general tenor of 
the agreement is trade creating, therefore, it could be argued that 




BISD Vo1.IV (1969) 41. 
BISD 6th Supp 71. 
Ibid, 73. 
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the GATT. The impact of this argument on the proper 
interpretation of Article XXIV :4 was displaced by a concern that 
other Contracting Parties would not be disadvantaged in their 
trading relationship with this new regional arrangement.19 
Theoretical questions gave way to the practical reality of trade 
and the impact the nascent EEC on this trade.20 
Disputes also arose over the interpretation of other provisions of 
Article XXIV. It was agreed that the EEC satisfied the definition of 
a customs union given in Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and (ii), because 
duties and other restrictive regulations would be eliminated on 
substantially all trade between the members. Moreover, provision 
had been made for a common external tariff. Concern was 
expressed over the interpretation of the provisions of the EEC 
Treaty relating to agriculture. In relation to this point discussion 
in the Working Party centred on the provisions of Article 
XXIV:5(a). This provides that in relation to duties and other 
regulations of commerce imposed at the beginning of the customs 
union, they21 
"... shall not on the whole be higher or more 
restrictive than the general incidence of the duties 
and regulations of commerce applicable in the 
constituent territories prior to the formation of such 
union ...." 
Several factors contributed to this concern; the wide area of 
discretion left to the Community institutions; and the absence of a 
precise plan showing the application of Articles 38 to 47 of the 
EEC Treaty; and the process of removing trade barriers between 
the Six. The Working Party reached no firm conclusion on whether 
19 Dam op cit n15, 662. 
20 Haight op cit n15, 397 -401. 
21 BISD Vol.IV (1969), 42. 
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the provisions of the Treaty relating to agriculture were 
compatible with the GATT.22 
Concern was also expressed that the proposed common 
agricultural policy would lead to the curtailment of third country 
exports to the Community. The majority of the Working Party 
expressed the following conclusion, 
"The particular measures envisaged under the Treaty 
carried a strong presumption of increased external 
barriers and a substitution of new internal barriers 
in place of existing tariffs and other measures. "23 
The end result of the Working Party's deliberations was that the 
EEC were subjected to the consultation procedure provided for in 
Article XXIV:7 GATT.24 In relation to agriculture, it was 
recommended that the Committee of the GATT, should set up 
suitable machinery "to follow and consider together with the six" 
the measures to be taken in the course of establishing the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the relationship of these 
measures with the provisions of the General Agreement.25 
The failure of the Working Party to reach agreed conclusions on 
the compatability of the EEC Treaty with the General Agreement, 
has had profound effects on the development of the GATT.26 This 
failure, also shared by the Working Parties established to consider 







BISD 6th Supp.88. 
Idem. 
See Article XXIV:7 GATT, BISD Vol.IV (1969) 42-43. 
BISD 6th Supp.89. 
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considered by some as one of the elements which contributed to 
the gradual shift away from the GATT as the body responsible for 
the orderly conduct of world trade.28 
The problems associated with regional arrangements was not 
anticipated by the framers of GATT. This conclusion is supported 
by the position of Article XXIV in the GATT agreement. It is found 
in part III, the part which deals with general administrative 
measures concerning the territorial scope of the agreement.29 The 
provisions of Article XXIV charge the GATT with the task of 
reconciling regional arrangements with free trade, the failure of 
the GATT to effect this reconciliation is attributable to several 
factors. 
As Dam notes30 the standard chosen to gauge the compatibility of 
regional arrangements with GATT are deceptively concrete and 
precise. However, they make little economic sense. None of the 
regional arrangements forwarded to the GATT for examination has 
ever been rejected as incompatible with Article XXIV. Problems 
of interpretation have also dogged the GATT's attempt to develop 
a consistent line of jurisprudence. As stated earlier, the dispute in 
the EEC Working Party over the interpretation of Article XXIV:4 
and its relevance to the subsequent paragraphs of Article XXIV, 
was one of the first concrete examples of the deceptive nature of 
this provision. Subsequent regional arrangements have led to 
disputes over the meaning of "on the whole31 (Article XXIV:5(a)) 
28 See Hudec R. "GATT or GABB? The future design of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (1970 -71) 80 YLJ 1299 ". 
29 Jackson J. World Trade and the law of GATT (1969). 
30 Dam op cit n15 660 -661. 
31 See the GATT examination of the Montevideo Treaty (1960) 
establishing the Latin America Free Trade Area. BISD 9th Supp.87. 
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and more importantly, "substantially all trade "32 (Article 
XXIV:8(a)(1) and (b)). As Haight concludes,33 
"If the GATT is to retain a significant influence on 
world trade policy, a new understanding of the 
meaning and application of Article XXIV is one of the 
issues that must be resolved. That Article ... is 
probably the most abused in the whole Agreement." 
At a time when the rules of the GATT are being flouted and when 
many consider the GATT an unsuitable body for the regulation of 
world trade, it is essential that the EEC should respect and comply 
with the provisions of Article XXIV, in particular, and the GATT as 
a whole. 
A discussion of the EEC's status under the GATT raises the 
question, what is the status of the GATT in Community law ?34 It 
has been noted35 that the relationship between the Community 
and the GATT is one of the "unexplored areas of conflict" in the 
Common Commercial Policy. It has to be recognised that the 
relationship between the Community and the member States in 
the GATT context has never been explicitly stated. Whereas the 
member States retain their capacity as Contracting Parties, the 
Community institutions have assumed responsibility for the bulk 
of the commercial negotiations undertaken within the framework 
32 See the GATT examination of the Stockholm Convention 
establishing the European Free Trade Area BISD 9th Supp.70. 
33 Haight op cit n15, 391. 
34 See Steenbeegen J. "The Status of GATT in Community Law!' (1981) 
15 JWTL 337. 
35 Pescatorr P. "External Relations in the Case Law of the Court of 
Justice of the EEC : (1979) 16 CML Rev.615. 
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of the GATT.36 Given the jurisprudence of the ECJ,37 it is suggested 
that this conflict in the Common Commercial Policy should be 
resolved in favour of the Community. This jurisprudence is also 
relevant when we consider the question asked above, the ECJ has 
stated,38 
"[i]t appears that in so far as under the EEC Treaty 
the Community has assumed the powers previously 
exercised by the member States in the area governed 
by the General Agreement, the provisions of that 
Agreement have the effect of binding the 
Community." 
Recognising that the Community has precedence over the member 
States and that the provisions of the GATT bind the Community, 
helps to answer the next logical question. Is the EEC capable of 
exercising any rights under the GATT? As Steenbergen 
concludes,39 
"The European Community is de facto a member in 
its own right of GATT, as its policies are frequently 
subject to negotiations between the Contracting 
Parties and the Community." 
Given that the EEC is a de facto member of the GATT it can be 
argued that it is capable of exercising rights, since it also assumes 
the obligation inherent in membership of the GATT. However 
before discussion of the rights the EEC could exercise, it is 
important to discuss the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA). 
36 See Feld. The European Common Market and the World (1967) ch.6. 
37 See Case 3, 4 & 6/76 Kramer [1976] ECR 1297; case 36/73 
Nederlandse Spoorwegen [1973] ECR 1299. 
38 Case 21 -24/72 International Fruit Co. [1972] 1 ECR 131. 
39 Op cit n34, 343. 
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The Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) 
The realization by some of the Contracting Parties in 1947 that 
certain aspects of their domestic legislation did not fully accord 
with the provisions of the GATT led to the drafting of the PPA.40 
Rather than await the repeal of these conflicting pieces of 
legislation, the PPA allows the Contracting Parties to provisionally 
apply, 
"(a) Parts I and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, and 
(b) Part II of that Agreement to the fullest extent not 
inconsistent with existing legislation. "41 
In a Working Party Report, adopted by the GATT, the phrase 
'existing legislation' was interpreted as meaning,42 
"... legislation which is, by its terms or expressed 
intent, of a mandatory character - that is, it imposes 
on the executive authority requirements which 
cannot be modified by executive action." 
This Grandfather Clause, as this part of the PPA became known as, 
allows Contracting Parties to derogate from the provisions of the 
General Agreement. The PPA imposes no obligation on the 
Contracting Parties to repeal existing legislation which 
contravenes Part II the GATT, that part of the agreemnt 
containing the most important provisions. In relation to 
agriculture, the effect of the PPA was much more serious, since it 
allows for the retention of domestic agricultural restrictions. The 
PPA and the whole structure of GATT were seriously questioned 
40 See Jackson J. "The Puzzle of GATT' (1967) 1 JWTL 131. Dam K. 
"GATT as an International Organization': (1969) 3 JWTL 374. 
41 
42 
BISD Vo1.IV (1969), 77. 
BISD 3rd Supp 250. 
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by the United States(US) in the early 1950s when it requested a 
waiver from certain obligations imposed by membership of the 
GATT. 
Agriculture and the GATT , The US waiver 
It could be said that the framers of the GATT were suffering from 
a misconception when they drafted the agreement. The 
misconception being the assumption that agricultural products 
could be subjected to the same disciplines as industrial products. 
Evidence to prove this theory is the relative paucity of provisions 
in the GATT dealing specifically with agricultural products. In 
their efforts to ensure a balance of advantages from the GATT, the 
framers did not pay sufficient attention to the nature of 
agricultural policies. 
The PPA is a recognition of the probability that any attempt to 
eliminate certain trade restrictions might have resulted in the 
total rejection of the General Agreement, because of the powerful 
domestic economic interests served by these restrictions. There 
was no similar realization of the powerful economic, social and 
political forces which had led to the introduction of all- pervasive 
agricultural support programmes in the 1930's.43 The future of 
the GATT and its application to international agricultural trade 
will be determined by the resolution of the conflict between two 
sets of opposing interests. On the one hand the economic, social 
and political interests which advocate a certain level of protection 
for domestic agricultural producers. On the other hand the 
economic, social and political interests which advocate free trade 
and adherence to the theory of comparative advantage. As an 
example of this conflict, it is helpful to examine the attitude of 
the US towards the GATT in the early 1950's. 
43 See Part I of this paper. 
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When the GATT was being drafted the US insisted that a provision 
be included which would permit the retention of quantitative 
restrictions when the latter were directed to the enforcement of 
domestic agricultural programmes. The success of the US in 
ensuring such a provision (Article XI:2(c)) legalized the retention 
of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933. In 1951, 
section 22 was amended to allow for the imposition of quotas and 
licence fees on imports of agricultural products when their import 
threatened to disturb domestic price support programmes. Such 
quotas were allowed regardless of the international commitments 
entered into by the US. The application of this power by the US to 
the import of dairy products constituted a flagrant violation of the 
obligations assumed under the GATT. To ameloriate the situation, 
the US requested a waiver from its GATT obligations under Article 
XXV:5. This provides,44 
"In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere 
provided for in this Agreement, the Contracting 
Parties may waive an obligation imposed on a 
contracting party by this Agreement." 
The US representative argued, in the Working Party established to 
consider the request, that the nature of the domestic agricultural 
support programme meant that imports were attracted in such 
exceptional quantities that the domestic programmes were being 
adversely affected.45 The US representative recognised, however, 
that the 1951 amendment to section 22 of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act 1933 had placed the US in violation of its GATT 
obligations. Hence the need for the waiver. The arguments of the 
US representative were accepted and the waiver requested was 
granted, under Articles II and XI GATT. 
44 
45 
BISD Vo1.IV (1969) 44-45. 
BISD 3rd Supp.32. 
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As part of the decision, it was recognised 
"The United States will remove or relax each 
restriction permitted under this waiver as soon as it 
finds that the circumstances requiring such 
restriction no longer exist or have changed so as no 
longer to require its imposition in its existing 
form. "46 
Discussions in the Working Party suggested that some 
amendments should be included in the essentially 'open- ended' 
waiver sought by the US. The following are illustrative of the 
proposed amendments:47 
(i) any waiver granted should be defined in scope and 
limited to those products which were actually under 
restriction; 
(ii) the waiver should be granted for a limited period of time 
or that it should be stipulated as a condition that 
restrictions applied under it should be eliminated after a 
specified date; and finally, 
(iii) as a condition of the waiver, the United States 
government should undertake to adopt measures to 
remove the underlying causes of the situation which 
necessitates the application of restrictions under section 
22. 
However, the US objected to these amendments on the grounds 
that if they were included in the waiver, it would not be suffice to 
meet the need for which it was requested. The views of the US 
representative prevailed and the waiver granted was essentially a 
'carte blanche' for the US Government to pursue its domestic 
agricultural policy whilst ignoring the ramifications of the policy 
46 Ibid, 34 (paragraph 5 of the Decision). 
47 BISD 3rd Supp.141, 142. 
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on the GATT.48 The only obligation imposed on the US was that it 
report regularly on the waiver. It is interesting to examine these 
reports to determine the attitude of other Contracting Parties to 
the 1955 US waiver. One review noted the effect of the waiver on 
other Contracting Parties and more importantly on the latter's 
agricultural policies.49 
"Governments of other countries were under constant 
pressure from their producers to follow protectionist 
policies and even small progress towards the 
removal by the United States of restrictions would be 
an encouragement to other countries to take similar 
action." 
As time passed, other Contracting Parties began to realise that the 
amendments rejected by the US representative in the 1955 
Working Party, seriously undermined the impact of the General 
Agreement in relation to agriculture.50 The open -ended nature of 
the waiver, according to some Contracting Parties, has frustrated 
the fulfilment of the objectives of the GATT in relation to 
agricultural trade. Further reviews of the waiver5 i serve to 
reinforce this sense of frustration. A sense of frustration which 
has not been eased by the US as there has been no significant 
48 Warley states "At a time when other exporters were highly 
agitated about agricultural trade restrictions, the architect of the 
trading system and the custodian of liberalism was itself giving primacy 
to national interests and demanding sanction for the use of a barrier 
which the agreement had set out to control and eliminate, namely 
quotas." Warley T. "Western Trade in Agricultural Products' (in ed. 
Shonfield International Economic Relations of the Western World 1959- 
71, Volume I: Politics and Trade) 287, 347. 
49 BISD 8th Supp. 173, 177. 
50 BISD 9th Supp. 259. 
51 E.g. BISD 11th Supp. 235; 13th Supp.132; 15 Supp.197; 18th 
Supp.223; 27th Supp.206. 
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removals or relaxations of the restrictions imposed. One of the 
latest reviews of the waiver notes,52 
"section 22 controls did constitute a major derogation 
from the GATT rules and that the United States 
continued to benefit from special privileges afforded 
by the waiver which were not available to other 
Contracting Parties." 
The report continued,53 
"This has created a situation of serious imbalance in 
rights and obligations under the General Agreement. 
The inequity of this situation was even more serious 
because if other Contracting Parties applied 
restrictions on imports, they could always be 
challenged under Article XXIII proceedings which, 
while applicable, were not practicable with regards 
to restrictions applied by the United States under the 
waiver." 
This discussion of the US waiver raises the following question. Is 
the GATT a suitable arena to discuss problems of international 
agricultural trade ?54 The US agricultural waiver, the proliferation 
of regional economic arrangements and the consequent weakening 
of the mfn principle, have led many55 to question the continuing 
relevance of the rules laid down by GATT. This questioning relates 
not only to agricultural products but also to industrial products. 
The increasing level of world economic interdependence has led to 
the realisation that the limited objectives of the GATT are 
inadequate for an effective regulation of the international trading 
52 
53 
BISD 30th Supp.221, 222. 
Ibid. 223. 
54 See Hudec R. "GATT or GABB? The future design of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade!' (1970 -71) 80 VU 1299, 1349. 
55 See Espiell op cit n13, 36. 
64 
environment.56 However, it would be wrong to dismiss the role of 
GATT in the future regulation of international agricultural trade. 
As Warley notes,57 
"Agricultural trade liberalization is an area in which 
GATT has had meagre success. However, this is not 
because there is anything fundamentally deficient in 
the GATT as a legal document as it pertains to 
agriculture. What [is] missing above all else ... [is a] 
willingness on the part of virtually all important 
Contracting Parties to allow agriculture to be subject 
to the same rules and travel the same route at the 
same speed as industrial products." 
Chapter 2 considers the provisions of the GATT relevant to 
agriculture and considers the weaknesses of each of the 
provisions. In the light of these weaknesses, several proposals are 
made which would improve the relevant provision, and thereby 
make that provision more relevant to the modern reality of the 
Contracting Parties' agriculural policies. Chapter 3 addresses the 
general efforts which have been made, and are being made, to 
ensure that the GATT becomes more relevant to agricultural 
policies and international agriculture trade. 
56 Hudec, op cit n54, 1351, notes that the tight consensus which 
existed at the beginning of GATT operations has disappeared, the focus 
of the Contracting Parties has shifted to market management and away 
from trade. 
57 Warley op cit n48, 352. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PROVISIONS OF GATT RELEVANT TO 
AGRICULTURE. 
As previously stated all Contracting Parties, with the exception of 
the United States, must abide by the rules of GATT as they apply 
to agriculture. It is important to analyse these provisions and to 
determine the parameters within which a common agricultural 
trade policy would operate. 
Article XI. General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions.i 
Article XI:1 enjoins the Contracting Parties to eliminate the use of 
quantitative restrictions on the importation of any product. A 
specific exception was made for the use of quantative restrictions 
in the implementation of domestic agricultural support 
programmes. Article XI:2, for example, allows for import 
restrictions which are necessary to the enforcement of 
government measures aimed at the removal of a temporary 
surplus of a like domestic product. 
The use of quotas permitted by Article XI:2(c) must relate to a 
government measure which restricts either the production or 
marketing of domestic production. Any restriction on imports, as 
the wording of Article XI:2 indicates,2 
"shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports 
relative to the total of domestic production, as 
compared with the proportion which might 
1 
2 
See Appendix A. 
Idem. 
66 
reasonably be expected to rule between the two in 
the absence of restrictions." 
Given the need for any measure to meet this requirement and the 
obligation of the Contracting Party to give public notice of either 
the total quantity or the total value of the product permitted to be 
imported, it is not possible to use Article XI:2(c) for protectionist 
purposes. The further requirement that the domestic product 
must be restricted to the same degree as the imported product, 
indicates that it is not possible to use this provision to apply 
restrictions to imported products in such a way as to boost 
domestic production of a like product, or a product which can be 
directly substituted for the imported product. 
This latter provision is important when considering the proposal 
of the European Commission on changes to the conditions under 
which certain animal feed proteins are imported into the EEC. 
Recognising the requirements of Article XI:2(c), the Commission 
stated,3 
"It would be extremely difficult for the Community 
to adopt vis -a -vis non -member States, especially 
developing countries, certain restrictive measures if 
such measures were solely justified by 
considerations of protectionism and if they were not 
part of an overall concept, the aim of which was the 
achievement of a better balance in the cereals 
sector." 
Any restrictions imposed on the import of animal feed 
proteins /cereals substitutes would have to be accompanied by a 
comprehensive programme restricting domestic cereal production. 
Any action the EEC may wish to take in relation to cereal 
3 COM.(82)175 Changes to the conditions under which certain 
products for use as animal feed are imported into the Community, 14. 
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substitutes could not be taken under Article XI:2(c) unless 
restrictions are also imposed on domestic production.4 
The question of whether the EEC could exercise its rights under 
the GATT was canvassed above and answered affirmatively. 
Further support for this answer can be found in the proposition 
that if you are found to have breached a specific Article, you must 
also be capable of exercising rights under the same Article.5 
Article XI of the GATT was relevant in a complaint made by the 
US on the EEC programme of minimum import prices, licences and 
surety deposits for tomato concentrates.6 
In the GATT Panel established as a result of the complaint, the US 
representative argued7 that the minimum import price for tomato 
concentrates, which prohibited the importation of the product 
below a certain price, was a restriction on imports. Thus, it was in 
breach of Article XI:1. He argued that the effect of the minimum 
import price was to raise the price of the product for the benefit 
of Community producers by limiting imports. Furthermore, the 
system could not be justified under Article XI 2(c) as there was no 
system leading to the restriction of domestic production. The EEC 
representative argued8 that the system had been established to 
4 BISD Vol.IV (1969). This conclusion is based on the assumption 
that all countries which export products used as animal feed to the 
Community are members of the GATT. Thailand for example is not a 
member of GATT and the Community has concluded a voluntary export 
restraint agreement with Thailand relating to imports of manioc to the 
Community. 
5 See Chapter 1, Article XXIV, The Customs Union Exception. 
6 BISD 25th Supp.68. 
7 Ibid, 74 -75. 
8 Ibid, 74. 
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prevent imports coming in at prices which would adversely affect 
the intervention system of the fresh tomato market. 
The Panel's analysis of the problem revealed the following 
conclusions ;9 the minimum import price was a restriction within 
the meaning of Article XI: 1; and, more importantly, the 
intervention system for fresh tomatoes did not constitute a 
governmental measure excepted under Article XI:2(c). Since the 
measure was not justified under Article XI:2(c), there was a prima 
facie case of nullification or impairment 10 of the benefits accruing 
to the US under the General Agreement. This particular complaint 
is illustrative of two points. Firstly, Article XI:2(c) cannot be used 
for protectionist purposes; restrictions on imports must be 
accompanied by substantially equivalent restrictions on domestic 
production. Secondly, the rise of non -tariff barriers (i.e. the 
licences and surety deposits) as a method of controlling the import 
of directly competitive agricultural products. 
Hillman11 defines a non -tariff barrier (NTB) as, 
"any governmental device or practice other than a 
tariff which directly impedes the entry of imports 
into a country and which discriminates against 
imports (i.e. does not apply with equal force on 
domestic production)." 
9 Ibid, 95-107. 
10 BISD 11th Supp.100 gives the following definition of nullification 
or impairment. In cases where there is a clear infringement of the 
provisions of the General Agreement or in other words where measures 
are applied in conflict with the provisions of GATT and are not 
permitted under the terms of the relevant protocol under which the 
GATT is applied by the Contracting Party." 
11 Hillman J. Non -tariff Agricultural Trade Barriers (1978), 1, 14. 
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As noted above, the 1930's led to wide -scale introduction of non - 
tariff barriers in the agricultural area.12 Such measures ensure 
the smooth functioning of domestic agricultural support 
programmes and present an obstacle to trade liberalization. The 
decreasing significance of tariffs as an obstacle to trade has 
resulted in an increase in GATT activity in the non -tariff area. A 
GATT study of non -tariff barriers identified five general 
categories: 13 
1. Government participation in trade; 
2. Customs and administrative entry procedures; 
3. Health and safety standards, packaging and labelling 
regulations; 
4. Specific limitations on imports and exports; and 
5. Restraints on imports and exports by the price mechanism. 
Within each of these general categories, several sub -categories 
also exist. Category 5 includes a mechanism used by the EEC which 
has given rise to considerable criticism by the Contracting Parties - the variable levy.14 
Complaints about the CAP by third countries centre, on the import 
side, on the effect of the variable levy.15 It is alleged that the 
variable levy system operated by the EEC serves to insulate the 
domestic market from economic conditions which prevail on the 
world market. The effect of the levy on the world market is to 
12 For example, the milling ratio ( see Chapter 1 of the first part of 
this paper). 
13 Hillman op cit nll, 50. 
14 See Part I of this paper for an explanation of the role of the 
variable levy in the price structure of the COMs. 
15 Commonwealth Secretariat Protectionism Threat to the 
International Order (1982) 1, 75 -76; Grennes T. "Economic 
Interdependence and the Variability of Tariffs:' (1980) 14 JWTL 242. 
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magnify the effects of any disturbances because EEC producers 
and consumers are so insulated. As shortages emerge on the 
world market and the price of a particular product rises, the 
variable levy falls. This encourages imports above those which 
would have taken place had protection been by tariff only. This 
increased level of imports leads to a price rise and further 
destabilization of the world market. As the price of a product falls 
in relation to the Community price, the variable levy increases. 
Imports into the Community are discouraged, adding to the price 
fall and magnifying the destabilising effects of the levy.16 
As an instrument of protection for the Community's agricultural 
production, the variable levy is extremely effective. As a factor 
leading to the positive adjustment of world trade, its effects are 
essentially negative. Yet the EEC has avoided recognition of the 
restrictive effects of the variable levy system' 7 and the 
Contracting Parties have concentrated their efforts on other 
aspects of the NTB problem. As an example of the Contracting 
Parties concern with the problem of non -tariff barriers the Tokyo 
Declaration of GATT ministers, which formed the basis of the last 
round of multilateral trade negotiations, declared as one of its 
aims,18 
"[to] reduce or eliminate non -tariff measures or 
where this is not appropriate to reduce or eliminate 
their trade restricting or distorting effects and to 
16 Ibid, 243. 
17 However the Community has recently recognised that variable 
levies constitute "duties or other regulations of commerce in the sense 
of Article XXIV:5(a)." BISD 30th Supp.168, 187. This is a reversal of the 
position maintained by the Community since the variable levy was 
introduced. 
18 BISD 20th Supp.19. 
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bring such measures under more effective 
international discipline." 
One of the concrete results of the Tokyo Round of negotiations was 
an Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,19 which subjected 
all products to its provisions.20 
The basic obligation contained in the Agreement states that the 
Parties shall ensure that technical regulations and standards shall 
not be adopted which constitute, or create, an obstacle to 
international trade.21 Article 2:2 of the Agreement indicates that 
all Parties shall adopt international standards, except where this is 
inappropriate for reasons of human health, safety, or the 
protection of the environment. 
While recognising the importance of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade and the contribution it could make to the 
elimination of certain non -tariff barriers, it is only the 
beginning.22 It deals with only one category of non -tariff barriers 
recognised by the GATT study and as such the Agreement is only 
the first step in dealing with the problem of non -tariff barriers. 
Efforts will have to continue to avert this danger to international 
trade. As Hillman notes, 
... progress through liberalization actions in future 
rounds of GATT negotiations will depend on the 
degree to which the bargaining governments can 





BISD 26th Supp.8. 
Article 1(3) of the Code. 
See the Preamble and Article 2(1) of the Code. 
See Middleton R. "The GATT Standards Code: (1980) 14 JWTL 201. 
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sometimes accompanies discussions of NTB's and the 
extent to which they can move beyond the 
deliberations on 'policy' to the harsher world of 
political action." 
Hillman concludes,23 
"It is essential to any GATT negotiations that all 
participants recognize the nature of the disease they 
are trying to cure, so that too much time and energy 
will not be spent dealing with symptoms. National 
domestic policies are the root cause of agricultural 
protection and for the interference in the free flow of 
international trade." 
By recognising that non -tariff barriers from an integral part of 
domestic agricultural policies, any assault on the former is a direct 
challenge to the latter. As the variable levy has been 
characterised as a non -tariff barrier, international efforts to 
control the problem of NTB's will assault this aspect of the CAP. 
The non -recognition of the restrictive effects of the variable levy 
system by the EEC delays any effective challenge to the system 
and, more importantly, to the CAP. 
Article XVI, Subsidies24 
One aspect of the non -tariff problem recognised by the framers of 
the GATT was the provision of export subsidies. In relation to 
export subsidies for agricultural products Article XVI:3 GATT 
declares, 
" ... contracting parties shall seek to avoid the use of 
subsidies on the export of primary products. If 




BISD Vo1.IV (1969) 26-27. 
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indirectly any form of subsidy which operates to 
increase the export of any primary product from its 
territory, such subsidy shall not be applied in a 
manner which results in that contracting party 
having more than an equitable share of world export 
trade in that product, account being taken of the 
shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the 
product during a previous representative period, and 
any special factors which may have affected or may 
be affecting such trade in the product." 
According to this paragraph, the obligation of each Contracting 
Party is not to acquire, through the use of export subsidies, a more 
than 'equitable share of world trade'. The immediate question to 
ask is, what is more than an equitable share of world trade? 
As Article XVI:3 indicates account should be taken of the previous 
performance of a Contracting Party. An exporting Contracting 
Party entering the market for the first time will not mean that 
that Contracting Party has acquired a more than equitable share.25 
Given the factors which may cause a rise in exports from one 
Contracting Party to the detriment of another, such as a crop 
failure or advantages gained from lower transport costs, it is clear 
that the phrase in question presents considerable definitional 
problems. In a discussion of a complaint made by Australia on 
French exports of wheat flour,26 the GATT Panel established listed 
several factors which it considered relevant in determining 
whether a Contracting Party had acquired more than an equitable 
share of world trade. 
25 Interpretative Notes and Article XVI:3, BISD Vol.IV (1969) 68 -69 
and see Evans J. "Subsidies and Countervailing Duties in GATT. Present 
Law and Future Prospects" 3 ITLJ 211 (1979). 
26 BISD 7th Supp.46. 
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The Panel indicated27 that it was important to consider the 
desirability of satisfying world requirements in the product 
concerned, account being taken of the special nature of the 
product. Although the Panel easily established that there had 
been a quantative increase in the level of French exports of wheat 
flour, it struggled with the problem of establishing a causal 
connection between the subsidy and the increase in the share of 
world export trade. The nature of this causative problem has 
already been mentioned by reference to the fact that increases in 
exports may be due to factors other than the subsidy. 
In an effort to deal with the definitional problems inherent in 
Article XVI:3, the Tokyo Round negotiations discussed export 
subsidies. The end result of these negotiations was the Code on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Article 10(2) of the Code 
defines more than an equitable share as including,28 
"any case in which the effect of an export subsidy 
granted by a signatory is to displace the exports of 
another signatory bearing in mind developments on 
world markets." 
The definitional problems inherent in ArticleXVI:3 has not been 
remedied as this new definition looks to the effects of export 
subsidies on the trade and production concerns of other 
signatories. This conclusion is illustrated by reference to the 
GATT Panels findings on complaints made separately by Australia 
and Brazil about EEC refunds on the export of sugar.29 The 




BISD 26th Supp.56, 69. 
29 BISD 26th Supp.290 (The Australian Complaint); BISD 27th 
Supp.69 (The Brazilian Complaint). 
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by the EEC, had resulted in Community exporters having more 
than an equitable share of world export trade in sugar. This 
prejudiced Australian and Brazilian interests. 
The Panels established could not reach a definite conclusion on the 
question of whether the EEC system led the latter to acquire more 
than equitable share of world export trade in terms of Article 
XVI:3. Although meeting before the conclusion of the Tokyo 
Round, the Panel had before it Article 10:2 of the Code on 
Subsidies, but the problem addressed in that section remained. 
The Panels concluded30 that the EEC system for the granting of 
export subsidies and its application had contributed to depress 
world sugar prices. Indirectly this caused serious prejudice to 
Australian and Brazilian interests, although it was not possible to 
quantify this.31 
The subsequent events in this complaint, indicate the seriousness 
with which other Contracting Parties view the export subsidy 
system of the CAP. After the Panel finding of serious prejudice or 
threat of serious prejudice to Australian and Brazilian interests, 
the GATT established a Working Party to discuss the possibility of 
the EEC limiting its subsidization of sugar exports.32 Article XVI:1 
provided the legal basis for the Working Party, it states,33 
"In any case in which it is determined that serious 
prejudice to the interests of any other contracting 
30 BISD 26th Supp.290, 318 -319. (The findings of the Panel in the 
Brazilian complaint are similar to those reached by the Panel in the 
Australian complaint.) 
31 Idem. paragraph (g) of the conclusions of the Panel. 
32 BISD 28th Supp.80. 
33 BISD Vol.IV (1969) 26. 
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party is caused or threatened by such subsidization, 
the contracting party granting the subsidy shall, 
upon request, discuss with the other contracting 
party or parties concerned or with the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES, the possibility of limiting the 
subsidization." 
The EEC representative argued that it had complied with the 
obligations of Article XVI:1 and that the export refund system was 
limited by the levies imposed on EEC producers of sugar.34 
Using Article 25 of the Havana Charter,35 some members of the 
Working Party argued36 that the EEC, rather than its producers, 
had a positive obligation to limit the effects of the subsidization. 
The majority of the Working Party concluded that the EEC had not 
advanced any meaningful possibility of limiting the subsidizaiton 
and their failure to do so, indicated that the threat of serious 
prejudice, found to exist by the GATT panels, would continue.37 It 
is unfortunate that further discussion of this question was 
hampered by differences of opinion in the Working Party over the 
interpretation of the mandate given by the GATT Counci1.38 
The discussion on the use of Article XVI:3 indicates the nature of 
the conflict of interest between domestic agricultural policies and 
the rules of GATT. The 1955 Review Session removed domestic 
price stabilization schemes from the ambit of Article XVI:3. The 
34 BISD op cit n33, 81. 
35 Article 25 of the Havana Charter was the basis of the wording of 
Article XVI GATT. 
36 Op cit n33, 83. 
37 Ibid, 89-90. 
38 BISD 29th Supp.82. 
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effect of this was to shift the emphasis away from a total 
prohibition on export subsidies towards an acknowledgement of, 
and an attempt to control, the use export subidies.39 
The definitional problems of Article XVI:3 were not solved by the 
1979 Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, yet one should 
not dismiss the potential value of the Code.40 It provides a 
workable compromise between the various participating countries 
and it does update the 1960 GATT list of prohibited export 
subsidies.41 However, it provides no effective rules for regulating 
export subsidies in the area of primary products, and does not 
adequately deal with the inescapable problem of causation in 
Article XVI:3. Obviously given the current economic climate, 
stringent rules on export subsidies are not possible. The example 
provided by the dispute on EEC refunds on the export of sugar and 
its aftermath is important. While recognising that the EEC actions 
did constitute a threat of serious prejudice to Australian and 
Brazilian interests, the EEC was unwilling to take a constructive 
role in the subsequent Working Party on subsidy limitation, 
despite the clear wording of ArticleXVI:1 on this question. This 
reticence stems from the result which could have been achieved 
in the Working Party , international interference in domestic 
agricultural policies. 
Progress in this area will not be on the basis of a new agreement 
prohibiting the use of export subsidies in any form, since such an 
39 Interpretative notes ad Article XVI:3 paragraph 2. BISD Vol.IV 
(1969), 68. 
40 See Seyoum B. "Export Subsidies under the MTN:' (1984) 18 JWTL 
512: Phegan C. "GATT Article XVI:3, Export Subsidies and Equal Shares: 
(1982) 16 JWTL 251: Low P. "Definition of Export Subidies in GATT." (1982) 
16 JWTL 375. 
41 See Low op cit n41, 375, 388 -90. 
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agreement would be difficult to negotiate and time consuming. 
Rather, progress should be through the avenues already provided 
by the GATT, and especially by Article XVI:1. However, since 
progress in this area is dependent on a dispute between two or 
more Contracting Parties, a new role should be found for the 
Committee on Subsidies established by the 1979 Code.42 The 
Committee could set up specific product sub -committees to 
examine the use of export subsidies by the Contracting Parties in 
that product. The sub -committees would examine the use and 
effect of export subsidies and concentrate on measures to limit 
the use of subsidies. Given the variegated nature of agricultural 
support in the Contracting Parties, the recommendations of all the 
product sub -committee would mean that there would be a form of 
reciprocity in any effort to limit the use of subsidies. Products on 
which one Contracting Party granted an export subsidy may 
decline in production as a result of limiting the use of subsidies. 
This decline would be offset by an increase in production for a 
product which another Contracting Party removed or limited a 
subsidy it granted. 
Progress in the area of export subsidies will be slow, given the 
prevalence of these measures. However the proposal made above 
seeks to establish that any progress should be balanced and 
reciprocal. This would make the necessary political commitment to 
such reform a little more realistic. 
42 BISD 26th Supp.75 - Article 16 of the Code. 
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Article XIX, Emergency Action on Imports of Particular 
Products.43 
According to the wording of Article XIX, three conditions must be 
satisfied before a Contracting Party may invoke the safeguard 
clause. There must be; 
(i) an increase in the level of imports; 
(ii) this increase in imports is attributable to 
(a) unforeseen developments; or, 
(b) the effect of GATT obligations; and 
(iii) the increased level of imports cause or threaten serious 
injury to domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products. 
It is important to examine each of these conditions in turn. 
Under (i) it is not necessary to show that there has been an 
absolute increase in the level of imports. The condition is satisfied 
merely by showing that there has been a relative increase in 
imports. As such, this is a potentially dangerous device given the 
current economic conditions. Its availability for protectionist 
purposes is constrained by the subsequent conditions and other 
provisions of Article XIX. 
The second condition relates to the aspect of causation, the level of 
imports must be due to unforeseen developments or the effect of 
GATT obligations. But what does the phrase 'unforeseen 
developments' encompass? An early GATT Working Party report, 
realising the difficulty of interpreting this provision, offered the 
following as a potential definition,44 
43 See Appendix A. 
44 Cited in Jackson J. World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969) 560. 
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"unforeseen development should be interpreted to 
mean developments occuring after the negotiation of 
the relevant tariff concession which it would not be 
reasonable to expect that the negotiatiors of the 
country making the concession would and should 
have foreseen at the time when the concession was 
negotiated." 
From this definition, it is possible to conclude that any increase in 
imports can be attributed to unforeseen developments. Indeed 
when examining the interpretation and application of Article XIX, 
one may conclude that the benefit of the doubt, on the question of 
unforeseen development, seems to go to the Contracting Party 
invoking Article XIX.45 
The definition of this phrase gives an indication of what is covered 
by the phrase 'effect of GATT obligations'. As stated above, it 
obviously relates to tariff concessions, but the preparatory work 
clearly indicates that this phrase has a broader ambit; it also 
includes the elimination or reduction of quantitative restrictions. 
Moreover, given the nature of the third condition, which is 
assessed by the invoking Contracting Party, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that Article XIX could be used to protect domestic 
producers at the expense of imports. 
However, GATT practice in this area suggests that such a use is 
rare, this may be attributable to the provisions of Article XIX(2) 
and (3). These conditions relate to the procedure for using 
safeguard measures. Generally speaking, advance notice must be 
given of a Contracting Parties intention to use Article XIX. This 
serves to afford other Contracting Parties, with a substantial 
interest as exporters of the product concerned, an opportunity to 
45 Ibid,559. 
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consult before the measures are implemented. If as a result of 
the consultation, no agreement is reached between the Contracting 
Parties, Article XIX:3 allows a Contracting Party to use the 
safeguard clause. It also permits other affected Contracting 
Parties, having a substantial interest in the matter, to withdraw 
substantially equivalent concessions. 
It is this aspect of Article XIX which contributed to the increased 
use of safeguard measures outside the framework of Article XIX 
in particular and GATT in general. As Tumlir states,46 
"It is destructive of the spirit of reciprocity for a 
country in an emergency to be obliged to pay for 
taking bona fide temporary action to negotiate such 
repayment and to be threatened with retaliation if it 
does not offer enough. 
The application of the principles of mfn treatment and reciprocity, 
have led to an increase in such safeguard measures as voluntary 
export restraint agreements(VRA's) and orderly marketing 
arrangements(OMA's). Both of these types of safeguard measures 
fall outside the scope of GATT supervision. 
These measures are primarily motivated by protectionist 
considerations in the importing contries. Since they are 
negotiated bilaterally, they open the way for discrimination in 
international trade. They are accepted by exporting countries to 
ensure they maintain at least some level of exports to the 
importing country concerned. As mentioned in Part I of the paper 
in the discussion of the principle of Community preference, the 
safeguard clause in each COM is rarely invoked. As the body 
responsible for administering the common organizations, the 
46 Tumlir J. "A Revised Safeguard Clause for GATT:' (1973) 7 JWTL 404, 
408. 
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Commission enters into negotiations with exporting third countries 
and informs them of its intention to apply the safeguard clause. 
As Sack observes,47 
"If the third country declares its willingness to limit 
its exports and if it is able to demonstrate its ability 
to ensure its declarations are complied with, there is 
no longer any reason for the Commission to apply the 
safeguard clause." 
When such declarations are forthcoming rather than invoke the 
safeguard clause, the Community concludes a VRA with the 
country concerned. The Communtiy by concluding such 
agreements are in breach of their GATT obligations.48 
Recognising the problems associated with Article XIX and the 
dangers posed by the proliferation of VER's and OMA's, the Tokyo 
Declaration, listed as one of the aims of the negotiations,49 
"[to] include an examination of the adequacy of the 
multilateral safeguard system considering 
particularly the modalities of application of Article 
XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalization 
and preserving its results." 
Despite the extensive negotiations conducted during the Tokyo 
Round, it ended without the conclusion of a comprehensive code 
47 Sack "Commission powers under the safeguard clauses of the 
COMs:' (1983) 20 CML.Rev. 757, 763 -764. 
48 The Community has concluded a member of VERs for agricultural 
products such as beef, sheepmeat and goatmeat and apples. See for 
example the VERs concluded in the sheepmeat and goatmeat sector with 
Hungary (OJ L 50/6 1981), Bulgaria (1982 OJ L 31/12) and Czechoslovakia 
(1982 OJ L 204/29). 
49 BISD 20th Supp.19, paragraph 3(d) of the Declaration. 
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on safeguard measures. Some measure of agreement was 
however forthcoming. It was recognised that:50 - the use of safeguard measures must be subject to greater 
international discipline; and 
this discipline should involve the acceptance of two 
principles; firstly that the measures should remain limited 
in scale and duration and; secondly, safeguard measures 
must be accompanied by efforts at structural adjustment 
to cure the cause for safeguard measures in the first 
instance. 
The issue on which the negotiations floundered and on which the 
EEC argued for, was that of selectivity.51 The EEC argued that 
selectivity would allow measures which would be directed against 
the offending exporter. The less developed Contracting Parties, 
amongst others, were unwilling to countenance the abolition of the 
mfn requirement inherent in Article XIX. 
The failure of the Tokyo Round negotiations in relation to 
safeguards did not spell the end of the GATT's efforts to come to 
terms with the problem. The Ministerial Declaration issued after 
the 38th session of GATT Ministers52 recognized the importance of 
establishing an improved safeguard system. To this end they 
listed six requirements which a comprehensive understanding on 
safeguards should contain.53 
50 Se Merciai "Safeguard Measures in GATT:' (1981) 15 JWTL 41. 
51 Se Schultz and Schumacher "The Reliberalization of World Trade: 
(1984) 18 JWTL 206. 
52 
53 
BISD 29th Supp.9. 




(iii) Objective criteria for action including the concept of 
serious injury or threat thereof; 
(iv) Temporary nature, degressivity and structural 
adjustment; 
(v) Compensation and retaliation; and 
(vi) Notificaiton, consultation, multilateral surveillance and 
dispute settlement with particular reference to the role 
and functions of the Safeguards Committee." 
The proposal below is an attempt to encompass these six 
requirements. The proposal recognises the need to accomodate 
bona fide actions under Article XIX and establish a procedure 
whereby VRA's and OMA's will come within the ambit of 
multilateral surveillance. 
A CODE ON SAFEGUARD MEASURES. 
The Contracting Parties to the GATT. 
Recalling the objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade; 
Recognising that Article XIX of the GATT provides a framework 
for the invocation of safeguard measures; 
Realising that problems with the application of Article XIX has led 
the Contracting Parties to have recourse to measures outside the 
framework of the GATT; 
Determined to end the practice of some Contracting Parties to 
have recourse to such measures as Voluntary Export Restraint 
Agreements and Orderly Marketing Arrangements; 
Resolved to adhere to this Code to regulate the use of safeguard 
measures; 
have agreed as follows: 
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Article 1 Conditions necessitating the use of Safeguards. 
1. Contracting Parties shall invoke the provisions of this Code if, 
and only if, the following conditions are satisfied; 
(a) there is a serious disturbance or a threat of serious 
disturbance in the domestic market of that 
Contracting Party; 
(b) the serious disturbance or threat of serious 
disturbance must be such as to cause or threaten to 
cause grave impairment to the objectives of any 
domestic industrial or agricultural policy; 
(c) the serious disturbance referred to in sub- 
paragraph (a) must result from an increase in the 
market share of a product which is similar to or 
directly competive with domestic production; and 
(d) the conditions specified above must arise from the 
binding of a particular tariff concession at a rate 
other than zero. 
2 Contracting Parties intending to invoke safeguard measures 
shall inform the GATT Secretariat of their intention, at least 
30 days before they are implemented. Such notification must 
include a list of both; 
(a) the proposed measures and the products concerned; 
and, 
(b) the Contracting Parties against which such measures 
shall be used. 
3 Upon receipt of this notification, the GATT Secretariat shall 
establish a Panel, as quickly as possible. This Panel shall have 
the following functions; 
(a) to determine whether the conditions specified in 
sub -paragraph 1 of this Article are satisfied in full; 
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(b) to determine whether the proposed measures are 
adequate to deal with the situation; and 
(c) to determine whether the proposed measures will 
have effects beyond that necessary to deal with the 
serious disturbance or the threat thereof. 
The Panel shall reach its decision on these questions at least 
seven days before the intended introduction of safeguard 
measures. 
Article 2 Safeguards and Selectivity. 
Given a positive decision by the Panel established by virtue of 
Articlel(3), a Contracting Party may lawfully adopt safeguard 
measures.Provided the conditions of Article 3 are satisfied, the 
safeguard measures may be adopted against selected Contracting 
Parties. 
Article 3 Conditions Governing the use of Selectivity. 
1 Selective safeguard measures shall be permissible if each of 
the following conditions are satisfied; 
(a) if the safeguard measures are temporary in nature. 
The proposed measures should not be in force for 
longer than seven years; 
(b) if the safeguard measures are degressive in nature. 
Such measures should be scaled down at the end of 
their third year of application. Further reductions 
should occur at the end of each subsequent year 
given the requirement that such measures shall 
cease to exist seven years after their introduction; 
(c) if the safeguard measures are accompanied by a plan 
leading to the structural adjustment of the product 
sector which necessitated the introduction of the 
measures. This plan shall be examined by a Panel to 
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determine whether it will effectively deal with the 
problems of the affected sector within the time 
period specified in paragraph (a) of this article; and 
finally 
(d) if the safeguard measures also provide for adequate 
consultation with the affected Contracting Party or 
Parties. 
2 Pending the acceptance of these requirements by the 
Contracting Party concerned and the approval of the Panel, 
especially on the structural adjustment plan, selective 
safeguard measures shall enjoy temporary validity. On 
acceptance of the requirements such measures shall have full 
legal validity. 
Article 4 Non -selective Safeguard Measures. 
Given the following situation; 
(a) a negative decision by the Panel established by 
virtue of Article 1(3); or 
(b) the non -acceptance by the Contracting Party 
invoking the safeguard measures of the 
requirements of Article 3(1);or 
(c) the non -approval by the Panel of the requirements 
of Article 3(1) and especially Article 3(1)(c). 
A Contracting Party may still invoke safeguard measures. Such 
measures shall not have selective application and they shall be 
subject to the provisions of Article 5. 
Article 5 Conditions governing the use of non -selective 
measures. 
The following provisions shall govern the use of safeguard 
measures invoked by virtue of Article 4; 
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(a) The Contracting Party which invoked the safeguard 
measures shall afford adequate opportunity for other 
Contracting Parties to consult with it on the operation of 
such measures. 
(b) The Contracting Party or Parties against which safeguard 
measures have been invoked shall be entitled to 
compensation. This shall be paid by the Contracting 
Party invoking the measures and shall be equal to 90% of 
the accepted import value of the product concerned in 
the relevant market. The import value shall be the value 
of imports in the full year preceding the use of safeguard 
measures. The level of compensation shall decline in 
each subsequent year to the following amounts; 50 %, 
30 %, 20% and finally 10 %. Compensation shall cease to be 
payable five years after the introduction of the safeguard 
measures. 
(c) In the event that three or more Contracting Parties are 
affected by the use of safeguard measures, or if 
compensation has not been paid, the Contracting Parties 
affected by the use of safeguard measures shall be 
entitled to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions. 
(i) A Contracting Party shall be deemed to be 
affected if it has a market import share greater 
than 7.5 %; 
(ii) substantially equivalent concessions shall be 
defined as the withdrawal of concessions to the 
accepted value of trade affected by the use of 
safeguard measures; 
(iii) Contracting Parties using this provision should 
strive to ensure that the concessions withdrawn 
relate as closely as possible to the product sector 
in which the Contracting Party has invoked 
safeguard measures. 
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2 Any dispute over the interpretation and application of the 
first paragraph of this Article shall be referred to and 
resolved conclusively by the Safeguards Committee. 
3 Taking into account the determination of all Contracting 
Parties to control the use of safeguard measures and given 
the acceptance of the Contracting Parties of the need for 
consultation, compensation and retaliation, any problems with 
the application of this Article shall be decided in favour of the 
Contracting Parties who are subject to the measures, unless 
the Contracting Party invoking the safeguard measures 
persuades the Committee otherwise. 
Article 6 Breach of the Conditions of Selectivity. 
1 In the event of the selective safeguard measures provided for 
in Articles 2 and 3, failing to comply with the provisions of 
Article 3 once they are introduced, such measures shall be 
deemed to be applied under Article 4 and become subject to 
the provisions of Article 5. 
2 The Safeguards Committee shall keep all safeguard measures 
under review and shall determine annually whether selective 
safeguard measures maintain their compliance with the 
provisions of Article 3(1). 
Article 7 Control of the existing situation. 
1 Given the widespread use of safeguard measures which fall 
outside the framework of Article XIX GATT, the following 
provisions shall apply to such measures. 
2 All Contracting Parties shall notify the Safeguards Committee 
of measures they are subject to and measures which they 
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impose. This notification shall occur within 90 days of this 
code entering into force. When such measures have been 
notified to the Safeguards Committee, it shall establish 
specific sector sub- committees to examine these measures. 
3 The Sectural Sub -Committees shall report on the effects of 
these measures within 180 days of their establishment. In 
their reports, they shall make recommendations on how the 
existing situation could be remedied. Specifically, it will 
report on whether any of the measures notified fulfil the 
conditions of Article 1(1) or Article 3(1). 
4 Contracting Parties, using safeguard measures 
outside the framework of Article XIX and which 
notified to the Safeguards Committee, 
recommendations of the Sectoral Sub -Committees, 
the following options; 
(a) to abolish the measures in question; 
(b) to submit the measures to the provisions 
or, 
(c) to continue to apply the measures. 
If the Contracting Party chooses option (c), the Contracting 
Party or Parties affected by such measures shall have the 





of this Code; 
Article 8 The Developing Country Clause. 
1 The provisions of this Code shall not apply to the use of 
safeguard measures by developing countries. 
2 Developed Contracting Parties shall endeavour, recalling the 
objectives of Part IV of the General Agreement, not to apply 
selective safeguard measures against developing countries. 
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3 Taking into account the rapid development of some 
developing countries, the Safeguards Committee shall 
determine whether a particular developing country, given its 
rate of economic growth and export performance, no longer 
qualifies as a developing country. If the Safeguard Committee 
decides a particular developing country has graduated, that 
country shall henceforth apply the provisions of this Code. 
The Safeguards Committee shall consider this question, only, 
if asked to by at least five Contracting Parties. 
Article 9 The Panels. 
1 The Panel referred to in Article 1(3) and Article 3(1)(c) shall 
be established by the GATT Secretariat. It shall comprise of a 
group of three economic analysts. It shall not include 
representatives of either the Contracting Party invoking the 
measures or any Contracting Party likely to be affected by the 
use of such measures. 
2 The decisions of the Panels shall be published. 
Article 10 Final Provisions. 
1 No safeguard measure may be invoked by a Contracting Party 
unless it fulfils the requirements of this Code. 
2 The dispute resolution procedure provided for in Article 5(2) 
shall not prejudice recourse by the Contracting Parties to the 
GATT, to Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement. 
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In recognition of the deficiencies of Article XIX, and the aim of 
most VERs, Article 2 of the proposal allows for the introduction of 
selective safeguard measures. These measures will be subject to 
the fulfilment of certain specified conditions. The proposal seeks 
to include one of the major reasons for the growth of VER's and 
satisfy the concerns of developing countries over the use of 
selectivity in safeguard measures. The Chairman of the GATT 
Safeguards Committee has recognised that,54 
"The existence of such actions [i.e. VERs] and their 
cumulative effect poses a serious threat to the 
multilateral trading system and it is a matter of 
importance to generate the political will to follow 
international disciplines in order to prevent further 
erosion of the GATT system." 
The international discipline provided by Article XIX has proved to 
be ineffective. The proposal for a new safeguards code remedies 
this ineffectiveness by addressing the problems of Article XIX. 
The adoption of this code constitutes the way forward for the 
GATT, since it would meet, and cope with, the "serious threat to 
the multilateral trading system ". 
Article XXVIII Modification of Schedules 
Tariff negotiations and the resulting concessions lie at the heart of 
the GATT system. To enable the Contracting Parties to renegotiate 
the concessions granted provision is made in Article XXVIII for 
54 BISD 30th Supp.216 219. 
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two types of negotiations; open season negiotations; and, out of 
season negotiations.55 
Open season negotiations may lead to either the modification or 
withdrawal of concesions in two situations. Firstly, not earlier than 
six months before the end of a period of firm validity, Contracting 
Parties may elect to modify or withdraw a scheduled concession 
from the first day of the next period of firm validity. Secondly, a 
Contracting Party may elect at any time during one period of firm 
validity to reserve the right to take action during the next period 
of firm validity. According to the wording of Article XXVIII,56 
open- season negotiations must be held with the Contracting Party 
with whom the concession was originally negotiated, with any 
Contracting Party deemed to have a principal supplying interest, 
and any other Contracting Party having a substantial interest in 
the concession. 
As the Interpretative notes to Article XXVIII suggest,57 the need 
for consultation is to ensure that Contracting Parties having the 
largest share in trade affected by the concession have an effective 
opportunity to protect their interests. The absence of a concise 
definition to the phrase 'substantial interest' effectively means 
that negotiations are carried out with all Contracting Parties, 
however small their interest in the matter. Instead of the 
trilateral negotiations anticipated by Article XXVIII, negotiations 
are usually multilateral. The purpose of the consultation is to 
reach agreement on the effects of the modification or withdrawal 
55 See Dam K. The GATT:Law and International Economic 
Organizations (1970) Ch.6 Technical Tariff negotiations. Article XXVIII 




BISD Vo1.IV (1969) 73-75. 
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of the concession and to provide for compensation.58 The wording 
of Article XXVIII suggests that it cannot be used for protectionist 
purposes. It provides that Contracting Parties shall endeavour,59 
"...to maintain a general level of reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous concessions not less 
favourable to trade than that provided for in this 
Agreement prior to such negotiations." 
In the event of the Contracting Parties failing to agree, Article 
XXVIII:3 permits the modification or withdrawal of a concession. 
This is at the price of the withdrawal of substantially equivalent 
concessions by either the party with whom the concession was 
initially negotiated, or the Contracting Party having the principal 
supplying interest, or the Contracting Party deemed to have a 
subtantial interest, or all three. This provision raises the problem 
of defining what is meant by "substantially equivalent 
concessions ". 
This phrase was the subject of a dispute between the EEC and the 
United States, a dispute usually referred to as the 'Chicken War'.60 
The dispute arose due to the introduction of the EEC import 
regime for poultry, the effect being a trebling of the import fee for 
poultry.61 Although the US claim was based on Article XXIV :6, the 
procedure set forth in Article XXVII was incorporated by 












supplier of poultry, this would enable the United States to 
withdraw 'substantially equivalent concessions'. The dispute 
referred to GATT,63 was not on the question of the interpretation 
of this provision but rather with a determination of the value of 
US poultry exports. A valuable opportunity was lost to give an 
authoritative interpretation of this phrase. The end result was 
that 'substantially equivalent concesions' entail the modification 
or withdrawal of concessions to the same value as those affected 
by the modification or withdrawal of concessions by the 
concerned Contracting Parties. 
Article XXVIII:4 provides for 'out of season' negotiations. These 
may be carried out at any time provided the necessary 
authorization has been given by the Contracting Parties.64 Such 
authorization is granted in very limited circumstances, mostly 
related to development purposes. Since the rules for such 
negotiations are less favourable than those relating to open season 
negotiations, the provisions of Article XXVIII:4 are rarely invoked 
by developed countries. 
As the section on Article XI indicated, the EEC wishes to impose 
restriction on the importation of animal feed proteins /cereal 
substitutes.65 When discussing this question the point was made 
that the EEC could not use Article XI but should use Article 
XXVIII. As the examination of this Article indicates should the 
EEC wish to modify or withdraw this concession, provision will 
have to be made for compensatory adjustment, or if no such 
63 BISD 126th Supp.65. 
64 Ad Article XXVIII (Interpretative Note) BISD Vol.IV (1969) 74 -75. 
65 See Chapter 1 of this part, Article XXVI, The Customs Union 
Exception. 
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provision is agreed, substantially equivalent concessions will be 
withdrawn. The scope for unilateral action is therefore limited. 
The introduction of the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System (HS) implies a considerable change in the GATT 
schedules of tariff concessions.66 As such it offers the EEC an 
opportunity for the modification of existing tariff concession. As 
the GATT study recognises,67 
"In order to avoid complicating the introduction of 
the Harmonized System, Contracting Parties should 
endeavour to avoid modifying or renegotiating their 
bindings for reasons not associated with the system." 
The alteration of existing bindings will, therefore, only take place 
where their maintenance would result in undue complexity, 
rather than a desire by one of the Contracting Parties to raise the 
level of protection afforded to its domestic producers. 
In conclusion, it is worth discussing the concept of binding or 
bound items relates to an agreement establishing a given rate of 
customs duty on particular products.68 The fundamental 
obligation in relation to bound duties is not to raise them above 
the level agreed upon, even when the effects of the increase 
would not be to cause an escalation in the level of protection.69 





BISD 30th Supp.17. 
Ibid,18. 
See GATT Article II BISD Vol.IV (1969) 3 -5. 
Ibid, Article II(1). 
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impose a tax on oils and fats.7 0 Such a tax could be in 
contravention of the GATT as the GATT imposes a standstill 
provision on the further taxation of bound items. An exception to 
this provision allows for,71 
"a charge equivalent to an internal tax imposed 
consistently with the provisions of paragraph 2 of 
Article III in respect of the like domestic product." 
Since the purpose of the proposed tax on oils and fats is to 
increase the consumption of both olive oil and butter, it is obvious 
that a tax on oils and fats would also have to be enforced on 
domestically produced olive oil and butter. This would defeat the 
purpose of the tax. 
The GATT and a Common Agricultural Trade Policy 
The foregoing analysis of the GATT provisions indicate the 
framework under which a Common Agricultural Trade Policy 
would operate and under which the CAP does operate. However, 
disquiet remains over the role of GATT in the agricultural arena, 
and the review undertaken reflects certain elements of this 
disquiet. 
The problems associated with the use of quotas in Article XI have 
forced Contracting Parties to adopt more subtle methods to protect 
their domestic agricultural producers. In most cases this has been 
accomplished through the use of non -tariff barriers. In recognition 
70 See E.C.Bulletin Supp.4 /83 Adjustment of the CAP, 17. 
71 Article II;1 The Commission proposal previously noted would be 
in conformity with the international commitments of the Community, 
according to the Commission. 
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of the problem presented by the use of these measures the GATT 
has taken its first step to control the problem. In relation to the 
EEC , the problems presented by the use of non -tariff measures 
has been dealt with by the internal harmonisation of these 
measures. However, the EEC continues to employ non -tariff 
barriers in the limitation of imports, the most effective of these 
measures being the variable import levy. The definitional 
problems which plague Article XVI:3 were not ameliorated by the 
Code on Subsidies. Moreover the original thrust of this Article has 
been deflected, thereby blunting its impact. The requirements of 
reciprocity and non -discrimination have forced some Contracting 
Parties outside the framework of the GATT, through their inability 
to use Articles XIX and XXVIII effectively. The proliferation of 
non -tariff barriers to agricultural trade and the increasing 
prevalance and market relevance of VRA has led to some 
response from the GATT, albeit a limited response. 
The experience of the GATT in relation to agriculture reflects the 
conflicts of interest previously alluded to, between the economic, 
social and political forces which motivate the involvement of 
governments in agriculture and the economic, social and political 
interests advocating free trade. One may conclude from this that 
the meagre success of the GATT is due to its tampering with 
aspects of domestic agricultural policy rather than tackling the 
source of these domestic policies. As Warley concludes,72 
"All members of the international community are 
aware that the world trading system could be 
impelled along a protectionist course as the 
cumulative result of unwitting and selfish national 
agricultural interventions and that such a 
development would be damaging to national 
72 Warley T. "Western Trade in Agricultural Products.' (in 
ed.Shonfield, International Economic Relations of the Western World 
1959 -71 Volume 1 Politics and Trade) 287, 402. 
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interests. All are aware that the proper exercise of 
national sovereignity and the protection of national 
interests require the sharing internationally of the 
benefits as well as the burdens of managing both 
change and stability within the world agricultural 
economy." 
It is to a discussion of these efforts to establish stability and 
provide for change that the next chapter turns. 
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CHAPTER 3: NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE GATT. 
The nature of the problem 
"From a policy point of view, both the existing level 
and the trend of protection are questions of key 
importance in any discussion of agricultural 
production and trade. In this respect, the level and 
trend of agricultural protection in the markets of 
some developed countries have apparently been such 
as to have seriously harmed the position of foreign 
exporters." i 
If the agricultural policies of the Contracting Parties and more 
especially the CAP, suffer from this shortcoming, it is obvious that 
international efforts to ameliorate the situation are more than 
justified. Therefore, it is important to assess the degree of 
protection afforded by the CAP. 
In this respect it is essential not only to gauge the nominal level of 
protection but also the effective rate of protection2 since the 
latter is of more relevance to agricultural exporters to the EEC. It 
would be helpful at this stage to recall some of the points 
previously made. The development of the CAP has led to the 
creation of a certain hierarchy of import measures.3 At the top of 
this hierarchy are products which have traditionally formed the 
core of the CAP, cereals, sugar and dairy products. Protection is 
accorded through the use of variable levies, which insulate for 
1 Yeats A.J. "Agricultural Protectionism: An analysis of 
international economic effects and options for institutional reform'.' 
(1983) UNCTAD Review (3) 1, 3. 
2 See Balassa B. "Tariff Protection in Industrialised Countries:' 
(1965) 73 J. Pol.Econ.573. (See also 1971 book by same author with same 
title.) 
3 See Part I of this paper - The external environment. 
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domestic agricultural producers.4 However, these levies have a 
destabilising effect on world trade. 
Yet the variable levy is not the only means of protection. For 
example, in relation to cheese there are health and safety 
regulations to be complied with. The introduction of the Tokyo 
Round Code on Technical Barriers to Trade will enable such 
regulations to be subject to international standardisation, 
surveillance, and consultation. However, as already recognised, 
Article 2:2 of the Code allows for exceptions when the 
international standards are inappropriate for such reasons as the 
protection of public health. It should also be mentioned that 
imports of cheese from coutries as diverse as Canada,5 Australia,6 
New Zealand,? and Finlande are subject to quotas. Quotas which 
are set well below the export capacity of the various countries 
concerned and conditional on observance of the minimum import 
price. 
The net effect of these provisions is an effective rate of protection 
of some 276 %9 and the elimination of efficient agricultural 
producers, such as Australia and New Zealand, from the 
Community market. Consequently such exporters are forced into 
a search for alternative markets, a search which is hampered by 
the use of export subsidies by the EEC to dispose of surplus 
4 Yeats op cit n 1, 6 -7 (Table 2); see also Sampson and Yeats "An 
evaluation of the CAP as a barrier facing agricultural exports to the EEC' 
59 Am.J.Agr.Econ.99. 
5 OJ L 71/129 1980. 
6 1980 OJ L 71/164. 
7 1980 OJ L 71/149. 
8 1981 OJ L 359/24. 
9 Sampson and Yeats op cit n 4. 
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domestic production. This use of export subsidies by the EEC is 
perhaps the most trade disruptive aspect of the CAP. The 
indiscriminate use of such subsidies allows the EEC to penetrate 
the established export markets of other countries, irrespective of 
whether the latter are more competitive than the EEC. Once 
displaced from their established markets, efficient producers may 
find great difficulty not only locating alternative markets but also 
re- penetrating their former market, thus magnifying the negative 
trade impact of the CAP. 
Further examples such as fresh meat10 or citrus fruit" merely 
serve to emphasise the points already made. The use of export 
subsidies, variable levies, and non -tariff barriers by the CAP, raise 
the effective rate of protection afforded to the EEC producers. The 
result of this is declining market shares for third countries12 and 
in some cases their displacement from traditional export markets. 
However, the EEC is not alone in the level of protection it affords 
to its agricultural production. Equally protectionist policies may 
be found in most developed agricultural producing countries. 
Japan 13 is an excellent example of a country where the 
agricultural policy is even more protectionist than the EEC. In 
relation to the United States14 a slightly different picture emerges. 
1961 marked the beginning of a process leading to the gradual 
realignment of internal support price towards prevailing world 
market price. The 1960's also marked the conversion of the 
10 Yeats op cit n.1, estimates the effective rate of protection to be 165 %. 
11 Idem, the rate of protection is estimated at 75 %. 
12 Tangermann S. "Agricultural Trade Relations between the EC and 
Temperate Food Exporting Countries' (1979) Eur.Rev. of Agr.Econ.214. 
13 See Olechowski and Sampson "Current Trade Restrictions in the 
EEC, U.S. and Japan ". (1980) 14 JWTL 220. 
14 Warley " Western Trade in Agricultural Products." in ed 
Shonfield, 319 -22. 
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United States to a belief in the value of a liberal framework for 
the conduct of world trade. However, this conversion was not 
total. For those products which it had no competitive advantage or 
for which it was uncompetitive its policy remained essentially 
protectionist. 15 
It is interesting to compare the approaches of these three 
countries to their domestic agricultural policies.16 
"Both the EC and Japan conduct their national 
economic affairs with a much greater degree of 
dirigisme than does the United States. More 
especially ... they regard their domestic agricultural 
policies as components of a set of integrated 
industrial regional and social policies designed to 
secure at a measured pace and by government 
guidance the kinds of societies they are trying to 
build." 
Warley states that this attitude reflects on their participation in 
international trade negotiations, 
"This philosophy and practice carries over into their 
international economic relations also. External 
relationships must be managed in such a way as not 
to jeopardize the attainment of broad national 
sectoral and regional development goals ... or to lead 
to an unplanned degree of dependence on external 
sources or excessive exposure to externally 
generated instabilities." 
Such an approach entails a pragmatic and gradualist approach to 
negotiations. In stark contrast the US and other countries, such as 
NZ and Australia, favour an idealistic and reasonably quick change 
to the nature of international agricultural trade. 
15 Ibid, 346-347. 
16 Warley T. "Agriculture in International Economic Relations:' 58 
Am.J.Agr.Econ. 820, 823. 
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Any approach advocated by the GATT would have to reconcile 
these two conflicting views on the pace of change. It is against 
this background that one should consider the GATT attempts to 
influence national agricultural policies. 
GATT ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE DOMESTIC 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
The Harberler Report.17 
Concerned with developments in international trade, the GATT 
commissioned a report by a Panel of Experts to consider trends in 
international trade. The report of this Panel is generally referred 
to as the Harberler Report. 
In their examination of the domestic agricultural policies of the 
Contracting Parties, the Report recognises 
which form the foundation of all policies;1 s a stabilizaiton element 
and a protective element. It goes on to examine the various 
methods chosen to implement these elements, interventionism; 
deficiency payments; and finally, external protection. The report 
recommends that domestic agricultural policies should be based 
on deficiency payments or as an alternative, interventionism. The 
report criticises external protection as a source of instability in 
world trade. It is interesting to note the impact these conclusions 
had on the formulation of the CAP. The Community based its 
policy on interventionism in the domestic market and external 
protection. Therefore it is not suprising that the protection 
17 Trends in International Trade: A report by a Panel of Experts (1958). 
18 Ibid, 67-68. 
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referred to in the first part of this chapter has occurred. Almost 
predicting the future course of the CAP, the Report notes,19 
" ... whether or not agricultural protectionism has 
increased in the highly developed countries, there 
are two incontrovertible facts. First agricultural 
protectionism exists at a high level in the most highly 
industrialized countries; and second the 
development of production and consumption of 
agricultural productionin such countries has been 
such as to make net agricultural imports into these 
countries more and more marginal in relation to their 
total domestic production and consumption of such 
products." 
The Report notes that the domestic policies of these Contracting 
Parties were a major factor in restraining world agricultural trade. 
To ameliorate this situation, the Harberler Report recommended 
the gradual moderation of agricultural protection through a shift 
away from price support towards income support. This would be 
achieved through the introduction of a deficiency payments 
scheme.20 This transformation of agricultural policy would result 
not only in greater public awareness of the policy but also 
stimulation of consumption by reducion of the level of consumer 
prices. 
19 Ibid, 87. 
20 Ibid, 102. 
Committee II 
The final result of the submission of 
establishment of various Committees 
GATT. In relation to agriculture, 
with the mandate of:21 - assembling data on the use 
Contracting Parties to support 
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the Harberler Report was the 
within the framework of the 
Committee II was established 
of non -tariff barriers by the 
domestic agricultural income; - examining the effects of these measures on international 
trade in agricultural products; - considering the adequacy of the GATT rules on non -tariff 
barriers to trade; and - suggesting procedures for further consultation between all 
Contracting Parties on agricultural policy. 
Progress within the Committee was through consultation with the 
Contracting Parties. However, a dispute over the terms of 
reference of the Committee operated in such a way as to limit its 
effectiveness. The Committee did note a fundamental difference 
of opinion between its members over the nature of the GATT.22 
Some considered it to be a code of rules of commercial policy. 
Others maintained that it was basically an instrument for the 
exchange of mutually advantageous tariff concessions, its 
provisions being aimed at safeguarding and ensuring the 
effectiveness of these concessions. This dispute emphasizes the 
failure of the GATT in relation to agricultural trade. However the 
dispute did not prevent the Committee from reaching its 
conclusions.23 
21 BISD 8th Supp.121. 
22 Ibid, 122. 
23 BISD 10th Supp.135. 
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Reaffirming the conclusions of the Harberler Report, the 
Committee concluded that there should be a moderation of 
agricultural protection.24 However, rather than advocating a 
change from price support to income support, the conclusions of 
Committee II recommended a change in the nature of price 
support.25 For example, it was recommended that prices should 
be set at a level which was remunerative to efficient producers 
rather than providing a price for all producers. It was also 
recognised that this price- setting exercise should take account of 
the need to increase consumption and to ensure that production 
would not be encouraged. 
The Committee concluded its work by observing,26 
"the balance [of obligations and rights] which 
countries consider they had a right to receive under 
the General Agreement has been disturbed. These 
developments are of such a character that either 
they have weakened or threatened to weaken the 
operation of the General Agreement as an instrument 
for the promotion of mutually advantageous trade. 
This situation raises the question as to the extent to 
which the GATT is an effective instrument for the 
promotion of such trade." 
The effect of these conclusions on the formulation of the CAP, like 
those of the Harberler Report, seem to have been negligible. 
Although not recommending a shift to income support, Committee 
II did recommend that certain constraints be placed on price 
support policies. By establishing a common cereals price which 
approximated more to the existing German price level rather than 
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predictions of over -production and unreasonable prices to 
consumers would occur within the framework of the CAP.27 
A future work programme agreed in 1967 established another 
Agricultural Committee.28 Its mandate was to examine the 
problems of the agricultural sector and prepare the way for future 
consideration of positive solutions to the agricultural problem. 
However, its deliberations did not lead to any significant 
improvements in the situation.29 
The Leutwiler Report 
The latest GATT effort to influence international trade was 
presented in March 1985.3e Entitled "Trade Policies for a Better 
Future - Proposals for Action ", it analyses the international 
trading environment during the 1970's and early 1980's and 
indicates how the problems facing the international trading 
system can be dealt with.31 
In relation to agriculture, the report recognises the failure of some 
Contracting Parties to live up to the GATT rules from the 
beginning, has led other Contracting Parties to find new ways to 
27 See Part I of this paper. 
28 BISD 15th Supp.67. 
29 BISD 16th Supp.12. 
30 GATT Newsletter, Focus 33. 
31 In the third chapter of the Report (The Way Forward) the group 
made fifteen recommendations for specific, immediate action to meet 
the "present crisis" in the trading system. 
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evade the existing rules. To remedy the situation the report 
recommends, 32 
"Agricultural trade should be based on clearer and 
fairer rules with no special treatment for particular 
countries or commodities. Efficient agricultural 
producers should be given maximum opportunity to 
compete." 
The report advocates the ending of the US agricultural waiver as 
the first step in the process of establishing "clearer and fairer 
rules". 
The Report's recommendations are in accordance with the 
programme of work and priorities for GATT in the 1980's. 
Paragraph 7(v) of the 1982 Ministerial Declaration urges the 
Contracting Parties to,33 
"bring agriculture more fully into the multilateral 
trading system by improving the effectiveness of 
GATT rules, provisions and disciplines and through 
their common interpretation; to seek to improve 
terms of access to markets; and to bring export 
competition under greater discipline." 
Given past work programmes and the failure to implement the 
Harberler Report and the conclusions of Committee II, it would be 
unwise to predict that the conclusions of the Leutwiler Report will 
lead to any significant change. Perhaps it is only through 
multilateral negotiations that such change will come. 
32 Op cit n 29, Recommendation 2. 
33 BISD 29th Supp.9 11 -12. See also BISD 31st Supp.10 (Trade in 
Agriculture. Without prejudice to other approaches, the Committee on 
Trade in Agriculture established in 1982 will concentrate on three areas: - 
(1) all quantitative restrictions and other related measures affecting 
imports and exports; (2) all subsidies affecting trade in agriculture; 
and 
(3) technical barriers to trade.) 
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MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
The Dillon Round34 
The significance of this round of tariff negotiations rests not on 
any of the concessions made but rather on the recognition of other 
Contracting Parties of the right of the EEC to negotiate on behalf of 
the member States. 
Negotiations in this round were primarily conducted under Article 
XXIV:6 GATT which provides,35 
"If in fulfilling the requirements of sub -paragraph 
5(a), a Contracting Party proposes to increase any 
rate of duty inconsistent with the provisions of 
Article II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII 
shall apply. 
The provision goes on to state that compensatory adjustments 
shall be made for any increase in bound duties. Although 
agreements were reached between the EEC and all other 
Contracting Parties, it was not possible to reach full agreement 
with the United States. This lack of agreement was due to the 
desire of the EEC to replace bound duties by variable levies for 
products to be covered by the CAP. However, a formal agreement 
was reached noting the lack of agreement and stating that for 





BISD Vo1.IV (1969) 42. 
36 These related to a group of products which constituted a large 
percentage of trade (in terms of volume) i.e. wheat, rice, corn and 
Sorghum. 
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Each time the Community enlarges, it has to conduct Article 
XXIV:6 negotiations. The negotiations on the accession of Greece37 
gave rise to a dispute between the EEC and the US about the use of 
credits.38 The Community contended that account should be taken 
of the credits created by the fall in duties of the Greek customs 
tariff due to its alignment with the Common Customs Tariff. This 
would reduce the level of compensatory adjustment. The United 
States considered that the credits created should not be taken into 
account and this argument was accepted by the other Contracting 
Parties. 
The end result of this exercise was the insertion of an Article in 
the Spanish and Portugese Acts of Accession which would raise 
the bound duties of the enlarged common customs tariff. If these 
increases remain within the limits provided by Article XXIV :5(a) 
and the requirements of Article XXIV:6, it should prevent a 
repetition of the arguments which occurred on Greek accession.39 
It remains to be seen how the other Contracting Parties will react 
to this provision, which could have the effect of raising the 
protective wall around the enlarged EEC. 
The Kennedy Round 
The possible enlargement of the Community to include the United 
Kingdom and a change in emphasis in American agricultural trade 
37 BISD 30th Supp.168. 
38 See COM (83) 508, On certain tariff problems connected with 
Bain and Portueal accession negotiations. 
39 Recent events have shown the weaknesses of this approach. Note 
the conflict between the EC and the United States, re export of maize 
to 
Spain, finally settled in January 1987. 
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policy were factors in the enactment of the US Trade Expansion 
Act 1962. This Act effectively inaugurated the Kennedy Round.40 
Agriculture became, for the first time an integral part of the 
negotiations. The main focus of these negotiations was the EEC 
proposal which attempted to bring agricultural products into the 
mainstream of trade negotiations.41 The Community's proposal, 
referred to as either Mansholt II or the montant de soutien, 
involved two elements:42 
-a mechanism through which the level of support provided, 
by each Contracting Party, to its agricultural producers 
could be measured; and 
-a proposal to bind these existing levels of support and that 
these levels of support provide the basis for future 
negotiations on agricultural products. 
The basis for the proposal was a belief by the Community that 
governmental involvement in agricultural production, which was 
universal, resulted in distortions of competition through their 
interaction on the world market.43 
The mechanism for measuring the level of support given to 
agricultural producers was a comparison of the guaranteed price 
given to domestic producers and the price for the product on the 
international market. This simple measurement would provide a 
base for future negotiations on the level of agricultural support. 
However, it suffered from two major defects. Firstly, it ignored 
the protection afforded by tariffs and non -tariff barriers. 
Secondly, it assumed that the world price represented the cost of 
production. As such, it ignored the impact which domestic 
40 See Metzger S. Trade Agreements and the Kennedy Round (1964). 
41 See Evans J.W. The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy (1971). 
42 Ibid, 209 -210. 
43 Warley op cit n 13, 383. 
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agricultural programmes and the use of export subsidies have on 
the world price. 
The consolidation of the level of support would have led to 
restrictions being placed not only on domestic agricultural policies. 
However the use of export subsidies by the Contracting Parties 
would have been restricted because of the obligation to respect 
the established negotiated reference price. However, it was the 
second aspect of the plan that caused most criticism. As Evans 
notes,44 
"But what ensured that Mansholt II would meet with 
violent opposition from the exporters was that the 
Community proposed that the montant de soutien be 
used not as a basis for further negotiations but as a 
substitute for them." 
In other words, tariff bindings would be replaced by a binding of 
the negotiated reference price. These prices would be bound 
against increase for a three year period. After each period, the 
bindings could be renegotiated to take into account developments 
in the previous three years, thus offering the possibility of 
increases .45 
This provision would have led to the maintenance of the present 
levels of support and as the agricultural exporters argued, it 
would have offered no prospect of trade expansion. It was this 
aspect of the plan which led the United States, who had recently 
converted to the idea of agricultural free trade, to reject the 
proposal. In any case the United States representative had been 
given no authority to enter into such an agreement.While realising 
that the technical aspects of the 'montant de soutien' proposal was 
the main reason for its failure, the significance of the proposal was 
44 
45 
Evans op cit n 41, 210. 
Warley op cit n 13, 384. 
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that it was an attempt by the EEC to reach international 
agreement on agricultural policies. Perhaps, it was the thought by 
other Contracting Parties that the plan merely proposed the 
internationalisation of the variable levy system at best or the CAP 
at worst, which led to its poor reception. 
The objection of limited trade expansion could be met within the 
context of the plan by agreeing to bind an agreed level of national 
self sufficiency rather than the level of support. As such this new 
binding would offer a chance for significant market growth and in 
relation to the EEC would offer the opportunity of appreciably 
reduced budgetary expenditure on market support. 
This proposal would enable the EEC to reduce expenditure on 
those products which it cannot produce efficiently and allow it to 
conclude agreements with third countries for the supply of 
agricultural products. It is also possible that provision could be 
made within such an agreement to allow an increase in the share 
of developing country exports accepted by developed countries, 
thereby contributing to their development. 
However, the re- activation of the montant de soutien proposal, 
even in a different form, may stand little possibility of acceptance, 
given the polarization of views on agriculture since the Kennedy 
Round. As Warley concludes,46 
" ... on the central issues nothing substantial has been 
accomplished. Apart from an enhanced 
understanding of the issues involved, the principal 
legacies were heightened friction between the major 
protagonists (the US and the EC) and a polarization of 
views as to the basic conditions under which 
agricultural trade should be conducted in the future 
.... Agriculture was central for a variety of reasons. 
It was a touchstone of whether the trend in the 
46 Ibid, 377. 
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world trading system was to be towards multilateral 
liberalism or regional protectionism." 
It was to the legacies of the Kennedy Round and the slide into 
protectionism, that the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations addressed itself. 
The Tokyo Round 
The Tokyo Declaration states as one of the aims of the 
negotiations,47 
"as regards agriculture, an approach to negotiations 
which, while in line with the general objectives of the 
negotiations should take account of the special 
characteristics and problems in this sector." 
Although progress was made in the Tokyo Round, in relation to 
agriculture the results can only be described as disappointing. 
This is attributable to several reasons. The first, and most 
important, reason was the limited mandate given to the 
Commission. The mandate included the following principles;48 - to restrict tariff concessions to products not covered by 
market regulations; - to yield no concessions to third countries that would add to 
the financial burden of handling surplus commodities; - to resist all attempts to question the principal elements of 
the CAP. 
Reflecting the polarization of views on agricultural trade, another 
reason for the lack of progress was a series of disputes between 
the EEC and the United States on important issues. The first of 
47 BISD 20th Supp 19. 
48 See Bucholz "The MTN and EEC Agriculture': (in ed. Tracy and 
Hodac Pre .- f . 'ri It r- in h- EE (1982). 
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these related to the very structure of the negotiations on 
agriculture. Whereas the US argued that industrial products and 
agricultural products should be treated as inseparable and be 
subject to the same negotiating process, the EEC argued for the 
creation of a special Agricultural Committee. The establishment of 
an Agricultural Committee, undoubtedly a triumph for the EEC, 
ensured that the CAP would emerge unscathed from the 
negotiations. It also indicated that the results of the negotiations 
would be limited.49 Further disputes arose over the safeguards 
negotiations and the re- negotiation of the International Grains 
Agreements. 50 
The EEC did make some agricultural concessions involving a broad 
range of countries.51 Concessions on cheese were made to 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In the meat sector a global 
quota was established for the benefit of several countries, 
including Argentina, Uruguay, Romania and Hungary. The 
apparent liberalism of these agreements has been shattered by a 
recent GATT complaint against the implementation of one of the 
global quotas, by Canada.52 The GATT panel established found 
that the EEC had attached a condition to the concession and that, 
the implementation of this condition had led to the discriminatory 
application of the quota.53 
49 Idem. 
50 See "International Grains Agreement" (1968) 2 JWTL 233 and Ali 
L. World "Wheat Markets and International Agreements" (1982) 16 JWTL 
59. 
51 Details of the concessions given are contained in COM (79) 514 
Final Report on the GATT MTN in Geneva. 
52 
53 
BISD 28th Supp.92. 
Ibid, 98-99. 
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The Tokyo Round marks an important stage in the history of 
GATT. The conclusion of six codes of conduct, of which the Code 
on Subsidies and the Code on Technical Barriers to Trade have 
already been discussed, signifies the intention of the Contracting 
Parties to make the GATT more relevant to the existing 
international trade environment. As such, the Tokyo Round 
recognises the increasing irrelevance of an agreement, drawn up 
in very different circumstances, to modern trade realities. While 
the GATT has always attempted to meet developments in the 
world trading environment, serious concern must be expressed 
about the relevance of the GATT rules and the fact that not all 
trading countries are members of the GATT.54 In an attempt to 
make the GATT rules more relevant to agriculture, the Contracting 
Parties agreed to further develop their cooperation in the 
agricultural sector and to establish an appropriate consultative 
framework .55 
However, no indication was given of what would be discussed 
within this framework. The Consultative Group of 18 has noted,56 
"As to the reasons for the differential treatment of 
agriculture, reference was made to the differences 
incorporated into the General Agreement itself, the 
effects of long standing derogations, disagreements 
as to the interpretation of certain GATT articles, to 
the existence of residual quantitative restrictions on 
agricultural products and to the undefined status, in 
GATT terms, of certain agricultural policy measures." 
54 E.g. the Soviet Union, China. 
55 BISD 29th Supp.16 -17 (see also 30th Supp.100 -106, 31st Supp.209 
and 32nd Supp.91). 
56 BISD 28th Supp.71, 78. 
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Beyond the Tokyo Round 
Recognising the validity of the Consultative Group's conclusions, 
the 1982 Ministerial Declaration endorsed its findings on 
agriculture and the GATT.57 The Committee on Trade in 
Agriculture to be established was charged with taking into 
account the effects of national agricultural policies on the 
objectives, principles and the provisions of the GATT. 
The work of the Committee on Trade in Agriculture would cover:58 - trade measures affecting market access and supplies; - the operation of the GATT as regards subsidies especially 
export subsidies; and finally - trade measures affecting agriculture maintained under 
derogations. 
The overall aim of the Committee is to recommend measures 
leading to greater liberalization in agricultural trade. Taking into 
account the effects of the United States waiver, these measures 
should lead to a greater balance of rights and obligations under 
the GATT.59 Past experience, especially that of Committee II, 
suggests that the results of the Committee's work will neither be 
spectacular nor will they lead to a radical change in domestic 
agricultural policies. 
Events seem to have overtaken the Committee on Trade in 
Agriculture with the endorsement at the November 1984 
ministerial meeting of the GATT Contracting Parties, of the need 
for a new round of tariff negotiations. However, given the legacies 




BISD 29th Supp.16. 
Idem. 
See footnotes 23 -26. 
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the liberalization of agricultural trade, it is, suggested that the 
opportunity for reform presented by such a new round will not be 
accepted. Evidence for this belief comes not only from past 
experience but also the recent declaration on the subject by the EC 
Council of Ministers.60 It recognises the importance of the new 
round in the efforts to achieve a more liberal trading system. 
However, the Declaration notes that the new round will not be 
sufficient itself to halt the slide into protectionism. In relation to 
agriculture the Declaration notes,61 
"As regards negotiations on agriculture in the new 
round the Community is ready to work towards 
improvements within the existing framework of the 
rules and disciplines in GATT covering all aspects of 
trade in agricultural products both as to imports and 
as to exports, taking full account of the special 
characteristics of, and problems in, agriculture." 
While recognising the apparent liberalism of this statement, the 
Declaration continues, 
"The Council is determined that the fundamental 
objectives and mechanisms, both internal and 
external of the CAP, shall not be placed in question." 
One recalls that a similar declaration was made at the beginning of 
the Tokyo Round and the effect of it was to limit any concrete 
improvement in the situation of agricultural trade. The question 
asked at the end of chapter 1 must be reconsidered. Is the GATT 
a suitable organization for the conduct of world trade in 
agricultural products? The conclusion reached at the end of this 
chapter, having considered the nature of the problem and GATT 
attempts to influence it, is that in relation to agriculture GATT is 
suffering from the "legacy of a misconception ". As Hudec reminds 
60 Noted (1985) 19 JWTL 305. 
61 Idem. 
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us when discussing the failure of the GATT in relation to 
agriculture,62 
"The basic miscalculation here seems to have been a 
failure to anticipate the forces, economic and political 
that are generated by price support programmes." 
Any effort to regulate the international conduct of agricultural 
trade needs to take these forces into account and it is to this 
problem that the proposals in the next section address 
themselves. 
62 Hudec R. "GATT or GABB? The future design of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade;' (1970 -71) 80 YLJ 1299, 1349. 
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CHAPTER 4: A NEW BEGINNING 
"As was the case with previous multilateral trade 
negotiations, no significant liberalization of 
agricultural trade occurred as a result of the Tokyo 
Round. Given the consistent failure of such 
negotiations to make any progress in this area or 
even to halt the spread of new protectionist 
measures, it is apparent that a new approach is 
needed for dealing with international agricultural 
problems" i 
Several approaches may be considered as ways of making 
progress in this area. These include:2 
(i) Free Trade; 
(ii) Agricultural Multilateral Trade Negotiations; 
(iii) Codes of Conduct; and finally 
(iv) International Commodity Agreements. 
(i) Free Trade 
Recognising the negative effects which domestic agricultural 
policy have on the stability of world agricultural markets and the 
efficient allocation of world resources, one possible course of 
action would be to work towards free trade in all agricultural 
products. As a proposal this represents something of an ideal 
situation, however, it helps in the assessment of other proposals. 
There are several difficulties involved in an acceptance of the 
doctrine of free trade: 
1 Yeats A.J. "Agricultural Protectionism: An analysis of 
international economic effects and options for institutional reform." 
(1983) UNCTAD Review 1 
2 Ibid.24 -29; see also Corbet and Niall "Strategy for the liberalization 
of Agricultural Trade:' (in ed. Josling and McFarquahar Agriculture and 
the State (1976)); Johnson " Impact of farm support policies on 
International Trade. (in ed.Corbet and Jackson In search of a NIEO (1974)); 
Nagle Agricultural Trade Barriers (1976); y Warle "Western Trade in 
Agricultural Products'' (in ed.Shonfield International Economic Relations 
.f h- Western W.rld 1 5 1 V1 me 1 Peli i n Tris-) Ch.2. II II 
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- given the social, political and economic forces which form 
the basis of domestic agricultural policies, it would be 
virtually impossible for any government to convince its 
agricultural population of the advantages of this solution; - given the events of the early 1970's and the attitudes of 
some governments to the interaction of national and 
international policies, the acceptance of the free trade 
philosophy would lead to an undue dependence on 
external sources of supply;3 - given the pattern of trade in unregulated commodities in 
the early 1970's,4 it is assumed that free trade could lead 
to cycles of surplus and shortage, requiring some 
international interference to mollify the effects of this; and 
given the existence of countries who regulate their 
international relations through state -trading, the adoption 
of a free trade philosophy would have to take into account 
the effects of these state -trading operations. 
(ii) Agricultural Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
Any proposal which could make progress would have to satisfy 
the four concerns which would defeat the proposal for world 
agricultural free trade. One such proposal would be the 
establishment of agricultural multilateral trade negotiations. Such 
negotiations would have two advantages over the current 
situation. Firstly, they would increase the concessions granted in 
the industrial sector. Secondly, they would concentrate exclusively 
on the problems of agricultural trade. 
To aid these negotiations a Committee on Agriculture could be 
established within the framework of the GATT to act as an 
information gatherer and analyser. The negotiations would 
concentrate on the present failings of the GATT in the agricultural 
3 The oil price rises and the consequent monetary fluctuations. 
4 The impact of the oil price rises on the prices of other 
commodities. 
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area. Recalling the previous discussion on the use of export 
subsidies, it would be within this framework that the proposed 
Committee on Export Subsidies would examine the practice of the 
Contracting Parties in this area and recommend proposals for 
change. Previous deliberations of the GATT would also be 
relevant, for example the conclusions of Committee II on price 
support policy and the conclusions of the 1967 Agricultural 
Committee on measures affecting imports and production. 
This proposal offers the opportunity of genuine progress in the 
agricultural sphere through focussing, more sharply than before, 
on the shortcomings of the GATT and how these shortcomings can 
be rectified. One note of caution should be sounded. All rounds of 
tariff trade negotiations previously held have rested on the 
concept of reciprocity. Given the strict requirements of this 
concept, it is arguable that its application is not relevant in the 
agricultural area. The Contracting Parties should focus not on 
achieving full reciprocity, but rather on achieving a balance of 
rights and obligations within the framework of the GATT.5 The 
acceptance of this more limited, and easily satisfied, criterion 
could make a substantial contribution to the efficacy of the 
negotiations. Such negotiations would also meet the criticisms 
noted of the free trade proposal. 
(iii) Codes of Conduct 
The results of these agricultural multilateral trade negotiations 
could be formulated into Codes of Conduct for the Operation of 
Domestic Agricultural Policy.6 These could be negotiated 
independently of the agricultural multilateral trade negotiations. 
It would be possible to have a code of conduct on the use of 
export subsidies in agricultural trade or a code on the use of 
safeguard measures. The codes would establish a framework for 
5 
6 
BISD 30th Supp.231, 223. 
Warley op.cit. n.2. 
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the conduct of international trade and supplement the relevant 
GATT provisions. They could be periodically renegotiated to take 
account of developments in the agricultural trading environment. 
The codes could go further and establish guidelines for the 
formulation and implementation of domestic agricultural policies. 
Negotiations should concentrate on the costs of protection inherent 
in the present policies and the effects of these costs on 
international trade. The parties to such negotiations would have 
to take account of the conclusions of the GATT Agricultural 
Committees and the Harberler and Leutwiler Reports. These 
documents would be a starting point for the negotiations. 
Obvious costs of protection are the increase in the price of 
products to the consumer and the excess cost of stimulated 
domestic production. Costs which stem from the nature of the 
price policies employed by some Contracting Parties. Negotiations 
should centre on methods to reduce these costs and the principle 
of comparative advantage, which forms the ideological basis of 
free trade, could be of some limited application in this area. 
Negotiations would establish an agreed price which would be 
remunerative to efficient producers. To ensure that the principle 
of comparative advantage is implemented, a programme of 
structural adjustment would have to be negotiated. This 
programme would enable inefficient producers to either leave 
farming or achieve efficiency. In the context of the CAP such a 
programme would alleviate the present financial burden of the 
market organizations and encourage an increase in consumption. 
Ignoring the problems of negotiation, the proposal interferes with 
the economic, social and political interests favoured by domestic 
agricultural policies. In relation to the CAP, it could lead to the 
desertion of the countryside and since this forms the basis for 
some aspects of both the price and structural policy, it is doubtful 
whether the EEC would accept such a proposal. 
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One way of avoiding this latter problem has already been 
indicated. In the context of the discussion of the montant de 
soutien proposal advanced in the Kennedy Round, it was 
advocated that rather than bind the levels of support, it would be 
more acceptable to bind an agreed level of self sufficiency. After 
binding the level of self sufficiency, negotiations would centre on 
the conclusion of guaranteed access agreements, which would 
meet the external dependence concerns expressed when 
considering the free trade proposal. These guaranteed access 
arrangements could, if any Contracting Party was unduly 
concerned with the stability /security of supply, become 
multiannual supply agreements. This reactivation of the montant 
de soutien proposal offers a way forward and it could even serve 
as a development device allowing a certain percentage growth for 
the exports of developing countries. This proposal would accord 
with the policy goals of both the CAP and the EEC's development 
policy. 
However, given the terms of the mandate given by the Council to 
the Commission at the beginning of the Tokyo Round and the 
recent Council Declaration concerning the Uruguay Round, it is 
extremely doubtful whether the EEC would countenance this type 
of reform of the CAP. 
(iv) International Commodity Agreements 
One final proposal has yet to be considered. The Community could 
participate in International Commodity Agreements (ICA's). One 
undoubted advantage of this proposal over all others is that in 
relation to ICA's all producing parties are capable of adhering to it. 
Whereas, in relation to the previous proposals made within the 
context of GATT, and essentially in relation to temperate -zone 
products, not all parties in the world trading system are members 
of the GATT.? The disadvantage of the ICA proposal is that it 
interferes with the philosophy of GATT which is to allow the free 
7 E.g. the Soviet Union and China. 
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play of market forces. This is not be a serious objection, as the 
GATT record in the agricultural area merely serves to indicate the 
extent to which agriculture forms an exception to the basic GATT 
philosophy. 
It is to a discussion of ICA's, their origin, modalities of operation 
and scope for progress that the next section of this paper 
addresses itself. At the end of this discussion, an assessment will 
be made of the two international institutions discussed and their 
role in international agricultural trade. 
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APPENDIX A - PROVISIONS OF THE GATT 
Article XI: General Elimination of Quantitative 
Restrictions 
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or 
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import 
or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted by 
any contracting party on the importation of any product of 
the territory of any other contracting party or on the 
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the 
territory of any other contracting party. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not extend 
to the following: 
(a) Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily 
applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of 
foodstuffs or other products essential to the 
exporting contracting party; 
(b) Import and export restrictions or prohibitions 
necessary to the application of standards or 
regulations for the classification, grading or 
marketing of commodities in international trade; 
(c) Import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries 
product, imported in any form, necessary to the 
enforcement of governmental measures which 
operate; 
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic 
product permitted to be marketed or 
produced, or, if there is no substantial 
domestic production of the like product, of a 
domestic product for which the imported 
product can be directly sbustituted; or 
(ii) to remove a temporary surplus of the like 
domestic product, or, if there is no 
substantial domestic production of the like 
product, of a domestic product for which the 
imported product can be directly 
substituted, by making the surplus available 
to certain groups of domestic consumers free 
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of charge or at prices below current market 
level; or 
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be 
produced of any animal product the 
production of which is directly dependent, 
wholly or mainly, on the imported 
commodity, if the domestic production of 
that commodity is negligible. 
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the 
importation of any product pursuant to sub -paragraph (c) of 
this paragraph shall give public notice of the total quantity or 
value of the product permitted to be imported during a 
specified future period and of any change in such value or 
quantity. Moreover, any restriction applied under (1) above 
shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports relative to 
the total of domestic production as compared with the 
proportion which might reasonably be expected to rule 
between the two in the absence of restrictions. In 
determining this period, the contracting party shall pay due 
regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous 
representative period and to any special factors which may 
have affected or may be affecting the trade in the product 
concerned. 
Article XIX: Emergency Action on Imports of 
Particular Products 
1(a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of 
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this 
Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product is being 
imported into the territory of that contracting party in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory 
of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party 
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and 
for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such 
injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to 
withdraw or modify the concession. 
(b) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with 
respect to a preference, is being imported into the territory of 
a contracting party in the circumstances set forth in sub- 
paragraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or threaten 
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serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly 
competitive products in the territory of a contracting party 
which receives or received such preference, the importing 
contracting party shall be free if that other contracting party 
so requests to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in 
part or to withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the 
product, to the extent and for such time as may be necessary 
to prevent or remedy such injury. 
2 Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall give notice in 
writing to the CONTRACTING PARTIES as far in advance as may 
be practicable and shall afford the CONTRACTING PARTIES and 
those contracting parties having a substantial interest as 
exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult 
with it in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is 
given in relation to a concession with respect to a preference 
the notice shall name the contracting party which has 
requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay 
would cause damage which it would be difficult to repair, 
action under paragraph 1 of this Article may be taken 
provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition that 
consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such 
action. 
3(a) If agreement between interested contracting parties with 
respect to the action is not reached, the contracting party 
which proposes to take or continue the action shall, 
nevertheless, be free to do so, and if such action is taken or 
continued, the affected Contracting Parties shall then be free, 
not later than ninety days after such action is taken, to 
suspend, upon the expiration of thirty days from the day on 
which written notice of such suspension is received by the 
contracting parties, the application to the trade of the 
contracting party taking such action, or in the case envisaged 
in paragraph 1(b) of this Article, to the trade of the 
Contracting Party requesting such action, of such substantially 
equivalent concessions or other obligations under this 
Agreement the suspension of which the do not disapprove. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub -paragraph (a) of this 
paragraph, where action is taken under paragraph (2) of this 
Article without prior consultation and causes or threatens 
serious injury in the territory of a contracting party to the 
domestic producers of products affected by the action, that 
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contracting party shall, where delay would cause damage 
difficult to repair, be free to suspend, upon the taking of the 
action and throughout the period of consultation, such 
concessions or other obligations as may be necessary to 
prevent or remedy the injury. 
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SECTION 2 COMMODITY POLICY. 
INTRODUCTION 
Josling notes,1 
"A degree of management of international markets 
holds out the promise of more stable trading 
conditions, at once reducing the need for defensive 
policies which isolate domestic agriculture from 
erratic price movements and allowing an orientation 
of domestic policy towards a more plausible 
international pattern of production and trade." 
Mere recognition of the inherent value of international trade 
regulation through commodity agreements is not a sufficient 
argument for using such agreements to influence domestic 
agricultural policy. The attitude of some countries to commodity 
agreements and their role in domestic agricultural policy, has 
been essentially negative. This mirrors the attitude of some 
Contracting Parties to the GATT and its attempts to influence 
domestic agricultural policies. 
There are problems using agreements to regulate international 
trade in primary commodities. However, . there is general 
acceptance of what is a primary commodity. This stems from 
Article 56 of the Havana Charter which defines it as,2 
It ... any product of farm, forest or fishery or any 
mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone 
such processing as is customarily required to prepare 
it for marketing in substantial volume in 
international trade. 
1 Josling T "The CAP and International Commodity Agreements in 
ed. Tracy and Hodac Prospects for European Agriculture (1982) 
2 UK Cmd Paper 7375 (1948), 56. 
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The problems relate to the methods by which the parties enforce 
the agreement and the objectives of such agreements. According 
to some these objectives go beyond mere regulation of 
international trade in the commodity. The succeeding chapters 
concern not only the types of commodity agreements but also the 
changing role of such agreements since 1945. This section will 
conclude with an examination of the EEC's attitude to such 
agreements and an assessment of how the external environment 
identified in this part of the paper can influence the CAP, 
especially the external aspects of the policy. 
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CHAPTER 1: A TYPOLOGY OF COMMODITY AGREEMENTS 
One element common to all Commodity Agreements, irrespective 
of how the parties choose to regulate the market, is the setting of 
prices. The establishment of the price band (minimum and 
maximum prices) can be determinative of the success of the 
agreement. Prices should not be set at levels which either 
encourage production or form a disincentive for the Parties to 
adhere to the agreement. A certain element of accurate and 
reliable forecasting of the trend of prices in succeeding years is 
essential to the success of any agreement. 
Even given the accuracy of this forecasting, the method chosen to 
implement the agreement may also cause problems. This chapter 
outlines three methods by which parties to commodity 
agreements have chosen to regulate the market. They are: 
(a) the multilateral contract system; 
(b) the export quota system; and 
(c) the buffer stock system. 
The Multilateral Contract System1 
This system is perhaps the easiest method of international 
commodity regulation as it involves the least interference by the 
Parties in the free flow of international trade. The contracts 
referred to are contracts of purchase and sale concluded between 
parties to the agreements. As such they involve the mutual 
exchange of rights and obligations between the parties. 
1 Khan K. The Law and Organization of International Commodity 
Agreements (1982). Chapter 5 gives an excellent account of the 
multilateral contract system. 
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The 1967 International Grains Agreement (IGA)2 provides one 
example of the operation of the multilateral contract system. The 
basic principle of the Agreement was the division of the parties 
into exporting and importing countries. Each of the exporting 
countries was given a datum quantity, assessed by the average of 
commercial sales over the previous five years, excluding the 
immediately preceding year. Datum quantities for importing 
countries were established in a similar manner. The basis of the 
Agreement was that the exporting countries were to sell up to 
their datum quantity and importing countries were to purchase 
up to their datum quantities, within the price range established 
by the Agreement. This was referred to as the balance of 
commitment on the part of the exporting countries and the 
balance of entitlement on the part of the importing countries. 
Since all transactions between the parties had to be consistent 
with the price range, it is obvious that the negotiation of the price 
range was crucial to the success of the Agreement. A Prices 
Review Committee was established with responsibility for review 
of prices and a power to recommend changes in the level of prices 
should the circumstances merit such a change. This Committee 
provided the possibility of changing the prices to meet the market 
situation, and ensuring the success of the agreement. However, 
the IGA failed for this very reason, in 1969 when prices fell below 
the established minimum, no formal action was taken. This 
frustrated the objectives of the Agreement and lead to its 
demise.3 
2 See Ashworth F.G. International Commodity Control (1984). 
Chapter 7 examines the regulation of the wheat market. See also Ali L 
"The World Wheat Market and International Agreements" (1982) 16 
JWTL 59. 
3 Ali op cit n2, 67. 
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The Export Quota System4 
The mainstay of this system of commodity regulation is a 
determination of each exporting country's level of exports, with 
the aim of establishing a balance between production and 
consumption. Before determining the level of individual exporting 
country quotas, it is necessary to assess the size of the world 
market in the commodity concerned which is available for 
regulation (the agreement market). 
After establishing the agreement market, the parties can establish 
the basic export entitlement of each exporter. Such entitlements 
are usually based on past export performance.5 This method of 
assessing export quotas can be criticised on two grounds. Firstly, 
it leads to the fossilization of the current production structures 
and secondly, it ignores any increases in production of minor, or 
first time, exporting countries. 
The 1977 International Sugar Agreement (ISA) met this criticism 
by dividing exporting countries into two classes; major and minor 
exporters. The significance of the distinction rests in the price 
mechanism which allowed for the reduction of export quotas to 
defend the minimum price; minor exporters were relieved of the 
obligation to reduce export quotas. Despite this two -fold 
classification of exporters, the ISA failed to achieve its objectives. 
This failure of the 1977 ISA to effectively regulate the market 
stemmed from several factors, including:6 
4 Khan op cit nl, Chapter 3, International Quota System. 
5 For an economic analysis of export quotas, see Fisher "Enforcing 
Export Quota Commodity Agreements: The Case of Coffee' (1971) 12 
Harv.Int'l LJ 401. 
6 Tsadik T. "International Sugar Market : Self Sufficiency or Free 
Trade:' (1982) 16 JWTL 133 and Smith I "Structure and Policy Changes in 
World Sugar:' (1977) 11 JWTL 228. 
136 
(i) the residual nature of the market (sugar exports take 
place on a preferential basis between Cuba and 
members of COMECON and between countries adhering 
to Protocol 3 of the Lomé Convention 1975); 
(ii) there were no measures to prevent exporters 
exceeding their quotas; and finally 
(iii) not all sugar exporters were parties to the agreement 
and, therefore, were not bound by its provisions (i.e. 
the EEC). 
The problems which plagued the 1977 ISA must be met if the 
sugar agreements are to be successful. For example, the limited 
size of the agreement market, owing to the existence of several 
preferential agreements, was one of the reasons for the failure of 
the latest sugar conference.? Whilst it was argued by some that 
such exports were important in assessing the size of the 
agreement market, it was argued, particularly by Cuba, that such 
arrangements should not fall within the scope of the regulatory 
mechanisms of any new ISA. 
The 1977 ISA experience also demonstrates the fact that to be 
successful, a commodity agreement must have all the major 
producers as parties since it is not possible to impose obligations 
on producers who are not signatories to the agreement. Equally, 
all substantial consumers should be involved in any agreement.8 
7 Smith I "Prospects for a New ISA.° (1983) 17 JWTL 308, and Smith I 
"UNCTAD : Failure of the UN Sugar Conference" (1985) 19 JWTL 296. 
8 Harris S. "US and EEC policy attitudes compared towards the 1977 
ISA': (1980) 31 J Agr Econ 351. 
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The Buffer Stock System9 
One element of the operation of the regulatory mechanism of the 
1977 ISA was the accumulation of special stocks by exporting 
countries which could be released to defend the maximum price. 
The holding of these stocks is one element of the Buffer Stock 
System, which may comprise of; 
(a) national stocks; 
(b) quasi -national stocks (i.e. internationally coordinated 
as in the 1977 ISA); or 
(c) international or buffer stocks. 
The Buffer Stock System serves the same objective as the export 
quota system, balancing supply and demand. Rather than control 
production in exporting countries, the Buffer Stock System may 
operate through an international agency. The agency defends the 
prices established by means of purchases when prices are either 
falling towards or below the minimum price, or by releasing 
accumulated stock, when prices were either rising towards or 
above the maximum price. This direct involvement of the buffer 
stock system in the market place is one of the reasons given by 
certain developed countries, notably the United States, for their 
reluctance to enter into commodity agreements.10 The Buffer 
Stock may either run out of money to make its purchases or 
accumulate excessive stock if it incorrectly predicts the trend of 
prices in the commodity concerned. The inherent unpredictability 
of the market requires that a sufficiently accurate and reliable 
forecast of the trend in prices is made before the Buffer Stock 
System can be effectively used as a method to regulate 
international commodity trade. 
9 Khan op cit nl, ch 4 The International Stock System: see also 
Brown CP Primary Commodity Control (1975) ch 4 and McNicol DL 
Commodity Agreement and Price Stabilization (1978) ch 3. 
10 See Denoon D. The NIEO. A US Response (1979) 
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The analysis of the three methods used for the international 
regulation of commodities suggest the following conclusions; 
(i) there is a need for reliable and accurate forecasting of 
the trend in prices for any commodity which will be 
subject to international regulation; 
(ii) there is a need for adequate provision to be made in 
any agreement for an alteration to the established 
price structure; 
(iii) any agreement should aim to include not only all 
producers of the commodity but also all substantial 
consumers; 
(iv) the agreement market must reflect all trade in the 
commodity concerned; and finally 
(v) the agreement should provide the means to change its 
basic economic provisions given the economic 
performance of its parties. 
The organization of any commodity must reflect the operation of 
the market for that commodity. Just as the operation of the 
market continuously changes so should the organization reflect 
that change. 
Before outlining a proposal which encompasses the conclusions 
made above it is necessary to outline the two periods of 
commodity policy since World War II. Two periods which reflect 
differing objectives for commodity agreements and differing 
means of achieving these objectives. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE HAVANA PERIOD. 
Chapter VI of the Havana Charter 
Article 55 of the Charter for the proposed International Trade 
Organization stated,1 
"The members recognize that the conditions under 
which some primary commodities are produced, 
exchanged and consumed are such that international 
trade in these commodities may be affected by 
special difficulties such as the tendency toward 
persistent disequilibrium between production and 
consumption, the accumulation of burdensome stocks 
and pronounced fluctuations in prices. These special 
difficulties may have serious adverse effects on the 
interests of producers and consumers.... The 
members recognize that such difficulties may, at 
times, necessitate special treatment of the 
international trade in such commodities through 
inter -governmental agreement." 
Whilst Article 55 recognised the role of commodity agreement in 
ensuring general economic expansion, the concept of special 
difficulties severely restricted the scope for commodity 
agreements. This concept of special difficulties is further 
developed in Article 62 of the Charter. Amongst the factors listed 
in this article are the following:2 
(a) a burdensome surplus has developed or is 
expected to develop; 
(b) in the absence of governmental action, the 




UK Cmd Paper 7375 (1948), 56. 
Ibid, 60. 
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(c) a substantial amount of production must come 
from minor producers; 
(d) the surplus would not be corrected by ordinary 
operation of market forces (i.e. a reduction in 
price does not lead to an increase in consumption 
or decrease in production); 
(e) widespread unemployment or under- 
employment in connection with the commodity 
has arisen or is expected to arise; 
(f) this problem will not be cured within a 
reasonable time by the ordinary operation of 
market forces. 
Despite the fact that the Havana Charter did not enter into force, 
the provisions of Chapter VI are, to some extent, still relevant. As 
ECOSOC Resolution 30(IV) recommended,3 
"pending the establishment of the International 
Trade Organization, members of the United Nations 
adopt as a general guide in intergovernmental 
consultations or actions with respect to commodity 
problems the principles laid down in [Chapter VI]" 
These principles were laid down in Articles 60 and 63 of the 
Havana Charter. These articles provide for:4 
(a) agreement negotiations shall be open to all parties to 
the ITO (now the United Nations); 
(b) commodity conferences shall be preceded by the 
appointment of a study group for the commodity; 
(c) agreements concluded shall provide for the adequate 
representation of both producer and consumer 
3 UN DOC No E/403. The resolution also requests the Secretary - 
General to set up an Interim Co- ordinating Committee for International 
Commodity Arrangements. 
4 Walker H. "The International Law of Commodity Agreements: 
(1963) 28 Law and Contemporary Problems 392, 402. 
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countries, giving each group equal votes in the 
administration of the agreement; 
(d) agreements shall be designed to assure availability of 
supplies sufficient to meet world demand; 
(e) agreements shall provide for opportunities for 
satisfying national consumption; 
(f) participating countries shall formulate and adopt 
programmes of internal adjustment to ensure that 
within the duration of the agreement, progress should 
be made to resolve the problems of the commodity; 
and 
equitable treatment for non -participants. (g) 
The impetus provided by these principles to commodity 
agreements was severely restricted. The concept of special 
difficulties ensured that the objectives of commodity agreements 
would be limited to the elimination of surplus and the avoidance 
of unemployment or underemployment in the commodity sector 
concerned. Prices were to be stable and remunerative for 
producers and fair and equitable to consumers.5 The capacity of 
such agreements to foster the economic development of 
developing countries was severely limited. As Khan notes,6 
"Primarily concerned with avoiding the severity of 
commodity controls of the past, the Havana 
principles show a remarkable disinterest in the 
positive aspects of ICA's." 
Before assessing how these principles have changed, it is 
important to analyse the efforts made within the framework of 
5 Article 57(c) of the Havana Charter op cit nl, 57. 
6 Khan K. The Law and Organization of International Commodity 
Agreements (1982), 73. 
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the GATT to formulate a commodity policy on the basis of these 
principles. 
The GATT and Commodity Policy 
Article XX of the GATT provides,? 
"Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
Contracting Party of measures: 
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under 
any intergovernmental commodity agreement which 
conforms to criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES and not disapproved by them or which is 
itself so submitted and not so disapproved:" 
The interpretative note to this provision indicates that the 
exception, provided for, relates to any commodity agreement 
which conforms to the principles approved by ECOSOC Resolution 
30(IV). The Havana principles have as a result of this provision 
been transferred into the legal framework of the GATT. The only 
additional stipulation is that the agreement is not disapproved of 
by the GATT Contracting Parties. 
A GATT Working Party established to assess the impact of 
Commodity Problems on International Trade noted some of the 
reasons why a general economic upturn did not automatically lead 
7 BISD Vol IV (1969), 37 -38. 
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to a recovery of commodity prices.8 One of these reasons was the 
restrictive measures which hampered trade in the commodity. 
Amongst these reasons were government support for agricultural 
prices and incomes, quantitative restrictions on imports, and 
revenue and protective duties. The Working Party concluded,9 
"There are, therefore, many facets in the overall 
picture. While fluctuations in economic activity in the 
industrial countries clearly affect demand and the 
general price movement of primary products taken 
as a whole, international and national policies, both 
in importing and exporting countries, have an 
important effect and may in the case of some 
commodities, be the decisive factor in trade in the 
commodities concerned." 
Whereas the Havana Charter prescribed a programme to assist the 
implementation of the commodity agreement and ameliorate the 
conditions which gave rise to the need for such an agreement, the 
conclusions of the GATT Working Party recommended a different 
The above quotation suggests that one of the major 
obstacles to the success of any international commodity 
agreement is the existence of domestic agricultural policies which 
are unduly protectionist. Indeed a later report emphasized the 
need for the industrial countries to restrain the uneconomic 
production of primary commodities and eliminate restrictions and 
preferences. These aspects of domestic agricultural policy, the 
report concluded merely destabilized international trade in the 
commodity. The report continues,10 
8 BISD 8th Supp 76. 
9 Ibid, 81. 
10 BISD 10th Supp 83, 93. 
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"However, while ICA's might contribute to the 
stabilization of prices, they do not provide the 
complete answer to the needs of the developing 
countries for more stability in their earnings from 
commodity exports." 
To remedy this problem, the Working Party suggested that an 
answer had to be found to the protectionist agricultural policies of 
developed countries. The Working Party reasoned that the best 
method to achieve progress would be for developed countries to 
follow liberal import policies.11 Such policies would allow for 
increasing opportunities for export, and export earnings, growth 
on the part of developing countries. 
The Baumgartner- Pisani Plan 
Proposals have been made within the framework of the GATT on 
commodity regulation and indeed some commodity agreements 
have been concluded. One of the most important proposals made 
was referred to as the Baumgartner- Pisani Plan.12 The main line 
of argument used in this proposal was that world market prices 
were too low, being lower than the production costs of major 
producers. Given the importance of the major producers, the Plan 
argued that they should be entitled to a fair and equitable price 
for their production. This would be achieved by raising the price 
of the product for all developed importing contries. Surpluses of 
the commodity would, if feasible, be used in a food aid 
11 Ibid, 93-94. 
12 For a discussion of this proposal see Casadio Transatlantic Trade 
(1973) ch 6; Knox The Common Market and World Agriculture : Trade 
Pattern in Temperate -Zone Foodstuffs (1972) ch 5; Warley T. "Western 
Trade in Agricultural Products" in ed. Shonfield International Economic 
Relations of the Western World 1959 -71 Vol.1. Politics and __T_rade (1976) 
287, 360 et seq. 
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programme. This would accelerate the economic development of 
developing countries. The plan, as well as an organization for 
temperate -zone production, also envisaged market organizations 
for tropical and non -mineral products. The latter would be an 
extension of the French "suprix" system, which guaranteed a 
certain level of market access and a higher price for tropical 
products from French colonies. The plan concluded,13 
"Since it is, in many countries, the existence of a large 
number of socially marginal farmers that decides the 
level of the support price, no such support price 
could ever be the economic basis of an agreement 
regulating world trade." 
Despite the obvious advantages of the Plan, it suffered from 
several serious drawbacks. Firstly, there was no indication of how 
supply in the temperate -zone products would be regulated. 
Secondly, there would have been problems associated with the 
setting of the price level. Obviously the Plan envisaged the setting 
of a high international price. Even ignoring the unacceptability 
this to consumer countries, this price would have undoubtedly 
encouraged production, even on the most marginal of farms. 
Finally, the plan ignored the powerful social, economic and 
political interests which form the basis of domestic agricultural 
policies, especially of those countries who are net importers. 
These interests have played their part in defeating proposals for 
liberalization, it is therefore essential that any regulation of the 
international commodity market should take them into account. 
13 Proceedings of UNCTAD 1 (1964) Vol.I1I 458, 464. 
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Arrangements and Agreements 
It would be incorrect to assume that no commodity agreements 
have been concluded under the auspices of the GATT. Several 
arrangements and agreements have been made, for example in 
relation to dairy products14 and bovine meat.15 It is interesting to 
contrast the agreements with the typical type of commodity 
agreement outlined in Chapter 1. Take for examaple the 1979 
International Dairy Agreement (IDA). 
The preamble to the IDA recognizes the need, given the interests 
of both producers and consumers to avoid surplus and shortage 
situations and to maintain prices at equitable levels.16 Article 1 
serves to reinforce these objectives, adding to them the goal of 
ever -greater liberalization of world trade in dairy products.17 The 
basic obligation of the Contracting Parties to the IDA is to provide 
the International Dairy Council with information on a range of 
topics, for example domestic policy and trade measures.18 Given 
this information in times of market disequilibrium or when such 
disequilibrium threatens to occur, the task of the Council is to 
identify possible solutions. Provision is made in Article V of the 
agreement for the provision of food aid to developing countries in 











Ibid, 93. Article III of the IDA. 
Ibid, 95. 
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agreement is the existence of several product protocols which 
establish minimum prices for such products as skimmed milk 
powder, milk fat and certain cheeses.20 
Article 3(2)(b) of Protocol 1 allows for the adjustment of the 
established minimum price. The obligation of the exporting 
participants is to ensure the normal commercial requirements of 
importers are satisfied, for the latter they agree to implement the 
price objectives. The IDA and more especially the 1979 
Arrangement concerning Bovine Meat, are not commodity 
agreements in the sense envisaged in chapter 1 of this Part. They 
are essentially commodity cooperation agreements designed to 
enable the maximum amount of information to be collected on 
various matters which affect the market in that commodity. 
However, both the IDA and the Bovine Meat Arrangement are 
consistent with the general philosophy of the GATT. This point 
emphasizes the basic failing of the GATT attempts to regulate 
international commodity trade since commodity agreements are 
inconsistent with demands for the removal of trade barriers. 
ICAs also interfere with the proper application of Article I GATT, 
the mfn clause, since it is impossible within the framework of 
commodity agreements to achieve full reciprocity.21 Despite the 
existence of Part IV of the General Agreement, and Article 
XXXVI:4 in particular, the GATT remains inappropriate for the 
international regulation of the commodity trade. As Preibsch 
remarked,22 
20 Ibid, 101-115. 
21 The essential element of the mfn clause is the provision of 
equality between the Contracting Parties, this element cannot operate 
in the context of ICA's since they provide for certain inequalities of 
treatment. 
22 Proceedings of UNCTAD 1 (1964) Vol.II 5 -6. 
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"The imposing code of rules and principles drawn up 
at Havana and partially embodied in the GATT... 
seems to be inspired by a conception of policy which 
implies that the expansion of trade to the mutual 
advantage of all merely requires the removal of the 
obstacles which impede the free play of these forces 
in the world economy. These rules and principles are 
also based on an abstract notion of economic 
homogenity which conceals the great structural 
differences between industrial centres and 
peripheral countries with all their important 
implications. Hence, GATT has not served the 
developing countries as it has served the developed 
countries. In short, GATT has not helped to create 
the new order which must meet the needs of 
development, nor has it been able to fulfil the 
impossible task of restoring the old order." 
The task of creating the new order was to fall to the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNCTAD PERIOD. 
Geneva to Nairobi 
The Geneva Conference of 1964 (UNCTAD I) ushered in a new 
phase in commodity policy. The objectives of commodity 
agreements, which were so restrictive during the Havana period, 
were broadened to encompass the desire of developing countries 
for a new, more equitable, world economic order. Henceforth, 
commodity agreements would serve the goals of development. 
The foremost advocate of change at the Geneva Conference was 
the Latin American economist Preibsch, who advocated "New 
Trade Policy for Development ", particularly with respect to 
commodities.1 Preibsch's basic argument was that since the end of 
World War II, the terms of trade for developing countries had 
steadily declined, thus thwarting their efforts towards economic 
development. Commodity agreements, Preibsch argued, should be 
used to enhance the terms of trade. This would encourage 
development by increasing the stability of commodity markets. 
The conference endorsed the thinking of Preibsch, stating,2 
"A basic objective of ICA's is in general to stimulate a 
dynamic and steady growth and to ensure reasonable 
predictability in the real export earnings of 
developing countries, so as to provoide them with 
expanding resources for their economic and social 
development while taking into account the interests 
of consumers in importing countries." 
The conference went on to elaborate on the methods by which 
these objectives would be achieved. To some extent these 
1 Proceedings of UNCTAD I (1964) Vol.Il, 1. 
2 Proceedings of UNCTAD I (1964) Vol.l. Annex A II 1 - ICA's and 
the removal of obstacles to, and expansion of, trade. 
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methods were similar to those advocated in Chapter VI of the 
Havana Charter.3 However, some aspects of these methods did 
reflect the change of emphasis in commodity policy by calling for 
direct international intervention in domestic agricultural 
programmes .4 In addition, the techniques to be employed 
advocated not only minimum import quantities for developing 
country exports to developed countries but also the latter's 
assistance in the diversification of developing country trade. As 
such, these measures were taking to a logical end the new 
objectives set for ICA's. 
Progress toward implementation of this "New Trade Policy for 
Development" was slow. This reflected developed country concern 
about the scope of the programme and the arguments on which it 
was based. A more obvious reason for the lack of progress in 
commodity policy was the theory of development which was 
popular in the 1960s. This theory advocated the economic 
development through industrialization, thereby relegating the 
valuable contribution which agricultural development could make 
to this goals. The second UNCTAD conference in 1968 in New Delhi 
reflected this by focussing discussion on the implementation of 
preferential tariff schemes for developing country exports. The 
concern of developing countries over the implementation of the 
3 Idem. The techniques to be employed would vary according to the 
characteristics of the commodity concerned. Appropriate measures 
included quota arrangements, long term contract and stock arrangements. 
4 Idem. Special Principle 8 stated that the domestic agricultural 
programmes of developed countries should be formulated and applied in 
such a way as not to deprive developing countries of the opportunity of 
supplying a reasonable proportion of domestic consumption in these 
countries. One of the techniques to be used in ICA's was a system of levies 
in developed importing countries which would provide reimbursement of 
the proceeds to developing exporting countries. (Proceedings of UNCTAD I 
(1964) Vol.!. Annex II Actions recommended to be taken by developed 
market economy nations.) 
5 At the 1967 meeting of the Group of 77, Preibsch asserted that 
agricultural development should go hand in hand with industrial 
development, cited in Sauvant K. The Group of 77 Vol.I 193, 195. 
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Generalized System of Preferences again pervaded discussions at 
the 1972 UNCTAD Conference in Santiago. 
However, the events of the following year were to refocus the 
concerns of developing contries on commodity policy. The 
quadrupling of oil prices by the Arab nations in the course of 
1973 served to underline the power of developing country 
commodity power. Despite suggestions of "food power" by some 
developed countries,6 the latter had no answer to the "petro- 
power" exhibited by the Arab nations. Spurred on by their 
example, developing countries called for the establishment of a 
new world economic order and given the fear of repetition of the 
oil episode, developed countries acquiesced to these demands. 
General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S -VI) declared the principles 
on which this New International Economic Order (NIEO) would be 
based. Article 4(j) states that there shall be a,7 
"just and equitable relationship between the prices of 
raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured 
and semi -manufactured goods exported by them and 
the prices [of goods] imported by them, with the 
[developing countries] aim of bringing about 
sustained improvment in their unsatisfactory terms 
of trade and expansion of the world economy. 
This demand for indexation of commodity prices was 
subsequently elaborated. It was coupled with demands for 
greater use of producer associations and demands for the 
conclusion of long -term multilateral contract agreements.8 It is 
6 The suggestion was made by the United States. 
7 For the document establishing the NIEO see Sauvant op cit n5 
Vol.V 559 -572. 
8 GA Res 3202 (S -VI) Programme of Action on the establishment of a 
NIEO. GA Res 3281 (XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of State. 
See also Krenin and Finger "A Critical Survey of the NIEO:' (1977) 10 JWTL 
493 and Francis "Producer's Associations in Relation to the NIEO:'' (1981) 30 
ICLQ 745. 
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against this background that the fourth UNCTAD conference 
convened in Nairobi. 
The Integrated Programme 
Section 1, paragraph 3(A)(iv) of General Assembly Resolution 
3202(S -VI), anticipated the preparation of an Integrated 
Programme for Commodities (IPC).9 The aim of the IPC would be 
to bring about a lasting improvement in the functioning of world 
commodity markets and to strengthen the commodity sectors of 
developing countries' economies by redistributing more equitably 
the benefits derived from international commodity trade. 
Resolution 93(IV) on the IPC laid down the objectives, coverage, 
international measures, and timetable for the new era in 
commodity policy.The two basic objectives of the IPC were to:10 
(a) improve the terms of trade of developing countries thereby 
to improving their purchasing power; and 
(b) to encourage a more orderly development of world 
commodity markets. 
The subsidiary objectives of the IPC correlate with those espoused 
in the Havana Charter and at the previous UNCTAD conferences 
with several additions. (For example, the objectives of increasing 
developing country participation in the marketing, distribution 
and processing of commodities.) 
The list of products in Resolution 93(IV) can be subdivided into 
three categories, agricultural raw materials, minerals (for example 
copper and tin) and finally food commodities (bananas, cocoa, 
coffee, meat, sugar, tea and vegetable oils).11 The coverage of the 
9 GA Res 3202 (S -VI) op cit n5 Vol.5, 561. 
10 UNCTAD DOC TD /184, 3. Paragraph II. 
11 Idem, paragraph 14. 
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programme was similar to that discussed at the pre- conference 
meeting of the Group of 77, with the exception of grains. The core 
commodities of which there were ten,12 were calculated to be 
those of most interest to developing countries. It is worthwhile to 
note at this stage that not all of these products are solely 
produced by developing countries and in some cases developed 
countries are in fact the major producers. The international 
measures envisaged by the IPC included, inter alia:13 
(a) international commodity stocking arrangements; 
(b) the establishment of pricing arrangements; 
(c) internationally agreed supply management measures; 
(d) the improvement and enlargement of compensatory 
financing facilities; and 
(e) the improvement of market access to developed countries. 
The major element was to be the international stocking 
arrangements. Under these arrangements it was envisaged that 
for each of the core commodities covered by the programme, a 
buffer stock system would be established. This system would be 
supplemented by either export quotas or production controls or 
multilateral purchase and supply contracts or a combination of 
these. The central element of the IPC was the Common Fund, the 
source of finance for the buffer stock system.14 The rationale for 
the Common Fund was based on the UNCTAD reasoning that one of 
the reasons for the failure to establish a series of international 
commodity agreements was a shortage of the finance necessary to 
ensure the success of any buffer stock operation. To remedy this, 
Resolution 93(IV) urged the Secretary General of UNCTAD to 
convene a conference to decide, inter alia, the objectives, financing 
needs and mode of operation of the Common Fund. 
12 The core commodities are cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton, jute, 
rubber, sisal, sugar, tea and tin. 
13 
14 
Op cit n 10, paragraph 12. 
Ibid paragraphs 21 -32. 
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Before the first Common Fund Conference had even convened, the 
attitudes of some countries to the Fund had changed. The issue of 
indexation of commodity prices, alluded to in General Assembly 
Resolution 3201 (S -VI) and which had lain dormant since 1974, 
re- emerged. Some developed countries viewed this issue of 
indexation as an interference with the free play of international 
economic forces.15 Speaking as President of the European Council 
of Ministers, the West German delegate to UNCTAD(IV) 
remarked,16 
"the EEC and its member States wish to increase their 
aid to developing countries but they cannot envisage 
the automatic transfer of revenues from their import 
policy or their tax system." 
The flow -on effect of this questioning of the economic wisdom of 
indexation was a re- appraisal of the overall merit of the IPC. 
Evidence produced from various studies cast doubt on the terms 
of trade argument which formed the basis of UNCTAD commodity 
policy. These studies doubted whether the terms of trade had 
shown a steady decline since World War II.17 
15 For a discussion of the problems of indexation see Cuddy 
"Indexation in International Commodity Agreements" (1979) 12 JWTL 
501 and UNCTAD "An Integrated Programme for Commodities and 
Indexation of Prices.' in ed. Sauvant and Hasenpflug The New 
International Economic Order (1978). 
16 Reservation to GA Res 3281(XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties States. In addition to the reservation expressed by West Germany 
on behalf of the EEC, reservations were also expressed by France, Italy, 
Spain, Belguim and the Netherlands. The response of the UK was one of 
divide and delay. See Goodwin G. "The OECD Industrialised Countries 
Response: in ed. Goodwin G. and Mayall J. A New International 
Commodity Regime (1980). 
17 See Ashworth F.G. International Commodity Control and Yeats A.J. 
Trade and Development Policies (1981). 
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Of greater concern were the studies questioning the reliance 
placed by the UNCTAD Secretariat on the viability of the buffer 
stock system to achieve the objectives of the IPC.18 Against this 
background it was not surprising that the first conference on the 
Common Fund ended in failure. The developed countries (Group 
B) could not even agree that a common fund was desirable, whilst 
the developing countries were redefining their concept of the 
fund. Further studies were ordered. By the time the second 
conference convened, Group B had at least decided that a common 
fund was necessary, yet attitudes differed over the size of the 
Fund and its mode of operation. On the hand, the developing 
countries originally foresaw a Fund of some $6 billion which 
would positively encourage ICA's. One the other hand, Group B 
argued that the Fund should have no capital structure of its own, 
and should play a passive and residual role in commodity 
markets. Subsequent negotiations at the second conference 
proved fruitless and the conference closed without agreement on 
the fundamental principles of the Common Fund.19 
Urged on by the forthcoming UNCTAD V Conference, agreement 
was finally reached on the 'Fundamental Elements' of the Common 
Fund in March 1979. It was agreed that,20 
18 E.g. Behrmann J. Development, the International Economic Order 
and Commodity Agreements (1978). The results of an analysis of the IPC 
by Behrmann yields results which show that implementation of the IPC 
may lead to developing country gains. The revenue gains from the 
programme would vary considerably across commodities. The conclusion 
reached is that various events outside the scope of the IPC will determine 
its success. 
19 An excellent discussion of the Common Fund Negotiations is found 
in Brown CP The Political and Social Economy of Commodity Control 
(1980) ch 4 The Common Fund Dialogue. 
20 UNCTAD/CA/1329., 1. A copy of this document can be found in 
Goodwin and Mayall A New International Commodity Regime (1980), 71- 
75. For a comment on the fundamental elements see Parkinson "The UN 
IPC, (1981) 34 CLP 259; Wassermann U. "UNCTAD: The Common Fund' 
(1979) 13 JWTL 355. 
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"The common fund would be established as a new 
entity and an effective and financially viable 
institution to serve as a key instrument in attaining 
the agreed objectives of the [IPC] as embodied in 
UNCTAD Resolution 93(IV)." 
The overall agreement was a success for Group B countries who 
had doubted the wisdom of establishing a Common Fund. 
Although Group B gave into the demand for a Common Fund, the 
mode of operation and financial resources suggest that it will not 
be the catalyst for ICA's which developing countries had hoped 
would result from acceptance of the IPC. Instead, the Fund will be 
a lending institution dealing directly with international 
commodity bodies who choose to associate with it. 
The resources which it is allocated to carry out these "First 
Window" activities come from direct government contributions 
and resources deriving from the association of ICA's with the 
fund. The fact that total resources are scanty and the choice given 
to ICA's whether or not to associate with the fund, indicate that 
the fund will favour commodities for which agreements have 
already been concluded. The role of the Fund in encouraging 
ICA's for products not previously subject to regulation will be 
limited.21 One positive aspect of the common fund discussions 
was the establishment of a "Second Window ". This window will 
finance measures other than buffer stocks measures, which will 
be financed under the "First Window ". For example, the Second 
Window will finance measures which will enhance the long -term 
competitiveness of a particular commodity. Second window 
21 Khan K. "The Fundamental Elements of the Common Fund' 5 Food 
Policy 38 Tait and Seifer "The Common Fund for Commodities: (1981 -82) 
16 G Wash J Int'l L & Econ 483; Cuddy "The Common Fund and Earnings 
Stabilization'.' (1978) 12 JWTL 107; Avramovic "Common Fund: why and 
of what kind ?" (1978) 12 JWTL 375. 
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activities will, therefore, reinforce some of the subsidiary goals of 
the IPC.22 
As Brown notes when talking of the IPC,23 
"Pressure on the Secretariat for action, whether real 
or anticipated, produced a programme which, 
although it provided momentary relief through 
structured activity was neither the product of a 
careful analysis of the problem nor adequately 
weighed up the possible consequences." 
Due to the restrictive scope of the Common Fund and the slow rate 
of progress in achieving the major element of the IPC (ICA's using 
the buffer stock system) UNCTAD has shifted the emphasis to 
other elements of the IPC. UNCTAD V in 1979 signified this shift 
by discussing methods by which commodity producers would 
increase their share of benefits from the commodity trade.24 One 
method to achieve this objective would be an improvement in the 
Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) established by the IMF.25 
Beyond Nairobi 
As already stated, compensatory financing for fluctuations in 
commodity export earnings was central to the discussions in 
Manila at UNCTAD V. The concern with price stabilization and 
enhancement, evident at UNCTAD IV, was replaced by concerns 
22 E.g. encouraging the processing, marketing and distribution of 
commodities produced by the developing country. 
23 Op cit n 19, 100. 
24 E.g. UNCTAD DOC TD/229 Action on export earnings stabilization 
and developmental aspects of commodity policy; TD /229 /Supp 2 
Processing before export of primary commodities; TD /229 /Supp 3 
Marketing and Distribution of primary commodities. 
25 Goureaux L. The IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility (1980). 
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over market and earnings stabilization. Complaints about the 
adequacy of the IMF CFF and the STABEX scheme, operated by the 
EEC, led the UNCTAD Secretariat to advocate the establishment of a 
new facility. 
This new facility would operate alongside the two existing ones. 
UNCTAD imagined that a third window to the Common Fund would 
be created. The view that the proposal constituted a form of 
indirect indexation or international deficiency payments scheme, 
militated against its whole- hearted acceptance by developed 
countries.26 The growth of protectionist tendencies in the 
developed countries and the problems of debt repayment 
overshadowed discussions of commodity policy at UNCTAD V. The 
discussions at the sixth UNCTAD conference in 1982 in Belgrade 
once more concentrated on these more pressing problems to the 
detriment of commodity policy. 
However, this conference had before an UNCTAD Secretariat 
proposal for an immediate action programme on commodities.27 
One element of this was the proposal for interim commodity 
agreements which, unlike ICA's, would concentrate on the short 
term balance of world supply and demand for the main 
commodity exports of developing countries. These agreements 
would bridge the period needed for a strong political commitment 
to full commodity agreements. Such agreements would impede 
the realisation of full ICA's as the temporary nature of interim 
agreements would be extended until the political climate 
improved.28 Considering the objections of some developed 
countries to ICA's, it is extremely doubtful whether interim 




TD 229, 94. 
UNCTAD DOC TD/273. 
Ibid 22 -34. 
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the expansion and liberalization of the IMF Compensatory 
Financing Facility, merely echoed the work of previous 
conferences. 
Since the 1976 Nairobi Conference, and more especially since the 
Common Fund discussions, there has been a marked downturn in 
the activity of the UNCTAD. Perhaps, the role of the Secretariat 
had changed too much. Initially, a means of achieving the 
development oriented goals of developing countries through its 
activities as an information gatherer and a forum for negotiations, 
it was transformed into an initiative -taking organization.29 This 
transformation was most obvious during the Common Fund 
discussions. Although the changing role of the Secretariat 
alienated an important section of the membership, it would be a 
mistake to ascribe the lack of implementation of the IPC to the 
mistakes of the Secretariat. Perhaps the reason for the delays 
stems from the concerns of developed countries. It appears that 
the developed countries are still clinging to the remnants of the 
old economic order as epitomised by the rules of the GATT. These 
countries seem unwilling to countenance the international 
interference in the implementation of domestic agricultural 
policies which would result from acceptance of the major element 
of the IPC. These objections to the IPC cannot be based on the fact 
that the history of ICA's is one of failure, since the IPC is 
fundamentally different from anything proposed during the 
Havana period of commodity regulation.30 
29 This transformation has been noted by Brown op cit n 19. 
30 Commonwealth Secretariat: The North -South Dialogue: Making it 
Work (1982), 37. 
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CHAPTER 4: COMMUNITY POLICY AND THE WAY AHEAD. 
Community Policy 
Speaking on behalf of the European Community at UNCTAD VI, Dr 
Lambsdorff, the German Economic Minister, announced,1 
"We are ... prepared to reaffirm the importance we 
attach to the Integrated Programme for Commodities. 
The Community is also prepared to seek means of 
improving the operation of existing commodity 
agreements and to participate constructively in any 
discussion of other products, in particular those that 
are part of the Integrated Programme." 
Despite these good intentions the EEC has difficulty in translating 
this general commitment to commodity agreements into the 
assumption of specific obligations. 
In an examination of EEC policy towards ICA's two trends emerge. 
First, for products which are not produced in the EEC either at all 
or produced in negligible quantities, the EEC has no hesitation 
entering into commodity agreements. Notable examples are 
tropical timber,2 rubber3 and coffee4. The second trend is that for 
products which are produced in the EEC, in significant amounts 
1 Proceedings of UNCTAD VI: Volume II, 56. 
2 International Tropical Timber Agreement: Annual Review of UN 
Affairs (1983), 223. 
3 International Natural Rubber Agreement. For details of the 
agreement see O'Grady "INRA: Progress and Problems" (1981 -82) 16 
G Wash J Int'l L & Econ 605. 
4 International Coffee Agreement. For details of the operation of 
previous ICA's see Khan K "International Coffee Agreement': 3 Food 
Policy 180. 
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enters into commodity agreements, provided, they contain no 
substantive economic provisions. As an example of this latter 
trend, the Community has acceded to the Arrangement on Bovine 
Meat,5 the International Dairy Agreement6 and the International 
Olive Oil Agreement.? 
The Bovine Meat Arrangement is limited to the provision of 
market information, as is the International Olive Oil Agreement. 
The International Dairy Agreement does contain some economic 
provisions, in the form of minimum prices. Considering the fact 
that the EEC is one of the major producers of dairy products, and 
especially of the products listed in the Protocols to the Agreement, 
such economic provisions impose no burden on Community 
producers. In fact, participation in the IDA has led to a noticeable 
decline in the amount of export refunds granted. Should the 
proposed ICA include economic provisions interfering with 
domestic production, the EEC is much more reticent. Take for 
example, the 1977 International Sugar Agreement (ISA).8 
Negotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD, pursuant to Resolution 
93(IV), the 1977 ISA found it impossible to achieve its primary 
objective, the stability of world sugar price. An important 
element in this failure, though not the only one, was the non - 
participation of the Community, one of the four major producers. 
At a time when other producers were cutting production in 
conformity with ISA requirements, the EEC increased production 
5 
6 
BISD 26th Supp, 84. 
Ibid, 91. 
7 See Wassermann U "UNCTAD: International Olive Oil Agreement" 
(1979) 13 JWTL 447. 
8 Harris S. "US and EEC policy attitudes compared towards the 1977 
ISA' (1980) 31 J Agr Econ 351. 
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and through the use of export subsidies, acquired a larger share of 
the world market in sugar. The 1981 sugar COM provides for 
Community accession to the ISA, but, as previously noted, 
discussions on a successor to the 1977 ISA ended in failure.9 
From this discussion, it is possible to indicate a number of factors 
which influence the EEC policy towards commodity agreements. 
Foremost amongst these is the operation of the CAP. The policy is 
primarily motivated by concerns with the welfare of domestic 
farmers. Any commodity agreement which interferes, in a 
negative fashion, with the delicate balance achieved by the CAP, 
stands little chance of acceptance within the EEC. Indeed, it could 
be asserted that the CAP, as presently formulated, could not be 
adapted so as to ensure consistency with the demands imposed by 
commodity agreements. One essential element of any internal 
reform is that it be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. This 
element would have to be transferred to international 
agreements, to ensure internal acceptance of these agreements. 
A voice as equally powerful as domestic producers is that of the 
domestic processing industry. This industry would undoubtedly 
be affected should some of the subsidiary objectives of the IPC be 
implemented. The development of a processing industry in the 
developing country producer would seriously jeopardize the 
economic viability of the EEC's processing industries. Moreover, 
should these countries also become involved in the marketing and 
distribution of the processed product further damage would be 
caused to this industry. The Community has sought to assure the 
maintenance of raw material supplies to its domestic processing 
9 Terlinden European Sugar Policy (1985). See also references 
given in footnotes 6 -8, Chapter 1 of this Part. 
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industry by concluding the Lomé Convention with certain 
developing countries.10 
Coupled with doubts about the domestic effects of commodity 
agreements are widespread doubts about aspects of UNCTAD's 
commodity policy. For example, the terms of trade argument used 
by Preibsch as the rationale for commodity agreements. Various 
studies show that it is by no means certain that developing 
countries terms of trade have in fact constantly declined. 
Preibsch's argument has been supported by other studies. The 
facts suggest any conclusion that you may wish to reach, since 
they are dependent on the base year chosen or the number of 
commodities covered or the importance of these commodities to 
developing country trade. Even accepting that the terms of trade 
of developing countries have declined, some developed countries 
express concern about the interference with the free play of 
market forces which ICA's entail. Foremost of these countries are 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and, to a lesser 
extent, the United Kingdom. In relation to the question of direct 
indexation of commodity prices to the prices of manufactured 
goods, the FRG argued that since these fixed price relationships 
would suspend the operation of market mechanism. This would 
interfere with the functioning of the world economy overall and 
this would lead to inflation.11 
Concern was also expressed by these countries about the role 
envisaged by UNCTAD policy for prices. The policy intimated that 
the price would be remunerative and would rise. As such, the FRG 
considered that this would effect a divorce between the enhanced 
10 For a fuller discussion of the Lomé Convention, see Part IV of this 
paper. 
11 Goodwin G "The OECD: Industrialised Countries Response': in ed 
Goodwin and Mayall A New International Commodity Regime (1980) III, 122. 
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price of the ICA and the long -term representative equilibrium 
price for that commodity. Instead of ICA's, these 
for structural adjustment, leading to an increase 
developing country processing of the commodity. 
could be affected by investment guarantees 
countries argued 
in the level of 
Such increases 
given by the 
developing country to developed country investors.12 However, 
given the political commitment which exists among developing 
countries to the idea of commodity agreements, it is suggested 
that the way forward is not as advocated by the FRG, the US and 
the UK, but through a revitalised form of commodity negotiations. 
A new form of commodity negotiations 
The aim of the proposal made below is to effect a compromise 
between the positions espoused by developed and developing 
countries. As such the proposal has to meet the doubts expressed 
by developed countries and offer the developing countries a 
framework within which they can achieve economic development. 
The proposal anticipates three types of commodity agreements: 
(a) Commodity Co- operation Agreements (CCA); 
(b) Multilateral Contract Commodity Agreements 
and, 
(c) International Commodity Control Agreements 
(MCCA); 
(ICCA). 
Before any of these agreements are concluded a number of 
preconditions must be met. Borrowing from the Havana period of 
commodity policy, a request must be made by two or more 
importing or exporting countries of a commodity for an 
examination of the prospects of entering into negotiations. A 
report is then prepared on the commodity and the report decides 
whether or not the commodity would benefit from regulation. If 
12 Proceedings of UNCTAD V (1979) Vol 1, 64. 
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it would not, the request is denied. If it would benefit a 
negotiating conference is called. At this conference, the Parties 
interested in the trade of the commodity would have the choice of 
the three agreements. 
These agreements may be differentiated by their objectives and 
the methods chosen to implement these objectives. The range is 
between minimum price only to a price band associated with a 
buffer stock and export quota system. It is envisaged that the 
parties will first conclude the first type of agreement, the CCA. 
Apart from the setting of a minimum trading price for the 
commodity concerned, no other economic provisions are included 
in the CCA. The aim of the CCA will be to prepare the way for the 
next stage of regulation and to demonstrate to developed 
countries some of the advantages which could flow from 
commodity arrangements. As a next step in the regulation of the 
commodity, it is envisaged that Multilatral Contract Commodity 
Agreement (MCCA) will be concluded. This may be the starting 
point for some commodities should the CCA prove ineffective 
given the demands of the commodity or if the commodity has 
previously been subject to international regulation. Under the 
MCCA some degree of market intervention is envisaged, in the 
form of minimum and maximum price within which the contracts 
will be fulfilled. Each Party will agree to import or export a basic 
quantity from or to any source thereby reducing the rigidity of 
traditional multilateral contract agreements. Since these MCCA's 
have a greater range of objectives, provision is made for the 
charging of a levy which will assist developing countries in the 
fulfilment of their contracts. 
The final stage of regulation will be the International Commodity 
Control Agreement (ICCA), which will be suitable for a limited 
number of commodities, (i.e., those which can be effectively and 
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economically stored). The stocking policy introduced under the 
MCCA system will form the basis of the buffer stock system. 
Prices will be protected by the operation of this stock and the 
implementation of an export quota system for major producers. 
The enhanced objectives of the ICCA call not only for the charging 
of a levy to aid developing country diversification but also 
association with the Common Fund. As a final step to ensure the 
success of the ICCA, policy recommendations may be made to 
effect changes in the domestic agricultural programmes of all 
parties. Each type of agreement makes provision for food aid and 
MCCA's and ICCA's couple this with the development of a national 
food development programme. 
Each of the various agreements provides for the establishment of 
an International Council to ensure the adaptability of the 
agreement to market conditions. The timetable imposed ensures 
that the evolution from CCA to ICCA is long enough to bring about 
a structural readjustment of the Parties' domestic agricultural 
programmes. This is one of the positive aspects of the plan, but 
for developing countries this period may be considered 
excessively long. 
A NEW FORM OF COMMODITY NEGOTIATION. 
The following process shall govern the negotiation and conclusion 
of commodity agreements. 
Step 1. 
A request may be made by either 
(a) two or more exporting countries of a commodity; or 
(b) two or more importing countries of a commodity 
for a report to be compiled on the prospects of entering into 












of this request, the UNCTAD Secretariat shall prepare a 
the commodity concerned. This report shall include 
on: 
the trend of prices; 
the trend of production; 
the trend of consumption; and, 
the competitiveness of the commodity in relation to 
other commodities and in relation to any substitutes 
which compete, in any form, with the commodity. 
shall be compiled within 90 days of the receipt of the 
request referred to in Step 1. The report shall reach a conclusion 
on whether the commodity concerned would benefit from 
international regulation. 
Step 3. 
If the report reaches the conclusion that the commodity in 
question should not be subject to international regulations the 
request shall be rejected. Another request may be made at least 
270 days after the presentation of the report. The Secretariat 
shall keep the commodity concerned under survellance and if, in 
the opinion of the Secretariat, the circumstances change to such an 
extent that international regulation of the commodity is 
considered desirable, the Secretariat shall prepare a report on its 
own initiative. 
Step 4. 
If the report reaches a favourable conclusion, the Secretariat shall 
convene within 60 days, a conference of all parties interested in 
the trade of the commodity concerned. The Conference shall 
decide what form of international regulation should be established 
for the commodity concerned. This regulation shall be one of the 
agreements listed in steps 5 to 7. 
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Step 5. Commodity Cooperation Agreements (CCA) 
A. As a first stage in the international regulation of the 
commodity concerned, the conference may determine that a 
CCA should be established. 
B. The objectives of the CCA shall be to increase international 
cooperation in the commodity concerned, so as to increase 
liberalization and to ensure the stability and expansion of 
international trade in the commodity. 
C. To achieve these objectives an International Council shall be 
established for the commodity. The International Council 
shall determine a minimum price for international trade in 
the commodity. This minimum price shall be reviewed 
every 90 days by the International Council. 
D. In co- operation with food relief agencies, especially the FAO, 
the International Council shall, where the product is capable 
of being made available to developing countries as food aid, 
coordinate the food aid programmes of exporting Contracting 
Parties. 
E. It shall be the duty of all Contracting Parties to inform the 
International Council of any measures affecting: 
(a) the production of the commodity; 
(b) the consumption of the commodity; and 
(c) the importation and exportation of the product 
from and to all countries irrespective of whether 
these countries are signatories to this Agreement. 
F. On the basis of this information the International Council 
shall, in consultation with the UNCTAD Secretariat, formulate 
proposals which will be used as the basis of negotiation of 
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MCCAs. Such proposals shall be formulated before the 
expiry of the CCA, which shall be two years after its entry 
into force. 
Step 6. Multilateral Contract Commodity Agreements 
(MCCA) 
A. Should the Conference decide that a CCA is inappropriate to 
the needs of the commodity concerned or on the expiry of 
the CCA, the second stage of international regulation shall be 
concluded. In this stage MCCAs shall be concluded. 
B. The objectives of the MCCA shall include, in addition to those 
of the CCA, the setting of a fair and remunerative price for 
producers, stable and equitable prices for consumers and a 
contribution to the development of developing country 
producers. 
C. To achieve these objectives, the Conference shall decide on a 
price band, setting maximum and minimum prices. The 
conference shall also determine the quantities which will be 
subject to the MCCA. For exporters, this quantity shall 
represent the average of commercial exports over the 
previous four years. No exporter shall export in excess of 
the maximum price. For importers, this quantity shall 
represent the average of commercial imports over the 
previous four years. No importer shall import at less than 
the minimum price. 
D. An International Council shall be established to ensure the 
success of the MCCA. To this end, it shall periodically review 
the price band and at the end of each year review the 
quantities established for importers and exporters, making 
any necessary adjustments. These adjustments shall reflect 
the economic performance of all parties to the agreement 
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during the previous year. In the absence of agreement at 
the Conference on either the price band or the quantities, 
these shall be determined by the International Council, as 
soon as possible. 
E. In co- operation with food relief agencies, especially the FAO, 
the International Council, where the product concerned is 
capable of being made available to developing countries as 
food aid, shall co- ordinate the food aid programmes of 
exporting Contracting Parties. The International Council, in 
consultation with the developing country receiving such aid 
and the FAO, shall endeavour to establish a national food 
development programme for the country concerned. The 
aim of such programmes shall be to lessen the dependence 
of the country concerned on food aid. 
F. On all transactions carried out under the MCCA system, 
Contracting Parties shall be charged a levy of 1% of the 
price. These funds shall be delivered to the International 
Council who shall distribute them to developing country 
Contracting Parties, to enable them to develop storage 
facilities. The proceeds of the fund shall be divided equally 
between developing importing and exporting Contracting 
Parties. 
G. All Contracting Party exporters shall establish national stock 
programmes for the commodity concerned under their 
national agricultural policies. These stocks shall be used to 
fulfil the objectives of the MCCA. 
H. The duration of the MCCA shall be four years. At the end of 
the third year, the International Council shall, in association 
with the UNCTAD Secretariat, formulate proposals for the 




7. International Commodity Control Agreements 
(ICCA) 
In exceptional circumstances, the conference may decide to 
establish, as the third stage of the international regulation of 
the commodity concerned, an ICCA. An ICCA may also be 
concluded at the end of the MCCA's term of validity. 
B. The objectives of an ICCA shall include the objectives of 
CCA's and MCCA's. In addition, the ICCA shall endeavour to 
aid the development of developing countries by encouraging 
the economic diversification and the processing of the 
commodity concerned by the developing country producer. 
C. To implement these objectives, the conference shall 
determine the price band for the commodity concerned and 
the conditions under which nationally held stocks shall be 
internationally co- ordinated. To defend this Buffer Stock 
system, the Conference shall determine export quotas for 
the largest producers. Such quotas shall be based on past 
export performance and shall take into account current 
production potentiality and any preferential arrangements 
on the part of exporting countries. 
D. An International Council shall be established to ensure the 
fulfilment of the objectives of the agreement. The 
International Council shall periodically review the level of 
the buffer stocks and export quotas. At the end of each year 
it shall make any adjustments which it deems necessary to 
ensure the success of the agreement. In the absence of 
agreement at the Conference on the price band, the 
coordination of national stocks or the level of export quotas, 
these questions shall be determined by the International 
Council within 30 days of the ICCA's entry into force. The 
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International Council shall also, within this time period, 
determine the export quotas of minor exporters. 
E. In co- operation with food relief agencies, especially the FAO, 
the International Council, where the product concerned is 
capable of being made available to developing countries as 
food aid, shall co- ordinate the food and programmes of 
exporting Contracting Parties. In addition, a national food 
development programme shall be established through 
consultations between the developing country concerned, 
the International Council and the FAO. The aim of such 
programmes shall be to lessen the dependence of the 
country concerned on food aid and to encourage national 
food self- sufficiency. 
F. On all transactions carried out under the ICCA system, 
Contracting Parties shall be charged a levy of 2 %. The funds 
collected shall be delivered to the International Council who 
shall distribute them to developing country exporters of the 
commodity concerned where the export earnings from that 
commodity are greater than 75% of total export earnings. 
G. Given the objective of the ICCA to encourage the 
development of the developing country processing industry, 
the International Council shall establish relations with the 
Common Fund. Using the funds provided by the Second 
Window of the Common Fund, the processing, marketing and 
distribution by developing countries of the commodity 
concerned shall be actively and positively encouraged. 
H. To enable the efficient operation of the buffer stock system 
established under the ICCA, the International Council may 
establish relations with the First Window of the Common 
Fund. 
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I. To ensure the viability of the ICCA the International Council 
shall collect information on measures affecting; 
(a) the production and consumption of the commodity; 
(b) the export of the commodity, especially export 
subsidies or incentives; 
(c) the import of the commodity, especially any 
technical regulations governing health and safety 
standards, packaging, marketing and distribution 
regulations. 
It shall be the duty of all Contracting Parties to provide such 
information. Taking this information into account the 
International Council shall recommend to any Contracting 
Party, the adoption of measures which would facilitate the 
proper operation of the ICCA. 
J. The duration of the ICCA shall be five years. At the end of 
the fourth year, the International Council, in association with 
the UNCTAD Secretariat, shall consider whether the 
agreement should be renegotiated. Given a positive 
conclusion proposals shall be prepared for the renegotiation 
of the agreement. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
1. The International Council proposed under steps 5 -7 shall 
adequately represent the interests of importers and 
exporters. Each group shall have an equal vote. 
2. Decisions of the International Council shall be taken by 
majority, except where the decision relates to the following: 
(a) the price bands of MCCAs and ICCAs; 
(b) the quantities relevant under the MCCAs; 
(c) the level of buffer stocks under ICCAs; and finally 
(d) the level of export quotas under ICCAs. 
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In the above cases, decisions will be by 75% majority. 
3. Should a 75% majority not be reached, another vote shall 
take place within 7 days, the majority for this vote being 
70 %. Should it still not prove possible to reach agreement 
another vote shall be taken within 4 days, the majority 
required shall be 66 %. 
4. Any disputes between Contracting Parties over the 
interpretation or application of the agreement shall be 
referred to the International Council. The International 
Council shall establish a panel to investigate the dispute and 
it shall reach its decision within 60 days 
5. Contracting Parties should endeavour to maintain the 
integrity of the agreement. 
6. No agreement may impose obligations on any country which 
is not a Contracting Party. 
The proposal meets the doubts expressed by developed countries, 
especially the perceived interventionist nature of commodity 
agreements. The proposal moves gradually from non -intervention 
(CCA) to intervention (ICCA). The reason for the existence of the 
MCCA as a second step is to enable a limited degree of market 
intervention to take place. The powers given to each 
International Council will ensure that the objectives of the 
agreement are fulfilled and that the economic provisions of each 
agreement accord with market reality. For developing countries 
the proposal offers the prospects of both market and price 
stability, coupled with a provision for food aid in appropriate 
cases. The ICCA offers these countries a chance to diversify and 
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develop processing industries of their own. The subsidiary 
objectives of the IPC are provided for under this proposal. 
Acceptance of the proposal rests on a recognition by all countries 
of the interdependence of the world economy. As the Brandt 
Report maintains a "mutuality of interests" binds developed and 
developing countries together.13 Acknowledgement of this 
interdependence after the oil price rise of 1973 led to the 
formulation of the NIEO and more particularly the IPC. The search 
for separate solutions and a recognition of past concerns on the 
advisability of commodity agreements contributed to he demise of 
the IPC. The proposal made above by amalgamating the two 
periods of commodity policy reconciles the concerns of the 
developed nations with the aspirations of the developing nations 
and offers a new way forward. 
13 North -South: A Programme for Survival, 33. 
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AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT. 
The GATT 
The GATT was designed to preside over the new economic order 
that would follow the end of the second world war. Its basic 
objectives were to enhance world trade and achieve a greater 
liberalization of this trade. 
How has the GATT managed to meet these objectives? With 
respect to industrial products the GATT has been very successful, 
a degree of success which is not shared with respect to 
agricultural products. Why should this be so? The provisions of 
GATT may not be particularly appropriate to the liberalization of 
agricultural trade. Article XI GATT on the General Elimination of 
Quantitative Restrictions and its exceptions were analysed. The 
complaint by the United States against the EEC on the use of a 
minimum import price for tomato concentrates, is illustrative of 
the problems associated with the application of Article XI. The 
GATT has found it near impossible to control measures which 
indirectly restrict agricultural trade. 
One such measure is the variable levy. The levy has been 
described by most non -member States as the most effective 
means of protection for the Community's domestic producers. 
GATT efforts to deal with the variable levy and other non -tariff 
barriers identified is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade. While laudatory as an attempt to deal with the problem of 
non -tariff barriers, it was recognised that it was only the first step 
in a long campaign. Further GATT provisions reveal similar 
difficulties, for example Article XVI:3, the prohibition on export 
subsidies for primary products. The Australian and Brazilian 
complaint concerning alleged EEC subsidization of sugar exports 
reflect the difficulties of interpretation inherent in this provision 
and GATT attempts to solve these difficulties; the Code on 
Subsidies. Further problems of application and interpretation 
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exist with respect to Article XIX of the GATT, Emergency Action on 
Imports of Particular Products. The rigidity imposed by this 
Article has led to the proliferation of agreements which directly 
contravene the GATT provisions. 
This discussion emphasizes the difficulties inherent in the 
application of the GATT provisions to agriculture. But it also 
raises a more important question. Is the concept of GATT 
applicable to agricultural trade? As stated earlier, GATT work in 
the area of agricultural trade reflects the legacy of a 
misconception. Agriculture by its very nature is protectionist. 
The waiver granted to the United States in 1955 for its 
agricultural programme is evidence of this nature. GATT attempts 
to deal with the protectionist nature of agriculture, enshrined as it 
is in domestic agricultural programmes, have been singularly 
unsuccessful. The Harberler report identified the problems 
associated with these programmes and recommended the 
adoption of agricultural policies based on the deficiency payments 
system. The results of the deliberations of the Panel of Experts 
were negligible. 
The one concrete result of the report, Committee II, did not bring 
about any substantial change in the nature of domestic 
agricultural programmes. A similar lack of success is exhibited 
when one considers the various rounds of trade negotiations, 
these have not led to any noticeable change. The new round of 
trade negotiations promises to be more relevant to agriculture. 
The formation of a group to press for reform of GATT rules on 
agriculture ensures that the topic will remain major priority of the 
new round. However, the policies of some Contracting Parties may 
frustrate substantial progress in the liberalisation of agricultural 
trade. One must doubt whether the GATT, no matter how many 
recommendations it may make, will ever liberalise something 
which is inherently protectionist and which the Contracting 
Parties to the GATT wish to remain protectionist. Against this 
background, any proposals leading to the liberalisation of 
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agricultural trade, may not be acceptable to the Contracting 
Parties. If the GATT is not an appropriate body for liberalising 
world agricultural trade, the question must be asked. Is any 
organization capable of bringing greater order to agricultural 
trade? 
The UNCTAD 
Could this institution make a positive contribution to world 
agricultural trade? The answer is a guarded no. The basic 
philosophy of this institution is development oriented. In relation 
to certain agricultural products it has chosen commodity 
agreements. 
The concern of such agreements is the enhancement of the 
development process through increasing the returns received by 
developing country commodity producers. This chosen method is 
not free from complications. The determination of the price band, 
the operation of the buffer stock system, the control of production 
through the implementation of export quotas, are all elements 
where the margin for error is slight, if any agreement is to be 
effective. Moreover, it is the prospect that restraints will be 
imposed on domestic producers that inhibits some developed 
countries from entering into such agreements. In the wake of the 
oil crisis, the formulation of the IPC offered the possibility that the 
demands of developing countries for a New International 
Economic Order would be met and developed countries would be 
assured security and stability of supply. However, it was soon 
recognised that oil was an exceptional case and this mollified the 
concerns of the developed world. 
The debâcle of the Common Fund negotiations emphasized that a 
new economic order was not being created but rather that the old 
one was being tampered with. Given this situation, the IPC was 
subject to intense scrutiny and realising the essentially negative 
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effects it would have, developed countries retreated from the 
positions they adopted at Nairobi. Consequently the attraction of 
commodity agreements declined and emphasis was shifted to 
other aspects of the IPC. Realising that UNCTAD and, more 
especially, commodity agreements do not provide a complete 
solution to the problems of agricultural trade, is the next step to 
establish another institution to regulate international trade in 
agricultural products? 
A hint of realism 
Since it would prove impossible to establish a new institution to 
govern the conduct of world trade, the only course of action is to 
work within the existing institutional framework. 
In relation to the GATT this work will consist of curing the 
misconception from which it suffers in relation to agriculture. An 
effort is needed to the applicable to the agricultural 
policies of the Contracting Parties. A number of suggestions have 
already been made including: 
(a) the surrender by the United States of the waiver 
granted in 1955; 
(b) the continuation of work on the problem of non -tariff 
barriers, especially the problems posed by the existence 
under the CAP of the variable levy system; 
(c) the establishment within the Subsidies Committee of 
sectoral sub -committees to collect information on the 
effects of export subsidies on primary products granted 
by Contracting Parties. The sub -committees will make 
recommendations for the scaling down and eventual 
abolition of such subsidies. The aim will be to achieve a 
balance of advantages and obligations between the 
Contracting Parties; and 
(d) the adoption by the Contracting Parties of the proposed 
code on safeguards, to control the use of Article XIX by 
180 
accommodating proposals for its update, and the 
abolition of VER's and OMA's concluded outside the 
framework of Article XIX. 
The implementation of these proposals would bring about a 
substantial change in the nature of GATT obligations with respect 
to agriculture. At the same time such proposals would not 
interfere with the autonomy currently exercised by the 
Contracting Parties over their domestic agricultural policies. 
Looking beyond these changes to the detailed rules of the GATT, 
several changes were advocated to the general concept. These 
included separate agricultural trade negotiations and codes of 
conduct for domestic agricultural policies. Given a failure to 
implement these proposals, what will become of the GATT? Will 
it, as Hudec suggests, be transformed into a GABB (General 
Agreement on Better Bargaining) ?1 
This question revolves around a concern over the utility of 
detailed substantive rules and the role of these rules is 
international trade regulation. The provision of detailed 
substantive rules presupposes the existence of some consensus on 
their content. However, given disputes between the Contracting 
Parties over the interpretation of the GATT rules as they apply to 
agriculture, it is suggested that this underlying consensus is no 
longer present. In relation to agriculture a GABB, rather than a 
GATT, now exists. The proposals made above would create a new 
consensus, a new set of obligations. This would facilitate a return, 
albeit limited, to the 1947 situation. This would ensure that the 
cause of the problem rather than the evidence of the problem will 
be discussed, irrespective of the solutions advocated. 
In respect of UNCTAD, a proposal was made for a new form of 
commodity negotiations. The proposal recognises developed 
1 Hudac. "GATT or GABB: The future design of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (1970 -71) 80 YLJ 1299. 
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country concerns and satisfies developing country demands. The 
four requirements, based on past experience, which are necessary 
for a successful commodity agreement are included in the 
proposal. The proposal addresses of the reasons for limited 
progress on individual commodity agreements; the 
hesitation /reticence of some developed countries to move from 
their general statements of support for commodity agreements 
towards accepting the obligations of membership. 
One can find support for this statement in the attitude of the EEC 
towards commodity agreements and it is to this body and the role 
it could play, that the final section of this assessment addresses 
itself. 
The Role of the European Community 
It was recognised, in the introduction to this part of the paper,that 
Europe is seen by many as the only group of countries now able to 
fill the leadership role in international negotiations. Europe, more 
especially the European Community, as a significant exporter of 
agricultural products and the worlds largest importer of 
agricultural products, is perfectly suited to fill this role. 
Before such a move is possible the EEC will have to revise its 
thinking on international markets. Josling presents four 
possibilities for this revision:2 
"(a) to abandon all concern with international markets 
and adopt a fortress Europe policy; 
(b) to extend the existing network of bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements on trade; 
2 Josling T. "The CAP and International Commodity Agreements:' in 
ed Tracy and Hodac Prospects for European Agriculture (1982) 
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(c) to adapt domestic policy to allow a greater impact of 
world market conditions on internal trade; and 
finally 
(d) to re- orient its thinking on international matters to 
that of an exporter." 
Options (a) and (b) would preserve the current autonomy of the 
CAP, whilst the latter option would also indicate to other countries 
their role in the supply of Europe's food needs. On the other hand, 
options (c) and (d) involve a substantial re -think of domestic 
policy, leading to significant adjustments within the Community. 
As such these options would involve a tampering with the delicate 
economic, social and political balance achieved within the CAP. 
For this reason, and also because any change along these lines 
would be evolutionary, it is suggested that the re -think should 
settle on option (b) with some concessions being made to the 
reluctant liberalism of (c). In this way the EEC will enhance its 
position through making part of its production subject to world 
trading conditions. This would it more 
constructive part in international trade negotiations. These 
negotiations should not interfere with the essential elements of 
the CAP's operation. It is essential that a balance be struck 
between the two elements of Community policy. For example, it 
involves a realistic assessment of what is considered essential to 
the operation of the CAP. For those elements which are 
considered non -essential, a deficiency payments scheme or direct 
income aid scheme should be introduced. 
This change of policy on the part of the Community should enable 
it to play a more constructive role. In addition, the adoption of 
both a realistic and consistent policy towards international 
markets would make it easier to match the economic, social and 
political demands of domestic farmers with the growing economic 
interdependence of all countries. In this way some progress may 
be made towards the effective regulation of international 
agricultural trade. 
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Should efforts to achieve effective international trade regulation 
fail, the Community will be thrown back to the network of 
bilateral and plurilateral agreements which it has concluded. It is 
these agreements which Parts III and IV of this paper discuss. 
184 
PART III. ASSOCIATION POLICY 
INTRODUCTION: 
The previous part of this paper reflected on the EEC's relations in 
the international arena. The examination of the two major 
international trade institutions (GATT and UNCTAD) noted their 
failure to achieve their objectives in the international regulation 
of agricultural trade. It also questioned whether such regulation 
was in fact desirable. In the light of the negative answer to this 
question, a basic philosophy for the development of an 
agricultural trade policy was formulated. The policy would rest 
on two pillars. An extension of the existing network of bilateral 
and plurilateral agreements trade and especially agricultural 
trade. The second pillar is adaptation of the CAP to allow for a 
greater impact of world market conditions on the operation of the 
CAP. 
Since these Agreements /Arrangements will form the basis of the 
Common Agricultural Trade Policy, it is necessary to outline how 
they developed and how the EEC has provided for the 
development of agricultural trade. The enlargement of the EEC to 
include Spain and Portugal, affords an opportunity to reform the 
CAP and to make changes to these bilateral agreements. For a 
policy developed to suit the needs of the original six, amended to 
suit the needs of the nine, an opportunity now exists, when the 
EEC has doubled its original membership, to add a new dimension 
to the CAP. For over twenty years it has served the internal 
needs of the EEC. Now an opportunity exists to turn the policy 
into a positive instrument of external economic policy. In this 
light, this part of the Paper examines EEC relations with the 
countries of the Mediterranean, EFTA and Eastern Europe as well 
as relations with developed and some developing countries. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE MEDITERRANEAN ARENA. 
The early period 
"The European Community since its creation always 
felt the need to establish privileged relations with its 
Mediterranean neighbours. The need for an active 
Mediterranean policy was self- evident, countries 
such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and even Turkey had 
a natural vocation, explicitly recognized in the Treaty 
to be involved in the process of European integration. 
How could the European Ccommunity ignore the 
Maghreb while Algeria was still an integral part of 
France and Morocco and Tunisia had only been 
independent for a few years ?" 
As Coval recognises above the EEC's relations with the 
Mediterranean stems from historical, social, economic and cultural 
links and from the fact that Article 237 of the Treaty allows any 
European state to become a member of the EEC. The first 
applicant under Article 237, Greece, is now a member.2 Turkey 
has recently applied for membership. 
The first country to apply for association (Article 238) with the 
EEC was Greece, this application prompted a similar application 
from Turkey. This latter application is illustrative of two facets of 
the relations of other countries with the EEC. Firstly, the political 
nature of most applications. In the case of Turkey, it was the 
consideration that Turkey wanted to become an integral part of 
Europe and in pursuit of this goal it did not, and does not, wish 
Greece to be in a more favourable position. Secondly, and more 
important in respect of the other Mediterranean Agreements, is 
1 Cova C. The Arab Policy of the EEC, 1. 
2 An Association Agreement was signed with Greece in 1961. On 
January 1 1981, Greece became the tenth member of the EEC. 
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what Tovias has labelled the 'drag effect'.3 In other words, once 
one discriminatory trade arrangement is made, other countries 
react against this by claiming similar, or greater, reductions in 
products for which they are directly competitive with the country 
who has concluded the discriminatory trade arrangement. In any 
event, Turkey's request for an association agreement received a 
favourable response from the EEC and an agreement was 
concluded in 1963.4 The agreement recognised the long -run 
desire for Turkey to be an integral part of Europe by setting a 
target date for accession in January 1995.5 The Agreement 
envisaged that there would be three stages to the relationship; a 
preparatory period; a transitional phase; and, a final phase.6 This 
latter stage would be based on the establishment of a customs 
union between the parties entailing greater co- ordination of the 
parties economic policies. Even before the end of the preparatory 
period, strains were developing in the association. In spite of this 
an Additional Protocol was negotiated which provided for the 
establishment of a customs union between the parties.? Even so, 
it was obvious that Turkey was becoming increasingly dissatisfied 
with the effects of the Agreement. 
One reason for this dissatisfaction was the growing range of EEC 
agreements with other Mediterranean Agreements. The drag 
effect which had benefitted Turkey in 1963 was now beginning to 
work against it. One of the Declarations of Intent attached to the 
Treaty of Rome had in fact envisaged the expansion of traditional 
3 Tovias A. Tariff Preferences in Mediterranean Diplomacy. 
4 Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and 
Turkey see 0J1977 L361/29. 
5 Article 2(2) of the Agreement stated that in order to attain the 
objectives set for Association a Customs Union would be established. 
6 
7 
Article 2(3) of the Agreement. 
Aditional Protocol (1970) concluded by Council Reg.2760/72. 
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trade links between the EEC and certain countries of the 
Mediterranean.8 The Morocco Protocol, declared "the readiness" 
of the EEC to enter into neogitations with Morocco and Tunisia, 
with a view to concluding conventions of economic association.9 
The lack of any guiding principles for this association and a 
greater concern with internal developments slowed the realization 
of the aims of the Protocol. Eventually after long negotiations, 
agreements were concluded in 1969 with Morocco and Tunisia.10 
They offered a range of agricultural concessions to these countries, 
the effects of which were blunted by restrictions placed on access 
to the EEC market.11 Once again the drag effect came into 
operation. Anxious to preserve the position of Spanish and Israeli 
exporters of citrus fruits on the EEC market, the EEC was faced 
with a dilemma. 
It applied to the GATT for a waiver from its obligations under 
Article 1 to enable it to grant concessions to Spain and Israel.12 
The Working Party established to consider the request, could not 
reach agreement on the need for such a waiver and did not even 
attempt to draw up a text. It merely confined itself to reporting 
the views expressed within the Working Party.13 The EEC reacted 
to this by concluding Preferential Trade Agreements with Spain 
8 For example the Morocco Protocol envisaged agreements between 
the EEC and Morocco and Tunisia. The Treaty of Rome also allowed for 




See Atlantic Paper 1/72 Europe and the Maghreb. 
JO L/3197. 
11 The Agreements offered tariff concessions of between 50 -80 %. 
The generosity of this offer was restricted by the imposition of seasonal 
calendars, minimum import prices and the exclusion of a number of 
products of export interest to Morocco and Tunisia. 
12 
13 
BISD 17th Supp.61. 
Ibid. 
188 
and Israel, thereby implementing the agricultural concessions for 
which it had sought a waiver.14 The reaction of the United States 
to this action was to lodge a complaint against the EEC in the 
GATT, an action which was dropped when the EEC agreed to 
concessions for US exporters of citrus fruit.15 What had 
happened though was irreversible. The EEC responding to the 
pressures exerted by various Mediterranean countries had 
concluded a mosaic of agreements, simply reacting to pressures 
rather than forging a comprehensive plan for this area. As 
Dahrendorf remarked,16 
"I am convinced that the commercial policy 
instruments at our diposal in connection with our 
current agreements with Mediterranean countries 
can help very little towards attaining the objective 
we have set for ourselves, which is to contribute to 
the creation of long term conditions for development 
and economic stability in Mediterranean countries." 
In an effort to achieve this objective, the Community decided to 
formulate a global Mediterranean Policy. 
14 The agreement with Israel was superseded by a 1975 Agreement. 
The Spanish Agreement governed the relationship between Spain and 
the EEC until January 1 1986, the date of Spanish accession to the 
Community. See Council Reg.1524/70 OJ 1970 L182/1. 
15 This arrangement is referred to as the Casey /Soames Agreement. 
16 EC Bu11.4/71, 38. 
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Towards the Global Policy 
In December 1973, the Foreign ministers of the nine member 
States declared,17 
"The EEC will implement its undertakings towards 
the Mediterranean .... in order to reinforce its long- 
standing links with these countries. The nine intend 
to preserve their historical links with the countries of 
the Middle East and to co- operate over the 
establishment and maintenance of peace, stability 
and progress in the region." 
The new policy would move beyond the purely commercial 
relationships established during the 1960's and encompass 
economic and regional development and even political co- 
operation. These aims were to be achieved by the conclusion of 
wide -ranging agreements between the EEC and the Mediterranean 
States. 
The policy was to cover the following states; Algeria; Morocco; 
Tunisia;18 Egypt; Jordan; Lebanon; and Syria.19 The overall plan 
treated the Mediterranean as an homogenous area. Despite the 
similarities between the Mashreq and Maghreb countries listed 
above, problems existed with the extension of the policy to 
include Israel, a country which the seven countries listed above 
did not recognise at the time. Turkey, Malta and Cyprus also come 
within the scope of the policy, despite the fact that Turkey hopes 
to join the EEC and the other two have agreements leading to the 
establishment of a customs union between them and the EEC.20 
Whilst Yugoslavia bears no economic similarity to the above 
17 Copenhagen Declaration ECBu11 12/73 Annex 1 
18 These three countries are referred to as the Maghreb. 
19 These four countries are referred to as the Mashreq. 
20 See footnotes 4 to 7 above. 
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countries, save that they are all classified as developing countries. 
Despite the heterogenity of the countries covered, the EEC 
persisted in a global policy. The negotiation of individual 
agreements with all these countries reflect the heterogenity of the 
area and seriously call into question the 'global' aspect of the 
'global' policy. Irrespective of this fact, the global policy still 
provides a framework in which relations between the EEC and the 
Mediterranean can be advanced. 
All the agreements aim to enhance the objectives of the policy, 
especially the economic development of the area. This is to be 
achieved through a continuation of the commercial clauses of 
previous agreements; complete industrial free trade and a range 
of agricultural concessions. In an effort to aid the development of 
the Mediterranean, most of the agreements reached include a 
Protocol on technical and financial co- operation.21 The aim of the 
financial co- operation is to foster capital projects in the production 
and economic infrastructure encouraging the diversification of the 
economic structure of the countries, the promotion of the 
industrializaiton and the modernization of agriculture.22 Each of 
the Agreements establish a Co- operation Council which has the 
power to make decisions which facilitate the attainment of the 
objectives of the Agreement.23 Each of the agreements allow for 
a periodic review of its provisions, an article which is especially 
important considering the impact enlargement is likely to have on 
the success of these Agreements.24 
Before going on to discuss the agricultural provisions of these 
Agreements, it is worthwhile to analyse the reactions of other 
countries to the development of the EEC's Mediterranean Policy. 
21 E.g. Co- operation Agreement between the EEC and Algeria OJ 1978 
L 263/1. 
22 Ibid 4, Article 4 of the Agreement. 
23 Ibid 22, Article 42. 
24 Ibid, Article 53. 
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This will assist in the examination of the effects of these 
agreements, not only on the Mediterranean countries themselves 
but also the effects of the Agreements on third countries. 
The Agreements in the GATT 
As previously explained, the GATT is an organization charged with 
the responsibility for the conduct of world trade. The Association 
agreements, free trade agreements and co- operation agreements 
concluded by the EEC must conform to the provisions of the GATT 
and especially the provisions of Article XXIV on the creation of 
customs unions and free trade areas. To recapitulate, Article XXIV 
establishes various standards which any arrangement must meet 
before it can be accepted as compatible with the GATT. These 
include; the agreement must facilitate trade between the parties 
and not constitute an obstacle to trade or raise barriers to other 
parties trade;25 duties and other regulations of commerce should 
not be made more restrictive;26 a plan should be established for 
the formation of the free trade area /customs union within a 
reasonable length of time;27 and finally duties and other 
restrictive regulations should be eliminated on substantially all 
trade between the parties.28 How have the agreements reached 
between the EEC and various Mediterranean countries measured 
up to these requirements? 
The Association Agreement with Turkey was criticised by the 
GATT Working Party, established to consider its compatibility 
with the General Agreement, since it would not lead to the 
25 Article XXIV(4). 
26 Ibid, paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b). 
27 Ibid, paragraph 5(c). 
28 Ibid, paragraph 8. 
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formation of a customs union within a reasonable length of time.29 
The Agreements of 1969 with Morocco and Tunisia were also 
criticised because of the lack of a plan or schedule leading to the 
formation of a free trade area.30 Another ground of criticism was 
that the agreements did not cover substantially all the trade 
between the parties, owing to the exclusion of large areas of 
agricultural trade.31 A similar criticism was expressed when the 
GATT considered the 1970 Agreement between the EEC and 
Spain.32 These criticisms were repeated when the GATT had 
before it the Association Agreement with Malta33 and the 
Additional Protocol to the Turkish Association Agreement.34 With 
respect to the Association Agreement with Cyprus, the Working 
Party, in addition to the criticisms noted above, pointed to the lack 
of commitment on the part of the EEC to establish a customs union 
between itself and Cyprus.35 Moreover, the Working Party was 
concerned about the nature of the rules of origin, arguing that 
these constituted the imposition of restrictive regulations on 
trade.36 
The Agreements concluded by the EEC since the inception of the 









BISD 13th Supp 59. 
BISD 18th Supp 149. 
Ibid, 156. 
BISD 16th Supp 166. 
BISD 19th Supp 90. 
Ibid, 102 and BISD 21st Supp 108. 
BISD 21st Supp 94. 
Ibid, 105. 
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when they were considered in GATT Working Parties.37 However, 
a different approach is obvious. Whilst members of the Working 
Parties still criticise, the EEC has argued that in the light of Part IV 
of the General Agreement and the general objectives of the GATT, 
these agreements are compatible with the GATT even if they are 
technically in breach of the provisions of Article XXIV.38 
However, one must question this approach, as it is extremely 
doubtful whether part IV of the GATT takes precedence over 
Article XXIV. Whilst it has been argued that the Agreements are 
a reflection of the changing nature of world trade and a 
courageous and constructive effort to develop relations between 
developed and developing countries, criticisms of the Agreements 
remain . 3 9 All of the Working Party reports reach no firm 
conclusion on the compatibility of the Agreement with the GATT 
and content themselves with reporting the divergance of views.40 
It is obvious that the Agreements do not satisfy the provisions of 
the GATT as they do not cover substantially all trade. This 
conclusion comes from an examination of the agricultural trade 
concessions made by the EEC under these various agreements. 
Agricultural Concessions? 
Certain agricultural provisions are common to all the agreements. 
For example, Article 23 of the Algerian Agreement provides 
that,41 
37 BISD 23rd Supp 55 (Israel); 24th Supp 80 (Algeria); 24th Supp 88 
(Morocco); 24th Supp 97 (Tunisia); BISD 25th Supp 114 (Egypt); 25th 
Supp 123 (Syria) 25th Supp 133 (Lebanon); 25th Supp 143 (Jordan). 
38 e.g. 24th Supp. 80,82. 
39 See for example Gaines, Sawyer and Sprinkle "EEC Mediterranean 
Policy and US Trade in Citrus" (1981) 15 JWTL 431. 
40 
41 
e.g. 23rd Supp 55,63. 
OJ 1978 L263/1,19. 
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"Should specific rules be introduced as a result of the 
implementation of its agricultural policy or 
modification of the existing rules or should the 
provisions on the implementation of its agricultural 
policy be modified or developed, the EEC may modify 
the arrangements laid down in the Agreement in 
respect of the products concerned." 
Whilst the EEC agrees to take Algeria's interests into account, it is 
obvious that the EEC considers the concessions to be unilateral and 
as such revocable at any time. The 'carte blanche' provided by 
this provision is modified to the extent that the balance of 
advantages stemming from the Agreement must be maintained.42 
Note, that it is the balance of advantages which is to be 
maintained rather than the balance of agricultural advantages. 
Algeria's only means of influencing EEC policy, with regard to any 
modification, comes through the operation of the Co- operation 
Commission or during the periodic reviews of the Agreement. 
With respect to products to which the agreements do not apply, a 
joint declaration, to most of the agreements, declare the parties 
readiness to foster within the limits imposed by the agricultural 
policies of each party, the harmonious development of agricultural 
trade.43 Whilst acknowledging the potential of this provision to 
future trade relations, it is important to analyse current 
concessions to determine whether any potential exists for 
extending the agreements. 
It is possible to divide the agricultural concessions, given by the 
EEC in the Mediterranean agreements, into three groups; the 
Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), the Mashreq (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria) and the others (Israel, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, 
Malta and Turkey). With respect to the Maghreb, the concessions 
42 Idem. Article 23(2) states that if the Community modifies the 
arrangements made by the Agreement for products subject to a COM, "it 
shall accord imports originating in Algeria an advantage comparable to 
that provided for in this Agreement ". 
43 OJ 1978 L 263/1,109. 
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given range from 100 to 20% reduction of customs duties on 
various products. More than 80% of agricultural exports from the 
Maghreb to the EEC are covered by these Agreements.44 The 
concessions are on particularly important export items such as 
citrus fruits, tomatoes, and potatoes.45 As with other 
Mediterranean agreements, the concession on fresh lemons is 
subject of the observance of the EEC reference price for this 
product.46 A special arrangement exists governing the export of 
olive oil. It provides that if these countries levy a special charge 
of exports, the EEC will reduce the import levy on olive oi1.47 In 
relation to processed agricultural products, concessions are given 
for preserved oranges, preserved tomatoes, tomato concentrate 
and fruit salad.48 However, the concession, in the form of a 
customs duty reduction, is limited by an annual tariff quota. A 
levy reduction also exists for Maghreb exports of cereal 
residues.49 The bilateral nature of the Agreements concluded by 
the EEC has allowed them to take account of the individual 
interests of such countries. For example, in relation to Algeria and 
Tunisia, the agreements provide for a reduction of custom duties 
on imports of wine. This is subject to an annual tariff quota.50 A 
44 Cited in Cova op cit n 1. 
45 The concessions for these products range from 40 to 80% and are 
restricted by a Seasonal Calendar. Each of the Agreements has a joint 
declaration on citrus fruits, which states that should abnormal 
conditions of competition jeopardise the advantages given, the Parties 
would seek appropriate solutions. 
46 Article 15(3) Algerian Agreement op cit n 41,14. 
47 See Articles 16 and 17 of the Tunisian Agreement OJ 1978 L 
265/1,13. 
48 Article 19 Algerian Agreement op cit n 41,15. 
49 See Article 23 of the Moroccan Agreement OJ 1978 L 264/1. 
50 Article 20 Algerian Agreement op cit n 41,16 -17. 
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reduction is also given to Morocco for exports of durum wheat to 
the EEC.51 
The Co- operation Agreements concluded with the Mashreq 
countries are roughly similar to those concluded with the Maghreb 
countries, account being taken of differences in production. For 
example, the Maghreb countries receive an 80% reduction in 
customs duties for oranges, the equivalent concession in the 
Mashreq agreements lists the reduction at 60 %.52 Once again, 
differences within the Mashreq countries reflect production in 
those countries. Egypt, for exmple, has a levy reduction on rice, 
subject to an annual tariff quota.53 Another example is the 
customs duty reduction given to Syria for exports of dehydrated 
or evaporated onions and garlic.54 
The pattern emerging from the analyses of the Agreements with 
the Maghreb and Mashreq, is that the EEC whilst giving 
concessions, limits the effects of such concessions by either tariff 
quotas, import /seasonal calendars or observance of the EEC 
reference price. The level of concession granted also depends on 
the nature of production in the particular country as reflected by 
the differing rates of concessions given for the same product. This 
pattern is reinforced when one examines the Agreements reached 
with Israel, Malta and Cyprus. For example, Israel has been 
granted an 80% customs duty reduction on exports of avocados,55 
whereas the corresponding figure for the Mashreq and Maghreb is 
51 Article 16 of the Agreement states that the "Community shall take 
all measures to ensure that the levy on imports into the Community of 
durum wheat is the levy less 0.5 ECU /tonne. 
52 See Agreement with Jordan OJ 1978 L 268/1. 
53 Article 19(1) OJ 1978 L 266/2,11. 
54 Article 18 OJ 1978 L 269/1,8. 
55 Article 8 Protocol 1 OJ 1975 L36/3. 
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only 60 %. The concession given to Israel for exports of apricot 
pulp is a 70% reduction in customs duties within an annual tariff 
quota of 150 tonnes,56 for Tunisia the reduction is 30% but the 
quota is 4300 tonnes.57 This variety of concessions is also evident 
in the EEC's relationship with Yugoslavia, even though the range of 
products differs significantly owing to a different production 
structure in Yugoslavia.58 
This range of concessions to Mediterranean countries concerned 
Turkey. Turkish officials argued that since Turkey was the only 
country in the Mediterranean which anticipated joining the EEC, it 
should have the most advantageous trade concessions. In 
recognition of the Turkish position, Decision 1/80 of the 
Association Council recommended measures to develop the 
agreement.59 As implemented, this decision requires the abolition 
of all customs duties which still applied to Turkish exports of 
agricultural products. In respect of these duties, those less than 
2% were to be abolished from January 1, 1981. All other customs 
duties were to be abolished over a period extending to January 1 
1987.60 However, Turkish exports are still subject to import 
calendars and tariff quotas. The decision also recognised the 




Ibid, Article 10. 
Article 21, op cit n 47,16. 
58 Co- operation Agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia, OJ 1983 
L 41/1. 
59 For the implementation of this decision within the EEC see 
Council Reg.3590/82 OJ 1982 L 375/1. 
60 
61 
Article 3 of Dec 1/80. 
Op cit 7. 
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"pinpoint those agricultural sectors in which Turkey 
considers it is ready to bring its system into line with 
the EEC system so as to arrive progressively at the 
application of the latter's." 
The relationship between the EEC and Turkey has improved as a 
result of Decision 1/80, to the detriment of other Mediterranean 
countries. This has caused increased dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of the Co- operation Agreements. This stems from: - the limited value of the concessions, even though the 
customs duties concessions are generous, they are limited 
by import /seasonal calendars, tariff quotas and 
observance of the EEC's reference price system; - the divergence of concessions on similar products given 
to different countries in the Mediterranean; and finally, - the application of the safeguard clause which allows the 
EEC to suspend concessions once the EEC market is 
disturbed. 
Given these criticisms, how can these agreements be improved? 
This question is all the more relevant given the enlargement of 
the EEC to include Spain and Portugal. 
The Impact of Enlargement 
An exchange of letters annexed to the EEC - Tunisia Agreements 
declares,62 
"Because of the importance of citrus fruits for the 
Tunisian economy, Tunisia considers that in the 
event of the EEC being enlarged to include other 
Mediterranean countries there will be a re- 
examination in accordance with Article 49 of the 
Agreement ... of the arrangements provided for in 
Article 15 [agricultural trade concessions] in order to 
62 Op cit n 47, 
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safeguard the advantages resulting from its 
implementation." 
The enlargement of the EEC to include Greece did not significantly 
affect the content of the Co- operation Agreements. The accession 
of two countries which produce similar products to those of the 
Mediterranean countries will have a significant effect on these 
arrangements. An examination of the Agreements, previously 
concluded, between the EEC and Spain and Portugal will show 
what products will be affected. 
To start with Portugal, Protocol 8 of the 1972 Free Trade 
Agreement concluded with Portugal, concerns the treatment 
applicable to certain agricultural products.63 Article 5 of the 
Protocol lists the concessions given by the EEC on products ranging 
from new potatoes, tomatoes, sweet peppers to strawberries. The 
reduction in the level of customs duties for these products ranges 
from 50% to 15 %, whereas for Maghreb and other countries of the 
Mediterranean the range is 60% to 40 %.64 Adding this level of 
concessions to the fact that Portugal will no longer be subject to 
the import calendars laid down in the Agreement, it is obvious 
that the quality of concessions granted to the Mediterranean 
countries will deteriorate as a result of Portugese accession. In 
addition, the tariff quotas which formerly applied to Portugese 
exports of wine and tomatoes will also cease to operate, further 
damaging the interests of Mediterananean exporters of these 
products. In relation to Spain a similar picture emerges. The 
1970 Preferential Trade Agreement granted agricultural 
concessions in the form of a 40% reduction of customs duties for 




products such as citrus fruit, subject to import calendar and 
observance of the EEC reference price.65 
The net effect of the Iberian Accession will be a removal of 
restrictions which limited their exports to the EEC. As a result, the 
concessions obtained by other Mediterranean countries will lessen 
in value, as their competitive position, which used to be better 
than that of Spain or Portugal, deteroriates. Most countries will be 
affected by the enlargement to differing degrees, significant 
damage could result to the trade interests of Morocco which 
exports 98% of its agricultural exports to the EEC. Other seriously 
affected countries include Israel, Egypt, Tunisia, Cyprus and 
Turkey.66 The nature of the EEC's reaction to the dissatisfaction of 
the Mediterranean countries with the present agreements and to 
the problems associated with the enlargement of the EEC, will 
determine how far it is able to achieve the objectives it set for 
itself when devising the Global Mediterranean Policy. 
EEC Reaction to Enlargement 
As the Commission recognise there will be no single, 
comprehensive solution to the problems thrown up by 
enlargement.67 Any solution to the problems caused to the 
Mediterranean countries will involve not only an alteration of 
these Agreements but also internal reform within the EEC and 
perhaps the Mediterranean countries themselves. 
65 J01970 L 182/1 Annex 1 of the Agreement Article 7. 
66 See COM (82) 352. On a Mediterranean policy for the enlarged 
Community. See also Tovias A. EEC Enlargement: The Southern 
neighbours. 
67 COM (84) 107 Commission Report to the Council on the exploratory 
talks with the Mediterranean countries and the Applicant countries: 
Commission proposals concerning the implementation of a 
Mediterranean Policy for the enlarged Community. 
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In recognition of this fact, the Commission realised that problems 
within the EEC have obstructed the effective operation of the 
Mediterranean Agreements.68 One of the most pressing of these 
problems is the North -South dichotomy manifested by the 
operation of the CAP. The inadequacies of the CAP vis -a -vis 
Mediterranean products makes it impossible for the EEC to 
develop its relations with the Mediterranean countries beyond 
those laid down in the Agreements. The review articles and the 
declarations on the development of harmonious trade relations in 
agricultural products have not led to any significant changes in 
the nature of the established relationship. 
This analysis of the problem is shared by the Mediterranean 
countries themselves.69 They point to the experience of the 
1970's when the EEC was confronted with recession and chose to 
resolve common problems unilaterally rather than in the spirit of 
co- operation in which the agreements were reached. They are 
concerned about the inherent contradictions which seem to plague 
the CAP and, quite rightly, are worried about the effect of 
enlargement, given the EEC's predeliction for the use of safeguard 
measures. However, they recognise that enlargement offers an 
opportunity similar to that presented in 1973. The EEC can make a 
positive contribution to the stability and economic development of 
the area. They also realise the temptation of the EEC to effect 
enlargement at the expense of third countries. To this end, they 
have suggested that their agricultural products should be treated 
as EEC products in return for them playing the necessary role in a 








Such an approach is not favoured by the EEC, since the 
Mediterranean countries could not become part -time members of 
the EEC.71 This approach would also involve problems with the 
decision making machinery and the application of the financial 
mechanisms of the CAP. The Commission has recommended the 
continuation of the present bilateral trade agreements with an 
increased emphasis on technical and financial co- operation.72 In 
recognition of the fact that such co- operation does not fully 
compensate the Mediterranean countries, the Commission has also 
proposed the continuation of agricultural concessions.73 The 
products concerned should be able to compete with internal 
production on the EEC market. However, such exports must 
comply with the reference price system. The EEC does not 
envisage abandoning the possibility of using safeguard measures. 
Rather it hopes that the application of these measures will be 
rendered unnecessary by setting a quantitative limit for 
Mediterranean exports. This limit would be based on the past 
export performance of these countries. This does not constitute a 
radical departure for the EEC nor does it meet the dissatisfactions 
expressed by the Mediterranean countries over the scope of the 
agricultural concessions. 
Progress in the Commission proposals, does come from an 
enhanced form of agricultural co- operation. The Commission 
recommend the strengthening of this aspect of the relationship, to 
further the broader objective of establishing complementarity of 
production rather than competitiveness. One aspect of this 
increased agricultural co- operation is the reduction of dependence 
on food imports for the Mediterranean countries. This is to be 








agricultural products (MSAs).74 The rationale behind MSA's is the 
increasing number of requests received by the EEC, from third 
countries, for predictable and secure terms for the multiannual 
supply of products of interest to them. MSA's therefore, go 
beyond the scope of the current bilateral trade agreements and 
are primarily directed towards "food security and development 
aid ". The existing EEC system (the export refund system) given 
its relation to the world market price is unable to satisfy these 
demands. In a Commission study of MSAs, it was emphasised that 
the development of such an instrument would allow the EEC to 
play its role in the search for global food security.75 
The MSAs concluded would need to be flexible and would involve 
the following elements. Price conditions, the price paid for the 
product under the MSA should be as near as possible to the 
prevailing world price. The Commission envisaged that such 
agreements should cover a three to five year period with annual 
quantities would be set in advance. In the event of crop failures 
etcetera on the EEC market, such agreements should also provide a 
safeguard clause which would allow domestic demand to be 
satisfied before the MSA was fulfilled. As developed, this 
framework attracted interest from several Mediterranean 
countries notably Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Each of 
these countries has different reasons for wanting to conclude such 
an agreement. Egypt, for example, sees it as part of the national 
food strategy which it has already established. Tunisia feels that 
it would make up for the detrimental effects of enlargement of 
the EEC and Morocco sees it as a way of decreasing the 
dissatisfaction it expresses over the operation of the Co- operation 
Agreement.76 
74 Idem. See also COM (81) 429 Negotiation of framework 
Agreements relating to the multiannual supply of agricultural products. 
75 
76 
Ibid, COM (81) 429, 1. 
Cova C. The Arab Policy of the EEC: Long Term Supply Contracts. 
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Despite the attractions of the MSA proposal, it has several 
shortcomings. It would mean that the EEC would become a net 
agricultural exporter. Since the prices under the MSAs will be the 
prevailing world prices, the EEC would be faced with a high 
budgetary cost, given the export refund system. The organization 
of trade in this way also gives rise to the fear that such 
agreements will encourage over -production within the EEC. 
Moreover, it would give third countries a certain right to EEC 
production. The Commission has answered these criticisms in the 
following way. The question of high budgetary cost does not arise 
because such agreements would be accompanied by the narrowing 
of prices between the EEC and its competitors. Rather than 
institutionalize surplus production, MSAs would lead to greater 
order in EEC production, since exports would be limited to those 
products for which supplies were assured. Finally, the existence 
of a safeguard clause means that domestic consumers will have 
the first call on all production.77 
Despite the positive role which MSAs could play, especially in the 
anticipated increased role for agricultural co- operation between 
the EEC and the Mediterranean countries, they do not provide the 
answer to the problems facing these latter countries. It must be 
doubted whether such agreements would not increase the surplus 
production problem of the EEC and the budgetary problems 
caused by the price policy of the CAP. Moreover, since an integral 
part of the policy is the reduction of EEC prices towards those 
prevailing on the markets of major competitors, it must be 
doubted whether the member States governments and the 
farmers themselves, would accept such a reduction in prices.78 
The MSA discussion emphasises the need for an EEC policy 
77 COM (81) 429, op cit n 74. 
78 Ibid, HL Select Comm on the EC: 2nd Report 1980 -81 Agricultural 
Trade Policy, 12. 
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towards agricultural trade. As an answer to the problems facing 
Mediterranean countries, its applicability is limited. A much more 
wide -ranging proposal is called for. 
Towards a new Mediterranean Policy 
"All that the European Community has developed 
under the name of its global Meditrranean policy, has 
been a trading system; it has not tried to 
institutionalize its undoubted security interests in 
the area into a formal political sphere of influence. "79 
This indictment of the global Mediterranean policy by Minet, 
emphasises the failure of the policy to come to terms with the 
objectives sought. Any new policy towards the area would have 
to reconcile the political aspirations of both European and 
Mediterranean countries, the desire to promote regional 
development and the need to continue, and improve, on the 
framework of trade relations. The following proposal for a new 
Mediterranean policy is an attempt to do all of this. 
With respect to the Mediterranean, and some Arab countries 
outside this area, a three -sided approach is recommended. Firstly, 
the establishment of a Euro- Mediterranean /Arab Forum where 
political questions affecting the area would be discussed. The 
representatives in this Forum would be either the Heads of 
Government or Foreign Ministers, or both, of all Contracting 
Parties. The second tier of the new relationship would be the 
Mediterranean Development Policy, encouraging the development 
of the Mediterranean countries, and those members of the EEC 
directly involved in the area (France, Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal). The final aspect of the new relationship would be the 
Mediterranean Trade Policy, which would encourage trade 
79 "Spanish and European Diplomacy at the Crossroads." in ed Minet, 
Siotis and Tsakaloyannis Spain, Greece and Community Politics.3. 
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between the Mediterranean countries and the EEC and between 
the Mediterranean countries themselves. 
The Mediterranean Forum 
This would replace, and hopefully improve on, the existing Euro- 
Arab Dialogue. In order to determine whether such an approach 
is feasible it is necessary to detail the beginnings of, and progress 
in, the Euro -Arab Dialogue. The effects of the oil embargo of 1973 
was to force a re- appraisal of EEC policy towards the Arab nations 
of the Middle East. In March 1974, a threefold plan was proposed 
to deal with the problems posed by the Arab nations.80 It 
included exploratory talks with the Arab league, leading to the 
establishment of a number of joint working groups and eventually 
a Euro -Arab conference at foreign minister level. As a result of 
the Luxembourg meeting of May 1976, a General Committee was 
established to co- ordinate the co- operation between the two 
sides.81 
Little or no progress has been made in the dialogue for various 
reasons. On the EEC side, they were unwilling to contemplate the 
establishment of a generalized free trade agreement with these 
Arab nations. This reluctance arose partly out of the fact that the 
EEC is associated with the majority of Arab countries either 
through the Mediterranean Agreements or the Lomé Convention. 
Equally, the EEC considered the dialogue afforded it an excellent 
opportunity for it to discuss the oil question and hopefully attain a 
80 See Allen D "The Euro -Arab Dialogue!' (1978) 16 JCMS 323: Cova op 
cit n 76 Part II EEC /Arab Relations after the Oil Crisis: Bielenstein ed. 
Europe's Future in the Arab View. 
81 This body was to be the supreme co- ordinating Body of the 
Dialogue. 
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greater security of supply for this product.82 However, the Arab 
nations refused to discuss the oil question and were primarily 
concerned with discussing the political situation in the Middle 
East. This is not surprising given that several of the participants 
in the dialogue are directly involved in the dispute with Israel. 
Further Arab objectives included efforts to coerce the EEC to exert 
pressure on Israel and also to recognise the legitimate role of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization. The EEC did not succumb to this 
first demand but in their statements on the situation in the 
Middle East they have recognised the role which the PLO must 
play in any eventual settlement of the problems in the area.83 
The request by the United States to be kept informed was a major 
inhibiting factor in the development of the dialogue. Speaking of 
the net results of the Euro -Arab dialogue, Allen remarks,84 
"At the substantive level, the Euro -Arab dialogue 
does not appear to have advanced very far, progress 
to date being limited to relatively small scale 
development projects that are unlikely to contribute 
much towards the future stability and economic 
prosperity of either region whose growing 
interdependence is nevertheless an incontestable 
fact." 
What hope then has the Euro- Mediterranean forum of making 
real progress? For a start, conditions have changed. The Euro- 
Arab dialogue began when the EEC had only 9 member States, 
now it has 12, all the new States are Mediterranean States. This 
fact, and recent events in the Mediterranean area, will accentuate 
the security aspect of European policy towards the area.85 
82 See Al- Asfahani - "Political Perspectives for the Euro -Arab 
Dialogue inthe 1980's' in ed. Bielenstein op cit n 80. 
ß3 European Political Co- operation (3rd ed 1977),127. 
84 Op cit n 80,330. 
85 e.g. the civil war in Lebanon. 
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Moreover, it is envisaged that the Euro- Mediterranean forum will 
discuss all issues which are of interest to the parties, whether it is 
security of supply for oil or the problems of the Middle East 
conflict. The development of a EEC policy towards this conflict 
means that EEC relations in the area can no longer be restricted to 
economic co- operation. In the light of this "positive and 
sympathetic attitude ",86 it is not unreasonable to expect that the 
Arab position on oil could be modified, especially given the fact 
that the EEC already contains one oil producer. 
Mediterranean Development Policy 
The second aspect of the new relationship is regional 
development. Two different aspects exist to this. Firstly, the 
regional development of the non -European Mediterranean 
countries. Greater use could be made of the existing co- financing 
provision of Article 7 of Protocol 1 to most of the EEC - 
Mediterranean Agreements.87 The remaining finance may come 
from other Arab nations, especially the oil producers. The aim of 
regional development will be to promote industrialization, 
encourage diversification and modernize agriculture. It is 
envisaged that such a development will take place on an intra- 
regional basis, for example, intra- Maghreb or intra- Mashreq. The 
EEC, by contributing funds, will encourage development and foster 
relations between neighbouring countries. The second part of the 
Mediterranean Development Policy will be the development of the 
EEC's Mediterranean region. 
86 
87 
op cit n 83,158 
E.g. Algerian Agreement op cit n 41. 
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To some extent, the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
(IMP's) represent a start in this direction.88 In the wake of 
enlargement the IMP's may prove inadequate. There is a need for 
increased finance through the Social Fund, the Regional Fund and 
the Agricultural Guidance section of FEOGA. The aims of this 
development will correspond to those of the non -European 
Mediterranean Policy aspect. An overall relationship should be 
established between the two aspects of the development policy, in 
order to minimise duplication of effort and to enhance a certain 
level of complementary between the regions. By far the most 
troublesome aspect of the new relationship will be the 
Mediterranean Trade Policy. 
Mediterranean Trade Policy 
It is envisaged that the industrial trade provisions will remain 
unaltered and the technical and financial co- operation provisions 
will only be altered to the extent necessary to take account of the 
Mediterranean Development Policy. It is in the agricultural area 
that changes will be made to the concessions already given, and to 
the operation of the CAP. Initially in giving concessions the EEC 
had to balance the demands of the European farmers for a certain 
level of protection against the demands of the Mediterranean 
countries for tangible concessions. It is obvious that the 
concessions were given in a way which left the balance heavily in 
favour of European farmers. The new trade policy will have a 
different balancing act to perform. The new philosophy will be to 
encourage the growth of complementarity and to enhance the 
positive aspects of competition. But how are these aims to be 
achieved? The solution advocated by the Commission, MSAs, has 
already been discussed and dismissed as inappropriate to the 
needs of the Mediterranean countries. Another approach may be 
88 Green Europe no197 For the Southern Regions of the Community. 
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product protocols, similar to the sugar agreement between the EEC 
and some of the signatories of the Lomé Convention.89 
This would allow the Mediterranean countries to export a certain 
level of produce, based on past export potentiality rather than 
performance, to the EEC market. The products would receive a 
guaranteed price. Is this not another form of tariff quota? It is 
not, for rather than restricting exports, it allows exports to the 
level of export potentiality. The implementation of such product 
protocols would be advanced by EEC efforts internally to 
discourage production which although competitive, suffers from 
other economic shortcomings (e.g. tomatoes under glass). Another, 
and perhaps a more feasible alternative would be for those 
countries currently having Co- operation Agreements with the EEC 
to convert them into free -trade agreements. This development 
would recognise the degree of dependence on the EEC which is 
shared by most of the Mediterranean countries. Any such free - 
trade agreements would have to include agriculture, thus enabling 
them to conform to the provisions of Article XXIV of the GATT. 
Initially, there may be restrictions on agricultural trade but such 
restrictions would progressively disappear. Any realistic 
evaluation of the possibilities for extending the agricultural 
concessions given to Mediterranean countries must take into 
account the CAP. The effect of enlargement will be to change the 
balance within the EEC in favour of Mediterranean producers. The 
North -South dichotomy in the operation of the CAP, which became 
evident in the Community of ten, will have to be remedied now 
that the Community has twelve member States. It is the nature of 
this reform which determines not only the future direction of the 
CAP but also the future of EEC -Mediterranean relations. It is 
essential that the introspective manner which is so evident in CAP 
reform should not manifest itself in this new reform. Given the 
Community declaration that enlargement will not take place at the 
89 See Part IV of this Paper for a detailed discussion of the Convention. 
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cost of third countries,90 opportunities for an increase in the 
tangible benefit of agricultural concessions to the Mediterranean 
seems hopeful. 
Even given this liberal reform, several problems will remain, most 
notable of these will be the EEC safeguard clause. Although this 
may be used in the short run period of adjustment, its use should 
decrease over the medium to long term. Despite the fervent 
hopes for greater concessions, problems exist with the approach 
advocated by this new Mediterranean policy. Firstly, in relation 
to its country coverage, five countries cause problems. The first of 
these is Israel. It should be obvious that this country would not 
be accepted into the Euro- Medediterranean Forum nor would 
Arab finance be too readily available to it. The problem is not 
really as great as imagined because, unlike other Mediterranean 
countries, the EEC -Israeli relationship is one of free trade rather 
than co- operation. Even though the final abolition of Israeli 
customs duties on EEC products has been delayed for another two 
years, this does not deflect the overall aim of the Agreement, 
which is to establish a free trade area.91 As such Israel could be 
covered by the third part of the new policy, until full free trade is 
attained. 
Another country which causes problems is Turkey, the only 
Mediterranean country capable of joining the EEC. Is it capable of 
joining the EEC and do the EEC Turkey wish to take their 
relationship that far? On the question of capability, as the 
Commission pointed out when considering the Greek application, 
any applicant must respect the principles of pluralistic 
90 COM (84) 107 op cit n 67, 20. 
91 OJ 1975 L 136/3. See also Wassermann "EEC- Israel Trade 
Agreement" (1976) 10 JWTL 92; see OJ 1984 L 332/1. 
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government and human rights.92 This view was later endorsed by 
all three institutions and the European Counci1.93 Given the 
current political situation in Turkey, it seems unlikely that it will 
meet these requirements. Even if, at some future stage, they do 
meet these requirements does Turkey want to join and does the 
EEC want it? Turkey's association with the EEC is no longer taken 
for granted, this is in part due to concerns expressed within 
Turkey on the value of the agreement and its dissatisfaction not 
only with its provisions, and the extension of preferences to other 
countries. A consensus seems to have emerged that Turkey's 
relations with the EEC should be strengthened, so it has applied 
for membership of the EEC.94 
On the EEC side, concern centres on the cost of enlargement to 
include Turkey. In relation to the industrial sector, since it is not 
adequately advanced, accession to the EEC will require the 
application of social and regional funds to Turkey.95 Adoption of 
the CAP would also cause problems, since Turkish prices for major 
CAP products are below those prevailing under the CAP. 
Accession will act as a stimulus to production thereby leading to 
increased surpluses. Food prices within Turkey would also rise.96 
The problem is to some extent remedied by Article 33 of the 
Additional Protocol on the gradual harmonisation of various 
92 
93 
op cit n 83,194 
OJ 1977 C103/12 
94 Burrows "A Community of 13? The Question of Turkish 
Membership of the EEC: (1979) 17 JCMS 143 Rustow and Penrose Turkey 
and the Communtiy Bahcheli "Turkey and the EC: The Strains of 
Association". (1980) 3 JE1 221. 
95 See "Implications of Turkish Membership for the Community:' in 
ed Rustow and Penrose op cit n 94. 
96 Ibid, Penrose "Is Turkish membership economically feasible ?" 
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sectors of Turkish agricultural policy with the CAP.97 Restrictions 
in the form of import calendars, tariff quotas and observance of 
EEC reference prices still exist. It is obvious that both parties 
should re- assess their relationship and determine whether any 
alternative exists to the present situation. Weighing up the 
advantages and disadvantages of Turkish membership of the EEC, 
it is suggested that Turkey should seek its future not in 
Association but rather within the context of the new 
Mediterranean Policy. Given this development, agricultural 
concessions can be given to other Mediterranean countries though 
an application of Reg.3590/82 on the abolition of custom duties 
facing agricultural exports. This would effect a significant 
improvement in the agricultural concessions granted to other 
Mediterranean countries and ensure that all countries in the area 
are treated equally. 
Two other countries which cause problems are Malta and Cyprus, 
because of the Agreements establishing a customs union between 
them and the EEC.98 The development of the relationship between 
the EEC and these two countries indicate that they should also join 
the new policy. This could be achieved either by establishing a 
co- operation agreement or, if the free trade area proposal made 
earlier is accepted, a free trade agreement. The final country 
which causes problems is Yugoslavia. This is because of its 
different production of agricultural products and the fact that it is 
a Communist country. This latter factor accounts for the interest 
shown by the EEC in Yugoslavia. In relation to the new 
Mediterranean Policy one factor which encourages Yugoslavian 
participation is the latter's open encouragement of Balkans co- 
operation.99 Such co- operation would clearly be enhanced by the 
97 
98 
Op cit n 59. 
OJ 1973 L 133/1 (Cyprus) OJ 1976 L 111/1 (Malta). 
99 See Artisen and Holt "Yugoslavia and the EEC in the 1970's" (1980) 
18 JCMS 355. 
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Mediterranean Development Policy, whilst account could be taken 
of its different agricultural produce within the new Trade Policy. 
As the policy allows for separate membership in each stage, it is 
to be noted that Yugoslavia, if it wishes may opt out of the 
political relationship established through the Euro- Mediterranean 
Forum. 
Whilst this analysis of the five countries which cause problems 
show that all, with the exception of Israel, could participate in at 
least two aspects of the new policy. Problems exist also between 
countries who would be natural parties to all three aspects. For 
example, in relation to the Mediterranean Development Policy, 
since political relations between Algeria and Morocco are strained 
over the Western Sahara question, encouragement of regional co- 
operation in the Western Mediterranean would be lessened as a 
result. Regional co- operation in this area would be further 
strained by the presence of Libya, a member of the Arab League. 
Given the political situation in Libya, it is envisaged that it would 
only be interested in the Euro- Medediterranean Forum aspect of 
the relationship. Concern also exists over the position of Lebanon, 
especially since due to the civil war in that country, the EEC - 
Lebanese agreement has been of little effect. 
Final Remarks 
The proposal made above seeks to establish a new type of 
relationship between the EEC and the countries of the 
Mediterranean and beyond. It recognises the political /security, 
regional development and economic development objectives 
which formed the basis of the Mediterranean policy as developed 
in the ealry 1970's. By splitting these objectives and enabling the 
Mediterranean countries to take part in all three, two or only one 
part of the new relationship to be established, the proposal also 
recognises the heterogeneous nature of the area. 
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In relation to agricultural trade, this chapter, by outlining the 
development of trading relations and the concessions given, 
emphasises the point that in relation to one of its most privileged 
partners the CAP has limited the value of concessions given by the 
EEC. The 1986 enlargement of the EEC offers it the chance to 
effect a change of direction by using the CAP as a positive element 
in external economic relations. As the Commission correctly 
concluded,100 
"The next enlargement will increase both the EEC's 
sensitivity and its responsibilities towards this 
region. It should prompt greater awareness of this 
and stimulate the growth of political will to deal not 
only with the immediate consequences, important 
and difficult as they are, but also with the long -term 
aspects, the fundamental interests of the 
Mediterranean countries as a whole, set against 
which the costs and sacrifices to be borne in the 
short -term can be rightly seen as very modest." 
The need to establish a new policy along the lines indicated above 
is not a matter of political commitment, for the EEC it is a matter 
of political and economic necessity. 
100 COM (84) 107 op cit n 67, 23. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EUROPEAN ARENA. 
The enlargement of the EEC by the accession of Denmark, Ireland 
and the United Kingdom brought about a fundamental change in 
EEC relations with the rest of Europe. In part this change was 
brought about by the actions of the EEC in reaching agreements 
with members of the European Free Trade Association, (EFTA) 
which the UK and Denmark had just left. On the other hand, 
external stimulus from the Soviet Union necessitated a re- 
appraisal of EEC policy towards Eastern Europe. 
EFTA1 
Given the fact that Denmark and the UK had been members of 
EFTA, the EEC considered it necessary to make arrangements with 
these countries to ensure their continued access to these markets 
and to improve their access to the EEC market. But what sort of 
arrangement was envisaged? 
Views differed within the EFTA countries on the nature of the 
relationship they wished to establish.2 Finland, for example, 
anxious to maintain its neutrality and not to distance itself from 
Eastern Europe in general or the Soviet Union in particular, sought 
a purely bilateral agreement. Sweden on the other hand wanted 
to go as far as possible in establishing links with the EEC although 
full accession was ruled out. Sweden wanted a customs union 
arrangement and was willing to link itself with the mechanisms of 
the CAP and even its financial provisions. It would also 
participate in the development policy of the EEC. Switzerland, 
1 The EFTA was formed by the Stockholm Convention 1960. It was a 
reaction by the other Western countries of Europe against the 
formation of the EEC. 
2 See Wellenstein E. "The Free Trade Agreements between the 
enlarged EC and the EFTA Countries' (1973) 10 CML Rev 137. 
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however, was not prepared to adopt the CAP but sought close 
relations with the EEC over economic and monetary policies and 
industrial and technological problems. From the EEC viewpoint 
particular problems would have been caused had it acceded to 
Swedish and Swiss demands, for example, how would the decision 
making process operate for these "part -time members "? The EEC 
reaction was therefore to propose the conclusion of free trade 
agreements. 
The Agreements 
The negotiation of individual agreements with the EFTA countries 
was particularly useful since it allowed the EEC to vary the 
agreements to take accocunt of the particular demands of the 
EFTA countries. However they were free -trade agreements rather 
than the custom -union arrangement sought by Sweden and 
Switzerland. The Agreements exhibit a remarkable degree of 
similarity both in the preambles and in the provisions. The 
preamble to the Agreements recognises the desire of the parties 
to "consolidate and extend economic relations ", and to promote the 
"harmonious development of their trade. "3 To this end the Parties 
resolved "to eliminate progressively the obstacles to substantially 
all their trade.4 To achieve this goal a timetable is provided for 
the abolition of tariffs on industrial products. What do the 
agreements provide for agriculture? 
Agriculture being only a small part of trade between the EEC and 
the EFTA countries, as a result it was virtually excluded from the 
agreements. If agriculture was included, it would have involved a 
substantial degree of harmonization between the Parties. Such an 
3 See Agreement between the EEC and Austria JO 1972 L 300/1; 
Sweden OJ 1972 L 300/1; Iceland OJ 1972 L 301/1; Norway OJ 1973 L 
171/1; Finland OJ 1973 L 328/1; Switzerland JO1972 L 303/1. 
4 See Preamble and Article 1 of each Agreement. 
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intense degree of harmonization would have required the 
participation of the EFTA countries in the operation of the CAP. 
With the exception of Sweden and perhaps Austria, the remaining 
EFTA countries and the EEC did not wish this to happen. However, 
some provisions of the Agreements are relevant to agriculture. 
For example, Article 15 of the Austrian Agreement declares the 
parties,5 
"Readiness to foster, so far as their agricultural 
policies allow, the harmonious development of trade 
in agricultural products to which the Agreement does 
not apply." 
By virtue of Article 2 of each Agreement and Protocol 2, the only 
agricultural concessions given were on processed products. 
Article 1 of Protocol 2 provided that these products were to 
benefit from the elimination of customs duties and other similar 
charges but only to the extent that those charges represented the 
protection of the industrial part of the production.6 Charges which 
are specific to the parties agricultural policies do not participate in 
this gradual elimination. 
The Agreements in GATT 
The exclusion of nearly all agricultural products from the scope of 
the Agreements caused great concern within the GATT. It was 
claimed by some that the requirements of Article XXIV(8)(b), the 
elimination of restrictions on substantially all trade, had not been 
met.7 For although Article XXIV(8)(b) did not contain a definition 
of 'substantially all the trade', it was advocated that the phrase 
encompassed all the trade with only minor exceptions and could 
5 Op cit n 3, 
6 Ibid, Protocol 2 of the Austrian Agreement laid down the tariff 
treatment and arrangements applicable to certain goods by processing 
agricultural goods. 
7 See Chapter 1 of Section 1 of Part II of this Paper; Article XXIV: 
The Customs Union Exception. 
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not possibly encompass the exclusion of an entire sector, even if 
trade between the parties in this sector was relatively small.$ 
Even given the limited nature of the concessions granted in the 
agricultural area, some members of the Working Parties 
considered the reduction, rather than the elimination, of duties on 
processed agricultural goods created new preferences.9 As such, 
this would put the Agreements in contravention of the GATT 
because instead of being a free trade agreement, it would be a 
preferential trade arrangement. Concern was also expressed over 
the effect these preferential tariff cuts on processed agricultural 
goods would have on the operation of the EEC's generalised 
scheme of preferences for developing countries. The views of the 
Parties to the Agreements conflicted with those of other members 
of the Working Parties. 
For the Parties to the Agreements the initial and most important 
question was whether the Agreements satisfied the conditions laid 
down in Article XXIV:4. The Parties argued that the Agreements 
were in fact trade creating since they would tend to facilitate the 
development of inter -area trade and thereby achieve a closer 
integration of the parties economics.10 With respect to third 
countries, the Parties argued that the economic development 
resulting from the Agreement would lead to the stimulation of 
demand for third country products, especially, from those who 
benefitted from the GSP.11 Due to the conflict of opinions on the 
Agreements, the Working Parties could not reach any unanimous 
conclusions as to the compatibility of the Agreements with the 
8 A similar argument was raised in the GATT Working Party 
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provisions of the GATT. It confined itself to merely reporting the 
difference of opinion expressed. Once again the principles of the 
GATT had been weakened and as before, the EEC's external policy 
had been the cause. 
Agricultural Trade, Concessions or Restrictions? 
By virtue of Article 15 of the Agreements, some measures have 
been taken to facilitate the development of agricultural trade. For 
example, on the entry into force of the EEC -Iceland Agreement, 
Protocol 6 of the Agreement laid down special provisions for 
imports of certain fish products into the EEC.12 A similar fishing 
arrangement was reached between the EEC and Norway in 1978.13 
However, developments in agricultural trade has not always been 
in the nature of concessions, more frequently they are in the form 
of restrictions. One of these restrictions is a Voluntary Restraint 
Agreement (VRA) concluded with Austria and Iceland in the 
sheepmeat and goatmeat sector.14 Due to the prevalence of such 
measures in the EEC's relations with third countries, it is worth 
spending some time detailing the contents of such VRA's. 
The aim of these agreements, usually concluded by an exchange of 
letters, is to limit the exports of a particular product from a 
particular country to the EEC market15 paragraph 2 of the 
Austrian Agreement imposes a limit on the level of exports to the 
EEC to 300 tonnes per annum for sheep and goatmeat. This 
12 Op cit n 3,156. 
13 Fishery products were not extensively covered in the 1973 
Agreement. 
14 Council Decision 81/359 OJ 1981 L 137/1. 
15 For a discussion of VRA see Part II s 1 ch 2 of this Paper: Article 
XIX Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products. 
221 
paragraph also obliges Austria to undertake to implement 
appropriate procedures to ensure that the annual quantity 
exported does not exceed this amount. Should these procedures 
not be implemented, the EEC reserves the right to suspend 
imports from Austria for the remainder of that year and to offset 
the excess quantity against Austria's entitlement for the following 
year. However, in the applicaiton of the safeguard mechanism of 
the agreement, the EEC undertakes to ensure that access to the EEC 
market for Austrian exports of sheep and goatmeat will not be 
affected by such measures.16 The EEC also undertakes to limit the 
levy applicable to imports to 10% ad valorem.17 
To ensure a certain amount of flexibility and adaptability, the 
VRA's usually provide for an expansion of the quantities on the 
accession on new members to the EEC.18 Such expansion will take 
account of the existing pattern of trade between the party and the 
new member of the EEC.19 In order to ensure the smooth 
functioning of each VRA, the Parties agree to establish 
consultative arrangements, which may be initiated by a request 
by either party.20 The provisions of the VRA outlined above are 
illustrative of similar arrangements concluded by the EEC with 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, 
Thailand and Uruguay, for differing products. 
It is interesting to note the lack of commitments entered into by 
the EEC. These are restricted to a selective application of 
16 Op cit n 14, point 4 of the exchange of letters. 
17 Ibid, point 5 of the exchange of letters. 
18 Ibid, point 6 of the exchange of letters. 
19 Idem, (No increase in quantity was given to Austria when Greece 
acceded to the EEC). 
20 Ibid, point 10 of the exchange of letters. 
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safeguard measures, if these are necessary, a limit on import 
levies and a commitment to consultation. In very limited cases 
only, does the EEC agree to implement its export refund system in 
a manner which complies with existing international obligations 
and its traditional share of the market.21 The obligations of other 
countries are much more onerous; limited export potentiality; an 
export licence systems to ensure the agreed level of exports is not 
exceeded and a limited capacity to alter the arrangement for their 
benefit.22 Indeed the renegotiation of these agreements usually 
involves a reduction in the level of exports. For example, the 
latest VRA with Austria and Iceland on trade in sheep and 
goatmeat has limited their exports to the sensitive EEC markets of 
France and Ireland to zero.23 Despite the free trade agreement 
between the EEC and Austria and Iceland, these countries are still 
treated as 'third countries'. This relegates the importance of these 
agreements and frustrates the development and enhancement of 
their mutual economic relations. One concession in the VRA area 
was the Council decision of December 1984 allowing the quantities 
expressed in the VRA's to be improved in fresh, chilled or live 
quantities.24 
Further concessions to the EFTA countries include a concession on 
cheese. These reciprocal agreements were reached with Austria, 
Finland and Switzerland.25 Each of the agreements allow for the 
import of cheese from these countries at a reduced levy within 
21 Ibid, Point 8 of the exchange of letters. The interpretation of the 
words used shall be consistent with Article XVI GATT and in conformity 
with Article 10(2)(i) of the 1979 Code on Subsidies. 
22 Ibid, point 9 of the exchange of letters. 
23 See Council Decision 84/309 OJ 1984 L 154/37. 
24 Council Decision 84/1633 OJ 1984 L 331/32. 
25 As an example of these agreements see OJ 1984 L 72/30 (Austria) 
and OJ L 18/11 (Finland). 
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certain annual quotas. In return a certain amount of EEC cheese 
will be imported into these countries.26 This concession is 
particularly important to Austria, one of the countries most 
affected by the exclusion of agriculture from the scope of the free 
trade agreements. The range of agricultural concessions given to 
the EFTA countries by the Agreements is extremely limited. This 
range has been further restricted by EEC measures, such as VRA's 
and annual tariff quotas. The question should be asked; what can 
be done to improve agricultural trade relations with the EFTA 
countries and especially those countries dissatisfied with the 
current operation of the free trade agreements? 
The Future 
The free trade agreements recognised that the relationship 
between the EEC and EFTA could evolve. For example, Article 32 
of the Austrian Agreement provides,27 
"Where a Contracting Party considers that it would 
be useful in the interest of the economies of both 
Contracting Parties to develop the relations 
established by the Agreement by extending them to 
fields not covered thereby, it shall submit a reasoned 
request to the other Contracting Party." 
Each of the free trade agreements, with the exception of Finland, 
included this evolutionary clause. Any request made would be 
forwarded to the Joint Committee28 for examination and 
hopefully the making of recommendations with a view to opening 
negotiations. This is one avenue available for the expansion of the 
Agreements. 
26 Ibid, point 3 of the exchange of letters. 
27 Opcitn3. 
28 Idem, Article 29 established the Joint Committee. 
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On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Free 
Trade Agreements, the EEC's Council of Ministers reaffirmed the 
importance which it attached to the relationship established. 
Moreover, it expressed the EEC's interest in improving the 
functioning of the Agreement, and of extending their scope.29 
This positive attitude towards enlargement of the Agreements 
reflected work in the European Parliament and the Commission. 
Work which involved the enumeration of areas of potential closer 
co- operation. The 1983 list was more extensive than the 1978 list 
drawn up by the Commission, both lists included trade in 
agricultural products.30 But how is such trade to be facilitated? 
One idea would be to follow the example provided by the EFTA 
Convention itself (Articles 21 to 25). 
The original negotiators of the EFTA Convention had no desire to 
establish a common agricultural policy. Instead, the EFTA 
countries agreed to promote their mutual trade in agricultural 
products while continuing to operate their own agricultural 
policies. Articles 21 to 25 of the Stockholm Convention enables 
the countries to conclude bilateral arrangements in order to 
facilitate the growth of agricultural trade (Article 23). Annex D to 
the Convention lists the treatment applicable to agricultural 
products. The products are divided into three groups; Part I 
products (goods processed from agricultural raw materials), these 
goods are usually treated as industrial products, thereby 
benefiting from free -trade treatment. However, protection of the 
agricultural element is permissible, to the extent that the prices 
paid in different countries by producers may differ. 
Compensation under Article 21 of the Convention may be obtained 
29 COM (83) 326 Closer Co- operation between the Community and the 
EFTA Countries, 1. 
30 Ibid, 7. (Points 4 and 5 of the 1983 List).see Hurni "EFTA -EC 
Relations;Aftermath of the Luxembourg Declaration." (1986) 20 JWTL 
497. 
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through laying a variable charge on import or on export. Part II 
products are generally those covered by the EEC: EFTA free trade 
agreement. Part III products are unprocessed agricultural 
products, and by virtue of Article 23 of the Convention, trade is to 
be facilitated by the conclusion of bilateral agricultural 
agreements. Tariff concessions made under Article 23 agreements 
apply in favour of all member States, reinforcing the multilateral 
nature of such agreements. An example of one of these 
agreements is the Finnish -Austrian Agreement of 1973, whereby 
Finland made concessions on Austrian wine in return for an 
Austrian undertaking to increase imports of eggs and pork from 
Finland and to facilitate the growth of imports of oats and 
barley.31 
The adoption of such a framework for the conduct of agricultural 
trade between the EEC and the EFTA has obvious advantages for 
both. It will enable the EEC to effectively regulate the import of 
unprocessed agricultural products, whilst ensuring a place for 
EFTA producers in the EEC market. The extension of tariff 
concessions to other members of the group will facilitate the 
development of trade. Liberalization of this trade could be 
achieved by moving products from Part III through Part II to Part 
I and perhaps even removing them from the Annex altogether, 
thereby safeguarding totally free trade. Given the similarity of 
production in the EEC and EFTA countries any such liberalization 
would take place over a long term. It would allow a growth in 
agricultural imports from and agricultural exports to the EEC. It 
would also provide an example of the positive role the CAP could 
play in the relationship between the EEC and the EFTA countries. 
It would also conform to the overall philosophy of the common 
agricultural trade policy, by finding a place, through bilateral 
agreement, for EFTA agricultural exports on the EEC market. A 
development, such as the one outlined above would herald the 
31 EFTA Bulletin 3/77, 6. EFTA Treatment of Agricultural Goods. 
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arrival of true free trade in Western Europe. But what about 
Eastern Europe? 
B. The State Trading Countries 
(Soviet Union, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania 
and Czechoslovakia) 
During the 1950's, one of the political impulses to the integration 
of Western Europe was the relative weakness of these countries 
vis -a -vis the two superpowers and more especially the Soviet 
bloc. The first sentence of the Spaak report recognised this 
weakness. This report did not envisage redressing this balance by 
common external action but rather by increasing the economic 
potential of the EEC internally.32 This choice was to have an 
essentially negative impact on the ability of the EEC to establish 
relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. 
The Early Period 
The reaction of the Soviet Union to the integration of Europe 
proposed by the Rome Treaty, was to propose an economic treaty 
encompassing all of Europe.33 Considering the reaction of the six 
to the British proposal for a Western -European free -trade area, it 
is not surprising that this proposal was not acceptable to the six. 
The formation of the EEC was criticised on mainly ideological 
grounds, leaving little room for an economic appraisal of the 
32 See Pinder J and P The European Community's Policy towards 
Eastern Europe (1975). 
33 See Pinder J "The Community and State Trading Countries" in ed. 
Twithchetl KJ Europe and the World: The External Relations of the 
Common Market (1976), 57. 
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effects of the group. Eastern ideologists maintained that 
irrespective of integration in Western Europe, the capitalist 
system would eventually collapse, so there was little need to 
establish any type of relations with this new entity. The events of 
the early 1960's, (the reduction of customs duties and the 
application by non -member States for accession) brought about a 
re- appraisal of the essentially negative attitude exhibited since 
1957.34 Complaints about the effect of integration in Western 
Europe from state -trading countries, especially from the Soviet 
Union, were referred from national capitals to Brussels, this re- 
emphasised the political and legal reality of the EEC. By and large, 
the other countries of Eastern Europe followed the Soviet line of 
ignoring the EEC. 
However, these smaller countries were affected more by the 
existence of the EEC than the Soviet Union and concern about their 
exports of agricultural goods, forced a reconsideraiton of the 
policy of ignoring the EEC. 
De facto recognition 
The first manifestation of this reconsideration came when the EEC 
started to reach agreements with East European countries on the 
applicaiton of supplementary levies. These levies were imposed 
on agricultural imports which did not respect the reference price 
established for that product within the EEC. These agreements, 
which took the form of an exchange of letters, indicated that the 
EEC would not apply supplementary levies, if the countries of 
Eastern Europe undertook to respect the reference price. Such 
agreements were concluded for various products with Poland 
34 See Schlaim and Yannopoulos (ed) The EEC and Eastern Europe ch 
2 Marsh "The Development of Relations between the EEC and the CMEA" 
traces the gradual change in Soviet policy towards the EEC. 
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(1965), Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (1969) and Yugoslavia 
(1970).35 
These agreements tend to reflect the importance of the EEC for all 
State -trading countries except the Soviet Union. The current 
range of agreements include a VRA on the exports of sheepmeat 
and goatmeat from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, 
to the EEC, especially to the sensitive markets of France and 
Ireland.36 In the context of the GATT, an arrangement exists 
between the EEC and Hungary, Poland and Romania on the export 
of beef to the EEC.37 The arrangement provides for an increase in 
the EEC's overall quota for frozen boneless beef from 38,500 
tonnes to 50,000 tonnes. While the arrangement provides for no 
set quantities for export, the parties agree to exchange 
information on the import and export possibilities existing on the 
EEC and their own markets.38 
While these agreements tend to show that the EEC has established 
some form of relationship with these countries, the existence of 
EEC wide quotas on imports from State -trading countries 
constitutes an obstacle to the strengthening of these ties.39 The 
problem of quotas and common rules for imports from State - 
trading countries reflects problems of an internal nature in the 
35 Noted Pinder op cit n 32; see Binns "The Development of a Soviet 
Policy Response to the EEC': 14 (1977) co- existence 240, 241. 
36 See OJ 1982 L 204/29 (Czechoslovakia); OJ 1981 L 150/7 (Hungary); 
OJ 1981 L 137/13 (Poland) and OJ 1982 L 43/13 (Bulgaria). 




Article II of Each Agreement. 
E.g. Council Reg. 1765/82 OJ 1982 L 195/1. 
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EEC over the Common Commercial Policy. Despite the Paris 
Communique of 1972 which reaffirmed the member States,40 
"determination to follow a common commercial 
policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe with 
effect from 1 January 73." 
No such common policy actually exists. Despite the existence of an 
EEC clause in member States agreements with State -trading 
countries, the content of these agreements did not pass to the EEC 
as of 1 January 1973.41 Moreover, an EEC offer to re- negotiate 
trade agreements with State -trading countries which were about 
to lapse was not accepted. The EEC, therefore, codified in one 
regulation all the member States contractual arrangements with 
these countries. Despite appearances the regulation is an 
amalgamation of member States liberalization and quota lists 
rather than a true EEC regulation of trade. This breach of the 
terms of Article 113 (1) of the Treaty reflects not only the 
reluctance of member States to hand over control of commercial 
policy to the EEC, thereby undermining arguments about the 
interpretation of Art.113, but also the legacy of the position 
adopted in the Spaak Report.42 
Towards de jure recognition 
Despite the inconsistencies in the applicaiton of Article 113 
indicated above, some progress has been made towards de jure 
recognition by State -trading countries of the EEC. For example, 
various textile agreements have been concluded between the EEC 
40 European Political Co- operation (3rd ed) 35, 45. 
41 See Wellenstein E. "The Relations of the EC with Eastern Europe!' 
(1983) EPW 192. 
42 Idem 
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and these countries.43 Romania approached the EEC officially in 
1974 asking for, and obtaining, special treatment for some of its 
exports which qualify for the Generalized System of Preferences. 
Of greater significance than this was the agreement reached in 
1980 between the EEC and Romania to establish a Joint 
Committee . 44 The agreement, as the preamble recognises, 
provides a framework whereby discussions can take place on 
ways to ensure "the harmonious development of trade" relations 
between the two. The agreement envisages that the joint 
Committee may formulate recommendations to solve any 
problems that may arise. These recommendations could lead to 
the conclusion of agreements.45 A later agreement between these 
two parties on industrial products, indicates that in most areas 
Romania has come to terms with the existence of the EEC.46 
Realising the importance of the EEC to the trade of other eastern 
European nations, the Soviet Union has adapted its policy toward 
the EEC. This adaptation took the form of advocating relations 
between the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA).47 This body established in 1949 was initially limited to 
organizing economic, scientific and technical co- operation between 
its member countries and co- ordinating their national economic 
plans. The increasing importance of the EEC in Western Europe 
brought about changes in the structure of the CMEA giving it 
competence to conclude supra- national agreements.48 Thus 
43 See Commission Reg 3019/77 OJ L 357/3. 
44 OJ 1980 L 352/1. 
45 Article 1 - the tasks of the Joint Committee. 
46 OJ 1980 L 352/5. 
47 See John I "Co- operation in Socialist Euopre: CMEA and Warsaw 
Pact" in ed Twitchett KJ European Co- operation Today (1980), 110. 
48 Ibid, 115. 
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before the CMEA actually approached the EEC it had been 
strengthened by its parties to enable it to act as a catalyst for 
integration within Eastern Europe. 
The approach the CMEA made to the EEC was in part motivated by 
the negative reaction in Eastern Europe to the proposals made by 
the EEC in 1974. As previously stated, at this time, the EEC 
informed state -trading countries that it was ready to renegotiate 
agreements they had concluded with the member States. The 
'scheme' for these trade agreements encompassed the following 
elements:49 - long term, non preferential trade agreements; - creation of conditions to stimulate the development of trade; - mutual most -favoured -nation treatment; and - examination of the possibilities of import liberalization. 
The CAP was excluded as a subject for negotiations. Considering 
the dependence of most of the State -trading countries on exports 
of agricultural products it is not surprising that this 'scheme' met 
with an unfavourable response. Moreover, the proposal totally 
ignored the CMEA. 
The CMEA proposal, presented in February 1976, stated in its 
preamble that relations were to be broadened and strengthened 
on both a bilateral and multilateral basis.50 In relation to trade, 
Article 7 of the draft agreement after laying down the principle of 
non -discrimination continues,51 
49 See Heister "The EC and the East Bloc" in Lodge ed. Institutions and 
Policies of the EC and Baumer and Jacobsen "EC and Comecon: Intricate 
Negotiations between Two Integration Systems in Europe:' in ed Feld 
Western Europe's Global Reach (1980). 
50 "Draft Proposal for an Agreement between the CMEA and the EEC 
on Principal Mutual Relation" in Levcik and Stankovsky Industrial Co- 
operation between East and West (1979) Annex 3 265 -268. 
51 Idem. 
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"... the y i.e. the p arties ] will abolish all prohibitions 
or limitations in export and import of any product, if 
these limitations or prohibitions are not applied to all 
third countries, they will not impose them in the 
future." 
Clearly, this provision was aimed at the EEC list of import quotas, 
established every year for products from State -trading countries. 
In relation to agriculture, Article 9 of the Draft Agreements 
provides,52 
"The CMEA and the EEC will promote trade in 
agricultural goods between the member countries of 
the CMEA and the member countries of the EEC. This 
will develop on a stable, long term, and just basis. 
Member countries of the CMEA and member 
countries of the EEC will not adopt any unilateral 
measures or limitations on trade in agricultural 
products which are not applied to all third countries." 
The EEC raised many objections to the Draft Agreement. Firstly 
acceptance of the proposal would recognise the competence of the 
CMEA. This would serve to underline the role of the Soviet Union 
in this organization and thereby strengthen its hold over other 
countries within Eastern Europe.53 Secondly, the CMEA could also 
be used to weaken the influence which the EEC could exert if it 
dealt with each Eastern European country on a bilateral basis. 
Thirdly, in relation to Article 9 of the Draft Agreement, the 
objections of the EEC are easy to predict. Irrespective of the fact, 
that the EEC market would be protected by the operation and 
observance of the reference price system, Article 9 would 
interfere with the operation of the CAP. If implemented, the EEC 
would be unable to take effective safeguard measures against 
these countries, since such measures would have to be extended 
52 Idem. 
53 Luttikholt. "The Soviet Union and the EC 1957 -76:' (1977) 14 co- 
existence 79, 87. 
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to all countries, perhaps infringing the international commitments 
of the Community. The partnership priorities of the EEC, would 
also be disturbed by the implementation of Article 9. 
Despite the fact that the EEC has little to gain from a trade 
agreement with the CMEA, negotiations have continued between 
the parties. What will be the end result of these negotiations? 
Given the fact that little economic gain can be expected for the 
EEC, it may be that negotiations will settle for merely agreeing on 
those elements which provide the lowest common denominator; 
environmental issues, exchange of technology, for example.54 The 
best one can hope for in these inter -institutional negotiations is 
the establishment of a skeleton agreement whereby contacts will 
be facilitated not only between the institutions and on a member 
State to member State level but also on an institution to member 
State level. In relation to agriculture, where external competence 
rests with the EEC Institutions, this is the only way in which 
contacts and trade between the EEC and the countries of Eastern 
Europe will progress. 
The Future 
An overall assessment of the trade situation between the EEC and 
Eastern Europe reveals the following facts. The Soviet Union is not 
interested in a bilateral agreement with the EEC, since most of its 
exports are raw materials and so enter the EEC duty free. 
Moreover, the Soviet Union will wish any link between the two 
regions to be on the EEC to CMEA level, as this will tend to 
reinforce its hegemony over other East European States. Of the 
East European States, East Germany is not interested in concluding 
an agreement with the EEC, given the existence of the Protocol on 
54 Pinder J "The Community and Comecon: What could negotiations 
achieve ?" 33 World Today 176. 
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German Internal Trade attached to the Treaty of Rome.55 
However, other East European States seek some sort of 
relationship with the EEC, especially in the agricultural sphere. 
On the EEC side, there is no desire to reach an agreement with the 
CMEA since it will reinforce the hegemony of the Soviet Union and 
provide an alternative economic focus in Eastern Europe. Finally, 
individual agreements with the State -trading countries are 
favoured but these must not be at the expense of partnership 
priorities which are considered more important. So what does the 
future hold for countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and Romania? These countries could conclude 
agreements with the EEC on the basis of the Romanian agreement. 
However, given the limited power of the Joint Committee and the 
limitation of this Agreement to industrial products, this would not 
be a very satisfactory solution. 
A more satisfactory solution would be to conclude agreements 
using the EEC -China Agreement as an example.56 The preamble to 
this Agreement lists as one of its aims,57 
"[developing] economic relations and trade between 
the EEC and China on the basis of equality and 
mutual advantage ... and to give a new impetus to 
their relations" 
To this end the parties agreed to grant each other mfn treatment 
on all aspects of their trade. The parties agreed to take all 
appropriate measures to facilitate the expansion and 
diversification of their trade. A Joint Committee is set up to assist 
this expansion and diversification. One provision of the 
55 This provides that in the application of the Treaty no change 
should be made to current trade arrangements. 
56 
57 
OJ 1978 L 123/1. 
Ibid, 2. 
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Agreement which would be of interest to the five east European 
countries, is Article 4(2) of the Agreement. Under this provision 
the EEC will endeavour to introduce measures to extend the list of 
liberalized imports and increase the level of quotas.58 An 
agreement similar to the EEC -China agreement would fail to cover 
the major exports of these countries agricultural products. 
Most of the five are members of the GATT, and progress could be 
made in this area. However as section 1 of Part II of this paper 
illustrated, the application of the GATT rules to agriculture is 
spasmodic. One must doubt whether this organization could be 
used to facilitate greater agricultural trade between the five and 
the EEC. Indeed complaints by these countries about the failure of 
the EEC to liberalize its import quotas vis -a -vis their products 
have gone unheeded. Another way forward for these five is 
provided in Article XXIV GATT - a free trade area. It could 
encompass "substantially all trade" since the EEC has little to fear 
from the industrial exports of these five countries. In the 
agricultural sphere, however, concessions would not be so all 
embracing, given the need to protect the domestic interests 
served by the CAP and the balance of concessions already granted 
by the EEC to other countries. Yet possibilities exist for 
establishing concessions which would benefit the five without 
impinging on any other interests. For example, using the 
Mediterranean experience, import calendars and tariff quotas 
could be established for various products such as beef, mutton 
and goatmeat. 
However, one problem exists with this solution. Can a free trade 
agreement between a market economy and a centrally -planned 
economy lead to a free -trade area within the meaning of Article 
XXIV GATT? To some extent this question has been answered by 
the examination, within the framework of the GATT of the 
58 Ibid, Article 4(2) of the Agreement. 
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Finland -Czechoslovakia Free Trade Agreement.59 Asked about the 
import commitments of State -trading countries, the Czech 
representative replied that trade was carried out on the basis of 
long -term bilateral trade and payment agreements.60 These 
agreements include an estimate of the annual volume of trade and 
contain a list of essential items specified in quantities. So, as long 
as these bilateral agreements provide for the continuous 
expansion of trade, it would be possible to establish a free -trade 
area between differing economic systems. To some extent this is 
confirmed by the wording of Article 9 of the Agreement,61 
"Czechoslovakia shall use the means provided by the 
Czech economic system which, in addition to customs 
duties, have a bearing on the access of Finnish goods 
to the Czechoslavakian market in a manner which 
will provide for the Finnish exports advantages 
corresponding to those enjoyed by the Czech exports 
on Finnish market as a result of the liberalization 
measures taken by Finland under this Agreement." 
This provision envisages that there should be a degree of 
reciprocity between the parties, thereby ensuring compliance with 
the provisions of Article XXIV GATT. What about agricultural 
products? Protocol No.1 lays down the treatment applicable to 
agricultural goods.62 
Besides specific concessions, Article 1 enjoins the parties to foster 
the harmonious development of agricultural trade, within the 
framework of their national agricultural policies. The objective is 
to ensure that trade develops in a manner satisfactory to the 
parties. Problems of agricultural trade are subject to the 
59 BISD 23rd Supp 67. 
60 Ibid, 69. 
61 The text of the Agreement can be found in (1977) 11 JWTL 479. 
62 Idem. 
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consultaiton procedures provided in the main Agreement.63 If an 
agreement similar to the Czech -Finnis Agreement was reached 
with the interested East European States it could provide for the 
balanced expansion of trade, especially in agricultural products. It 
would provide a guaranteed export market for both parties to the 
Agreement and establish a framework in which economic (and 
development) relations could be fostered. 
Recognising that various factors militate against the formulation 
ofan EEC -CMEA link, various proposals have been made in this 
part to make progress in the relationship the EEC has with various 
East European countries. 
1. - An extension of the EEC -Romania agreement to Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland; 
2. - The signing, by these countries of an agreement similar 
to the EC -China Agreement; 
3. - The conclusion a free trade agreement between the EEC 
This last 
and these countries based on 
Czechoslavakia Free Trade Agreement. 
suggestion offers a balanced way forward in the EEC's 
the Finland- 
relations with Eastern Europe. Of course, the EEC could always 
unilaterally abandon its quota restrictions on imports of State - 
trading countries. However, given the failure of the EEC to 
establish a Common Commercial Policy vis -a -vis these countries 
by 1 January 1973, such a unilateral concession appears unlikely. 
Moreover, option 3 accords with the philosophy of the common 
agricultural trade policy (reluctant liberalism) and demonstrates 
how the CAP can be used as a positive implement in the external 
relations of the EEC. Inserting Eastern Eruope rather than CMEA in 
63 Article 15 of the Agreement establishes a Joint Commission 
responsible for the administration of the Agreement and the review of 
its implementation. By virtue of Article 16 the Joint Commission shall 
function by mutual agreement. 
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the following conclusion by Marsh, suggests that the future course 
of the relationship will be determined by the EEC.64 
"The future prospects of EEC -CMEA relations will be 
conditioned by the developing outline of EEC foreign 
economic policy and the motives underlying it. It is 
hoped that those motives do not stem from 
considerations of mere short term economic and 
political gain but are a product of a genuine desire to 
contribute to a lasting East -West economic and 
politicel détente .... At the moment the EEC holds the 
key to nature of this relationship, it remains to be 
seen whether or not it will use its power in this area 
constructively." 
An overview 
The examination of the EEC relationship with the countries of 
Eastern Europe and the EFTA illustrates the negative impact the 
CAP has had on the external economic policy of this relationship. 
Although able to face industrial product competition from the 
EFTA countries and a carefully controlled competition from 
Eastern Europe, no such open -ended approach is apparent in 
agricultural trade. Perhaps, the similarity of production between 
these countries militates against an effective agricultural 
relationship. However, given the need for the EEC to formulate a 
true agricultural trade policy, some changes will have to be made 
to the EEC relations with the rest of Europe. Proposals have been 
made with respect to the EEC's agricultural trade relations with 
these countries. In the absence of a political commitment 
relations with the rest of Europe will remain in the form outlined 
above since the economic incentive to enter a new era is not a 
powerful motivating factor for the EEC. However, the EEC should 
not disregard the opportunities presented to it, not only to 
encourage free trade within Europe but also to establish a lasting 
64 Op cit n 34, 38. 
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and stable peace between East and West. The CAP should not 
determine the nature of the relationship which the EEC has with 
the rest of Europe rather this relationship should determine how 
the CAP operates within Europe. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DEVELOPED COUNTRY RELATIONS, 
"THE UNASSOCIABLES ". 
To have a truly international personality the EEC must be able to 
establish relations with all countries, especially with those as 
developed as it is. As the statement of the conference of the 
Heads of State and Government of the member States of the 
Community, meeting in Paris, in 1972 declared,' 
"With regard to the industrial countries, the EEC is 
determined, in order to ensure the harmonious 
development of world trade: - to maintain a constructive dialogue with the 
United States, Japan, Canada and its other 
industrialized trade partners in a forthcoming 
spirit, using the most appropriate measures." 
What are these appropriate measures? Has the EEC shown a 
forthcoming spirit? And more importantly, have relations 
between the EEC and these countries contributed to the 
harmonious development of world trade? The following account 
of the EEC's relations with such countries as Australia, Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand and the United States will provide the 
answers to these questions. 
Australia 
Australia was one of the three developed Commonwealth 
countries affected by the 1973 enlargement. Unlike New Zealand 
for whom special arrangements were made in the Treaty of 
Accession, or Canada who subsequently concluded a co- operation 
1 European Political Co- operation (3rd ed, 1977) 35, 45. 
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EEC links with Australia are fostered through ministerial 
consultations.2 How did enlargement affect Australia? 
The most significant change in Australian trade over the past 
decade has been the declining importance of agricultural exports. 
It is not surprising that the CAP has been a target of criticism. 
Criticisms which seem justified on examination of the trade 
relations in agricultural products between the EEC and Australia. 
Between 1974 and 1977, Australia was one of those countries 
severely affected by the special safeguard measures taken by the 
EEC to limit imports of beef. A continuing role for Australia in the 
EEC beef market was to some extent guaranteed by EEC 
concessions in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Of the global quota of 20,000 tonnes of fresh, chilled or frozen 
bovine meat, Australia has a quota of 5000 tonnes.3 While this is 
a valuable concession, Australian complaints do not end here. On 
enlargement, Australia managed to diversify its markets for beef 
exports, especially to the Middle and Far East. The fourth round 
of ministerial consultations in June 1985 brought about a 
commitment from the EEC not to grant export refunds for 
European beef exports to the Far East.4 In the light of this 
assurance Australia dropped a complaint which it had made to 
GATT on the EEC export refund system for beef. However, in 
September 1985, the export refund system was reinstituted for 
ten designated countries in the Pacific. While recognising that 
these ten are countries where beef consumption is low, this action 
provoked criticism from Australia. New measures to reduce the 
EEC surplus of beef, through reducing the price at which surplus 
beef is sold to merchants for exports outside the EEC, have also 
2 See Miller "The EC and Australia' in ed Lodge Institutions and 
Policies of the EC and Miller "The Unassociables`.' The EEC and developed 
countries overseas:: 30 World Today 327. 
3 
4 
OJ 1980 L 71/160. 
EC News No.5 1985, 1. 
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been criticised for threatening Australian markets in both the 
Middle East and Far East. The debate continues.5 
Restrictions have been placed on the export of sheepmeat and 
goatmeat from Australia. The quantity is set at 17,500 tonnes per 
annum, a significant reduction in traditional Australian exports to 
the EEC.6 Further restrictions are also placed on traditional 
Australian exports of cheese, these being limited to annual quotas 
of 2,500 tonnes of cheddar cheese and 500t of processed cheese.7 
However, the greatest source of criticism of the CAP relates to the 
common organization of the market in sugar. Until 1975 Australia 
was the main beneficiary of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. 
The demise of this Agreement and the negotiation of Protocol 3 of 
the Lomé Convention, on exports of sugar to the EEC, ended this 
trade in sugar. Australia was forced to find alternative markets 
for its sugar exports. This process was not helped by the failure 
of the 1977 ISA or the growth of EEC sugar exports through the 
export refund system. As previously noted, Australia was one of 
the countries who complained to the GATT about the EEC's export 
refund system for sugar. A complaint which did not yield a very 
satisfactory result for Australia. 
EEC -Australia dialogue has been carried out within the 
multilateral framework of the GATT and OECD and on a bilateral 
basis through ministerial consultations betweeen the Commission 
and Australia. The relationship in the 1970's and early 1980's 
was characterised by 'acrimonious debate' over the effects of the 
CAP. The recent Labour Government, led by Mr Hawke, has 
ushered in a new phase in the relationship whereby Australia 
hopes to achieve its aims by consultation rather than 
5 EC News No.4 1986, 1. 
6 OJ 1980 L 275/13, 20. 
7 OJ 1980 L 71/164. 
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confrontation . 8 It remains to be seen whether this change of 
approach by Australia will yield any significant concessions from 
the EEC in the agricultural area. 
Canada 
Canada, another of the Commonwealth countries affected by the 
1973 enlargement was not as severely affected as either Australia 
or New Zealand. The nature of its trade is heavily reliant on the 
United States market. This over -concentration motivated 
Canadian policy makers to find ways to deepen and diversify their 
external relations. In order to achieve this better balance in their 
external economic relations, the Canadians sought to establish 
relations with the EEC. The end result of the pursuit of this '3rd 
Option' was the conclusion in 1976 of a Framework Agreement for 
Commercial and Economic Co- operation between the two parties.9 
The Agreement recognises the Canadian desire to establish a 
direct link with the EEC and its member States. And in a phrase 
which is echoed in other EEC agreements, the parties resolved to 
"consolidate, deepen and diversify their commercial and economic 
relations ".10 Article 1 of the Agreement states that each party 
grants the other most -favoured -nation treatment,11 a strange 
provision considering that the parties are already under this 
obligation as a result of their adherence to the GATT. The 
remainder of the Agreement is limited to means of encouraging 
commercial and economic co- operation and to this end a joint 
8 
9 
BISD 26th Supp 290. 
EC News No.4 and 10, 1986. 
10 OJ 1976 L 260/36. See Lasok D "Involvement with the EEC: Some 
Canadian Considerations" (1976) 22 McGill LJ 574. 
11 Ibid, 36. 
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Committee has been established.12 The nature of the Agreement 
is non -commital. However, it does provide an avenue through 
which EEC -Canadian relations can be fostered and developed, 
especially since in the field of economic co- operation no matter is 
excluded. 
Agricultural relations between the EEC and Canada have centred 
on Canadian claims for compensation arising out of the 
enlargements of the EEC and the negotiation of an agreement for 
cheese. An agreement was reached within the context of GATT 
enabling Canada to export cheese to the EEC.13 The EEC, according 
to the Agreement, undertakes to import an annual quantity of 
2,750 tonnes of aged cheddar. Canadian obligations under the 
agreement include an obligation to respect the minimum prices 
prevailing on the EEC market.14 Like the cheese agreement 
reached with Australia, the Agreement includes a safeguard 
clause which enables the EEC to make adjustments to the quota, in 
consultation with Canada, should difficulties arise on the EEC 
market.15 The Agreement fails to compensate Canada for the 
effects of the 1973 enlargement. Since the concession on cheese is 
reciprocal, it has been pointed out that whilst Canada must respect 
the minimum price on the EEC market, there is nothing to stop the 
EEC from selling below these prices on the Canadian market.16 
Relations with Canada in the agricultural area encounter the 
stumbling block which also affects Australia's relations with the 
Community, the CAP. It is the competitiveness of these nations' 
12 Idem. 





OJ 1980 L 71/129. 
Point I of the Agreement. 
Point I, 2. 
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agriculture which obstructs a more wide ranging relationship in 
the agricultural area. Canada has turned away from the EEC since 
1976, perhaps, in recognition of the futility of the "Third Option" 
and the inevitable nature of its dependence on the United States 
as an export market for its products. Ministerial discussions 
between the EEC and Canada have tended to focus on the wider 
issues of the multilateral trade system and, the EEC's import ban 
on seal products which adversely affects Canadian interests.17 
Japan 
EEC relations with Japan suffer from the inadequacies which 
characterise the EEC's relations with the CMEA; a lack of 
agreement between the member States and the Community 
institutions on the proper interpretation of Article 113.1 8 
Ministerial discussions centred on the rising tide of Japanese 
exports to the Communtiy, especially in the high technology 
area.19 To counter this deterioration in the trade balance, the EEC 
efforts in these consultations concentrate on persuading the 
Japanese to open up its domestic market, to allow for an increase 
in EEC industrial exports. Agricultural issues are rarely discussed. 
17 Cohn "Canada and the EEC's CAP. The issue of trade in Cheese.' 
(1978) 1 JEI 125. Point I, 3 of the Agreement envisages discussions 
between the parties only if Canadian prices cause serious difficulties on 
the Community's cheese market. 
18 
19 
EC News 1985 No.6, 4. 
See Chapter 2 of this Part. 
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New Zealand 
The most adversely affected commonwealth country as a result of 
the 1973 enlargement was New Zealand.20 Earlier accession 
applications by the United Kingdom brought about a realization 
within New Zealand that efforts would have to be made to ensure 
the continued accessibility of its exports to the United Kingdom 
market.21 Intense political negotiations by various New Zealand 
governments and by the British government on behalf of New 
Zealand brought forth a solution to the problems which would face 
this country in the event of British accession to the EEC. This 
solution for two of New Zealand's most vital exports was 
enshrined in Protocol 18 of the 1972 Act of Accession. This 
provided for continued New Zealand exports of cheese and butter 
to the UK market.22 
Protocol 18 authorised New Zealand exports of cheese to the 
United Kingdom market from 1973 to 1977, although the 
quantities declined as each year passed. Article 5(3) of the 
Protocol precluded the extension of this arrangement beyond 
December 31 1977.23 Anxious to continue its export of cheese to 
the UK market, the New Zealand government pressed for the 
extension of the arrangement after this date. Such an extension 
was not contemplated by the EEC. A solution to the problem was 
found in the context of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations whereby New Zealand was given an annual quota of 
9000 tonnes (6500 tonnes cheddar and 2,500 tonnes processed 
20 EC News No.2 1986, 1. 
21 See Lodge J The European Community and New Zealand. 
22 See McCluskie R The Great Debate (1986) for a discussion of the 
dialogue between NZ and the UK during the 1963 negotiations on UK 
entry to the EEC. 
23 EEC Treaty of Accession Appendix 1 Cmnd 5179 (1973). 
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cheese) . 24 This arrangement is similar to that reached with 
Australia. Imports are allowed provided they conform to the 
minimum price requirements of the EEC market. However, given 
the fact that in 1973 New Zealand actually delivered 100,000 
tonnes to the UK market, this concession imposes a considerable 
burden on New Zealand.25 Attempts to diversify have been 
thwarted by the presence of the EEC export refund system in the 
international cheese market. 
In relation to butter, Protocol 18 was much more generous. It 
allowed for substantial quantities of New Zealand butter to be 
exported to the UK market. However, several problems have 
arisen with its provisions. For example, the pricing formula 
envisaged that New Zealand would receive a price representing 
the average of prices over the years 1969 to 1972.26 The effects 
of inflation and the application of monetary compensatory 
amounts soon made it uneconomic for New Zealand to export to 
the UK market. Perhaps, this was one of the reasons why the New 
Zealand quota for 1973 and 1974 was not fully filled. New 
Zealand complaints about the pricing system were resolved at the 
Conference of EEC Heads of Government in 1975. The Dublin 
Declaration stipulated that the EEC,27 
... which remains attached to the fair 
implementation of the Protocol is ready to review 
periodically and as necessary to adjust the prices 
having regard to the supply and demand 
developments in the major producing and consuming 
countries of the world and also to the level and 




OJ 1980 L 71/149. 
26 Actual deliveries of NZ cheese to the UK in 1976 and 1977 exceeded 
the quotas established. 
27 Op cit n 23. 
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The cost to New Zealand of this concession on the pricing formula 
was a recognition by New Zealand of the principle of degressivity 
of supply. This was a serious blow to New Zealand hopes, since for 
negotiating reasons, it was essential that New Zealand should 
resist any attempts to phase out what it regarded as a permanent 
arrangement.28 It is not surprising that the quantities allowed to 
be exported should decrease, given the impression created in EEC 
circles that New Zealand was not making the most of the 
opportunities provided by the Protocol. 
This concept of degressivity was applied when the butter 
concession was re- negotiated at the end of 1977. Article 5(2) of 
the Protocol envisaged the negotiation of,29 
"Appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance 
after December 31, 1977 of exceptional 
arrangements in respect of imports of butter from 
New Zealand." 
When these "exceptional arrangements" were reviewed towards 
the end of 1977, it was noted that the situation not only in the UK 
market but also the EEC market had changed. On the former, 
production of butter had increased significantly whilst, on the 
latter, problems of surplus production had led to the introduction 
of a "co- responsibility levy" to deter excess production. Previous 
regulations governing the import of New Zealand had limited the 
New Zealand share of the U.K. market for direct consumption of 
butter to 25% and charging a special levy on all other uses.30 It 
had proved difficult to implement this system. 
28 New Zealand and the EEC: Basic Facts (1979), 41. See also Green 
Europe No.171 EEC Imports. The NZ File and Annex 1 to COM (83) 616. 
29 Lodge J "New Zealand and the European Community.' Yearbook of 
World Affairs 1981, 208, 209 et seq. 
30 Op cit n 23. 
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The 1977 review concluded with the application of the principle 
of degressivity to New Zealand butter exports, setting the 1978 
quota at 125,000 tonnes declining to 115,000 tonnes in 1980.31 
New Zealand had lost its arguments for a permanent, fixed 
arrangement. Further reviews of these "exceptional arrangements" 
have led to further deductions in the level of exports from 94,000 
tonnes in 1981 to 79,000 tonnes in 1986.32 During the visit of the 
EEC's Commissioner for Agriculture to New Zealand in September 
1985, the promise was made that,33 
"In its considerations the Commission will, as in 
earlier years, use its full powers to ensure that an 
appropriate balance be struck between the diverse 
interests of all parties concerned." 
What are these "diverse interests "? From the New Zealand point 
of view, despite efforts at diversification, it remains heavily 
dependent on the EEC market. From the EEC's point of view, the 
increasing surplus of milk and milk products is a major cause of 
concern. Although a modification to the International Dairy 
Agreement in June 1985 enabled the EEC to dispose of some 
surplus stock, this accomplished a reduction in, rather than the 
elimination of stocks. The attitudes of some member States is 
against any continuation of the "privileged position" enjoyed by 
New Zealand on the EEC butter market.34 As a Commission report 
31 Reg. 1655/76 OJ 1976 L 185/1. Article 3. This particular 
regulation has been amended frequently to extend the import 
arrangement. Reg.2007/84 OJ 1984 L 187/7 on its amendment of Reg. 
3667/83 stated that before August 1 1985 the Council should unanimously 
decide on the maintenance of the exceptional arrangement from 
January 1 1989. 
32 EC News 1986 no 8,1. 
33 Address to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs 
(Wellington September 3 1985), 10. 
34 Lodge op cit n 29, 214. 
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on the functioning of Protocol 18 and subsequent regulations 
noted, New Zealand exports constitute less than 4% of total EEC 
production.35 The report quite correctly points out that stopping 
imports would "not solve the Community's milk problem nor 
relieve the Community of its responsibility to restore balance ". 
The report concludes,36 
"Any major and abrupt drop in the quantities to be 
exported by New Zealand to the UK would have 
serious consequences for that country's economy 
which would adversely affect the political and 
economic relationship between New Zealand and the 
Community." 
A political commitment seems likely to be made allowing for the 
continued export of New Zealand butter to the UK market, perhaps 
around the 70,000 tonnes per annum figure.37 The grounds for 
the conclusion rest on the more overt political dimension to the 
relationship between the EEC and New Zealand. Both are 
interested in the development and stability of the South Pacific 
region. 
Problems have arisen in other areas of agricultural trade, exports 
of apples from New Zealand are subject to a voluntary restraint 
agreement, as are exports of mutton, lamb and goatmeat, even 
though the latter is not particularly restrictive.38 The level of 
dependence on continued access to the Community market for 
New Zealand products indicates the importance which it attaches 
to a constructive relationship with the EEC. The broadening of the 
relationship, through the consultative committee arrangement, 
35 COM (83) 616 Report on the functioning of the arrangements 





Comment by Andreissen op cit n 33. 
OJ 1980 L 275/28. 
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indicates the importance which the EEC attaches to having one 
friendly ally in the South Pacific region and its desire to create "a 
more active partnership across the board. "39 
The United States 
Initially a supporter of move towards European integration, the 
United States soon became concerned about the operation of the 
then "fledgling" CAP. This concern manifested itself in what has 
become known as the 'Chicken War'.40 
This "war" arose from the following development of the CAP. 
Regulation 22 laid down measures for the gradual establishment 
of a common organization of the market in poultry meat.41 In 
order to keep West German production competitive against 
imports a special compensatory payment was levied in the nature 
of an import duty. A drop in the level of American poulty exports 
to West Germany led to demands from the United States for a 
modification of the pricing arrangements laid down in Reg. 22. 
The American administration using the "unsatisfied" negotiating 
rights which it claimed under Article XXIV:6 GATT sought to open 
negotiations.42 Irrespective of the merits of the claim, it was 
doubted whether the United States fulfilled the conditions under 
39 Address to the NZIIA in Christchurch reported EC News No.5 1986, 3. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Lodge op cit n 29, 220. 
40 See Daleiden "Agricultural Policy and the Import of Poultry Meat 
from the United States" (1963) 1 CML Rev 339. Walker "Dispute 
Settlement The Chicken War: (1964) 58 AJIL 671. 
41 Walker op cit n 41, 673 -77. 
42 Ibid, 682. See also Ames and Turner "US Poultry Exports 
Challenging EC and Brazilian Poultry Subsidies'. (1986) 1 FILJ 109. 
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Article XXVIII GATT.43 The main interest in the dispute was the 
attempt by the United States to influence the development of the 
CAP. The end result of the dispute was the promise by the 
Community that,44 
"until the putting into operation of the CAP for corn, 
Sorghum, rice, ordinary wheat and poultry, the 
member States undertake not to modify their 
national import systems in such a way as to make 
them more restrictive." 
However, this did not preclude the common organization of the 
markets for these products from being restrictive whenever the 
national import systems were replaced by a common import 
system. 
American efforts to influence the CAP continued during the 
Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations. However, as 
already noted, the Kennedy Round was a failure insofar as 
discussion of agricultural trade was concerned.45 Increasingly, the 
CAP became the major bone of contention between the parties. 
This was because of the relative decline in traditional agricultural 
exports from the United States to the EEC, and because the 
Community had started to compete with the United States on the 
world markets. The fact that such exports were facilitated by the 
EEC's export refund system, fuelled the criticisms levelled against 
the CAP by the United States. 
In the late 1960's criticism of the CAP was directed against the 
preferential trade agreements concluded by the EEC with Spain 
43 See discussion of this dispute Part II s 1 ch 2: Article XXVIII: 
Modification of Tariff Schedules. 
44 EC Bull Supp 4/62, 69 -70. See also Harris S EEC Trade Relations 
with the USA in Agricultural Products. (1977). 
45 See Part II sl ch3 GATT attempts to influence domestic 
agricultural policy. 
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and Israel. The United States complained that these agreements 
would cause trade diversion in favour of the preferred countries. 
A request by the EEC for a waiver from its obligations under 
Article I GATT, in order to reduce the customs duties facing citrus 
fruits originating in Spain and Israel, was severely criticised.46 
Most members of the Working Party, established to consider the 
request, thought that such preferences were not necessary, given 
the efficient nature of production in these two countries.47 Most 
members of the Working Party in fact doubted whether such 
preferences were in conformity with the basic GATT principle of 
non- discrimination.48 Unable to prepare a draft text of the 
waiver, the Working Party reached no agreed conclusion. 
Disregarding the divergence of opinion within the Working Party, 
the EEC concluded preferential trade agreements with Spain and 
Israel, which provided for tariff concessions on the exports of 
citrus fruit. 
Angered by this infringement of the GATT, the United States 
lodged a complaint against the Agreements on the grounds that 
they violated the mfn principle of Article I GATT and the value of 
tariff concessions under Article II GATT. This situation was 
remedied by the Casey /Soames Agreement of 1973. In return for 
the US dropping the complaint against the agreements, the EEC 
undertook not to expand its agreements with the countries of the 
Mediterranean.49 The expansion of these agreements through the 
Global Mediterranean Policy jeopardises the Casey /Soames 
Agreement. Do the preferences granted by the EEC to 




BISD 17 Supp 61. 
Ibid, 65. 
Ibid, 67. 
49 Gaines, Sawyer and Sprinkle "EEC Mediterranean Policy and US 
Trade in Citrus" (1981) 15 JWTL 431, 431 -434. 
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way? A study has noted three potential effects of the 
Mediterranean Agreements concluded by the EEC on US trade in 
citrus. They are,50 
"(1) US exports to the EEC should decline due to the 
displacement by Mediterranean suppliers; 
(2) US exports to third countries should decline due to 
the increased competition from either displaced 
non -preferred suppliers; and finally 
(3) US imports should increase as other non -preferred 
suppliers seek markets for their displaced 
production." 
The study concludes that trade diversion in favour of the 
Mediterranean countries has in fact occurred.51 US complaints 
have eased due to negotiated tariff reductions for citrus fruits for 
non -preferred countries in their peak growing system. It seems 
likely that this arrangement will be nullified by the enlargement 
of the EEC, given the high level of Spanish production, and the fact 
that this production will cease to attract customs duties. The 
complaints of the United States made in the early 70's could well 
reappear in the late 80's. 
The Tokyo Round of trade negotiations constituted another 
opportunity for the United States to criticise the CAP, whilst 
looking for some concessions from the EEC. However, the fact that 
the CAP had escaped the Kennedy Round intact and had matured 
in the intervening period limited the possibilities for concessions. 
The Tokyo Round was as much of a failure vis -a -vis agricultural 
trade as was the Kennedy Round. Disputes between the EEC and 
the US about the framework of negotiations, and a new 
international grains agreement and the new code on subsidies 
militated against any substantial progress. Some concessions were 






concerning the poultry sector, reduced the threshold prices and 
levies on certain poultry parts.52 An exchange of letters also led 
to the reduction in the threshold price for round grain rice53 and 
a tariff quota of 10,000 tonnes was established for high quality 
beef.54 Such concessions only tamper with the CAP rather than 
bring about a fundamental re- evaluation of its provisions. 
As the relationship between these two parties moved into the 
1980's, the United States adopted a much more strident approach 
to the CAP. For example, American reaction to a new common 
organization of the market in sugar was to enact a new Sugar Act 
which effectively prohibited EEC access to the American market.55 
The rationale behind the legislation stems from the export - 
subsidy system used by the EEC. This system has been at the 
centre of two American complaints to the GATT over EEC exports 
of wheat flour and pasta.56 The Reagan Administration currently 
has a catalogue of complaints on the operation of the CAP which, 
in addition to the complaints on export subsidies, mentioned 
above, include,57 
"(i) high import levies which shield the EEC from world 




OJ 1980 L 71/138. 
Idem. 
OJ 1980 L 71/139. 
55 See Terlinden European Sugar Policy (1985) and Tsadik 
"International Sugar Market: Self- Sufficiency or Free Trade." (1982) 16 
JWTL 133. 
56 BISD 29th Supp 46, 47. See also Coccia "Settlement of Disputes in 
GATT under the Subsidies Code: Two Panel Reports on EEC Export 
Subsidies: 16 Ga J Int'l & Comp L 1 (1986) and "Just Friends: Proceedings of 
the 77th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law. 
57 Ginsberg "The EC and the USA: in ed Lodge Institutions and 
Policies of the EC ", see Friedman L The Troubled Alliance: Atlantic 
Relations in the 1980's (1983). 
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(ii) high -price support levels on open ended production 
leading to surpluses that are often subsidized for 
export; 
(iii) Mediterranean tariff preferences for citrus products; 
(iv) the recommendation for a levy on imports of oils 
and fats, to pay for the accession of Spain; and 
finally, 
(v) the proposed levy on cereals substitutes." 
How is this relationship between the EEC and the United States to 
advance? Various possible avenues of compromise have been 
suggested58 including; an agreement to disagree over the trade 
effects of domestic agricultural policy; movement on the United 
States position against Commodity Agreements thereby satisfying 
EEC demands for more stable international markets; movement 
on the EEC side through a reduction in the level of export 
subsidies; marketing sharing arrangements; and finally a 
standstill agreement. Recalling that any agreement will have to 
satisfy the objectives sought to be realised by each parties 
domestic agricultural policies and noting the divergences of these 
objectives one must seriously doubt whether any agreement is 
possible given past disagreements bewtween the EEC and US. 
Perhaps, the best that can be hoped for is an improvement in the 
consultation procedure. As Lamb notes,59 
"We export many of the same products as the EEC, 
but without government subsidies. When subsidised 
EC products threaten to knock US out of traditional 
markets or prevent US from getting a toehold in new 
ones, there is bound to be conflict. It is tempting to 
threaten to outsubsidise the competition and indeed, 
until the early seventies we did subsidise farm 
exports - but it is less costly and certainly safer from 
58 Harris op cit n 45. 
59 Lamb "Issues in US- European Community Relation: in UACES The 
United States and the European Community!' New Administration and 
Continuing Problems, (1981) 1, 5. 
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an economic point of view to try to manage each 
problem as it arises or, ideally, before it arises." 
An overall appraisal 
An answer can now be given to the questions asked at the 
beginning of this chapter. As to the appropriate measures, it is 
obvious that this is by the establishment of ministerial 
consultation arrangements. The forms of partnership chosen by 
the EEC to deal with the countries of the Mediterranean and of 
EFTA, have been deemed inappropriate for these five developed 
countries. Perhaps, it is because these types of agreements are 
designed to complement the trade of the partners with that of the 
Community. Given the nature of competition between these five 
nations and the EEC, free trade or co- operation agreements are 
clearly inappropriate. 
As for the forthcoming spirit and the harmonious development of 
world trade, the answers to these questions clearly show that 
neither is accurate. The EEC's reaction to these five, with the 
exception of Japan and perhaps New Zealand, underlines the basic 
assumption of the CAP. Internal production will provide most of 
the food required by the EEC, where imports are required they 
will be for products either not produced in the EEC in sufficient 
quantities or at all. Because these countries are producers of 
temperate -zone products which directly competes with internal 
production, access for them is limited. As such, it could hardly be 
said that the EEC has contributed to the harmonious development 
of world trade in agricultural products. Equally, these countries 
have not significantly contributed to the harmonious devlopment 
of world trade. The situation on the world markets is neither the 
fault nor responsiblity of the EEC. 
What solution can be found to this problem? Is a solution desired? 
It is obvious that the GATT could not be used as a forum for 
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finding a solution, given the ineffectiveness of this organization in 
so far as agricultural trade is concerned. Perhaps the more 
limited organization, the OECD, could provide a framework for 
further consultations searching for a solution. The crux of the 
problem is not which organization is chosen or which method is 
opted for but rather the lack of desire on the part of the EEC for a 
solution to be found. Any solution would tamper with the 
intricate balance established by the CAP. It must be assumed that 
since the EEC has put minimal effort in establishing relations with 
these five developed nations, that it is happy with the outcome. If 
it were not, it would strive to improve these relations. With the 
exception of Japan, it was these countries which wanted to 
associate in a constructive fashion with the EEC rather than vice 
versa. Given this situation, relations between the five and the EEC 
will develop in areas outside agriculture. For example, the 
Committee on Raw Materials between the EEC and Australia and 
the consultative committee with New Zealand aiding co- operation 
with South Pacific countries. It is to be regretted that the EEC has 
chosen this minimalist option. It downgrades the role these 
countries and the EEC could play in the revitalization of world 
trade with respect to agriculture and in the development of the 
developing countries. In light of this, the following statement of 
the Foreign Ministers of the EEC on the European Identity appears 
empty of real meaning,60 
"The Community, the world's largest trading group 
could not be a closed economic entity. It has close 
links with the rest of the world as regards its 
supplies and market outlets. For this reason the 
Community, while remaining in control of its own 
trading policies, intends to exert a positive influence 
on world economic relations with a view to the 
greater well -being of all." 
60 Copenhagen Declaration, December 1973, point I, 7. European 
Political Co- operation (3rd ed 1978), 69, 71. 
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It could be asked, whether the EEC is in control of the CAP or is 
the CAP in control of the EEC? This discussion of EEC relations 
with developed countries tends to show that the latter rather than 
the former is the case. 
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CHAPTER 4: DEVELOPING COUNTRY RELATIONS, 
THE NON ASSOCIATES. 
The European Community's approach to developing country 
relations illustrates a conflict between the member States over the 
orientation of the EEC's development policy. Whereas some 
member States favour a regionalist approach, concentrating on 
Africa, other member States press for a globalist approach, which 
would treat all developing countries equally.' The conflict 
between these differing approaches is obvious when on 
examination of EEC's relations with Latin American and Asian 
countries. 
Latin America 
At the end of the 1970's the Economic Commission for Latin 
America noted,2 
"The market of the European Community is at 
present the most important for Latin America after 
that of the United States. In addition, exports to the 
EC have increased more rapidly than those to the 
United States. Thus the European Community has 
played the most important role in balancing and 
diversifying Latin America's trade relations. For its 
part, Latin America is one of the most important 
regions, as regards both the volume and composition 
of its purchases." 
Was the reason for this situation the relationship established by 
the EEC with the countries of Latin America? 
1 For further discussion of this point see Part IV of this Paper. 
2 Cited in Mower AG. The EC and Latin America: A Case Study in 
Global Role Expansion. 
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The first step in the relationship was made by a Council decision 
of December 1970 which agreed to the establishment of a 
permanent co- operation mechanism.3 The decision suggested 
meetings at ambassadorial level between the EEC and the 
countries of Latin America. This permanent dialogue provided no 
tangible improvement in the relations between these two regions. 
Perhaps, the heterogenity of Latin America, characterised by the 
presence of newly industrialized countries, developing countries 
and even least developed countries, militated against one overall 
approach. To counter this heterogenity, the EEC opted for a series 
of bilateral agreements with some of the more advanced countries 
of the region. This bilateral approach was to some extent 
anticipated by the countries of the region in the 1970 Buenos 
Aires Declaration. 
The Agreements 
The aims of the Agreements concluded between 1973 and 1975 
between the EEC and Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were 
inspired by the parties determination to,4 
"Strengthen, deepen and diversify [trade] relations 
for their mutual benefit." 
Each of the Agreements granted the parties most favoured nation 
treatment, not only on customs duties but also on all charges of 
any kind on imports and exports.5 Concessions in the agricultural 
area were made to Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. For example in 
3 Muniz "EEC -Latin America: a relationship to be defined" (1980) 19 
JCMS 55. 
4 OJ 1973 L 333/1 (Uruguay); OJ Sp Ed 1971, (Argentina); OJ 1974 L 
102/23, (Brazil; OJ 1975 L 247/1 (Mexico). [See also OJ 1982 L 281/1: 
Framework Agreement for Co- operation between the EEC and Brazil.] 
5 Article 2 of the Agreements. 
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relation to Brazil, Annex I of the Agreement implemented a EEC 
concession on beef.6 This concession stated that when 
implementing the market organization in beef and veal, the EEC 
would endeavour to fix the suspension of the levy at the highest 
possible level.? Further concessions included the binding, at 20 %, 
of the rate of duty on fresh, frozen or chilled bovine meat.8 
Similar concessions were also made to Argentina and Uruquay.9 
Despite concessions in the agricultural area and the wording of 
Article 3 of the Agreements (mutual co- operation in agricultural 
matters), the countries of Latin America remain dissatisfied with 
the concessions and the operation of the CAP. 
The CAP poses a serious problem for Latin American producers 
since agricultural goods constitute over fifty per cent of the EEC's 
imports from the region.lo One particular aspect of the policy, the 
variable levy, has been criticised by Latin American exporters as 
an unduly protectionist device. Coupled these complaints, the 
common external tariff has also been criticised since it tends to 
reinforce the CAP and so excludes a large volume of exports from 
Latin America countries. The existence of non -tariff barriers 
further restricts the level of trade. As recognised in an Annex to 
all the agreements, the main growth area in trade between these 
regions stems from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
It is this device rather than the bilateral agreements which has 
been responsible for the growth of EEC -Latin American trade. 
6 Op cit n 4, 28. 
7 Idem. 
8 Ibid, Article 4 of the Agreement. 
9 Op cit n 4, 5. 
10 COM (84) 105 Guidelines for the strengthening of relations 
between the Community and Latin America, Annex 1. 
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Recent Developments 
Since the conclusion of the agreements between the EEC and the 
countries of Latin America, several developments have obstructed 
improvements in the established relations. The partnership 
priorities of the EEC have shifted away from Latin America 
towards Asia and Africa. The decline in the relationship is also 
attributable to other factors. 
One particular aspect of this decline has been the conclusion of 
voluntary restraint agreements with these countries, covering 
various products. The most notable of these has already been 
referred to, the VRA in the sheepmeat and goatmeat sector. This 
VRA has been concluded with Argentina and Uruguay with the 
level of exports from these countries being set at 23,000 tonnes 
and 5,800 tonnes respectively.11 Recent re- negotiations of these 
agreements have limited exports to the sensitive EEC market of 
France and Ireland to zero.12 With respect to Brazil, a voluntary 
restraint agreement has been concluded in relation to manioc (an 
effort by the EEC to limit the use of cereal substitutes within the 
Community).13 Despite some concessions, notably on beef, the 
trade relationship between these two regions has continuously 
deteriorated since the signing of the Agreements. 
Relations deteriorated still further in the wake of the dispute 
between the United Kingdom and Argentina over the sovereignty 
of the Falkland Islands and the imposition by the EEC of sanctions 
against Argentina. This hiatus was broken by two events; the 





OJ 1980 L 275/13 (Argentina); OJ 1980 L 275/37 (Uruguay). 
Council Decision 84/309 OJ 84 L 154/49. 
OJ 1982 L 219/58. 
COM (84) 105 op cit n 11, 2. 
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conclusion of a Co- operation Agreement between the EEC and the 
member States of the Cartagena Agreement (the Andean Pact).15 
As with the bilateral agreements of the 1970's the agreement's 
objective iss to deepen, extend and diversify the parties economic 
and trade relations.16 The sole economic impact of this 
Agreement comes from the decision by the EEC to treat the 
Andean Pact members as one customs area. This allows them to 
benefit from the cumulative origin provisions of the EEC's GSP.17 
This illustrates the point already made, that the main, perhaps 
sole, benefit which Latin American countries have derived from 
their association with the EEC comes, not from the bilateral 
agreements and agricultural concessions therein, but, from the 
operation of the GSP. This result is not surprising considering the 
fact that the EEC has other partnership priorities to which it 
attaches greater weight.. It is against this background that any 
evaluation of the future of the link between these two regions 
must be considered. The range of factors /interests which govern 
the EEC's relation with the ACP countries through the Lomé 
Convention, the relations with the Mediterranean countries and 
even the lack of relations with Eastern Europe serve to reinforce 
the lowly position of Latin America in the 'pyramid of privilege'. 
The impact of enlargement 
The enlargement of the EEC to include Spain and Portugal, two 
countries with historic, cultural and social ties with Latin America, 
will affect a reassessment of the position of Latin America in EEC 
policies. Spanish accession to the EEC with its policy of Hispanism 
15 OJ 1984 L 153/1 (Members of the Group are Bolivia, Columbia, 
Ecudor, Peru and Venezuela.) 
16 Preamble to the Agreement. 
17 For a fuller discussion of the EEC's GSP see Part IV ch 5 of this 
Paper. 
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will add a new dimension to the relationship between the 
regions.18 
Spain's declared policy towards Latin America, captured in 
Hispanism, centres on the implementation of four principles. 
Minet lists these principles as interdependence, continuity, non- 
discrimination and community.19 The aim of Hispanism is to bring 
about a social and cultural community between Spain and Latin 
America and to increase their economic co- operation. Despite this 
latter aim, trade between Latin America and Spain (and Portugal) 
constitutes only 8.7% of the latter's total trade.20 Given this facet 
of the relationship, the Iberian accession may not bring about a 
radical change in the relationship between the EEC and Latin 
America, despite the Joint Declaration of Intent attached to the 
Spanish Act of Accession. However, it may tip the balance in 
favour of those member States who argue from a globalist 
development policy as opposed to the regional one favoured by 
the EEC. 
The current state of the EEC's economy and the interests served 
by the CAP, suggests that future EEC policy on Latin America will 
focus on the maintenance of the EEC trade position in a world 
economy characterised by increased competition and increasing 
threats of protectionism, rather than encouraging the 
development of the relationship. This line of reasoning is 
supported, if on examination of the EEC's relations with the 
countries of Asia. 
18 Muniz op cit n 3, 55. See also Joint Declaration of Intent on the 
development and intensification of relations with the countries of Latin 
America, OJ 1986 L 302/479. 
19 Minet "Hispanismo and the Third World" in ed. Minet, Siotos and 
Tsakaloyanno Spain, Greece and Community Politics, 55. 
20 COM (84) 105 op cit n 11, Annex 1. 
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B. Asia 
It is possible to differentiate two types of EEC relations with the 
countries of Asia. The first is in the form of an agreement 
between the EEC and ASEAN. The second is bilateral agreements 
with some former beneficiaries of the United Kingdom's 
Commonwealth Preference Scheme. 
ASEAN 
By virtue of the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, a loose inter- 
governmental association of Asian countries was formed. It 
included Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
it has became known as ASEAN (Association of South East Asian 
Nations) . 21 The development of institutions to service this 
association grew with its expanding activities. 
Relations with the EEC began in 1975 with the establishment of an 
ASEAN - EEC Study Group. The outcome of this dialogue was the 
conclusion of an ASEAN - EEC Co- operation Agreement.22 Like the 
agreements with Latin American countries, the declared objective 
of the Agreement was to "consolidate, deepen and diversify" 
commercial and economic relations between the parties.23 Article 
1 of the Agreement grants each party most -favoured -nation 
treatment.24 The remainder of the agreement is limited to 
21 See Reyes "Building Bridges and Opening Doors' in ed Akrasanee 
and Rieger ASEAN -EEC Economic Relations (1984). This group ha snow 
six member, Brunei has joined. 
22 OJ 1 1980 L156/7. 
23 The Preamble to the Agreement. 
24 Op cit n 22. 
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commercial, economic and development co- operation between the 
parties.25 
In relation to trade patterns, the EEC relies on ASEAN for such 
items as rubber, timber, palm oil and cattle feed. The increase in 
exports of this latter product to the EEC from Thailand, caused the 
EEC to conclude a co- operation agreement on manioc production, 
marketing and trade.26 The agreement limits Thai exports of 
manioc to the EEC for the years 1982 -86. However, Article 4 of 
the agreement by which the EEC agrees to safeguard Thailand's 
position on the EEC manioc market has been the cause of the 
failure of this agreement.27 Unable to safeguard their position on 
the EEC market, Thailand has continued to expand its exports to 
the EEC. A new Agreement limiting exports for the 1987 -1990 
period has been concluded. 
Of the six members of ASEAN, only Singapore and Brunei are not 
major exporters of primary products. While trade between ASEAN 
and the EEC is very important for the former, for the EEC it 
accounts for only a small proportion of trade. This explains the 
nature of the relationship between the parties, confined as it is to 
negotiations over GSP concessions.28 As with Latin America, the 
interests of other partners such as the Lomé countries and the 
Mediterranean are considered more important than those of 
ASEAN. Even though concessions have been granted to these 
countries under the GSP, such concessions are limited by tariff 
25 Ibid. Articles 2 -4. Article 5 of the Agreement establishes a Joint 
Co- operation Committee. 
26 OJ 1982 L 219/52. 
27 Ibid, 53, (see Council Decision 86/22 OJ L 155/8. A review of the 
1982 agreement establishing quantities for the period 1 January 87 to 31 
December 1990). 
28 See Corbet H "Issues Relating to the EC's Imports of ASEAN 
Primary Products; . and Langhammer "ASEAN Manufactured exports in 
the EC markets:' in ed Akrasanee and Rieger op cit n 21. 
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quotas, thereby nullifying the positive value of the concessions. 
The group as a whole does benefit under the rules of origin by 
being treated as one customs territory thereby allowing them to 
use the cumulative origin provisions of the GSP. Speaking of 
European interests in ASEAN, Harris and Bridges state;29 
"There must in consequence [considering the GSP] be 
doubt about the EC commitment to promote 
development of ASEAN trade with the Community, 
even though, since the EC -ASEAN ministerial 
meetings began, the EC has improved and extended 
its schemes. 
Once again another group of countries in their relationship with 
the EEC have been frustrated by the regionalist orientation of its 
development policy and the desire to protect domestic agricultrual 
producers and processors within the EEC. A similar picture 
emerges on examination of the EEC's bilateral relations with this 
area. 
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
The accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC in 1973 brought 
about a fundamental change in the trading environment for these 
countries. Excluded from the offer made to other Commonwealth 
Countries in Protocol 22 of the Act of Accession, these countries 
were left to negotiate individual or collective trade agreements 
with the enlarged EEC.30 The major trade impact of the 1973 
enlargement for these countries was the abolition of 
Commonwealth Preferences which they had previously enjoyed in 
29 Harris and Bridges European Interests in ASEAN, 33. 
30 Protocol 22 states that independent Commonwealth countries 
listed in Annex VI of the Act of Accession are offered Association. India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka were not listed in Annex VI. 
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the UK market.31 Coupled with this the UK had to adopt the GSP 
of the EEC, the CET and the CAP. The position of these countries 
was further weakened because of the number of countries who 
would be in a more preferential situation on the UK market as a 
result of its adoption of the 'partnership priorities' of the EEC. 
This situation was very detrimental to the exports of agricultural 
and semi -processed agricultural products from these countries. 
The solution offered by the EEC was the conclusion of bilateral 
trade agreements. Agreements were concluded between 1974 
and 1976, and all of them exhibit a great degree of similarity. 
They are inspired by the desire to "consolidate, deepen and 
diversify" their commercial and economic relations.32 To achieve 
this the parties granted each other most -favoured -nation 
treatment.33 Through the operation of the Joint Committee all 
efforts are to be made to promote the development and 
diversificaiton of trade.34 Agricultural concessions were listed in 
the Annexes to the Agreement, and were in the form of 
improvements to the EEC's GSP.35 These concessions are for 
products which are of special interest to the Contracting Parties. 
For example, for India, tea; for Sri Lanka, dessicated coconut; and 
for Bangladesh, freshwater fish and tea. Unlike the Andean Pact 
Agreement and the ASEAN agreement, these four countries do not 
benefit from the cumulative origin provisions of the GSP's rules of 
31 See Tulloch The Seven Outside: Commonwealth Asia's Trade with 
the Enlarged EEC (ch 2: The Trading Environment) and Ghai Asian 
Commonwealth Countries and the EEC. 33 -37. 
32 OJ 1974 L 82/1 (India); OJ 1975 L 247/1 (Sri Lanka); OJ 1976 L 
168/1 (Pakistan); OJ 1976 L 319/1 (Bangladesh). [See OJ 1981 L 328/5 - 





Article 2 of each agreement. 
Article 4 of each agreement. 
Annex II to the Agreements lists the GSP concessions. 
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origin. The concessions do not really benefit the recipient country 
in its efforts to promote economic development. (More will be 
said of this point in Part IV of this paper). 
One interesting feature of the relationship between the EEC and 
India is an agreement on cane sugar.36 Originally a signatory to 
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, India, by virtue of Protocol 
17 of the UK Treaty of Accession, was allowed to export sugar to 
the UK until 28 February 1975.37 At that time it was envisaged 
that the CSA would either be abolished or be replaced by a 
Community wide agreement. As it turned out Protocol 3 of the 
first Lomé Convention continued the importation of cane sugar 
from those countries who were signatories to the Convention. The 
only developing country who was a member of the CSA and not a 
signatory to the Lomé Convention was India and special 
provisions were made for it. According to the terms of the 
agreement, which closely mirrors Protocol 3 to the Lomé 
Convention, the EEC undertook to import 25,000 tonnes of Indian 
cane sugar per annum for an indefinite period. This quantity was 
reduced to zero in July 1981. Following an improvement in sugar 
production in India in 1982, it demanded that its initial quota be 
re- established. The Council of Ministers decided that although the 
quota should be re- established, its level would not be 25,000 
tonnes but 10,000 tonnes.38 
36 
37 
OJ 1975 L 190/1. 
See Chapter 2 of Part IV of this Paper. 
38 See Terlinden: European Sugar Policy, for a discussion of 
Protocol 3 and the re- establishment of quotas for the export of sugar to 
the EEC. 
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The future for Latin America and Asia 
The development of economic relations between the EEC and these 
two regions reflects the partnership priorities of the Communitry 
and the failure of the EEC to use the CAP as an instrument of 
commercial policy. Although the empirical evidence does not 
suggest that for agricultural products the Lomé Convention has 
been a significant source of trade diversion,39 aspects of the 
agreement discriminate against other developing countries. Since 
the Lomé signatories are at the top of the EEC's "pyramid of 
privilege" they are able to influence the level of concessions given 
to all other EEC partners. This includes the major element of EEC 
policy towards the countries of Latin America and Asia, the GSP.40 
The trade deterrence aspect of EEC relations with Latin America 
and Asia, reinforces the role of partners such as the Lomé 
signatories and the Mediterranean countries in the EEC's pyramid 
of privilege. Other reasons for the paucity of agricultural 
concessions given is the operation of the CAP and the influence of 
domestic processing industries within Europe. For example, 
exports of manioc from Brazil and Thailand have been restricted 
because of increased use of cereal substitutes within Europe, 
which threaten the COM in cereals. Exports of mutton and 
goatmeat from Argentina and Uruguay originally restricted by a 
VRA have been further restricted owing to the common 
organization of the market in these products. Exports of sugar 
from India have been curtailed through the demands of the Lomé 
Convention signatories and the perpetual EEC surplus in this 
product. And finally, exports of canned pineapples from Malaysia 
are subject to a restrictive tariff quota under the GSP, in an 
attempt to help domestic processing industries and the signatories 
39 
40 
The Courier No.99, the Kiel Study. 
Op cit n 29, 31. 
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of the Lomé Convention. What scope exists to improve this 
situation? 
In a 1973 Commonwealth Secretariat study of the impact of 
enlargement on the trade patterns of the Asian Commonwealth 
countries, several suggestions were made to deal with the 
problems caused by enlargement. The solutions advocated are 
equally applicable to Latin America. They are:41 
1. the establishment of a truly generous scheme of preferences, 
providing inter alia, for duty -free entry of all agricultural and 
processed goods of interest to these countries; 
2. the conclusion of collective or bilateral trade agreement 
offering these countries concessions analogous to those 
offered to the ACP under the Lomé Convention; 
3. partial trade or individual product agreements for products of 
export interest to these countries; and finally, 
4. financial and technical compensation to enable adjustments to 
be made due to the loss of export markets. 
Irrespective of the merits of these proposals, they face one 
substantial obstacle, the existence of the Lomé Convention. Any 
changes in the relationships established by the EEC would tend to 
upset the balance of concessions already given. The realistic 
evaluation of any future expansion of the EEC's relations with the 
countries of Latin America and Asia must take these factors into 
account and in doing so it may be concluded that no change is 
probable. Should any course be taken as a result of the 
enlargement of the EEC tro include Spain and Portugal, it is likely 
to lead to a reduction in the already meagre scope of the 




Ghia op cit n 31, 38-40. 
Op cit n 29, 84. 
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"The real costs to Europe are likely to arise in terms 
of opportunities missed. Here the costs may be high 
in the long term but by then we shall be able to 
blame them on something else." 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
"The Pyramid of Privilege" 
This part of the paper has outlined the nature of the EEC's 
relations with non -member States. From this outline a definite 
pyramid of privilege has emerged, those countries at the top of 
the pyramid are treated better than those at the bottom. For 
example the Mediterranean countries, their co- operation 
agreements entail industrial and agricultural trade concessions 
plus financial and technical co- operation. The next stage of the 
pyramid is occupied by the EFTA free trade agreements, which 
promise industrial free trade and concessions are given for 
processed agricultural products. The bilateral agreements 
concluded between the EEC and the countries of Latin America 
and Asia occupy the next stage down in the pyramid. Each of 
these three stages have one common feature, a Joint Co- operation 
Committee to further the aims of the agreements; 'to deepen and 
diversify their trade relations'. Such an institution is missing from 
the final two stages of the pyramid, those occupied by developed 
countries and by state -trading countries. The consultative 
machinery provided for the former merely relates to the 
harmonious development of relations between these countries and 
the EEC. Industrial trade is regulated through the operation of the 
GATT and for agricultural trade some concessions, albeit of limited 
import, have been made. For the state -trading countries there is 
not even consultative machinery, their industrial exports are 
restricted and agricultural exports are subject to strict control. 
Another pattern to emerge from the outline is that agricultural 
trade concessions are linked to the type of production. For 
Mediterranean type products, a wide range of concessions are 
given on the basis that such products are not produced in 
sufficient quantity in the EEC. This basis serves as an explanation 
of the concessions given to the producers of tropical products. 
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Although these concessions are not to be found in bilateral 
agreements but in the EEC's GSP and the Lomé Convention. For 
the final group of products, temperate -zone products, concessions, 
if given, are extremely limited and often subject to quantitative 
control. The rationale for all the concessions given rests on the 
agricultural production structure within the EEC. Most of the 
concessions were made at a time when the EEC consisted of only 
nine member States. Since that time three Mediterranean states 
have acceded the EEC. How will this enlargement affect the future 
scope of concessions given by the EEC? 
The Impact of Enlargement 
It is possible to assess the impact of enlargement in terms of trade 
creation and trade diversion. Trade creation will occur through 
the adoption by Spain and Portugal of the EEC's CET and GSP. In 
relation to agriculture this will benefit the Asian countries but not 
Latin American countries since Spain and Portugal are already 
major consumers of their products. 
Trade diversion will occur because Spanish and Portugese 
adoption of the CAP. The concessions given to Mediterranean 
countries will be of limited value, due to the similarity of 
production between the Iberian countries and the Mediterranean 
countries. Trade diversion will also occur as the EEC will assume a 
large share of Portugese and Spanish imports of agricultural 
products. For products such as beef and veal, milk and milk 
products, sugar and some cereals the level of EEC exports to Spain 
and Portugal will increase. This will displace American and Latin 
American agricultural exports. However, this trade diversion may 
improve the situation of New Zealand, as the pressure on the EEC 
milk market will not be as pronounced. Any attempt to quantify 
the levels of trade creation and trade diversion will be tentative 
since it is uncertain not only what impact the adoption of the CAP 
will have on Spanish and Portugese production but also, what 
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internal reforms, if any, will occur to the CAP as a result their 
accession. 
However, the accession of Spain and Portugal will increase the 
number of demands which the CAP attempts to satisfy. The 
nature of the policy and the level of prices established under it, 
suggests that the experience of the ten (structural surpluses and 
high budgetary expenditure), will become the experience of the 
twelve. It should be obvious that given the limited nature of the 
EEC's financial resources, some reform of the CAP is inevitable. 
Moreover, the level of Spanish and Portugese economic 
development suggests that they will require financial assistance 
not only from the social and regional funds but also from the 
guidance section of FEOGA. These requirements will increase the 
demands for a reduction of the proportion of FEOGA guarantee 
section in the total EEC budget. This reduction necessitates some 
internal reforms of the CAP, a reduction in prices, intervention 
arrangements and the export refund system. Enlargement 
presents the EEC with an opportunity to develop a coherent 
agricultural trade policy. A policy which would complement the 
other policies of the EEC. 
Solutions 
The development of this policy will allow the EEC to order its 
relationships in a coherent fashion. This ordering is problematic 
since the range of agreements concluded by the EEC has devalued 
the significance of establishing a relationship with the EEC. The 
proposals made in this part are an attempt to establish a new type 
of relationship between the EEC and its partners. Their acceptance 
would bring about fundamental changes in the external relations 
of the EEC and necessitate changes to the nature of the CAP. 
For the Mediterranean, the area most affected by the recent 
enlargement, it was envisaged that a new Mediterranean Policy 
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would be drawn up. This would encompass the development of 
political co- operation through the Euro- Mediterranean Forum; the 
encouragement of the regional development of all Mediterranean 
states from Algeria to Yugoslavia through the implementation of a 
Mediterranean Development Policy; and finally a Mediterranean 
Trade Policy to encourage the development of intra- and inter- 
regional trade. In relation to agricultural products, three avenues 
for progress were suggested. The first was the extension of the 
Turkish -EC relationship to other countries (i.e. the abolition of all 
customs duties on agricultural products). The second proposal 
envisaged the conclusion of product protocols for Mediterranean 
agricultural products and internal reforms to ensure the success of 
such protocols. The final and most ambitious proposal was for the 
conclusion of total free trade agreements between the EEC and the 
Mediterranean countries. 
For the EFTA and State -Trading countries, a gradualist approach 
was recommended. For the former, this involved the adoption of 
the approach favoured by these countries in their own 
agricultural trade relations, bilateral agreements. It is envisaged 
that agricultural products would be divided into three categories, 
each having differing degrees of liberalization measures. This 
need to ensure compatibility between the EEC -EFTA trade 
arrangements and intra -EFTA trade arrangements was also 
present in the approach advocated for the five state trading 
countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania). With respect to these countries, it was envisaged that 
bilateral agreements would be concluded on the basis of the 
Finland -Czechoslovakia Free Trade Agreement. This would allow 
the development of reciprocal trade by the conclusion of annual 
product agreements. 
Each of the proposals made reflect the pyramid of privilege which 
has emerged in the EEC's relations with other countries. However, 
they also seek to bring about some change in the nature of 
concessions by allowing for greater temperate -zone, 
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Mediterranean -zone and tropical -zone concessions. For 
temperate -zone products it is envisaged that increased 
concessions would be given only to EFTA and State -trading 
countries. Concessions for the "Un- Associables" will remain to be 
made in the context of the GATT. For tropical -zone products it is 
envisaged that the EEC would establish a generous GSP, providing 
duty -free entry for all tropical agricultural products. This would 
promote Latin American and Asian exports to the EEC. 
Two factors restrain the EEC from improving its bilateral relation 
by the adoption of a common agricultural trade policy. These are: 
the existence of multilateral relations established since 1957 with 
66 developing countries, currently in the form of the third Lomé 
Convention; and, the absence of any proposals on CAP reform 
which contemplate a development similar to that outlined above. 
It is these restraining factors which the remaining parts of the 
paper discusses. 
The objectives set for this part in the introduction have been met. 
The history and current nature of agricultural concessions have 
been discussed and proposals have been made to accommodate 
these bilateral agreements within the framework of a common 
agricultural trade policy. The temptation exists for the EEC to 
adopt protectionist measures in order to make the adjustment 
necessary as a result of enlargement. This temptation is 
especially strong in the agricultural sector. It could lead to 
increases in the levels of intervention spending and export 
refunds thus necessitating a greater share in the EEC budget for 
the Guarantee Section of FEOGA. This would increase the pressure 
on the EEC's resources and prevent the development of other 
European funds. Reform of the CAP, taking into account the 
interests of those countries associated with the EEC, would enable 
the pace of integration to be accelerated. This would consolidate 
the progress already made and enable the EEC of twelve to 
become a more homogenous area. Such reform would also enable 
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the promise made by the Director -General of Agriculture to the 
College of Europe to be realised. As Claude Villain remarked;1 
"D'un façon général, je voudrais souligner que si nous 
tenons à jouer notre rôle d'exportateur et à faire 
notre part équitable du commerce mondial, la 
Communauté ne veut pas être un facteur d' 
anarchie." 
1 "L'état de la politique agricole commune.' in ed Tracy and Hodac 
Prospects for Agricultur in the EEC.(1982) 
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PART IV: THE DEVELOPMENT CO- OPERATION 
POLICIES OF THE EEC. 
INTRODUCTION: 
In the communique issued after the October 1972 Paris Summit of 
the Heads of State and Government of the Member States, it was 
declared that,1 
" ... the Community must, without detracting from the 
advantages enjoyed by countries with which it has 
special relations, respond even more than in the past 
to the expectations of all the developing countries." 
These "expectations" include increased and technical assistance to 
promote the process of development, the promotion of primary 
product agreements (which would lead to market stabilisation and 
increased export earnings), and the improvement of the 
Generalised System of Preferences (which would increase levels of 
manufacturing exports from the developing countries). As the 
above statement recognised, the EEC could only meet these 
expectations to the extent that they would not detract "from the 
advantages enjoyed by countries with which it has special 
relations ".This part of the paper will trace the growth of these 
special relations, now known as the Lomé Convention, and it will 
examine their changing nature. An assessment can then be made 
of the extent to which these "special relations" have obstructed 
the EEC's efforts to meet the expectations of the developing 
countries. 
How does the EEC view the relationship between its development 
co- operation policies and its other policies? The answer to this 
question may be gleaned from the following statement of Claude 
1 European Political Co- operation (3rd ed) 35, 44. 
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Cheysson, Commissioner for Development. At the time of the 
signing of the first Lomé Convention, he stated,2 
"If we are in earnest about wanting these countries 
to develop we must realise that the development aid 
policies to be pursued will be part and parcel of our 
general policies and not a separate part of our action. 
It is not "Sunday charity" which is needed, it will 
have to be thought of every day and in every aspect 
of our lives." 
Of necessity, this implies that the EEC and the member States 
should co- operate; 
(i) on the external level; mulitlaterally, in institutions 
such as the UNCTAD and bilaterally, in relation to the 
agreements concluded between the EEC and various 
developing countries, and 
(ii) on the internal level; that is, in relation to common 
and national policies which indirectly affect the EEC's 
relations with developing countries. The most obvious 
example in this area is the CAP. 
If the EEC's efforts in the area of development are to be successful 
it is necessary that there should be co- operation on both levels 
and a level of co- ordination between the two. Concessions granted 
in either multilateral or bilateral arrangements may be rendered 
meaningless if there is no co- ordination with the internal policies 
of the EEC and the member States. 
Efforts have been made to achieve co- ordination and cohesion 
between the EEC's and the member States' policies on the external 
level. Similar efforts are not so prevalent on the internal level.3 
2 "Europe and the third world after Lomé: 30 World Today 51, 52. 
3 E.g. COM (75) 94 Harmonization and Co- ordination of Development 
Co- operation Policies: and EC Bull Supp 5/82 Memorandum on the 
Community's Development Policy. 
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Given the predominantly agricultural nature of developing 
countries exports, it is the CAP which operates as an "indirect" 
factor limiting the success of the EEC's development policy. It is 
the problem of agricultural co- operation which this part of the 
paper addresses. As the 1980 resolution of the ACP -EEC 
Consultative Assembly noted,4 
"... in the longer term, an adequate solution to this 
problem [of agricultural co- operation] and to all the 
anomalies in the agricultural trade relations between 
the Community and the developing countries can be 
found only if: - the Community finally adopts an agricultural 
trade policy compatible with its development 
and policy. 
Such a policy would have to meet the expectations of the 
developing countries and not detract from the EEC's special 
relations. The reconciliation of these competing demands does not 
promise to be an easy task for EEC policy -makers. 
4 See Focke K "From Lomé 1 to Lomé 2 ". Texts of the report and 
resolution adopted on 26 September 1980 by the ACP -EEC Consultative 
Assembly, 69, 74 (Para 44 of the Resolution). 
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CHAPTER 1: THE ROAD TO LOME. 
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome 
As Zartman notes, there arel 
" .. two poles of the economic debate ... autarkic self - 
reliance and open international co- operation. These 
poles are turned into the horns of a dilemma because 
in economics, as in security, no state is an island and 
because co- operation always poses the problem of 
domination. Thus between an independence that is 
impossible and an inter -dependence that is 
dangerous, middle solutions have to be found" 
In the case of the EEC's special relations with the developing 
world, the middle solution is one of selective inter -dependence. 
The modern version of this middle solution, now known as the 
Lomé Convention, has its origin in part IV of the Treaty of Rome. 
As negotiations on the Treaty of Rome neared conclusion, the 
French insisted, as a condition -precedent for participation in the 
EEC, that a new and special relationship should be established 
with its dependent territories. Two different solutions were 
eventually agreed on: 
(i) A protocol on goods originating in and coming from 
certain countries and enjoying special treatment when 
imported into a member State. This protocol, referred 
to as the Morocco Protocol, allowed for the 
continuation of this special treatment when the Treaty 
entered into force; and, 
(ii) Part IV of the Treaty, which provided for the 
association of various overseas countries and 
territories (OCT). 
1 The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the EEC 
(1971), 7. 
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The purpose of this association, as laid down in Article 131 of the 
Treaty of Rome, would be to "promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close 
economic relations between them and the EEC as a whole ".2 This 
broad objective was further developed in Article 132 which 
provides, inter alia,3 
"Association shall have the following objectives: 
1. Member States shall apply to their trade with the 
countries and territories the same treatment they 
accord each other pursuant to this Treaty. 
2. Each country or territory shall apply to its trade 
with member States and with the other countries and 
territories the same treatment as that which it applies 
to the European State with which it has special 
relations. 
3. The member States shall contribute to the 
investments required for the progressive development 
of these countries and territories ..." 
These objectives, and the means to achieve them, were amplified 
in Article 133 -135 and the Implementing Convention attached to 
the Treaty. The timetable applicable to the elimination of customs 
duties between the member States was also applicable to the 
elimination of customs duties between the member States and the 
O C T . 4 However, Article 133 (3) introduced an element of non - 
reciprocity of concessions into the relationship, by allowing the 
OCT to levy customs duties "to meet the needs of their 
development and industrialization or produce revenue for their 
budgets ". Given this limited concession to the principle of 
reciprocity, it was envisaged that Part IV and the Implementing 
2 Article 131 goes on to state that association shall serve to lead the 
inhabitants of the associated countries and territories to the economic, 
social and cultural development to which they aspire. 
3 
4 
Five objectives are listed in Article 132. 
Article 133(1). 
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Convention would lead to the establishment of a free trade area 
between the EEC and the OCT. 
The Implementing Convention on the association of the OCT 
provided that the provisions of the Treaty applicable to the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions between the member 
States should also apply to the EEC's relations with the OCT. 
Import quotas open to one member State, with which the OCT 
State had special relations, would be converted into global quotas 
open to the other member States. The trading relationship was 
designed to place all member States on an equal footing. Equally, 
the Implementing Convention allowed for the spread of the 
burdens of association by establishing a development fund for the 
OCT. This fund would supplement the efforts of the OCT to 
promote economic and social development. As Zartman 
concludes,5 
"Part IV of the Rome Treaty was designed to share 
among the European six, at least to some small extent, 
the burdens and benefits of the colonial past and to 
provide some limited benefits for the African colonies. 
It was a means of protecting colonial markets and 
assuring supplies of primary products for the six 
instead of the metropole alone and of opening the 
colonies to greater trade and investment." 
The examination of Part IV of the Treaty in GATT raised several 
questions about its compatibility with the Agreement.6 For 
example, the Working Party questioned the permissibility under 
Article XXIV (GATT) of the simultaneous establishment and co- 
existence of a customs union and a free trade area. Using Article 
5 "Europe and Africa, Decolonization or Dependency ?" (1975 -76) 54 
Foreign Affairs 325, 327. 
6 BISD 6th Supp 70, 90. 
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133(3) of the Treaty of Rome the view of one delegation was 
that:7 
(a) the OCT constitutes much more than follows from the 
definition of a free trade area as laid down in Article 
XXIV(8)(b) GATT; 
(b) Article 133(3) gives the OCT power to levy new duties. 
This is contrary to the definition of a free trade area. 
Moreover there would be no guarantee that tariffs 
would be eliminated on substantially all trade 
between the constituent territories; and finally 
(c) Article XXIV is inappropriate to underdeveloped 
countries. 
The Working Party recognised the importance of this legal 
question, but they also realised that to prohibit the simultaneous 
formation of a customs union and a free trade area would 
introduce into the agreement a restrictive provision which it did 
not contain. However, the views expressed above are worthy of 
further consideration, especially since the Harberler Report 
doubted whether Part IV contained the necessary characteristics 
to promote development.8 Economic integration will bring 
benefits if, as Matthews has noted,9 
"(i) the economies of the partner countries are 
actually very competitive but potentially very 
complimentary and 
(ii) the amount of trade between them represents a 
large proportion of their total external trade." 
It was doubted that Part IV would actually lead to the creation of 
a free trade area, the Working Party viewed it as merely an 
extension of existing preferences to other countries. As such it 





Trend in In ern i nal T .. - A R n 1 f Ex. r (1958). 
The Association System of the EC, 85. 
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Working Party did not reach this conclusion. Instead, a series of 
studies, relating to the possible trade impact of Part IV, were 
recommended.10 As Barnes concludes,11 
"The Working Party had to report a deadlock. But 
subsequent developments suggest that those who 
were attacking the association provisions of the 
Treaty neither expected that the six would be 
persuaded to abandon the concept of association nor 
were ready themselves to take any kind of counter 
measures. It would seem probable that they were 
trying to influence the level of the common external 
tariff (CET)." 
These attempts to influence the level of the CET were to be 
successful, but it can be questioned whether reductions in the CET 
were a direct result of external pressure rather than internal 
pressure. This internal pressure, in the form of a global 
development co- operation policy first manifested itself in Article 
136 of the Treaty of Rome, which limited the operation of the 
implementing Convention to five years. 
The Yaoundé Conventions 
This first period of association between the EEC and the OCT was 
dominated by the political independence of the OCT. This 
necessitated the renegotiation of the provisions on Association. It 
has been noted that,l2 
"The merit of this first experiment between the EEC 
and the Associated African States and Madagascar 




12 Ibid, 40. 
d th- D-vel in W erl. r IV f h- Rem- T 
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(AASM) is that it actually existed and that it paved 
the way for the future." 
The result of this experiment was the Yaoundé Convention of 
1963 which recognised the new political and legal context of 
association policy. In essence, the Convention marked the 
continuation of Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. However, notable 
differences existed. The Convention was signed by independent 
states. Instead of the creation of one large free trade area, 
Yaoundé provided for the establishment of individual free trade 
areas between the EEC and each of the AASM. Customs duties and 
other trade restrictions were to be abolished at the same rate as 
those between the members of the EEC; a commitment similar to 
that contained in Part IV of the Treaty. 
In relation to agricultural products, the Convention assured the 
AASM that their interests would be taken into account when the 
CAP was being formulated. During the period before the 
implementation of any common organization of the market (COM), 
the AASM would benefit from the treatment applicable to trade 
within the EEC. The only product exported by the AASM for 
which a COM had been established, at the time of the negotiation 
of the Convention, was rice. The Convention allowed the AASM to 
benefit from the inter -EEC treatment for traditional export 
quantities. For quantities in excess of the traditional level of 
exports, the AASM received preferences as against all other non - 
EEC suppliers.13 
The scope of the agricultural concessions given to the AASM was 
restricted by two factors. Firstly, the reduction of the CET on 
various tropical products such as coffee, cocoa, pineapples and 
coconuts. Secondly, the retention of the German import quota on 
bananas originally agreed on in 1957, these bananas coming from 
13 See Twitchett C.C. Europe and Africa: From Association to 
Partnership (1978) ch 5 The Yaoundé Convention of 1963. 
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Latin American suppliers. Once again, the conflict between a 
regional development policy (concentrating on the AASM) and a 
globalist policy (extending benefits to all developing countries) 
surfaced during the negotiations of the Convention. In an effort to 
improve the geographic balance of the EEC's development policy, a 
Joint Declaration of Intent was issued, offering the prospect of 
association to Commonwealth countries having economic and 
production structures comparable with the AASM.14 
International reception of the Convention was not enthusiastic. 
The GATT Working Party report on the compatibility of the 
Convention with the agreement canvassed the same sorts of 
questions as the 1957 review of Part IV had.15 It was doubted 
whether a free trade area could be established, within the 
meaning of this phrase in Article XXIV (GATT), between the EEC 
and each of the AASM.16 Some members of the Working Party 
expressed the view that the Convention was merely an extension 
of the preferential arrangements agreed upon in 1957.17 Whilst 
others questioned the advisability of establishing a free trade area 
between industrialized and developing countries and the 
insistence of the former on reciprocal trade advantages from the 
latter.18 The Working Party did not reach any firm conclusions, 
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The second Yaoundé Convention, concluded in 1969, met with a 
similar fate in its examination by the GATT Working Party.20 At 
this time, the EEC claimed that Yaoundé II had created a free 
trade area between the EEC and each of the AASM, thereby 
completing the process which had started in 1957.21 This claim is 
only partially true. A free trade area had been established in 
relation to industrial products, in the sense that their importation 
were now free of customs duties and taxes having an equivalent 
effect. For agricultural products the situation had changed 
dramatically since 1957. As Article 2(2) of the second Yaoundé 
Convention recognised,22 
"Toutefois, les dispositions du paragraphe 1 ne 
préjugent pas du régime d'importation réservé aux 
produits 
- énumérés à la liste de l'annexe II du traité, dès lors 
qu'ils font l'objet d'un organisation commune des 
marches au sens de l'article du traité; 
- soumis à l'importation dans la Communauté de la 
mise en oeuvre de la politique agricole commune." 
In Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, and to a lesser extent in the first 
Yaoundé Convention, the AASM benefitted from the treatment 
which the member States had applied between themselves in 
relation to agricultural products. Between 1963 (Yaoundé 1) and 
1969 (Yaoundé II) the CAP had been formulated, and a new form 
of treatment for AASM agricultural exports was required. This 
new form of treatment elaborated on in Protocol I to Yaoundé II, 
granted the AASM a margin of preference over third countries but 
denied them benefits which they had previously enjoyed under 
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EEC, in the form of the CAP, had adversely affected the nature of 
its external policy. 
The level of preferences granted to the AASM had suffered a 
major decline. It would be incorrect to assume that the only 
factor governing this decline was the introduction of the CAP. 
Other factors were also at work. Reductions in the levels of the 
CET had occurred as a result of multilateral trade negotiations 
Another major factor was the introduction of the generalised 
system of preferences by the EEC in 1971. Although the trade 
provisions were an important aspect of the Yaoundé Conventions, 
they were not its only provisions. The operations of the European 
Development Fund were an important attraction of the 
relationship, indeed it could be stated that they were its only 
attraction. Tariff preferences although important, are not 
sufficient in themselves to encourage in the process of 
development. Speaking of the trade effects of the Association of 
the AASM with the EEC. Quattra remarked,24 
"It would be difficult to argue that the association had 
a significant impact on trade flows between the 
associated African countries and the EEC or a 
significant adverse impact on the exports of non - 
associated developing countries to the EEC." 
Despite its inadequacies as a trading relationship, its importance 
as an aid relationship ensured its continuation. A turning point in 
the EEC's association policy was approaching and with it, the end 
of the concept of association. 
24 "Trade Effects of the Association of African Countries with the 
EEC' IMF Staff Papers Vol XX, 499, 530. 
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The End of Association 
The turning point in the EEC's association policy occurred by 
virtue of the accession to the EEC of another colonial power, the 
United Kingdom. As with France in 1957, the 1973 Act of 
Accession made special provision for the UK's former colonies. 
This special provision was Protocol 22, essentially a repeat of the 
Joint Declaration of Intent of April 1963.25 Protocol 22 offered 
independent Commonwealth countries three options: 
"-participation in the Convention of association, which, 
upon the expiry of the Convention of association 
signed on 29 July 1969 [Yaoundé II], will govern 
relations between the EEC and the AASM which 
signed the latter Convention; - the conclusion of one or more special Conventions of 
association on the basis of Article 238 of the EEC 
Treaty comprising reciprocal rights and obligations, 
particularly in the field of trade; and 
the conclusion of trade agreements with a view to 
facilitating and developing trade between the 
Community and those countries." 
This offer was made to those countries listed in Annex VI, the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Commonwealth countries. The 
Commonwealth countries in Asia were specifically excluded. Most 
of the countries accepted the first option and they joined with the 
AASM to negotiate a new Convention to govern their future 
relations with the EEC. In its memorandum on the future relations 
of the EEC with these states, the Commission noted that EEC 
policy,26 
25 Op cit n 1, ch 3. Zartman discusses the Declaration of Intent and 
the receiption of the Declaration within African Commonwealth 
Countries. 
26 EC Bull Supp 1/73. Renewal and Enlargement of the Association 
with the AASM and certain Commonwealth Developing Countries, 1. 
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"... will have to achieve a synthesis between the 
various advantages granted and guaranteed to the 
present partners of the Association on the one hand 
and, on the other, a genuine renovation of the 
Association, the enlargement of which will require 
very important changes and additions." 
The Commission went on to elaborate on the content of the new 
Convention. 
In order to maintain the results of the past, the new trade 
provisions were to be as advantageous of those guaranteed under 
the Yaoundé Conventions. The provisions would serve as a 
framework for improving the system applicable to the imports of 
agricultural and processed agricultural products which were 
either similar to, or competitive with, EEC products. In other 
words, the new Convention would seek to maintain the margin of 
preferences given under the Yaoundé Conventions.27 To ensure 
compliance with the provisions of the GATT, the Commission 
recommended that the Associates grant them mfn treatment and 
some reverse preferences. The new Convention would lead to the 
establishment of a free -trade area.28 The granting of reverse 
preferences in the Yaoundé Conventions was subject to adverse 
criticism by members of the GATT Working Party examining the 
arrangement. It was pointed out that Part IV of the GATT, 
allowed developing countries not to extend reciprocity to 
developed countries. The Commission suggested that the problem 
of reverse preferences should be dealt with through the use of 
derogations. This method had been provided for in Protocol 2 of 
Yaoundé II and the Arusha Agreement between the EEC and 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya.29 In the discussion of the problem 
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comply with the requirements of Article XXIV and the general 
principle of non -discrimination. This principle of non- 
discrimination was also emphasised in relation to the application 
of quantitative restrictions by the Associates.30 
In conclusion, the Commission guidelines for the future relations 
of the EEC with the Associates argued for the continuation of the 
trading relationship established by the Yaoundé Conventions. In 
relation to agricultural products, the Associates would have a 
margin of preference over third countries. Excise duties on 
tropical products would be removed and the interests of the 
associates would be taken into account in the preparation of the 
non -tariff measures of the CAP. The African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries (the ACP) had a different vision of the new 
Convention. Their guiding principles included:31 - recognition of the principle of non -reciprocity in trade 
and tariff concessions; - revision of the rules of origin to facilitate the 
development ACP; - free and assured access to EEC markets for all products 
including processed and semi -processed agricultural 
products, irrespective of whether or not they were 
subject to the provisions of the CAP; 
special arrangements for certain products, and in 
particular, sugar, bananas and citrus; and finally, - the guaranteeing to ACP countries of stable, equitable and 
remunerative prices in EEC markets for their main 
products in order to allow them to increase their export 
earnings. 
The ACP group were clearly seeking a qualitatively new 
relationship with the EEC, one which would promote their 
30 Ibid, 17. 
31 See Dadoo and Kuster "The Road to Lomé : in ed Von Geusau The 
Lomé Convention and the NIEO" (1977) and Pinder J. "The Community 
and Developing Countries: Associates and Outsiders : (1974) 12 JCMS 53. 
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economic development without impinging on their economic 
independence, to any great extent. The EEC was seeking to 
maintain the relationship established under Part IV and carried 
on through Yaoundé. A reconciliation between the two groups 
was reached and the next chapter examines the content and 
extent of this reconciliation. 
CHAPTER 2: LOMÉ, A NEW MODEL FOR RELATIONS 
BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING 
STATES? 
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The Preamble to the first Lomé Convention recognises the resolve 
of both the EEC and the ACP States,1 
"to establish a new model for relations between 
developed and developing States compatible with the 
aspirations of the international community towards a 
more just and balanced economic order." 
The means to achieve this end include the development of co- 
operation and trade among the ACP States and the promotion of 
trade co- operation between the ACP States and the EEC. This 
chapter will examine the trade and other provisions of the 
Convention which establish a 'new model for relations' between 
the developed and developing States. 
Trade Provisions 
The basic trade provision of the Lomé regime is that ACP products 
may be imported into the EEC free of customs duties, charges 
having equivalent effect and quantitative restrictions.2 The basic 
obligation of the ACP states is to apply the principle of non- 
discrimination in their relations with the EEC.3 The concept of 
reverse preferences has disappeared and the ACP need only 
extend mfn treatment to the EEC. The trade regime, therefore, 
1 OJ 1976 L 25/2, 5. (7th Recital of the Preamble.) 
2 Article 2 Lomé I and Lomé II. Article 130 of Lomé III. The text of 
each of the Conventions is reproduced in the Courier, no.30 (Lomé I), 
No.58 (Lomé II) and No.89 (Lomé III). 
3 Article 136 Lomé III. 
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meets some of the objectives set for it by the Commission and the 
ACP States. 
It ensures the continuation of the free trade system established 
under the Yaoundé Conventions, with the principle of 
liberalization at the centre of this system. However, the absence 
of reciprocity, one of the objectives of the ACP negotiators, 
indicated that the Convention would not comply with the 
provisions of Article XXIV GATT. On presentation of the Lomé 
Convention to the GATT, the EEC representative, noting this 
conflict with the provisions of Article XXIV, argued that the 
Convention should be examined "in the light of the totality of the 
objectives" of the GATT.4 This argument was necessary since the 
Lomé Convention could not be accepted under Article XXIV. 
Although Article 2(1) of the Convention allowed for the removal 
of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect, this 
applied essentially only to industrial products. Article 2(2) laid 
down the treatment applicable to agricultural products, it read,5 
"(a) Products originating in the ACP states: - listed in Annex II of the Treaty when they 
come under a common organization of the 
market within the meaning of Article 40 of 
the Treaty; or - subject, on importation into the Community to 
specific rules introduced as a result of the 
implementation of the common agricultural 
policy; 
shall be imported into the EEC notwithstanding the 
general arrangements applied in respect of third 
countries in accordance with the following provisions; 
(i) those products shall be imported free of 
customs duties for which EEC provisions in 
force at the time of importation do not 
provide, apart from customs duties, for the 
4 BISD 23rd Supp 46, 47. 
5 Op cit n 1, 11 -12. The current provision is Article 130(2) Lomé III. 
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application of any other measure relating to 
their importation, 
(ii) for products other than those referred to 
under (i), the EEC shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure, as a general rule, more 
favourable treatment than the general 
treatment applicable to the same products 
originating in third countries to which the 
most -favoured -nation clause applies." 
In relation to agricultural products subject to the CAP, the basic 
import regime remains the same as it was under Yaoundé. The 
demands of the ACP for totally free access for all agricultural and 
processed agricultural products, irrespective of whether or not 
they are subject to the CAP, has not been met. However, the level 
of concessions given are more generous than in any other EEC 
arrangement with a third country. In detail, these concessions 
include: 
Beef and Veal:6 Exemption from customs duties for all products 
covered by the COM. This exemption may be suspended if 
imports exceed a quantity equivalent to the EEC average of beef 
and veal imports from this source, for the years 1969 -1974, 
allowing for an annual growth rate of 7 %. The EEC allows special 
treatment for traditional exporters (Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe) in the form of a suspension of import 
duties within a tariff quota. The quota which reflects the 
traditional level of exports to the EEC. 
Cereals and Rice:7 Preferential treatment in this sector extends 
from the non -application of the fixed component of the third 
country levy (processed cereal and rice products) to the reduction 
6 Council Reg.486/85 on the arrangements applicable to 
agricultural products and certain goods resulting from the processing 
of agricultural products originating in the ACP States and the OCT. OJ L 
61/4, 6. (Title 1.) 
7 Ibid, Titles V and VI 7 -8. 
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of the third country levy by a percentage and a fixed amount 
(paddy rice and husked rice). 
Fruit and vegetables:8 Preferential treatment includes the 
exemption or reduction of customs duties. These advantages are 
limited by the imposition of a marketing timetable and /or a tariff 
quota. For example, radishes benefit from exemption and no 
timetable, whereas onions, tomatoes and strawberries benefit 
from a 60 per cent reduction of custom dusties for a specific 
period and for a specified amount. Processed fruit and vegetable 
products are exempt from customs duties for all products covered 
by the COM. The additional duty on sugar for particular preserves 
and juices has been abolished. 
- Other products:9 In this area the concessions range from 
exemption from customs duties (oil seeds, tobacco) to the 
suspension of the variable component for certain goods processed 
from agricultural products (tapioca and sago). 
Despite the fact that over 94% of the ACP products subject to the 
CAP obtained exemption from customs (protective) duties, the 
ACP remain dissatisfied with the concessions given by the EEC. 
During the signing ceremony of the second Lomé Convention, the 
President of the ACP Council of Ministers stated,10 
"[we] could not escape a feeling of deep frustration 
that the EEC could not finally respond positively to 
our legitimate claims for unhindered access for our 
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In recognition of this frustration, Article 2(2)(b) of Lomé II 
reads,11 
If during the application of this Convention, the ACP 
States request that new lines of agricultural 
production or agricultural products which are not the 
subject of specific arrangements upon the entry into 
force of this Convention should benefit from such 
arrangements, the Community shall examine these 
requests in consultation with the ACP States. 
The apparent liberality of this provision was circumscribed by a 
EEC declaration which limited the examination to those products 
"for which there would be real possibilities of export to the 
Community" and insofar "as these exports might assume an 
important position in the exports of one or more ACP States ".12 
This provision has been invoked by the ACP States. For example 
in 198213 the ACP States requested that the EEC should consider: 
(i) the prospect of giving preferential treatment to 
strawberry imports during the off -season in Europe. 
(This request was met. Lomé III allows for a 60% 
reduction of custom duties from 1 November to the 
end of February within the limits of a quota of 700 
tonnes.); 
(ii) the effect of the increase in the coefficient used to 
calculate the variable component of the import levy on 
processed cereal products, in particular wheat, bran 
and wheat residue. The increase in the coefficient 
entailed an increase in import duties. (The EEC agreed 
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preference over third countries. However, Lomé III 
did not give the ACP States any level of preference.) 
Delays in the EEC decision -making on these requests led to the 
inclusion of Article 130(2)(c) in the 1985 Convention. It reads,14 
" ... the Community shall, in the context of the special 
relations and special nature of ACP -EEC co- operation, 
examine on a case -by -case basis the requests from 
the ACP States for preferential access for their 
agricultural products to the EEC market and shall 
notify its decision on these reasoned requests within 
not more than six months of the date of their 
submission." 
The Article goes on to instruct the EEC to take account of the 
possibilities offered by the off -season market and the concessions 
granted to other developing third countries. 
Despite the extensive nature of the preferences accorded by the 
EEC to the ACP States for agricultural products, the share of ACP 
States in the EEC's agricultural imports from developing countries 
has actually declined since 1975.15 This decline occurred despite 
the fact that each of the Conventions include provisions on trade 
promotion. Trade preferences and trade promotion are obviously 
not sufficient to encourage the growth of the ACP's agricultural 
export trade. Lomé II recognised the importance of agricultural 
and rural development in the ACP States. The basic objective of 
agricultural co- operation between the parties was,16 
14 Op cit n2, 32. 
15 See Courier No.98 "The Kiel Study" 61 -91. Table 6: Changes in 
Market Shares and Regional Concentration of ACP Exports to the EEC, 
1975 and 1982, 67. 
16 Article 83 Lomé II op cit n2, 21. (See Title 1 of Lomé III, ch 1 
Agricultural Co- operation and food security op cit n2, 15 -17.) 
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"to assist [the ACP] in their efforts to resolve 
problems relating to rural development and the 
improvement and expansion of agricultural 
production for domestic consumption and export and 
problems they may encounter with regard to 
security of food supplies for their population." 
The basis of this co- operation will be technical and financial 
assistance in the promotion of integrated rural development 
projects. Such projects have an internal focus. They aim to 
achieve security of food supplies in the ACP states, through such 
measures as better use of factors of production and the extension 
of secondary and tertiary back -up activities. Through the internal 
development of agricultural production it is hoped that internal 
requirements will be satisfied and that the standard of products 
for export will be improved. This will increase ACP export 
earnings and so promote the process of development. Speaking of 
the future of ACP trade exports to the EEC, Twitchett observed,17 
"The only way ahead for the ACP is a major 
investment in quality control and more efficient local 
management of agricultral production, possibly 
combined with a vigorous trade promotion 
programme." 
The trade provisions outlined above may be sufficient to 
encourage the development of ACP trade, if the ACP take 
advantage of measures included in the Convention, especially the 
agricultural co- operation provisions. The development of 
agricultural processing facilities in the ACP could promote their 
development. However, other provisions of the Conventions could 
act as a positive disincentive to the diversification of ACP trade. 
One such provision is the scheme for the stabilization of export 
earnings, which the next section of the paper discusses. 
17 "Patterns of ACP /EEC Trade' in ed Long F. The Political Economy 
of EEC Relations with ACP States' (1979) 145, 171. 
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The Stabilization of Export Earnings System 
During the negotiations for the Lomé Convention, the ACP States 
insisted that the Convention include some means of guaranteeing 
to the ACP States stable, equitable and remunerative prices in the 
EEC market for their main products. The ACP States hoped that 
this would increase their export earnings and provide funds for 
development. However, the EEC had also recognised the need to 
ensure adequate stability of export earnings. Protocol 22 stated,18 
"The Community will have as its firm purpose the 
safeguarding of the interests of all the countries 
referred to in this Protocol whose economics depend 
to a considerable extent on the export of primary 
products ...." 
The Commission memorandum on the contents of the new 
Convention recognised that trade liberalization and spontaneous 
efforts to increase sales to the EEC could not solve the problem of 
export earnings instability. Previous efforts to alleviate the 
problem had failed to provide a lasting solution. Article 17(3) of 
the first Yaoundé Convention had allowed EDF aid to be used,19 
"[in] the field of diversification and production, for 
measures essentially intended to make marketing 
possible at competitive prices on the Community 
market as a whole." 
Article 17(4) allowed EDF aid to be used to alleviate "the effects of 
temporary fluctuations in world prices ". These provisions 
provided some relief to the AASM against fluctuations caused by 
18 Part III of Protocol 22. 
19 See Zartman "The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa 
and the EEC ch 2, Negotiating the Yaoundé Convention and Twitchett CC 
Eure. - :n. Afri Fr.m A . iati.n . Pr n-r hi. ch 5 The Yaoundé 
Convention of 1963. 
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the phasing out, during the period of the operation of Part IV of 
the Rome Treaty, of the French suprix system. The suprix system 
served to mollify some of the effects of fluctuating prices of 
exported primary products to the metropole. During the 
negotiations for Yaoundé II, the AASM endeavoured to decrease 
the instability of their export earnings by proposing a system of 
minimum price guarantees for tropical product exports to the EEC. 
The proposal was not accepted by the EEC and Yaoundé II 
repeated the provisions of Yaoundé I relating to price stabilization 
guarantees. Article 21 of Yaoundé II, repeating the provision of 
Article 17(4) Yaoundé I, allowed advances to be made to the 
stabilization funds of the AASM. However, Article 20 of Yaoundé 
II allowed grants -in -aid to be made, in exceptional circumstances, 
where a drop in world market prices resulted in 'difficulties of a 
specialised and exceptional nature'. This provision could not be 
used to alleviate 'a situation of chronic instability of export 
earnings'.20 
The EEC had a choice between two methods in the implementation 
of the pledge given in Protocol 22. It could opt for a system of 
commodity agreements which would alleviate export instaiblity 
by price and quantity guarantees or it could adopt a system for 
the stabilization of export receipts, a form of compensatory 
financing. The problems associated with the first option were 
manifold. Firstly, a commodity agreement would have to include 
all major commodity producers and consumers. The EEC and the 
associating countries would not be the sole parties to such 
agreements. Secondly, past experience did not augur well for this 
option. Commodity agreements had a record of failure, especially 
in relation to the price objectives of the agreements. Finally, not 
all products exported by the associated countries would be 
suitable for commodity agreements. As a result of these and 
other problems, the Commission advocated a system of export 
20 JO 1970 L 282/1, 17. 
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earnings stabilization.21 As Persuad states, the attraction of this 
type of scheme is obvious,22 
It ... it does not, as in the case of price regulation 
arrangements lend itself to price raising policies and 
because it does not interfere with the operation of 
market forces." 
The Commission memorandum recognises these advantages of 
compensatory financing by stipulating that the scheme must 'not 
interfere with the free play of market forces'; 'create obstacles to 
international trade'; 'be compatible with world agreements where 
they exist for the same products'; and not hinder the conclusion 
of new commodity agreements.23 As a result of these stipulations, 
the EEC offered a guarantee, albeit limited, of stabilising the 
export receipts from certain primary products exported by the 
ACP to the EEC. The scheme, which was to become known as 
STABEX, was one of the reasons why the Convention was hailed as 
a new model for relations between developed and developing 
nations. Article 16 of the first Lomé Convention lists as the aim of 
the scheme to remedy,24 
" ... the harmful effects of the instability of export 
earnings and ...thereby enabl[e] the ACP States to 
achieve the stability, profitability and sustained 
growth of their economies." 
The means to this end is the stabilization of export earnings of 
certain primary products exported by the ACP on which the ACP 
21 EC Bull Supp 1/73 Renewal and enlargement of the association 
with the AASM and certain Commonwealth developing countries, 17 -21. 
22 "Export Earnings from Commodities: Export Earnings 
Stabilization in the Lomé Convention' in ed Von Geusau The Lomé 
Convention and the NIEO (1977) 81 -91, 81. 
23 
24 
EC Bull Supp 1/73 op cit n21, 19. 
OJ 1975 L 25/1, 14. 
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States are dependent and which are affected by price and /or 
quantity fluctuations. The products covered are selected on the 
basis of:25 
"(i) the importance of the product to employment 
in the ACP State, the deterioration in the terms 
of trade between the EEC and the concerned 
ACP States and the differing levels of 
development of individual ACP States; and, 
(ii) the dependence of the economies of the ACP 
countries on receipts from these traditionally 
unstable source of export earnings. (Instability 
resulting from price and /or quantity 
variations.)" 
Originally twelve categories of products were selected; groundnut 
products; cocoa products; coffee products; cotton products; 
coconut products; palm, palm nut and kernel products; raw hides, 
skins and leather; wood products; fresh bananas; tea; raw sisal 
and iron ore. (A total of twenty -nine individual items.) Article 
17(3) of Lomé I allowed for the expansion of the product list to 
include products on which the economies of one or more ACP State 
depended, to a considerable extent and in which sharp 
fluctuations affect export receipts. This provision was used during 
the course of Lomé I to expand the product coverage and re- 
negotiations of the Convention have resulted in a product list of 
forty -eight products.26 
The system is brought into operation when these products are 
either released for consumption in the EEC or brought under the 
inward processing arrangements there, in order to be processed.27 
25 Ibid, Article 16 (now Article 147 Lomé III). See also Hasenpflug 
"The Stabilization of Export Earnings in the Lomé Convention: A Model 
Case ?" in ed Sauvant and Hasenpflug The NIEO (1977). 
26 
27 
Op cit n2, 35. Article 148 Lomé III. 
Ibid, 34. Article 147 Lomé III. 
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In special cases, derogations may be made from this provision to 
allow exports of the products in question to any destination to be 
used for the purpose of calculating the transfer.28 In order to 
determine eligibility for a transfer the Conventions establish two 
thresholds; a dependence threshold and a trigger threshold. For 
each ACP State and for each product a reference level is 
calculated. This level corresponds to the average of export 
earnings during the four years preceding each year of 
application.29 A request is triggered on the basis of results, if the 
ACP States' export earnings for each product are at least a certain 
percentage below the reference leve1.30 An ACP State becomes 
eligible for a transfer if earnings from the export of the product(s) 
to all destinations represented a certain percentage of its total 
earnings from merchandise exports (the dependence threshold). 
Lomé I fixed the percentages at 7.5 %, these were reduced to 6.5% 
by Lomé II and to 6% by Lomé III. For the least developed, land 
locked and island ACP States the progression has been from 2.5% 
to 2% to 1.5 %. 
The level of the transfer is decided by the Commission, to whom 
applications are addressed, and will usually be the difference 
between the reference level and actual earnings. The Commission 
may refuse to authorise a transfer if it is shown that the fall in 
export earnings from exports to the EEC is the result of a trade 
policy measure adopted by the ACP State which adversely affects 
those exports.31 The funds allocated to the scheme have risen 
from 375 million units of account for the five years of Lomé I to 





Ibid, 35. Article 150(3). 
Ibid, 36. Article 158(3). 
Ibid, 37. Article 161(1). 
Idem. Article 163(b). 
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for the duration of Lomé III.32 The level of the funds also 
provides another reason why a transfer may either not be given 
or may not be given in full. Lomé II introduced a provision 
allowing for the reduction of transfer should the funds, which are 
divided into annual instalments, prove insufficient to meet 
transfer requests, even allowing for advances from the next year's 
instalment.33 
Assuming that the level of funds is sufficient, the ACP State 
requesting assistance will receive the transfer. Lomé I provided 
that the recipient ACP State should decide how the resources 
transferred will be used.34 However, Lomé II introduced a rider 
to this freedom, by stating that the transfers should be used to 
support the overall objectives of the STABEX system.35 As Article 
23(2) of Lomé II stated,36 
" ... transfers must be devoted to maintaining 
financial flows in the sector in question or, for the 
purpose of promoting diversification, directed 
towards other appropriate sectors and used for 
economic and social development." 
This obligation is not the only one imposed on the ACP States by 
the STABEX scheme. With the exception of the least developed 








Ibid, 35. Article 152. 
Ibid, 36. Article 155. 
Op cit n2, 16. Article 20 Lomé I. 
Op cit n2, 12. Article 23(2). 
Idem. 
Op cit n2, 39. Article 173 Lomé III. 
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"(a) the unit value of the product under consideration 
exported to the EEC was higher than the average 
unit value during the four years prior to the 
preceding year; and, 
(b) the quantity of the same product actually 
exported to the EEC was at least equal to the 
average of the quantities exported to the EEC 
during the four years prior to the preceding year; 
and, 
(c) the earnings for the year and the product in 
question amount to at least 106% of the average 
of earnings from exports to the EEC during the 
four years prior to the preceding year." 
Assuming these conditions are satisfied simultaneously, the ACP is 
expected to contribute an amount equal to the difference between 
actual earnings derived from exports to the EEC during the 
preceding year and the average of earnings from exports to the 
EEC during the four years prior to the preceding year. The 
contribution may be direct to the system or by deduction from its 
transfer rights.38 
The STABEX system undoubtedly satisfied not only the demands 
of the ACP during the negotiations of Lomé I but also the 
obligation assumed by the EEC in Protocol 22. However, questions 
arise. How well has the system satisfied the ACP States? Is 
STABEX the best way of satisfying the obligations contained in 
Protocol 22? As Sutton has commented,39 
"What developing countries must have from trading 
blocs such as the EEC is guaranteed access to their 
markets to sell their goods, combined with 
commodity agreements and buffer stocks to help 
stabilize the prices of their exports and thus enable 
them to plan on the basis of predictable foreign 
exchange earnings." 
38 Idem. Article 173(3). 
39 The EEC and the Developing World -A CLháing Relationship 
(1976), 23. 
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It appears that just as efforts made during the Yaoundé regime 
failed to find a lasting solution to the problem of export earnings 
instability, so STABEX, although an improvement, is equally 
incapable of providing a lasting solution. 
The Protocols 
Sugar. Protocol 22 of the Act of Accession of Ireland, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom made special reference to sugar in the 
context of the EEC's purpose of safeguarding the interests of 
countries whose economies depend, to a considerable extent, on 
the export of primary products. It noted;40 
"The question of sugar will be settled within this 
framework, bearing in mind with regard to the 
exports of sugar the importance of this product for 
the economies of several of these countries and of 
the Commonwealth countries in particular." 
Specific reference to sugar was necessitated by the existence of 
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA). This agreement, 
signed in 1951, guaranteed access to the British market at a 
guaranteed price, generally above world prices. By virtue of 
Protocol 17 of the Act of Accession the CSA would expire on 28 
February 1975.41 With the exception of Australia, all members of 
the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement were developing countries 
and, with the exception of India, all could theoretically have 
accepted the offer made to the Commonwealth in the first part of 
Protocol 22. 
40 Part III of Protocol 22. 
41 Protocol 17 allowed members of the CSA to export the traditional 
quantities of sugar to the UK market. It did change the price received 
for this sugar. 
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The accession of the UK entailed a re- negotiation of the import 
arrangements for sugar because of the heavily import- dependent 
nature of the UK sugar market. The Commission memorandum on 
enlargement of the association, as previously noted, distinguished 
two options for the EEC; world commodity arrangements or export 
earnings stabilization. Although export earnings stabilization was 
chosen for the vast majority of products, sugar would constitute a 
special case, necessitating a slightly different solution. This 
solution was enshrined in Protocol 3 of the first Lomé Convention. 
It was a product agreement, limited in application to the ACP 
States and providing specific quantity and price guarantees. 
Article 1 of Protocol 3 reads,42 
"The Community undertakes for an indefinite period 
to purchase and import, at guaranteed prices, specific 
quantities of cane sugar, raw or white, which these 
States undertake to deliver to it." 
Clearly, the arrangement is reciprocal, the EEC agrees to purchase 
and specific quantities it ACP States. 
The undertaking to import specific quantities indicates that the 
arrangement is between the EEC and each ACP State rather than 
with the ACP States collectively. 
The quantities of sugar benefitting from this arrangement amount 
to 1.3 million tonnes, a decrease of half a million tonnes from the 
agreed quantities under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. 
Article 3(2) of Protocol 3 states that, subject to the provisions of 
Article 7, the quantities allocated cannot be reduced without the 
consent of the individual states concerned.43 The 1.3 million 
tonnes of sugar referred to in Article 3 is marketed on the EEC 
market at prices freely negotiated between buyers and sellers. 
EEC intervention in this process is limited to an undertaking to 
42 
43 
OJ 1975 L 25/1, 114. 
Idem. 
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purchase at the guaranteed price quantities of sugar which cannot 
be marketed in the EEC at a price equivalent to or greater than the 
guaranteed price.44 The price received by ACP sugar exporters is 
annually negotiated between the EEC and the ACP States and 
should be "within the price range obtaining in the EEC ".45 
The obligations imposed on the EEC are matched by the obligation 
of the ACP States to deliver the agreed quantities in each delivery 
period. Should an ACP State fail to deliver its agreed quantity, 
Article 7 may come into effect. It provides that if for reasons of 
force majeure an ACP State is unable to deliver its full agreed 
quantity, the Commission shall allow an additional period for 
delivery, if the ACP State so requests. If no request is made, the 
shortfall shall be re- allocated for delivery during the delivery 
period in question, thereby maintaining imports of sugar at the 
level established by the Protocol. However, the level may decline. 
Article 7(3) and (4) state,46 
"(3) If, during any delivery period, a sugar exporting ACP 
State fails to deliver its agreed quantity in full for 
reasons other than force majeure, that quantity shall 
be reduced in respect of each subsequent delivery 
period by the undelivered quantity. 
(4) It may be decided by the Commission that in respect 
of subsequent delivery periods, the undelivered 
quantity shall be re- allocated between the other 
states which are referred to in Article 3. Such re- 
allocation shall be made in consultation with the 
States concerned." 
The discretion given to the Commission has been exercised. For 




Ibid, 115. Article 5(3) of the Protocol. 
Idem. Article 5(4) of the Protocol. 
Idem. 
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tonnes, Kenya's quota from 5000 tonnes to 93 tonnes and Congo's 
quota from 10,000 tonnes to 4810 tonnes. Despite the reductions 
the level of ACP quotas imports remain constant around 1.3 
million tonnes. This is due to the accession of other States to the 
Sugar Protocol as the number of States adhering to the Convention 
has increased.47 The obligation of the EEC to import this amount 
of sugar remains because of two provisions of the Protocol. Firstly, 
the indefinite nature of the Protocol, and secondly, the 
implementation of the Protocol takes place within the framework 
of the EEC's sugar COM, but without prejudice to the EEC's basic 
commitment. 
The Sugar Protocol is an extremely valuable concession to sugar 
exporting countries. Although the quotas in no case exceed 60% of 
any ACP States domestic production, the economic benefits of 
selling to the EEC market, with its high guaranteed price, far 
exceed those of selling to the world market, with its generally 
depressed price. However, Protocol has been criticised, by the 
ACP who question its implementation and by those people in the 
EEC who see it as a form of aid. The economics of the Protocol 
have been called into question, as one commentator noted,48 
"Not only does the European Community have to 
subsidize the sales of its own surplus production on 
the world market it is also bound, contractually to 
import a further 1.3 million tonnes per annum to 
swell its already large surpluses. The whole 
operation makes even less economic sense 
considering that the EEC re- exports refined sugar to 
ACP States." 
47 The Protocol had 13 signatories, in 1986 18 ACP States benefitted 
from its provisions. 
48 Terlinden European Sugar Policy, 77. 
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Despite the criticisms of the Sugar Protocol, it is an important 
innovation in the Lomé relationship. Another facet of the 'new 
model' established by the Lomé Convention. 
Rum and Bananas The accession of the UK also necessitated 
special arrangements in respect of traditional imports of rum from 
the Commonwealth. Arrangements were originally laid down in 
Protocol 7 of the first Lomé Convention and are currently to be 
found in Protocol 5 of the third Lomé Convention. Article 1 of of 
this Protocol provides,49 
"Until the entry into force of a common organization 
of the markets in spirits, [rum] originating in the ACP 
States shall be imported duty free into the 
Community under conditions such as to permit the 
development of traditional trade flows between the 
ACP States and the Community and between the 
member States." 
The quantities allowed to be imported are fixed each year on the 
basis of the largest annual quantities imported into the EEC from 
the ACP States in the last three years. Allowance is made for an 
annual growth rate of 37% for the UK market and 27% for all other 
member State markets. The annual quota is set at 170,000 
hectolitres of pure alcohol but may be increased if this hampers 
the development of traditional trade flows.50 Provision is also 
made in the Protocol for measures of trade promotion to 
encourage the expansion of sales in non -traditional markets.51 
Protocol 5 guarantees to rum -exporting ACP States, the 
maintenance of traditional trade flows and the possibility of 
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Convention on bananas, 52 offers similar guarantees. However, in 
this product area, the ACP States are not so advantaged. The 
reason for this stems from the 1957 Rome Treaty, more 
specifically, the Protocol on the tariff quota for imports of 
bananas. This protocol allows the Federal Republic of Germany to 
enjoy an annual duty -free tariff quota for the import of bananas. 
The quota was determined by reference to German imports of 
bananas in 1956 (290,000 tons), each period of the transitional 
phrase required a different percentage of the 1956 quantity. In 
no case should the quota fall below 75% of the 1956 quantity of 
imported bananas.53 A declaration attached to the Protocol noted 
the readiness of Germany to support measures which would lead 
to the increase of banana imports from associated overseas 
countries and territories. A similar declaration was appended to 
the second Yaoundé Convention 54 
The major source of these imports are the countries of Latin 
America and not the Associates, thereby denying potential market 
the In the early 1970's, it was suggested that the 
EEC introduce a preference for banana imports from the associated 
countries. This would be achieved by the introduction of a levy, 
As allied measures, the German protocol would be dropped and 
the CCT on bananas would be reduced. The proposal was 
rejected.55 Against this background, the provisions of the Lomé 







Provision 1 of the Protocol. 
JO 1970 L 282/1, 32. 
See Courier No.78, Dossier 64, 79. 
Op cit n49. 
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" ... improv[e] the conditions under which the ACP 
States' bananas are produced and marketed and of 
continuing the advantages enjoyed by traditional 
suppliers ... and agree that appropriate measures 
shall be taken for their implementation." 
Article 1 of the Protocol guarantees that no ACP State, as regards 
access to traditional markets and advantages, be placed in a less 
favourable position than in the past.57 The appropriate measures 
referred to in the Preamble of the Protocol are production 
improvements, quality enhancement, internal transport and 
storage facilities, marketing and trade promotion measures. 
Despite these measures, the ACP States have only a 1% of the 
largest banana market in the EEC - the German market. ACP 
bananas are simply not competitive.58 
Each of the Protocols discussed above seeks to preserve traditional 
trade flows. Only the rum protocol positively provides for an 
expansion of exports. The EEC is seeking ways of limiting sugar 
imports from the ACP States and ACP bananas face almost 
insurmountable problems on the German market. One must 
question the EEC's purpose of safeguarding the interests of the 
economies of ACP States dependent on exports of primary 
products. As implemented, this seems to safeguard European 





Op cit n56, 92. 
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Other Provisions 
Some other provisions of the Conventions are also of interest. For 
example, the agricultural trade concessions given by the EEC may 
be reduced if a new common organization of the market is 
introduced or if an existing common organization is modified. In 
such cases, the EEC undertakes to grant the ACP States a 
preference, as against third countries enjoying most favoured 
nation treatment.59 This safeguard is also accompanied by a more 
general clause which allows the EEC to take safeguard measures, 
should the application of the Convention's trade provisions lead to 
serious disturbances in the economy of the EEC or of one or more 
of the member States.60 The ability to invoke safeguard measures 
is, however, circumscribed. Such measures are not be used for 
protectionist purposes and the measures adopted are restricted to 
those which least disturb the proper functioning of the 
Convention.61 
consultations should take place between the parties 
concerning the application of the safeguard measures. 
Consultations should also occur whenever the EEC intends to 
conclude a preferential agreement with third States, if the ACP 
request them.62 This provision, which establishes the ACP at the 
top of the EEC's hierarchy of trade relations, can be used to ensure 
that these preferential agreement do not result in a level of 
concessions greater than those accorded to the ACP. The special 
position of the ACP in relation to all other countries having 
59 Op cit n2, 32. Article 130(2)(d) Lomé III. See also Annex XVI: 
Lomé III. 
60 Ibid, 33 -34. Articles 139 -143 Lome III and Annex XVII, Joint 
Declaration on Article 140 containing the text of the Joint Declaration 
by the Council of Ministers ... concerning safeguard measures. 
61 
62 
Idem. Article 139(3). 
Article 130(2)(d) Lomé III. 
318 
agreements with the EEC is further reinforced by the rules of 
origin. Rules of origin are those rules which govern the eligibility 
of products to receive the benefits of the preferential 
arrangements, thereby ensuring that no third country gains 
preferential access at the expense of the ACP States.63 So only 
genuine ACP products benefit from the arrangements. Problems 
arise when the goods produced incorporate some imported 
materials. Although origin rules are not a problem in relation to 
primary products, they may well be in relation to processed 
agricultural products. The origin rules used by the EEC are based 
on the concept of substantial transformation, that is, the particular 
product has been processed to such an extent as to transform its 
specific characteristics to a substantial degree. 
The use of the concept of substantial transformation allows for the 
compilation of two lists; List A, although there has been a change 
of tariff heading insufficient transformation has taken place; and 
List B, the converse of A. The complications inherent in rules of 
origin are further aggravated by the introduction of two further 
criteria, a maximum imported material criterion and a process 
criterion requiring the operation to be performed in the ACP 
States. The effect of the rules of origin contained in the Lomé 
Convention, the most liberal rules used by the EEC, means that the 
level of manufactured exports from the ACP is low as is the level 
of processed agricultural product exports. The rules, their 
complexity and high process criterion, acts as a positive 
disincentive to the development efforts of the ACP.64 Incentives 
to develop are on offer to the ACP States through the operation of 
the European Development Fund. 
63 Protocol No.1 Lomé III. 
64 See McQueen "Lomé and the Protective Effect of Rules of Origin;' 
(1982) 16 JWTL 119. 
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Previously, it was noted that one of the major reasons why 
countries acceded, and adhered, to the Yaoundé Conventions was 
the level of aid given by the EEC. It has been claimed that the 
relationship between the EEC and the ACP is still an aid 
relationship.65 Generally speaking, the aims of financial and 
technical co- operation under the Lomé regime does not differ 
significantly from those of the Yaoundé regime, the aim is still 
economic development. Although various other objectives have 
been added, the purpose remains the same. All that has changed 
are the methods. Perhaps this concentration on the aid 
relationship is a reflection of the past "successes" of the Yaoundé 
relationship. All the EEC may be trying to achieve is a 
solidification and embellishment of the past, to ensure the 
continued adherence of the ACP to the principles established in 
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed some of the features of the Lomé 
relationship, the trade provisions, STABEX, and the product 
protocols. Comparing these features with those of the Yaoundé 
regime it is possible to note both continuity and change in the 
relationship between the EEC and the ACP. The focus remains on 
development, although each Convention may reflect a different 
aspect of the problem. For example, Lomé II concentrated on the 
problems of agricultural development. Lomé III marks a turning 
point in the relationship, for the first time the parties have 
elaborated the principles of co- operation, the acquis -Lomé. 
The next chapter will critically evaluate the provisions elaborated 
in this one. Analysing the relationship between the EEC and the 
ACP as it enters a new decade opinions on it are bound to diverge. 
65 See Jones D. Europe's Chosen Few (Policy and Practice of the EEC 
Aid Programmer 
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Does it establish a new model for relations between developed 
and developing nations? Does it perpetrate the relationship of 
economic colonialism established by Part IV of the Treaty of 
Rome? Does it allow the ACP to achieve the level of development 
they aspire to? Does it impede this process? One must recognise 
that the Convention includes innovations which, to some extent 
meet the demands of developing countries for a new international 
economic order. However, one must also acknowledge the failings 
of the relationship and attempt to suggest improvements which 
will help Lomé achieve its goals. 
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CHAPTER 3: BEYOND LOMÉ - AN EVALUATION 
OF THE LINK. 
The development of trade 
Speaking of the negotiations for a successor to Lomé I, Helleiner 
stated,1 
"The real test of the value of a renegotiated Lomé 
Convention must be whether it assists the ACP 
countries, singly or collectively, to upgrade and 
diversify their exports and thus improve their 
economic structures." 
The mechanisms developed to achieve this are the provisions on 
trade co- operation. These provisions allow for the duty free entry 
of ACP products, with the exception of those products subject to 
the CAP. These provisions aim to achieve a 'better balance in the 
trade of the Contracting Parties', 
The interpretation of this objective has been the subject of dispute 
between the EEC and the ACP. On the one hand, the ACP argue for 
a dynamic interpretation of this provision. The trade provisions 
should be utilised in such a way as to promote the establishment 
and economic viability of manufacturing and processing 
industries. The development of these industries, with the 
extensive nature of the trade preferences given, would allow the 
objectives of the Convention to be achieved; the economic 
development of the ACP. On the other hand, the EEC 
interpretation of the provision is an essentially static 
interpretation. The provisions of the Convention should be used 
to ensure the continued satisfaction of the demands of European 
industry and consumers. An analysis of the trade impact of the 
1 "Lomé: Market Access and Industrial Co-operation" (1979) 13 
JWTL 181. 
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Lomé Convention indicates that the latter interpretation of the 
'better trade balance' objective is the true interpretaiton. 
A major study of the development of ACP -EEC trade (the Kiel 
study) indicates a declining market share for ACP States; in EEC 
non -oil imports from developing countries; in EEC imports from 
developing countries of semi -manufactures and manufactures; 
and finally, in EEC agricultural imports from developing 
countries.2 The study goes on to indicate that various EEC trade 
policy- induced barriers to ACP export growth and export 
diversification exist.3 The first of these is; 
(i) product coverage in ACP trade preferences and preference 
redundancy. 
The EEC is fond of pointing out that 99.5% of ACP exports enter the 
EEC duty free. However, as Hewitt and Stevens indicate, 'this 
figure says more about the nature of current ACP exports than it 
does about the value of Lomé Concessions'.4 As the Kiel study 
indicates, about 60% of total ACP exports to the EEC was accounted 
for by 20 commodities. These commodities are freely importable 
into the EEC from any source.5 This raises two further points, (i) 
the continued commodity concentration of ACP exports and (ii) 
preference redundancy. As the study noted,6 
2 "Effects and Prospects of EEC -ACP Trade and Trade Policy 
Relations:' (the Kiel Study) see the Courier No.98, 61 -69. 
3 Ibid, 77. 
4 "The Second Lomé Convention: in ed Stevens C The EEC and the 
third world: A Survey Vol.1. 
5 Op cit n2, 77. See also Twitchett C.C. "Patterns of ACP /EEC Trade' in 
ed Long Th- Pali i .1 Econom f EE R 1 i with A P _ . - , 145. 
6 Op cit n2, 77. 
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"An important question which arises in this 
connection is whether the preferences granted to the 
imports from the ACP countries are necessary to 
promote their exports in the EEC or whether they are 
redundant in this respect." 
If 60% of ACP exports receive no preferences over third countries, 
a case of preference redundancy is established. However, 25% of 
ACP exports to the EEC do benefit from a level of preferences as 
against third country suppliers.7 The preferences granted on this 
percentage of exports may either make the higher priced ACP 
product equal in price to those of non -ACP suppliers or it may 
make it cheaper. In both of these cases, the preferences result in 
a distortion of competitive forces, the lower priced non -ACP 
product losing out to the higher priced, but preference receiving, 
ACP product. Given the fact that the ACP share of the EEC market 
has declined, it seems certain that the preferences given to the 
ACP are insufficient to allow them to compete with non -ACP 
suppliers. 
Some 4% of ACP exports were affected by the operation of the 
CAP, and only seven out of twenty -five of the most important ACP 
exports enjoyed a tariff advantage as against third countires.8 
Combining these statistics with the fact that the ACP are major 
exporters of primary products (and especially foodstuffs), the 
conclusion is that the CAP serves to restrict the export growth of 
the ACP. This fact /conclusion has been recognised that the 
European Parliament in their analysis of the future of the Lomé 




Twitchett op cit n5, 157-162. 
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the consequences of agricultural tariff preferences were not 
satisfactory. The reasons given include:9 - products granted preferential status are totally absent or 
represented only in small quantities in the range of goods 
on offer; - EEC trade measures have considerably limited the effect 
of preferences. These measures include, in particular, the 
maintenance of the reference price system for many 
varieties of fruit and vegetables; the extension of 
preferences for Mediterranean products; the general 
safeguard clause; and the regulation on origin with regard 
to vegetable oils; and finally, - the existence of special marketing conditions limiting the 
effectiveness of tariff preferences. 
These reasons indicate that tariff preferences by themselves are 
insufficient to promote the development of ACP -EEC trade. This 
conclusion was acknowledged by the parties during the 
negotiation of Lomé II. Hence, the emphasis given in that 
Another factor emerges 
from the list of reasons given above, that is, to ensure a genuine 
level of preferences for the ACP would require not only a change 
to the preferential regime governing ACP products but also the 
Mediterranean agreements, the GSP and, more importantly, the 
internal mechanisms of the CAP. To hope for such an extensive 
amendment of the delicate balance of internal and external 
policies, in an effort to give 'real' preferences to ACP agricultural 
exports, is unrealistic. Another method of supporting agricultural 
exports will have to be found. This conclusion is strengthened 
when on consideration of the second EEC trade policy- induced 
barrier identified by the Kiel Study. 
9 EP Doc 1- 605/83 Report on the context of the future ACP -EEC 
Convention to follow Lomé II. Rapporteur U.Irmer, Sub report on trade 
Rapporteur K.Wawrzik, 130. 
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(ii) The erosion of preference margins. 
This erosion arises from two sources, the Generalized System of 
Preferences and the GATT. In relation to the GSP, the erosion 
issue centres on tropical agricultural products and their 
processing. As the Kiel study acknowledges, the major source of 
competition for the ACP comes from the ASEAN countries.) a 
Analysis of the trade performance of these two blocs in relation to 
tropical agricultural products indicates that the GSP has 
'dismantled' ACP preference margin. This dismantling has 
occurred despite consultations between the EEC and the ACP 
before the introduction of the annual GSP regulation. GATT 
induced tariff cuts, especially on items such as tea, coffee and 
cocoa beans, have also contributed to a certain amount of 
preference erosion. The value of preferences is, therefore, 
declining. As Wall acknowledges,11 
" ... in the EC context, the word preference had lost 
much of its original meaning by 1972. The 
increasing inability of the Community (a) to offer 
trade preference for semi -manufactured and 
manufactured goods; (b) to offer more than 
temporary preferences for a small range of tropical 
products and (c) to offer any significant benefits at 
all for products covered by the CAP, meant that the 
only meaningful form of compensation that any 
Convention could offer would have to take the form 
of aid, of one description or another." 
Summarising the discussion so far, it appears that the EEC market 
accessibility of ACP agricultural exports are affected by a number 
of factors; the erosion /redundancy of tariff preferences and the 
operation of the CAP. In addition to these EEC -induced factors a 
number of exogenous barriers and ACP policy -induced barriers to 
10 See Chapter 4 of Part III of this paper. 
11 pp cit n2, 79. The EEC's Lomé Convention: Stabex and Third World 
Aspirations (1970) 7. 
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export growth and export diversification exist. Lomé III, 
recognising the existence of these exogenous barriers, has 
attempted to provide a means towards their solution. Note, for 
example, the provisions on drought and desertification;12 
transport and communication;13 and plant and animal diseases.14 
The ACP policy- induced barriers cannot be overcome through the 
Convention, as it recognises the right of each state to determine its 
own political, social, cultural and economic policy options.15 
The immense scale of the problem does not mean a solution 
cannot, or will not, be found. What is needed are guarantees of 
market access, commodity agreements and buffer stocks to enable 
planning on the basis of predictable foreign exchange earnings. 
Perhaps, the parties to the Convention should conclude regional 
commodity arrangements. The possibility of such arrangements 
has already been canvassed. The 1971 Commission Memorandum 
on Development Co- operation recognised the desirability of 
concluding regional commodity arrangements should international 
agreements fail to be concluded within a reasonable period of 
time.16 The means to achieve regional commodity arrangements 
can be found in the Conventions themselves, for example Article 
44 of Lomé III recognises the determination of the Contracting 
Parties to co- operate on agricultural commodities.17 The 







Chapter 2 of Title I (Part two) Lomé III. The Courier no.89, 17. 
Title V (Part two) Lomé III ibid, 25. 
Chapter I of Title I (Part two) Lomé III ibid, 15. 
Article 3 Lomé III ibid, 10. 
EC Bull Supp 5/71. 
Article 44 -49 Lomé III op cit n12, 18 -19. 
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- a mechanism to reduce excessive price fluctuations. This 
could be achieved by establishing a minimum purchase 
price for ACP products on the EEC market; 
-a mechanism to reduce quantity fluctuation. The obvious 
method to achieve this would be the creation of suitable 
stocking arrangement on either a national, regional or 
inter -regional level (see Articles 26, 29, 45 Lomé III);18 -a mechanism to reduce quality variations. This could be 
achieved through the Technical Centre for Agricultural 
and Rural Co- operation (Article 37 Lomé 1II19). Special 
emphasis should be given to the effective control of 
disease, pests and other factors causing a deterioration in 
either quality or quantity. 
Further ancillary measures could include provisions to promote 
the processing and the marketing of the commodities and the 
diversification of production to lessen the impact of commodity 
dependence. 
The regional commodity arrangement would be aimed at securing 
market access to EEC markets and, more importantly, the 
upgrading and diversifying ACP exports. The overall purpose of 
the arrangements would be the improvment of the ACP's 
economic structures. Access to the EEC market could be achieved 
by minimum quantity agreements, similar to those contained in 
the Sugar Protocol. The necessary financial requirements to assist 
the objectives of the arrangement could be met by the European 
Development Fund. As the 1971 Commission memorandum 
recognised, the regional commodity arrangement would be 
temporary pending the conclusion of international commodity 
18 
19 
Ibid, 15 and 18. 
Ibid, 17. 
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arrangements, which have similar economic provisions.20 This 
link with the international arena raises a problem concerning the 
range of commodities which would be suitable for both regional 
and international commodity agreements. Products such as coffee, 
cocoa, sugar and tea are amenable to international agreements. 
However, the ACP States export other products for which an 
international agreement is a remote possibility (e.g. fruit and 
vegetables). In the case of the latter product the EEC and the ACP 
could conclude a regional commodity arrangement. As an 
alternative to a commodity arrangement, the EEC could agree to 
foster the aims of the numerous producer associations for 
products not amenable market regulation. As an example, the EEC 
could agree to promote the objectives of the African Groundnut 
Council (AGC). The preamble to the AGC Convention states the 
desire of the Counci1,21 
"To contribute by means of adequate action to the 
stabilization of prices of groundnuts in the world 
market, at a remunerative level" 
EEC action could be directed towards the ancillary measures of 
regional commodity arrangements; the development of processing 
and marketing and the diversification of the economies of the ACP 
States. 
The proposal made above (the conclusion of regional commodity 
arrangements or alternatively, support for the objectives of 
producer associations) seeks to guarantee the ACP a level of 
market access to the EEC market. It recognises the limitations of 
preferences, especially their inability to generate trade. By 
promoting measures which will have the effect of generating 
trade, the Lomé Conventions will enhance the development 
prospects of the ACP. The trade generated by regional commodity 
20 
21 
Op cit n16. 
The Courier No.86, 80. 
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agreements will not be solely in the direction of the EEC. The 
nature of the CAP suggests that the scope for further trade 
concessions is limited, for this reason both proposals seek to 
promote ACP trade with non -EEC states. While recognising that 
this will weaken the link established in 1957, it is a reflection of 
the nature of the problems facing the ACP. Europe cannot hope to 
solve these problems alone. The co- operation of all countries is 
necessary to achieve the economic development of the ACP and 
other developing states. 
STABEX, an analysis for an innovation 
The one feature of the Lomé Conventions which has attracted the 
greatest analysis and criticism is the scheme for the stabilization 
of export earnings. The criticisms range from the allegation that 
the scheme discriminates against other developing countries,22 to 
claims that the scheme is a positive disincentive to the 
development of the ACP States.23 It is undoubtedly true that in 
the absence of a global scheme similar to STABEX, the ACP States 
have an advantage over other developing countries, an advantage 
which is further accentuated by their preferential access to the 
EEC market. However, various internal problems with the 
operation of the STABEX scheme limits the extent of these 
advantages and hence, the scope of the discrimination. 
The first of these internal problems is the product coverage of 
primary products. It has been stated that the nature of the 
product coverage reveals the true purpose of the scheme; it is an 
attempt by the EEC to achieve security of supply for certain 
22 See Moss The Lomé Conventions and their implications for the US 
(1982) ch 4. The Stabex system: Operation, Analysis and Critique. 
23 See Sutton The EEC and the Developing World. A Changing 
Relationship (1976) 18 -25. 
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essential commodities.24 This impression is strengthened when 
one considers the negotiation and operation of Sysmin, a system 
similar to STABEX but relating only to minerals. If a percentage 
fall of 10% or more occurs in the capacity of an ACP State to 
produce or export minerals or in export earnings and this fall 
seriously compromises the profitability of an otherwise viable and 
economic line of production, the ACP State concerned will be 
entitled to a Sysmin transfer. Unlike STABEX, the system is not 
connected to the development needs of the ACP but with the 
economic survival of the mining industry in the ACP States. As 
such, the scheme allows two charges to be made against the EEC. 
These have been identified by Rajana as,25 
(i) the subordination of the Lomé arrangement to the EEC 
general scheme for alleviating its own energy and 
mineral needs; and 
(ii) the reinforcement of the existing production structures 
of the ACP States and a deepening of their external 
dependence. 
These charges, although relating to Sysmin, are equally applicable 
to STABEX. 
By concentrating on primary products, STABEX operates as a 
disincentive not only to the development of processing industries 
and thus of industrialization but also to the development of food 
crops instead of export crops.26 In recognition of this, Lomé III 
includes provisions to achieve food security through agricultural 
co- operation, especially in the area of food strategies.27 It is in 
24 See Persaud "Export Earnings from Commodities: Export Earnings 
Stabilization in the Lomé Convention.' in ed Von Geusau The Lomé 
Convention and the NIEO. 
25 "Europe and the Third World: A Critical Appraisal of Lomé II:' 
(1980) 3 JEI 197, 205. See Kibola "Stabex and Lomé III (1984) 18 JWTL 32. 
26 
27 
Sutton op cit n23, 18. 
Op cit n12, 16. Article 35 Lomé III. 
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this context that one must examine the requests of the ACP for the 
purchase of available agricultural surpluses from the EEC, in 
addition to their food aid requirements. 
The main reason for the limited product coverage of STABEX is the 
operation of the CAP. Two examples illustrate this point, tobacco 
and citrus fruit. In relation to the ACP request concerning the 
possible inclusion of tobacco in the STABEX system, the 
Commission's reply expressed the reluctance of the EEC to include 
it. The reasons given include the following,28 
"Such an extension would mean, in effect, granting 
outside the EEC, an automatic guarantee limited to 
the quantity of production from which EEC tobacco 
producers do not benefit." 
The ACP request for the possible inclusion of some citrus fruits 
(grapefruits, oranges, tangerines and lemons) received a similar 
reply.29 The solution to the problems of fluctuating export 
earnings in these two commodities could not be found in the 
context of STABEX. The solution would have to be in the form of 
tariff preferences accompanied by import calendars and /or tariff 
quotas.30 
The reluctance of the EEC to extend STABEX to cover products 
subject to the CAP is understandable. However, it does confirm 
the role of the ACP as traditional suppliers of certain primary 
products. Thus STABEX offers no incentive to develop other lines 
of production and if other markets are cultivated, this may result 
in the loss of a STABEX transfer. As noted during the description 
of the STABEX system a transfer may be denied if either economic 
28 COM (81) 674, Possible inclusion of tobacco in the Stabex system, 1. 
29 COM (81) 656. 
30 See Council Reg.486/85 OJ 1985 L 61/4. Articles 16 and 17 (tobacco 
and Article 13 (fruit). 
332 
conditions do not justify it, or the fall in export earnings is the 
result of a trade policy decision adversely affecting exports to the 
EEC. A decision to undertake further processing and thus, a 
decline in the level of exports to the EEC or, a decision to send 
exports to markets other than the EEC, may, in the exercise of the 
Commission's discretion, be considered as an adverse trade policy 
decision. The exercise of the Commission's discretion, itself a 
subject of criticism, may be negated if the fall in exports to the 
EEC is a result of increased exports between the ACP States.31 In 
such cases, STABEX may be applied, if so, it results in inter -ACP 
transfers. Alternatively, the system may still apply to exports to 
all destinations, if the Council of Ministers so decides, taking into 
account the fact that the ACP to be granted a derogation does not 
send the bulk of its exports to the EEC.32 
The limited product coverage of STABEX serves as a disincentive 
to the process of development, thereby nullifying one of the aims 
of the scheme. The process of development, occurring through the 
of processing and manufacturing industries, is also 
stultified by the dependence threshold, the percentage of an ACP 
States' total earnings from merchandise exports. The reason for 
this is as follows, if an ACP State has one major product an 
attempt to diversify its export base could jeopardise the 
attainment of the dependence threshold for the one major 
product.33 The thresholds which serve to actuate the system, 
when economic conditions justify it, are set at 6 %, all shortfalls 
less than 6% do not activate the system. This may cause the loss 
31 See Dolan "The Lomé Convention and Europe's Relationship with 
the Third World -A Critical Analysis". (1978) JEI 369. 
32 Op cit n2, 35. Article 150(3) Lomé III. 
33 Wall The European Community's Lomé Convention: Stabex and 
Third World Aspirations, 11. 
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of substantial export earnings. 34 The inequities resulting from the 
thresholds was pointed out by the Court of Auditors,35 
"The same ACP State may receive a financial transfer 
for a STABEX product which slightly exceeds the 
dependence threshold, whereas for another STABEX 
product which greaty exceeds the same threshold the 
transfer is refused because the reduction in export 
earnings is only a small percentage below the 
reference level." 
These inequities justify the need for a graduated system for 
triggering off transfers, so that those States who most need the 
transfers actually receive them (i.e. the less- diversified ACP 
States). The inequities of the threshold, as the Court of Auditors 
indicate, partly result from the reference level.36 The fact that 
these levels are based on past export earnings has been a source 
of criticism.37 The choice of nominal export earnings over the last 
four years frustrates the objectives of the scheme by stabilizing 
export earnings at an inadequate level. No account is taken of 
either movement in import purchasing power, or the effects of 
inflation.38 If real export earnings, around a moving average 
centred on the year of the shortfall, were taken into account and 
provision made for indexing the price of primary exported 
products with manufactured imported products, the scheme 
would meet its objectives and promote economic development. 
34 See Kibola "Stabex and Lomé III "(1984) 18 JWTL 32. See also 
Hasnpflug "The Stabilization of Export Earnings in the Lomé Convention: 
A Model Case ?" in ed Sauvant and Hasenpflug The NIEO (1977). 
35 COM (80) 211 Court of Auditors. Special Report on the operation of 




See Persaud op cit n24, 85. 
38 See The Courier No.98, 87 for the Average Annual Inflation Roles 
in ACP Countries 1965 -80. 
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Acceptance of this proposal by the EEC is doubtful, the level of 
funding required for the scheme would increase and concern over 
the possibility of inflation resulting from indexation are the 
reasons for this belief. After all, the scheme was not supposed to 
interfere with the free play of market forces. 
The major problem faced by the scheme is an insufficiency of 
funds. The difficulties encountered in 1980 and 1981 are 
illustrative of this problem.39 In 1980, for the first time since its 
inception, the amount of admissible requests exceeded the funds 
available. The situation repeated itself on a much greater scale in 
1981. The factors which played a role in this crisis were the 
changes made to STABEX by Lomé II (lowering of thresholds, 
greater product coverage, globalization, and provision for inter - 
ACP transfers) and a sharp fall in the prices of commodities 
covered by the system. In 1980, using that years instalment, the 
balance from Lomé I and the maximum advance on the 1981 
year, STABEX could only achieve an actual cover rate of 52.8 %.40 
The figure for 1981 was 42.8 %.41 The was to 
lose credibility as it was unable to cope with the decline in the 
competitive position of ACP products. However, the system was 
able to operate within its parameters, even though all transfers 
were not fully met. Moreover, the bad years of 1980 and 1981 
were reflected in the reference levels for the remaining years of 
Lomé II, thereby reducing those levels and the transfers to be 
paid in subsequent years. The events of 1980 and 1981 led many 
to question the viability /necessity of STABEX, as Hewitt noted,42 
39 The Courier No.79. Dossier on Stabex. See also COM (82) 150. 
Application of the system for the stabilization of export earnings 1980 -81. 
40 
41 
The Courier No.79, 68. 
Idem. 
42 "The Lomé Convention: Entering a Second Decade" (1985) 23 JCMS 
95, 112. 
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" ... if the APC's market share has fallen for most 
STABEX commodities, it makes little economic sense 
for the Community 'to compensate' ACP governments 
for losses in their market share (whether this arises 
from production difficulties or poor marketing) when 
other developing country commodity exporters are 
performing better without the benefits of STABEX 
and the other privileges accorded under Lomé." 
Perhaps, STABEX is a disguised form of aid! Consider the fact that 
the ACP do not accept any direct link between the transfer and 
the sector experiencing difficulties, the micro -economic effects are 
not as strong as the macro -economic effects of a transfer. Yet 
STABEX does not operate well as "an instrument of macro- 
economic stabilization ".43 Clearly, a choice will have to be made as 
efforts to unite the macro and micro -economic effects of STABEX 
transfer fails to achieve the objectives of the system. If the aim is 
overall economic development, a macro -economic structure for 
STABEX should be chosen. If the aim is to develop production in 
the affected sector a micro -economic structure would be 
preferred. 
In its report on the future of the Lomé link, in relation to STABEX 
the European Parliament recommended that it be fundamentally 
reformed. To maintain it as a tool for development, it proposed 
that,44 
" -all processing stages for agricultural and other 
raw materials are covered by the system; -a basis for calculation is established which allows 
for trade between the ACP countries and exports 
to markets other than the Community for specific 
regions and products; - the diversification of existing single crop 
economics is not restricted; 
43 Faber "The Economics of Stabex ". (1984) 18 JWTL 52. 
44 Op cit n9 para 54 of the proposed resolution. 
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- the growing of food crops for internal 
consumption is not restricted; and - where STABEX appropriations are used, 
agreement is obtained and monitoring 
arrangements implemented to determine whether 
the appropriation should be invested in 
rationalization of the economic activity concerned 
or for purposes of diversification, in particular, to 
secure self supply in food stuffs." 
The implementation of these recommendations would involve 
substantial alterations to the product coverage of the system, the 
thresholds and reference levels and increased resources. As the 
last of these recommendations indicate, the European Parliament 
was concerned about the efficacy of the transfers. They seemed 
to have chosen a micro -economic structure for STABEX, transfers 
being used for rationalization or diversification, instead of a 
macro -economic structure, to aid the process of development. The 
recommendations were not acted upon. The STABEX system 
provided for in Lomé III is not fundamentally different from that 
of Lomé II. The future of the system may be in doubt as 
disagreements about the system exist between the member 
States. On the one hand, France wishes the scheme to continue in 
expanded form with transfers channelled through national 
product stabilization funds and with control over domestic pricing 
policy.45 On the other hand, the UK feels the scheme is of little 
effect, duplicating the IMF scheme and has the EEC fulfilling a role 
which the IMF could better fulfil.4ó The outcome of this debate is 
either an improved STABEX or no STABEX. The nature of the IMF 
scheme, the Compensatory Financing Facility, suggests that 
STABEX will survive. 
45 See Hewitt A "Stabex: Analysing the Effectiveness of an Innovation: 
in ed Stevesn The EEC and the Third World: A Survey Vol.1I1 (1985). 
46 Idem. 
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The IMF Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) and STABEX differ 
substantially in scope, objectives and modes of operation. Goreaux 
identifies the following differences,47 
" -CFF covers earnings from all merchandise exports 
to all destinations and is open to a wider group of 
countries; - the amount of the transfer under CFF cannot 
exceed the net shortfall in earnings from all 
merchandise exports; - the purpose of CFF is to provide assistance to 
members with an overall balance of payments 
deficit arising from the export shortfall; - CFF can only be used if the member has a balance 
of payments need and if it co- operates with the 
IMF to find solutions to its balance of payment 
difficulties; - CFF relates to shortfall in any period of 12 
consecutive months. The shortfall is calculated as 
the five year average centred on the shortfall 
year; - drawings from CFF are not subject to any 
thresholds although a limit is imposed on the 
amount transferred; - interest is charged on all loans and they are 
repayable by all members within a set time 
period." 
The possibility of changes to STABEX to make it more like the CFF, 
would be an enormous step for the EEC. A globalized scheme 
would need wider product coverage, abolition of thresholds, 
calculations in terms of real purchasing power, longer repayment 
periods and vastly increased financial resources. Such a dramatic 
47 "The IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility: IMF Staff Paper 
No.34 (1980) 80 -84. See also Finger and Derosa The Compensatory 
Financing Facility and Export Instability:' (1980) 14 JWTL 14. 
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change in the nature of STABEX could not be envisaged.48 
However, some of the methods used in the CFF could be used in 
STABEX. The most important adaptation would be the use of the 
five year average to determine the net shortfall. This adaptation 
would introduce a degree of flexibility which STABEX currently 
does not possess. 
Other changes to the nature of STABEX are more problematic. An 
expansion of product coverage seems unlikely, the thresholds 
would remain, although a graduated trigger threshold system 
would resolve some of the inequities of the present system. The 
possibility of increased financial resources is also doubtful. Such 
increased resources may not be needed if the proposals made in 
the first section of this chapter are implemented. A system of 
regional commodity arrangements which would achieve price and 
quantity stabilisation would obviate the need for STABEX although 
a need would still remain. Equally, fostering the aim of producer 
associations would also reduce the need for STABEX. The example 
earlier was of the Groundnuts 
encouragement of their objectives would reduce the need for 
transfers.(Transfer for groundnuts and groundnut oil accounted 
for 42% of all STABEX transfers in the years 1975 -80.49) 
If the proposals were acted upon, a decrease in the level of 
STABEX transfer could result as fluctuations of price and 
quantities are mollified. As a result of the implementation of 
regional commodity arrangements or measures to support 
producer associations the objectives of STABEX could be satisfied. 
48 See Persaud "Export Earnings Stabilization in the ACP /EEC 
Convention'! in ed Long F. The Political Economy of EEC Relations with 
ACP States 91 -106 and Hasenpflug op cit n34 and Cuddy J. "Compensatory 
Financing in the North -South Dialogue - The IMF and Stabex Schemes!' 
(1979) 13 JWTL 66. Each of these articles discusses the possibility of a 
Globalised Stabex. 
49 The Annex: Statistics and Graphs, The Courier No.79, 77 -82. 
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This system of regional commodity arrangements backed up by 
STABEX would put an end to criticisms of STABEX, such as,50 
"Stabex does not directly address the many problems 
to which primary product exporters are exposed 
other than short -term foreign exchange shortages. 
Even here the approach is patchwork. It is doubtful 
if the final impact on the ACP so far has been 
significant. Small, infrequent financial transfers are 
of dubious lasting effect." 
Sugar, problems with the Protocol 
A 1975 study of the effects of the Lomé Convention on the 
World's Cane Sugar Producers, noted,51 
"One suspicion is that the Lomé price provisions may 
be less generously interpreted than those of the CSA 
because of the constant pressure to reduce 
Community agricultural budget costs and the fact 
that sugar is not one of the Community's deficit 
commodities." 
This suspicion proved well grounded. Despite the fact that the 
Sugar Protocol provides for the guaranteed price to be negotiated 
annually, the price is usually fixed automatically at the level of 
the EEC's intervention price. The ACP constantly strive for 
genuine negotiations, in which all relevant economic factors are 
taken into account. 
One economic factor considered by the ACP to be relevant is ocean 
freight costs. A 1982 Commission document examined the 
problem of ocean freight costs, which according to the ACP, 
rendered equal prices for ACP and EEC sugar inequitable to ACP 
50 Moss op cit n22, 178. 
51 Harris and Hagelberg "Effects on the Lomé Convention on the 
Worlds Sugar Cane Producers : (1975) 2 ODI Rev.2, 38. 
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exporters. The resulting proposal for a Council Declaration on the 
problem, while noting that transport costs were a permanent 
charge for ACP exporters, expressed the conclusion that the 
problem could not be alleviated within the framework of the 
Sugar Protoco1.52 Given the requirements of Article 1(2) of the 
Protocol, that implementation be carried out within the 
framework of the COM for sugar, if the guaranteed price for ACP 
sugar were increased by a transport element, ACP sugar would 
have to be bought into intervention because it could not be freely 
marketed within the EEC. Moreover, a higher price for 
preferential ACP sugar would have political acceptability 
problems within the EEC. The Commission document stated the 
willingness of the EEC to co- operate with the ACP States in finding 
a solution to the problem but such co- operation would take place 
outside the framework of the Sugar Protoco1.53 Ocean freight costs 
were not, therefore, a relevant economic factor. As a Commission 
spokesman informed the ACP in 1982,54 
"the only relevant economic factor was the price that 
commercial purchasers are prepared to pay for sugar 
at any given moment" 
Another economic factor which is not considered relevant in the 
process of price formation is the need for the ACP to achieve a 
return on their investments. This should be relevant considering 
that investments in ACP sugar production are carried out with the 
financial help and technical assistance of EEC firms and agencies.55 
The failure of the EEC to engage in genuine annual negotiations 
52 COM (83) 243 ACP Sugar, the problem of ocean freight costs. 
53 Ibid, 5 (Part 4 of a recommended Council Declaration). 
54 The Courier No.75 Dossier -Sugar, 62. 
55 COM (78) 623 Lack of proper co- ordination between the policies of 
the member States and the EC- Sugar. 
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was one of the 'violations of the Sugar Protocol' discussed by a 
special ACP Council of Ministers in 1985. The feeling of the 
participants was that no real negotiations had ever taken place on 
prices, the EEC simply "offered" the ACP a price which they could 
"take or leave ".56 
In 1986 the ACP requested a special top -level meeting to discuss 
the fixing of the guaranteed prices, and the EEC reluctantly 
agreed.57 The dispute over price related to the EEC offer of a 
1.15% increase in the price of raw sugar (the state in which most 
ACP sugar is exported to the EEC) as against 1.3% increase for 
refined sugar from the EEC. The ACP wanted a 1.33% increase in 
the price for raw sugar. A compromise was finally reached at the 
ACP Council of Ministers meeting in Bridgetown. The nature of 
the compromise was that for sugar delivered between 1 July 1985 
and 31 March 1986 a 1.15% increase was granted, whereas for 
sugar delivered between 1 April and 30 June 1986 the increase 
would be 1.33 %. Although accepted by the ACP group, the 
did satisfy ACP producers. Yet, the price they 
receive on the EEC market is 10% greater than the international 
price.58 
Another aspect of the Protocol which has caused problems is the 
allocation of quantities. Annex XIII of Lomé I stated that requests 
from ACP States not specifically referred to in Protocol 3 to 
participate in the Protocol should be examined.59 The request 
made by Zambia for admission to the Protocol is illustrative of the 
attitude of the EEC to the Protocol. The request was rejected, but 
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own quotas if they wished Zambia to be admitted to the 
Prot o c o 1.6 o The rider to this option was that the reduction of 
quotas and the admission of Zambia should not result in the 
overall quantity of 1.3 million tonnes being exceeded. Although 
the number of ACP States benefitting from the Protocol has 
increased from 14 to 18, the overall quantity has not been 
exceeded. According to the Commission the present situation on 
the EEC and world markets preclude any increase in the level of 
quotas.61 
Moreover, in the Commission's view, Protocol 22 of the Act of 
Accession was not intended to apply to countries which developed 
a capacity to export sugar after the Sugar Protocol entered into 
force . 6 2 Clearly, the EEC is anxious to keep the level of 
preferential sugar imported at 1.3 million tonnes. Perhaps 
through the use of Article 7 and a failure to reallocate delivery 
shortfalls, the overall quota might even be reduced. The level of 
the quota at 1.3 million tonnes exceeds by .2 million tonnes what 
is to be the secure for ACP sugar. This 
ignores the fact that other member States use ACP sugar and the 
offer by Portugal to buy 0.3 million tonnes of ACP sugar on its 
accession to the EEC. The Commission opposed the Portugese offer 
and suggested that the ACP only export 70,000 tonnes of sugar at 
world market prices.63 Once again the CAP seems to be 
controlling the operation of the Lomé link. As one commentator 
has noted,64 
60 See Terlinden European Sugar Policy (1985). Operation of the 
Sugar Protocol - Supplies for the EC or and for development. 
61 See COM (83) 172, for the Commission discussion of this point. 
62 Idem. 
63 The Courier No.90. Yellow Pages, III. 
64 Jackman "The Sugar Protocol. An ACP View:' The Courier No.75, 57, 59. 
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"The idiosyncratic arithmetic of the [CAP] would have 
it that the cost of stocking and exporting Europe's 
huge current surplus of beet sugar is directly 
attributable to ACP imports. Never mind that when 
the protocol was signed, Europe was a net importer 
of sugar. Never mind the concept enshrined in the 
protocol that its implementation would be 'carried 
out within the framework of the management of the 
common organization of the sugar market'. The 
consummation of this train of logic would be that the 
prices paid to ACP sugar producers by commercial 
buyers and refiners, whose viability as a Community 
industry depends directly on ACP cane sugar, should 
somehow be seen as a form of aid." 
As predicted by Harris and Hagelberg in their 1975 study, it is the 
operation of the CAP which has led to a less than generous 
interpretation not only of the price provisions but of all provisions 
of the Protocol. The problems stem from the 1974 decision to 
expand sugar production within the EEC and a number of current 
problems such as the stagnation of internal consumption, 
competition from substitutes and the situation and outlook of the 
world market in sugar.65 
The sixth annual report of the ACP -EEC Consultative Assembly in 
its examination of the experience of the Lomé link recommended 
various improvements which would lead to a more effective Sugar 
Protocol. These included:66 - effective price negotiations which take into account all 
relevant economic factors and provide for genuine 
consultation of the ACP States and their effective 
participation; 
65 See Tsadik "International Sugar Market - Self Sufficiency or Free 
Trade" (1982) 16 JWTL 133 and Smith I "Structure and Policy Changes in 
World Sugar!'(1977) 11 JWTL 228. 
66 See Annex VI to the 1982 Annual Report of the ACP -EEC Council of 
Ministers. 
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- adaptation of the CAP to ensure, subject to Article 7, that 
the agreed quantities are irreducible; - limitation of domestic production to take account of 
domestic consumption, the Sugar Protocol and world 
market trends; and finally - accession to the International Sugar Agreement by the 
EEC. 
These recommendations closely mirror the recommendations of 
the European Parliament's Committee on Development and Co- 
operation in its report on the medium and long -term problems of 
the EEC's sugar policy in relation to Protocol 3.67 The 
implementation of the recommendations of either of these two 
bodies would involve substantial changes to the Sugar Protocol, 
and to the operation of the CAP. As such, the chances of success 
are slim. In relation to the need for 'effective' negotiations, a 
possible result of which would be higher prices for ACP sugar, this 
would directly threaten the competitive potential of cane refiners 
in relation to beet producers. The elimination of the refining 
margin (between raw and white sugar) could have serious macro- 
economic effects for the ACP States, due to reduction of the 
competitive margins of EEC refiners. Internal adaptation of the 
CAP is also problematic. EEC participation in the 1977 ISA did not 
occur owing to the low level of quotas offered to it.68 It seems 
unlikely that other sugar exporting nations would agree to EEC 
participation in future international sugar agreements should its 
demands be as large as those of 1977. As has been frequently 
stressed in this paper, the CAP is a delicate balance of economic, 
social and political forces, substantial adaptations to the sugar 
COM would necessitate the negotiation of a new balance between 
the remaining COM's. This would be a long and torturous process. 
67 Doc 1- 456/83 Report on the medium and long term problems of 
the Community's sugar policy in relation to the ACP -EEC Sugar Protocol. 
Rapporteur V. Sable. 
68 See Harris "US and EEC Policy Attitudes Compared towards the 1977 
ISA:' (1980) 31 J Agr Econ 351. 
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Perhaps, the answer lies not in changes to the CAP but in changes 
to the nature of the Sugar Protocol. 
Terlinden, in a major work on European sugar policy, has 
identified three possible options for the future of the Sugar 
Protoco1.69 
"i. The ACP would be relieved of their contractual 
duty to supply the EEC. Imports would serve as 
an outlet for ACP States unable to sell their sugar 
on the world market. 
ii. If an ACP exporter is unable to sell on the world 
market, the EEC would buy the sugar on the spot 
for use as food aid; 
iii. Reduction in quotas in return for EEC aid to assist 
the diversification of the agricultural sector and 
economy of the ACP State." 
Of these three possible options, the most advantageous to both 
parties is option 1, although a number of difficulties may arise. 
The option would operate as follows. The ACP would find a buyer 
on the world market and would receive from the EEC the 
difference between the world price and the guaranteed price. The 
level of the guaranteed price would increase as ACP exporters no 
longer have to pay transport costs to the EEC. The option would 
not affect the access of ACP sugar to the EEC as those quantities 
not sold on the world market would be marketed within Europe in 
the traditional manner. So, this option gives the ACP guarantees 
similar to those of the Sugar Protocol. 
The Sugar Protocol would have to be renegotiated since Article 
1(1) obliges the EEC to "purchase and import" a certain level of 
ACP sugar. The implementation of the Protocol would no longer 
take place within the framework of the management of the 
common organization of the sugar market. Further amendments 
would include; the price provisions (Article 5) and the non- 
69 Op cit n60, 115. 
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delivery provision (Article 7). The renegotiated protocol would 
meet the demands of the ACP over the price and afford the EEC an 
opportunity to reform its sugar COM. The renegotiated protocol 
would recognise the need for the ACP to develop their trade with 
markets other than the EEC and provide a means of economic 
support for the ACP during a transitional period, pending 
optimum diversification of their trade. The proposed regional 
commodity arrangements, the encouragement of local producer 
associations and the renegotiated sugar protocol all entail a certain 
level of economic de- coupling from the EEC. Is this the future 
direction of the Lomé link? 
The future of the Lomé Link 
The preceding analysis of the trade impact of Lomé, STABEX and 
the Sugar Protocol, indicate that whilst the ACP receive more 
preferential treatment from the EEC than any other third country 
or group of countries, the objectives set for the agreement have 
not been met. Heralded as a model for relations between 
developed and developing countries, the performance of the 
Convention marks a perpetuation of a pre- existing link with 
limited new features. 
Despite the extensive nature of the trade preferences granted, the 
level of ACP -EEC trade as a percentage of total EEC trade has 
declined. The preferences granted suffer from either erosion or 
redundancy. Measures to alleviate the declining impact of 
preferences, such as STABEX and the Sugar Protocol, are plagued 
with internal difficulties, preventing their maximum efficacy. The 
decline in the efficacy of preferences will be further accentuated 
as the full impact of the accession of Spain and Portugal is felt. 
Although the markets of these two countries will be opened up, 
expanding the preferential area, the agricultural nature of the 
economics will result in a shrinkage of the market area for some 
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agricultural products.70 The main culprit of this shrinkage is the 
CAP. The effect of the CAP and the application of its principles 
have already been noted in the context of the Sugar Protocol, with 
the rejection of the Portugese offer to import ACP sugar. It has 
also been noted in the context of STABEX, with the refusal to 
include citrus fruits in STABEX. 
The accession of Spain and Portugal will entail other consequences 
for the ACP, notably the reactivation of the internal debate on the 
orientation of the EEC's development policy The link between the 
new member States and the countries of South America will be a 
new factor in the determination of external EEC policy. After 
enlargement, Sharp and Whittlemore predict,71 
" ... it will be significantly harder than today for the 
Community to reach any worthwhile consensus on 
external policies and harder to draw a line between 
the interests of the poorer member States and those 
of the third world bloc." 
The recent enlargement of the EEC offers an opportunity to 
evaluate the Lomé link and to answer the following questions. 
Why should the EEC perpetrate the link? and 
What more can the EEC do for the ACP? 
Initially responding to demands from France and later from the 
United Kingdom, it appears that the Lomé relationship is 
essentially a relic of the past. Although the objectives have 
broadened, the fundamental objective of assisting the process of 
development has remained. Yet none of the countries associated 
with the EEC through the Yaoundé or Lomé Conventions has 
developed into a newly industrialising country. The associated 
70 See Green "EEC Enlargement and Commercial Policy towards the 
Third World' and Van Themaat and Emmery "EEC Enlargement and Third 
World Trade in ed de Bandt European Studies in Development. 
71 Europe and the World Without (1977), 8. 
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countries remain amongst the poorest in the world. EEC 
commentators, speaking at the 'Forum on Development Policy 
after 1985' all recommended the continuation of the present 
geographical focus of the EEC's development policy.72 Such a 
geographical concentration of EEC efforts has given rise to 
criticisms of 'divide et impera' tactics. One commentator 
expressed the criticism as follows,73 
"there remains a nagging doubt - not only in the 
third world - that the EEC, by conferring a 
fundamentally non -replicable special trade and aid 
relationship on part of the third world and by 
encouraging the ACP to restrict the Community's own 
liberality towards the rest of the world, is using a 
development instrument - the Lomé Convention - to 
divide the developing world and to drive a wedge 
into the solidarity of the group of 77." 
Despite the discriminatory aspects of the Lomé Convention, other 
developing countries have been able to increase their share of the 
EEC market. Clearly, the development instrument is to 
achieve its objective. Since association with the EEC has not 
helped the ACP to develop, perhaps it is time the links were either 
reduced or broken. 
Earlier in this chapter the following recommendations were made; - the EEC should conclude regional commodity arrangements with 
the ACP: such agreements would be aimed at reducing price and 
quantity fluctuations and encouraging processing industries; - for products considered unsuitable for such arrangements, the 
EEC should agree to foster the aims of ACP producers associations; 
(Both these recommendations would involve changes to the 
STABEX system. For example the elimination of the provision 
72 Ed Stevens The EEC and the Third World: A Survey Vol.IIl ch 12. 
73 Hewitt "The Lomé Convention: Myth and Substance of the 
Partnership of Equals;' in Europe and Africa: Issues in Post Colonial 
Relations, 27. 
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allowing for the refusal of a transfer of the fall in export earnings 
was the result of a trade policy adverse to the EEC); and finally, - the renegotiation of the Sugar Protocol. This would basically 
involve removal of the provision of Article 1(1), "and import". 
The implementation of these recommendations would result in a 
level of economic de- coupling from the EEC market. Initially the 
ACP should use these measures to promote intra -ACP trade. This 
promotion would be assisted by the provisions of Lomé III on 
regional co- operation. For example, Article 101 states,74 
"The Community shall support the ACP States efforts 
to promote collective and self -reliant social, cultural 
and economic development and greater regional self - 
sufficiency." 
The promotion of intra ACP trade would form part of the Action 
Programme for Intra -ACP Co- operation as recognised in the Suva 
Declaration.75 The results of the Kiel study on ACP -EEC trade 
would actually favour such this development.76 The first step 
would be to use the proposed measures to promote intra -ACP 
trade. The second step would involve the ACP using Article 136 
(2)(b) of the Lomé III Convention. This allows for the non - 
application of the mfn principle in respect of trade relations either 
on an intra -ACP level or on a ACP -developing country (non -ACP) 
level. 
Primary responsibility for ACP development would thus rest on 
the ACP themselves. Should they decide not to take advantage of 
any of the above schemes or be unable to take advantage of the 
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would perform an essentially supportive role. It would allow the 
ACP to expand production and export this production to other ACP 
States and provide assistance either through the regional 
commodity arrangements or STABEX whenever problems arise. 
The partnership between the EEC and the ACP would eventually 
dissolve as a new framework for ACP trade develops. In the 
interim the relationship will continue to benefit both parties. 
In 1982 the Executive Secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Africa offered two options for the development of Africa;77 -a hard option; this would involve an orientation towards 
national and collective self reliance using domestic 
resources and implying a temporary partial delinking 
from the outside economy; and 
-a soft option; this would have an emphasis on aid, access 
to aid and commodity price stabilization. 
The soft option would be a continuation of past efforts, whereas 
the hard option could be implemented if the above 
recommendations were implemented. If implemented the hard 
option would not have to involve a 'temporary partial delinking' 
as the EEC could provide the necessary assistance, over a 
transitional period, to ensure the success of the scheme. 
The transition of the Lomé link from a relationship established in 
1957 to a relationship of co- operation will prepare the ACP to 
meet the challenges facing them for the remaining years of this 
century. The Lomé linkage currently one revolving around 
decisions made in the EEC by EEC institutions will change to one 
centering on decisions made by the ACP primarily affecting the 
level of intra -ACP co- operation. The individual and collective self 
reliance of the ACP will be fostered, and the EEC will have played 
a vital role in this. As the Lomé Conventions are supplemented by 
77 In ed Stevens op cit n73. Pronk "Europe and Africa: Hard and 
Soft Options for the 1980's: 
351 
the measures outlined above, criticisms such as the one outlined 
below will be rendered meaningless.78 
"One is left with the impression that the EEC is 
pursuing old policies with new means. In 
comparison with the previous association 
agreements, the Lomé Treaty is an improvement, but 
seen against the background of the real needs of the 
ACP during the final part of this century, the 
Convention cannot be called a very good agreement." 
Implementation of the proposals outlined above will proffer hope 
that a future Lomé Convention will be called "a very good 
agreement". 
78 Frey- Wouters The European Community and the Third World 
(1980), 253. 
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CHAPTER 4: HUNGER IN THE WORLD 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine one particular aspect of 
the EEC's policy towards developing countries - the provision of 
food aid. Is this policy a mere adjunct of the CAP or is it part of 
the development policy of the EEC? The debate over the true 
categorisation of the EEC food aid policy revolves around the 
resolution of these two questions. Alternatively, one author has 
framed the question thus; "Hunger in the world - does the EEC 
exacerbate it or alleviate it ?" 1 The attempt to answer this 
question yielded the following answer,2 
"If the question of world hunger is considered solely 
within the ambit of 'development aid policy' 
narrowly defined, it is difficult to argue that the EEC 
seriously exacerbates the problem. But if it is 
acknowledged that hunger in the developing 
countries is also affected by a host of other EEC 
policies and actions, many of which are framed 
without any direct reference to developing countries, 
then the question becomes very apposite." 
The legal basis of the EEC's food aid policy is unable to provide a 
complete answer to the questions asked above, although it does 
provide some assistance. Originally, the policy was based on 
Article 43 of the Treaty, implying that food aid was a mere 
adjunct of the CAP. The legal basis of current food aid provisions 
is now Articles 43 and 235.3 This composite legal basis, although 
recognising the intimate links between food aid and the CAP, 
indicates that a new policy goal is being pursued. Equally, it 
1 Stevens "Hunger in the World. Does the EEC exacerbate or 
alleviate it ? "in ed Stevens The EEC and the Third World A Survey Vol.II 
Hunger in the World (1984). 
2 Ibid, 1. 
3 E.g. Council Reg.2681/74 on Community financing of expenditure 
incurred in respect of the supply of agricultural products as food aid, OJ 
L 288/1. 
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indicates that the food aid policy is neither an integral part of the 
EEC's agricultural policy nor an integral part of the development 
co- operation policies of the EEC. An analysis of the EEC financing 
incurred in respect of the supply of agricultural products as food 
aid also fails to provide a clear answer to the questions asked 
above. Whereas that portion of expenditure which corresponds to 
the export refunds is charged to the Guarantee Section of the 
FEOGA, all other expenditure is charged to Chapter 92 of the 
Budget. Perhaps an analysis of the operation of the food aid 
policy will determine the answer to the questions asked above. 
Food aid as an adjunct to agricultural policy 
It is the origins of food aid which gives rise to the belief that it is 
a mere appendage to domestic agricultural policies. As Cathie 
notes,4 
"The giving of aid in kind has largely arisen as an 
expedient outcome of the protectionist agricultural 
policies of the developed agricultural producers and 
not as a response to the immorality of the world 
hunger." 
Given this fact, it was assumed by many that food aid was a 
means of distorting trade, a concealed form of dumping or a 
disguised subsidy for commercial sales, allowing an unfair means 
of entry into new markets. To counter these criticisms, a series of 
principles on Surplus Disposal were formulated. A surplus 
disposal is defined as,5 
4 The Political Economy of Food Aid (1982), 3. 
5 For a discussion of the FAO Principles, see FAO Secretariat "Food 
Aid and Other Forms of Utilization of Agricultural Surpluses: A Review 
of programmes, policies and consultation!' Proceedings of UNCTAD 1 
(1964) Volume III, 403. 
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"An export operation (other than a sale covered by 
an ICA) arising from the existence or expectation of 
abnormal stocks and made possible by the grant of 
special or concessional term is through government 
intervention." 
The principles, which are supervised by a Committee on Surplus 
Disposal, list the objectives for formulating disposal programmes 
as; (a) increased consumption (or additionality); (b) orderly 
disposal to avoid sharp falls in prices; and, (c) the avoidance of 
harmful interference with the normal patterns of production and 
international trade, through voluntary consultations. To add 
greater precision to the principles, the usual market requirement 
was introduced. This provides that the food aid agreement 
concluded between the donor and the recipient should require the 
recipient nation to import food on a commercial basis. This would 
alleviate some of the harmful consequences, of surplus disposal, to 
the normal pattern of trade.6 
In the early days of surplus disposal, by far the largest donor was 
the United States. The Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act 1954 (usually referred to as PL 480), was the legal 
basis of the US surplus disposal programme. The rationale of the 
legislation, the cost of storing surpluses could be linked with the 
food deficits of developing countries, helped earn food aid a bad 
reputation. A reputation of food aid being used to serve domestic 
agricultural programmes of developed countries rather than 
fostering the agricultural growth of developing countries. The 
proposals for a multilateral food aid agency was an attempt to 
redirect the objectives of food aid away from surplus disposal and 
towards helping the process of economic and social development. 
Plans for the establishment of an international agency to co- 
ordinate and control food aid operations were first mooted in 
6 See Cathie op cit n4, 53. (Chapter 3 Principles of Surplus Disposal, 
the WFP, and International Food Aid Policy.) 
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1946. A proposal by the Director General of the FAO would have 
led to the introduction of a World Food Board (WFB). The 
responsibilities of this Board would have included the 
accumulation of stocks; the disbursement of stocks to countries in 
need; and the provision of funds for the disposal of surplus 
agricultural products. The proposal was not acceptable. The 
interventionist nature of the proposed Board was a cause of 
concern for many countries. This reason recurred when a later 
proposal was made for the establishment of an International 
Commodity Clearing House. Having functions analogous to the 
proposed Board, countries feared the impact on multilateral trade 
which would result from the House's activities.? However, an 
agency was eventually established - the World Food Programme 
(WFP).8 
The rationale behind the creation of the WFP was the exploration 
and application of methods of using food aid which would not 
have adverse effects on the recipients of such aid. The WFP, using 
a project approach to food aid, developed several categories of 
projects, the disbursement of food aid to which would accelerate 
the process of economic and social development. The categories of 
WFP projects are (i) economic and social infrastructure projects; 
(ii) directly productive projects and (iii) human resource projects. 
(Priority is accorded to categories (i) and (ii)). The potential 
advantages of WFP operations are:9 
i. food aid may be linked with other forms of aid; 
ii. the establishment of a pool of money can contribute to 
the flexibility and efficiency of food aid programmes 
and 
7 See Sanderson "The role of international trade in solving the food 
problems of developing countries:' in USDA: International Food Policy 
Issues (1978). 
8 See Cathie op cit n4, 53, Introduction: International Food Aid Policy. 
9 Ibid, chapter 2. 
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iii. the concentration of operations in a single 
international agency makes it possible to ensure the 
highest level of welfare for all concerned and ensure 
efficiency in aid administration. 
Despite the potential advantages stemming from the WFP co- 
ordination of food aid, bilateral programmes continue to have an 
important role to play in the provision of food aid. 
The food aid policy of the EEC began on 1 July 1968 with the entry 
into force of the Food Aid (Cereals) Convention. This was one of 
the more positive results of the Kennedy Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations.) O Since that time the essential scope and 
objectives of the EEC's food and policy have altered. Although 
envisioned as a means of surplus disposal, the policy now follows 
a more development- oriented approach. The question of to what 
extent it still fulfils some role within the CAP remains 
unanswered. The main objectives of the EEC's food aid policy are 
to lend support to the balance of payments of recipients, to 
improve the nutrition of the recipients and to lend assistance to 
development through transfer of resources. These objectives are 
reflected in the criteria for allocation of food aid, which are:11 
1. Need. This is assessed on the basis of cereal import 
requirements derived from FAO estimates; 
2. Per capita GNP. This is used as an indication of 
poverty. Based on World Bank figures, three 
categories of countries have been established (poorest, 
intermediate and other special cases); and, 
3. Balance of Payments deficit. This is assessed in 
absolute terms and as a percentage of projected total 
imports. 
The range of products given by the EEC as food aid include cereals, 
rice, milk products (milk powder and butter oil), sugar and 
10 
11 
Op cit n5, 407. 
Green Europe 184. Community Food Aid, 1. 
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vegetable oils. Provision is also made in the budget for food aid to 
be given in other products.12 
The principal mechanisms used for the disbursement of EEC food 
aid are, (i) Food for work; (ii) The provision of food security 
stocks; (iii) Direct Action and (iv) Counterpart Funds. The latter 
two deserve further explanation. The direct action use of food aid 
involves schemes targeting specific groups (such as school 
children) or an operation combining rural development and 
agricultural development. An example of this is the Operation 
Flood project in India. The objectives of the scheme include the 
development of local milk production, the guarantee of stable 
supplies of milk and the promotion of rural producers self - 
reliance. The EEC provides food aid, in the form of milk products, 
which are then re- constituted and help the scheme achieve its 
objectives. The other use of food aid which merits further 
comment is the use of counterpart funds. These funds are 
generated by the sale of food aid on local markets and are used to 
finance development schemes agreed between the EEC and the 
recipient.13 
Despite the varied use of the food aid provided by the EEC, the 
policy has come in for considerable criticism.14 For example, 
despite the requirement that food aid should not act as a 
disincentive to local production, it alleged to have this effect. By 
giving food aid, a demand for an imported product may develop in 
preference to the domestic product, thereby discouraging 
production. Moreover, if the food aid is marketed free or at 
subsidised prices, the downward effect on domestic producer 
12 Green Europe 175. The CAP and World Food Shortages: Food Aid, 4. 
13 Chapter 92. Food Aid and Food Projects in place of food 
aid(Chapter924). 
14 See Europe Doc N 1249/1250: The Pisani Memorandum on the EEC's 
New Food Aid Strategy. pt 2.2.5 Aid for setting up production chains. 
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prices may act as a disincentive to local production. In both of 
these cases food aid inhibits the development of local production. 
In addition, the commitment of the EEC to provide a certain 
quantity of agricultural products as food aid acts as an incentive 
to EEC producers. A situation of additional domestic demand is 
created. The advantage of this increase in domestic demand is 
that it decreases the real cost of food aid and indirectly serves the 
objectives of the CAP. It is not difficult to determine the real 
objective of the EEC's food aid policy. A demand is created for 
CAP products which in the absence of the food -aid policy would 
not exist. Although food aid may meet the nutritional 
requirements of its recipients, and this has been doubted,15 it 
may also further weaken the balance of payments situation of the 
recipient and thereby further retard the process of economic 
development. Concern about the nature of the EEC's food aid 
policy, in particular and the problem of hunger in the world, have 
brought about a rethink in the objectives of the policy. 
Whilst anxious to preserve the positive aspects of the programme, 
the EEC, spurred on by the European Parliament, has found 
another way of dealing with hunger in the world. 
15 E.g. Jones and Tulloch "Is Food Aid Good Aid ?" ODI Rev 2.74, 1. 
Stevens Food Aid: "More sinned against than sinning ?" ODI Rev 2/77, 71. 
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Food aid as development aid 
In a 1980 debate on hunger in the world, the European 
Parliament linked the process of development with the 
elimination of world hunger.16 They considered it essential that 
as many developing countries as possible should achieve self - 
sufficiency in food. The means to achieve this end was the 
adoption of food strategies on either a local, national or regional 
level. The role of the EEC would be to: 
- provide appropriate financial assistance based, inter 
alia, on multi -annual financing measures and 
financing provided jointly with member States and 
international organizations; and - guarantee the technical aid needed to enable 
developing countries to define and implement their 
own food strategies. 
The EEC's food aid policy would have to be reviewed and adjusted 
to take into account developing countries security of food supplies 
and their agricultural and rural development. 
The review of the food aid policy, carried out by the Commission, 
resulted in a plan of action to combat world hunger.17 The plan 
was based on four types of operation. These were;18 
"1. A special food operation to mitigate the 
consequences of the present shortfalls in the 
least developed countries and make available 
to the International Emergency Food Reserve 
the resources which it still lacks; 
2. Joint comprehensive action in support of 
national policies to develop the agricultural 
16 Bethke "Food Aid. A negative factor" 31 Aussenpolitik 180. 
17 Op cit nl Resolution of September 1980. 
18 COM (81) 560 Towards a plan of action to combat world hunger. 
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sector implemented by developing countries 
that wish to place their efforts and those of aid 
donors within a coherent food strategy; 
3. Operations with a specific theme covering 
regional groups of countries having to face 
similar difficulties in combatting the 
deterioration of their natural production 
conditions and developing their potential 
resources; and, 
4. Measures to increase the external food security 
of the developing countries." 
The favoured type of operation was number 2, the food strategy 
approach. This approach involves a change of direction for the 
food aid policy, placing its operations in the context of a 
development policy, to further the objectives of that policy. 
Williams has described a food strategy as,19 
"[an] integrative policy approach to food production, 
distribution and consumption, encompassing the 
broad economic and social policies and reforms which 
affect the wider distribution of income and peoples 
access to food." 
The development of a food strategy is essentially a political act, 
requiring the ranking of development priorities. The Commission 
in its plan of action identified those countries who had prepared a 
coherent food strategy and it identified three criteria for 
identifying those countries with which a start could be made. The 
criteria required that the developing country to have a large food 
shortfall, the capacity and the will to conduct valid food strategies 
and be recipients of substantial aid from the EEC and its member 
States.20 The four countries chosen were, of necessity all ACP 
States, Mali, Rwanda, Kenya and Zambia. The only factor linking 
19 Ibid, 4. 
20 The Courier no.84, Dossier. Food Strategy, 48. 
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all four was the rate of population growth and the declining 
percentage of which was actively employed in agricultural 
production. 
The purpose of the food strategy in Mali was to re- organize the 
grain market and thereby halt the increasing food deficit in that 
commodity .21 In Kenya, the aim was to restore productivity to 
the agricultural sector and so bring about a return to self - 
sufficiency, and perhaps surplus.22 A similar problem was faced 
in Zambia where the task was one of balancing the needs of food 
production, the need to generate foreign exchange and the 
requirements of the country's fast -expanding urban sector.23 The 
Rwandan problem was mounting pressure on land. The food 
strategy was to concentrate on improving marketing, storage and 
processing and promoting access to agricultural imputs and 
research in an effort to conserve natural resources.24 The 
challenges faced in each of the food strategies was different, yet 
the conditions for success in each were the same. Two such 
conditions exist: - first, the donor countries and organizations have to make 
their aid a direct part of whatever implementation plan 
the recipient has decided on and adapt their schemes to 
its chosen rate of implementation; and 
second, the recipient has to set up a permanent 
consultation process with the donors ... 
Given these requirements and the nature of food strategies, any 
results will take time. The 1986 review of the four food strategies 
found (i) Mali, "the results have been positive though not all initial 










(iii) Zambia, "the EEC effort has contributed to paving the way for 
many food policy reform measures taken by the government "; 
and (iv) Rwanda - "the EEC has actively supported progress in the 
main areas ". The results, as can be seen from the above quotes, 
are difficult to evaluate. The interlocking of EEC aid and internal 
initiatives further complicate this assessment.25 
Despite the unproven nature of the food strategy approach, it has 
been written into the Lomé Convention.26 
"Community measures aimed at food security in the 
ACP States shall be conducted in the context of the 
food strategies or policies of the ACP States 
concerned and of the development objectives which 
they lay down. 
They shall be implemented, in co- ordination with the 
instruments of the Convention, in the framework of 
EEC policies and the measures resulting therefrom 
with due regard for the Community's international 
commitments." 
As a result of the implementation of the food strategy approach, 
there have been parallel developments in food aid policy, these 
are also to be found in the new Lomé Convention.27 The 
developments consist of the adoption of a new set of guidelines 
for EEC policy.28 These guidelines include the integration of food 
aid, as thoroughly as possible, with development policies. This 
calls for consistency between food aid and other co- operation 
measures. Food aid will continue to concentrate on low- income 
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Article 33 Lomé III. The Courier No.89, 16. 
Idem. Article 35. 
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annual food programmes which will be used to encourage the 
development of food production.29 Until food self sufficiency is 
reached, food aid will continue to have a role, particularly through 
the use of counterpart funds. It was also recognised that 
triangular operations should be encouraged. This type of aid 
involves buying products in developing countries which have an 
exportable supply and donating it to a country with a deficit. This 
type of operation not only stabilizes the market in the producer 
country, provides the recipient country with a 'local product' but 
also makes a contribution to regional food security.30 
The implementation of food strategies involves a reduction in the 
importance of food aid, although it may still play a role within the 
confines of the strategy. Given the requirements of the food 
strategy, the need for increased financial, technical and 
agricultural co- operation, it was only natural that the four pilot 
countries were members of the ACP. However, the choice of these 
four countries, although technically providing more food aid, is 
another source of discrimination effected by the Lomé Convention 
against non -ACP States. As Kennes remarks, in respect of food 
strategies,31 
"It is now time to generalise the approach, in a 
modest and pragmatic way, where it is possible, both 
within and outside the ACP countries, taking into 
acocunt the specific circumstances and learning from 
the strengths and weaknesses encountered in the 
four countries ...." 
29 Op cit n20, 55. See also COM (82) 320. A special programme to 
combat hunger in the world. 
30 Idem, point 3. See also COM(81)429. Negotiation of framework 
agreements relating to the multiannual supply of agricultural products. 
31 "Food Strategies: Review and Prospects." The Courier no. 100,23. 
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Answering Questions 
This chapter began by asking the question : Is the EEC food aid 
policy a mere adjunct of the CAP or is it part of the EEC's 
development policy? An examination of the legal and financial 
bases of the policy did not reveal the answer. The analysis of the 
operation of the policy shows that although it started as a means 
of disposing of agricultural surpluses, it has moved towards being 
a tool in the process of development. 
The latest Commission paper on the food aid policy states that 
food aid is now an integral part of the development policy.32 
They point to the 1984 decision allowing for the possibility of 
replacing food aid by credit, where there is a risk of upsetting the 
recipients market, as evidence of the transformation of the 
policy.33 Proposed reforms, such as the encouragement of 
triangular operations, clearly point the way forward for food aid 
policy as an integral part of development. Should these 
operations also be accompanied by greater use of counterpart 
funds and the active promotion of food strategies, food aid policy 
will truly belong as a part of the development aid policy. 
However, such changes involve internal consequences. If greater 
use is made of triangular operations and food strategies are 
encouraged the additional demand created by past food aid 
operations will have to be dealt with. It is, of course, possible that 
the quantities of agricultural products not used for bilateral food 
aid may be devoted to multilateral food aid agencies, such as the 
WFP. Given the fact that decreases in agricultural production will 
be difficult to achieve and that the 'real' cost of food aid will rise 
as less of it is obtained on the EEC market, is there any other 
avenue down which this additional domestic demand may be 
32 
33 
The Courier No.99. Yellow Pages XIII. 
Idem. 
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as less of it is obtained on the EEC market, is there any other 
avenue down which this additional domestic demand may be 
channelled? One answer could be Article 34 of Lomé III. This 
provides,34 
"With regard to available agricultural porducts, the 
Community undertakes to ensure that export refunds 
can be fixed further in advance for all ACP States in 
respect of a range of products drawn up in the light 
of the food requirements expressed by those States." 
The question of the supply of available agricultural products has 
been the subject of debate between the ACP and the EEC since 
1976. So far, it has not proved possible to reach an agreement 
which satisfies both parties.35 The ACP want a guarantee for a 
multi -annual programme of supplies, at preferential prices, with 
special payment terms. The Community insist that the 
transactions must take place within the normal contractual 
framework and that the machinery of the CAP be respected. So 
the EEC would offer the ACP the possibility of purchasing cereals, 
milk products, some sugar and possibly other foodstuffs at prices 
stabilized by prior fixing of export refunds. Note the convergence 
of the products on offer with those used in the EEC's food aid 
policy. While not meeting the demands of the ACP, the EEC's offer 
does recognise some of the concerns expressed by them. In order 
to pursue the quesiton of the availability of agricultural products, 
Annex III to Lomé III instructed the Committee of Ambassadors 
to establish a working party to carry out a detailed study of the 
question. Despite a deadline, the report of this working party is 
not yet forthcoming.36 
34 Op cit n27, 17. 
35 See for example the 1982 Report of the ACP -EEC Council of 
Ministers, 19 -20. 
36 Op cit n27, 118. 
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Should the EEC and the ACP fail to reach a mutually acceptable 
solution to the question of the availability of agricultural products, 
what impact would this have? Would domestic agricultural 
production in the EEC have to be restructured? Such restructuring 
may be deemed necessary considering the impact of food aid 
policy as part of development policy. Triangular operations, for 
example, promote stabilization of local markets and contribute to 
food security. Food strategies have similar goals. Recall the aim of 
the Kenyan food strategy a restoration of the position it enjoyed 
before 1978, self sufficiency and surplus. The plan of action to 
combat world hunger included, as one of its operations, measures 
to increase the food security of developing countries. The 
disruption of international markets caused by the disposal of EEC 
agricultural surpluses would threaten this security. 
Once again the lack of consistency between internal and exernal 
EEC policies manifests itself. Once again a need is shown for an 
agricultural trade policy and for consistency between that policy 
and the development co- operation policies of the EEC. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES. 
The 1972 Paris Summit of the Heads of State and Government of 
the member States of the EEC, resolved, inter alia, tol 
" ... progressively to adopt an overall policy of 
development co- operation on a world -wide scale, 
comprising, in particular, the following elements: 
- the improvement of generalized preferences 
with the aim of achieving a steady increase in 
imports of manufactures from the developing 
countries." 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the origins and 
workings of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
Considering the above resolution of the Paris Summit, the question 
addressed will be, is the Generalized System of Preferences an 
effective part of the EEC's development co- operation policies? If 
the answer to the question is no, and criticism of the GSP suggests 
that this may be so, the question of changes to the nature of the 
GSP to ensure that it meets its objectives, will be addressed. 
The Origins of the GSP 
The first attempt to introduce the concept of preferential 
treatment for developing countries into the international trade 
order occurred in the context of the Havana Charter. Article 15 of 
which read,2 
"The members recognize that special circumstances, 
including the need for economic development and 
1 
2 
European Political Co- operation (3rd ed), 35, 44. 
Cmd Paper 7375, 19. 
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reconstruction, may justify new preferential 
agreements between two or more countries in the 
interest of the programmes of economic development 
or reconstruction of one or more of them." 
It has to be noted that the idea of a preferential treatment was to 
meet the need for "economic development or reconstruction ", 
thereby allowing developed countries to use the Article. The 
constraints imposed by Article 16 (General mfn treatment) and 
Article 17 (Reduction of tariffs and elimination of preferences) 
severely limited the potential scope of Article 15. In any case, the 
provision was not put to the test, because of the non -ratification 
of the Charter. The debate on the question of preferential 
treatment for developing countries lay dormant until 1963, when 
two separate proposals were discussed which would have allowed 
special tariff treatment for developing countries. The first of 
these proposals resulted from the work of Committee III, a 
Committee established as a result of the Harberler Report. The 
proposal had the following elements:3 
i. duty free entry into developed country markets 
should be granted for tropical products (deadline for 
implementation 31 December1963); 
ii. developed countries should agree to the elimination of 
customs tariffs on the primary products important in 
the trade of developing countries; and, 
iii. developed countries should also urgently prepare a 
schedule for the reduction and elimination of tariff 
barriers to exports of semi -processed and processed 
products from developing countries providing for a 
reduction of at least 50% of the present duties over the 
next three years. 
The second proposal, the so- called Brasseur plan, was more 
restrictive than the first proposal. The plan called for the 
3 See BISD 10th Supp 25. 
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negotiation on a case by case basis, of selective measures between 
developed and developing countries. This system of selective 
temporary and degressive preferences, for which no reciprocity 
was expected, was designed to help infant industries in the 
developing countries become internationally competitive.4 
Both proposals were not well received, Contracting Parties to the 
GATT were worried about the effects of the proposals on the new 
round of multilateral tariff negotiations, on which they were about 
to embark (The Kennedy Round). The Contracting Parties resolved 
that, in the course of these negotiations no effort would be 
neglected to reduce the obstacles facing developing countries 
exports. As Tulloch notes, the only positive outcome of the 
negotiations within the GATT and Committee III, was the 
recognition of the principle of non -reciprocity in trade 
negotiations between developing and developed countries.5 
Dissatisfaction with the results achieved within the framework of 
GATT led developing countries to switch the focus of their 
demands to UNCTAD. In a list of principles to govern international 
trade, resolved at UNCTAD I, General Principle 8 indicated that the 
developed countries should grant tariff concessions to all 
developing countries and should not require any concessions in 
return.6 The demands for a preferential tariff scheme, elaborated 
on by the Charter of Algiers, resurfaced at UNCTAD II in 1968. 
Resolution 21 of the Conference reads,? 
4 Tulloch The Politics of Preferences ch 5 History of the 
Community's GSP. 
5 Ibid, 38. See Part IV of the GATT. 
6 Proceedings of UNCTAD 1 (1964) Vol.l. Part 1. Action taken by the 
Conference. 
7 Proceedings of UNCTAD II (1968) Vol.1. Part I. Action taken by 
the Conference. 
370 
"Recognizing the unanimous agreement in favour of 
the early establishment of a mutually acceptable 
system of generalized non -reciprocal and non- 
discriminatory preferences which would be 
beneficial to the developing countries. 
Agrees that the objectives of the generalized, non - 
reciprocal, non -discriminatory system of preferences 
in favour of the developing countries, including 
special measures in favour of the least advanced 
among the developing countries should be, 
(a) to increase their export earnings; 
(b) to promote their indistrialization; and 
(c) to accelerate their rates of economic 
growth." 
Having agreed in principle to the establishment of a system 
allowing preferential tariff treatment for developing countries, the 
developed (donor) countries established an OECD Special 
Committee on Preferences. The report of this Group forms the 
core of the donor countries ideas on the GSP. Their conclusions 
include the following:8 
i. Special tariff treatment in developed country markets 
could help developing countries increase their export 
earnings; 
ii. Such arrangements would not involve any reciprocal 
advantages in developing country markets for 
developed countries; 
iii. Such arrangements should apply to all industrial 
products (Chapters 25 -99 BTN). Other products could 
be included on a case -by- case -basis; and 
iv. As for beneficiaries, donor countries would base 
themselves on the principle of self -election. 
The scheme would run for an initial period of ten years, a 
comprehensive review before the end of this period would 
8 "Tariff Preferences for Developing Countries ". Documentation 
forwarded by the OECD to UNCTAD (1970) 4 JWTL 474. 
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determine whether or not it should be continued. It was 
emphasised that the tariff preferences were temporary in nature 
and that they did not constitute a binding commitment. 
Moreover, the granting of preferences was not to impede 
subsequent reductions of tariffs on a mfn basis or the subsequent 
withdrawal of the preferences.9 This latter condition reflected 
disagreements within the Group on the nature of safeguard 
mechanisms. Even given these constraints, the implementation of 
the system of preferences was made conditional on its legal 
compatibility with the provisions of the GATT.10 
Faced with this problem of compatibility with the provisions of 
the GATT, the GATT Secretariat proposed three possible 
solutions :11 
(a) a waiver under Article XXV to cover the preference 
system; or 
(b) an amendment to the General Agreement; or 
(c) a unanimous declaration by the Contracting Parties 
authorizing preferences for a limited period of time. 
Despite the recommendation of the Secretariat that option (c) 
should be chosen, the Contracting Parties opted for a waiver. This 
states that the provisions of Article I GATT (the mfn provision) 
should be waived for a period of ten years, to the extent 
necessary to allow developed countries to accord preferences to 
products originating in developing countries.12 Echoing the 
conclusion of the OECD Group, the waiver reaffirms the temporary, 
non -binding nature of the commitment and the conclusion that 
the operation of the GSP should not constitute a barrier to further 
mfn tariff reductions. Although the inclusion of these elements 
9 Agree Conclusion IV of the Special Committee on Preferences. 
10 Agree Conclusion IX(2)(c). 
11 See Yusuf A Legal Aspects of Trade Preferences for Developing States. 
12 BISD 18th Supp 24. 
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undoubtedly satisfied the developed 'donor' countries, the 
developing countries were not satisfied with the waiver. They 
complained that the temporary nature of the derogation would act 
as a disincentive to possible investment in developing countries. 
Moreover, the temporary derogation did not recognise 
preferential treatment as a principle of international trade law.13 
The GSP was placed on a sounder legal foundation by the 1979 
decision of the, Contracting Parties on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of 
Developing Countries (The Enabling Clause). The main provision of 
the text reads,14 
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the 
General Agreement, Contracting Parties may afford 
differential and more favourable treatment to 
developing countries, without according such 
treatment to other Contracting Parties." 
Although falling short of a modification of the legal structure of 
the GATT, the provisions of the decision permanently inserts into 
the law of GATT the commitment of the developed countries to 
grant differential and more favourable treatment to developing 
countries. 
Despite the solution to the problem of the legal compatibility of 
the GSP with the GATT, the simultaneous introduction of all the 
GSP schemes did not eventuate. Arguments concerning reverse 
preferences granted by the AASM to the EEC under the Yaoundé 
Convention delayed the introduction of the United States scheme 
until 1974. Anxious to avoid the rigidity which would be imposed 
13 Yusuf "Differential and More Favourable Treatment: The GATT 
Enabling Clause' (1980) 14 JWTL 488, 507. 
14 BISD 26th Supp 203. 
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by attempts to harmonise preference schemes, the EEC introduced 
its scheme in 1971. It was heralded as,15 
"[giving] immediate and significant benefits to 
developing countries and gives further proof, if any 
were needed, that far from being protectionist, [the 
Community] is both liberal minded and outward 
looking." 
The next section of this chapter outlines the evolution of the EEC's 
scheme and assesses the veracity of this assertion. 
The Evolution of the EEC's GSP 
The scope of the EEC's scheme was determined by many factors. 
Tulloch notes the three main sources of pressure were,16 
i. the commitment to existing common policies 
with political and temporal priority over the 
GSP. (This included the CAP and the Association 
Policy.) 
ii. Industrial and agricultural lobby pressures. 
iii. National policies, themselves influenced by 
national lobbies. 
By examining the influence of these pressures, the scope for an 
effective GSP will be determined. The Associates, and later the 
ACP, were anxious to ensure that the existing level of preferences 
were maintained and that any new products which could be 
exported by them would be guaranteed a certain level of 
preferential market access. No preferences would be given on 
15 Cited in Cooper "The EC's System of Global Tariff Preferences: A 
Critique ". (1971 -72) 8 J of Development Studies 379, 381. 
16 Tulloch op cit n4, 65. 
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those products for which the AASM, and later the ACP, did not 
benefit from preferences. This factor has been constant limitation 
on the effectiveness of the GSP. Not only does the EEC have to 
guarantee a certian level of preference for the ACP, but also for 
the Mediterranean countries and even the EFTA countries. The 
GSP does not rank highly in the EEC's hierarchy of preferences, 
standing as it does above a handful of countries subject to the mfn 
and other countries not yet members of the GATT. 
Although the GSP was originally envisaged as a scheme to assist 
manufactured exports from developing countries, the EEC's 
scheme also included agricultural products. Whereas the 
manufactured /industrial list was drawn on the basis that all 
products were included, subject to exception, the agricultural list 
operated on the reverse assumption. Products would have to be 
specifically included. In the elaboration of the list of agricultural 
products which would benefit from the GSP, the EEC was guided 
by a number of rules. Recalling the purpose of the scheme, and 
especially its application to manufactured or semi -manufactured 
products, no preferences would be given to basic products or to 
products which had undergone only simple processing. For those 
agricultural products which were subject to variable levies, no 
preferences would be granted since it would be difficult to 
identify the industrial protection element of the variable levy. If 
goods were subject both to customs duty and a levy, preferences 
would be granted, whilst maintaining the levy.17 
The desire to protect domestic processing industries also featured 
in the limitation of the EEC's offer. Preferences would not be 
granted on those products where developing countries processing 
industries strongly competed with domestic processing industries. 
The results of these limitations was an initial list of processed 
agricultural products which protected domestic farmers and 
processing industries and the export interests of the AASM (ACP). 
17 Ibid, 72. 
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The accession of the United Kingdom and Denmark, who before 
accession had extremely liberal agricultural product lists, led to a 
progressive increase in the number of products subject to 
preferences. 
The GSP is the only instrument by which the EEC can satisfy the 
demands of developing countries as they conclude co- operation 
agreements with the EEC. Agreements with India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, the countries of ASEAN and of Latin America 
has further expanded the product coverage. The 1986 scheme 
gives preferences on a total of 351 processed agricultural 
products.18 Domestic interests and the interests of the ACP 
continue to limit the scheme. This occurs mainly through the 
depth of the tariff cuts, tariff quotas for certain products, the rules 
of origin and the safeguard clauses of the GSP regulations. 
Depending on the sensitivity of the product the preferential 
margin consists of a cut of varying depth in the customs duty or in 
some cases complete exemption. In 1986, 81 products were given 
complete exemption from customs duties, although the variable 
component may still be levied on some of these products.19 Most 
agricultural products benefit not from duty -free treatment but 
from a reduced rate, which varies from product to product. In 
some cases, the tariff reduction is small (e.g. natural honey 27% 
mfn, 25% GSP), whilst for others the remaining tariff has a certain 
nuisance value (e.g. bilberries provisionally preserved, 2 %). As 
part of its efforts to help the least developed amongst the 
developing countries, the EEC's scheme allows for the duty free 
entry of all products covered by the scheme, plus two others 
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developing countries must abide by the tariff quotas set for 
various products. The products subject to tariff quotas are: 
i. Raw or unmanufactured tobacco other than the 
Virginia 'flue- cured' type, excluding sun -cured oriental 
type. (The 1986 quota is 12,917 tonnes);21 
ii. Raw or unmanufactured virginia 'flue cured' type 
tobacco (the 1986 quota is 65,992 tonnes, an increase 
of nearly 5000 tonnes on the 1985 quota);22 
iii. Soluble coffee (the 1986 quota is19,200 tonnes, an 
increase of one hundred ton on the 1985 quota);23 
iv. Preserved pineapples, other than in slices, half slices 
or spirals (the 1986 quota is 46,750 tonnes compared 
with the 1985 quota of 44,900 tonnes);24 and, 
v. Preserved pineapples, in slices, half slices or spirals 
(the 1986 quota is 22,475 tonnes compared with a 
1985 quota of 29,560 tonnes).25 
The 1986 scheme bears witness to the purpose of these quotas, 
of the export interests of the ACP States. The 1985 
tariff quota for cocoa butter (22,000 tonnes), a product of export 
interest to the ACP, has been suppressed.26 For each of the quota 
products an EEC reserve is established, the remaining quota is 
divided between the member States. When a member State has 
utilised 90% of its share, it draws a second share from the EEC 
reserve. The process continues until the reserve is depleted at 
which stage the products cease to benefit from preferential 
21 Ibid, Articles 3 -7. 
22 Ibid, Articles 8 -12. 
23 Ibid, Articles 13 -16. 
24 Ibid, Articles 18 -22. 
25 Ibid, Articles 23 -26. 
26 OJ 1985 L 338/183, Articles 13 -18. 
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treatment and the mfn rate of duty is imposed on further imports 
into the EEC.27 
If a developing country decides to take advantage of the 
preferences offered, the product will benefit from preferential 
treatment only if it meets the rules of origin. Under these rules, a 
product is entitled to receive preferential treatment if it meets the 
following conditions ;28 
i. it must have been produced wholly in the beneficiary 
developing country or if materials or parts were 
imported, these must have undergone sufficient 
working and processing in that country; 
ii. it must be consigned directly from the beneficiary 
country to the EEC; and 
iii. the fulfilment of these requirements must be 
supported by documentary evidence. 
The rules of origin, like those of the Lomé Convention, are based 
on the tariff leap /substantial transformation concept. Those 
processes which do not meet the qualifying criteria are listed in 
List A, whereas qualifying processes are enumerated in List B. 
Although the rules of origin of Lomé and the GSP are similar, 
many of the process requirements are less stringent under Lomé. 
An UNCTAD study on the GSP and the Lomé Convention gives the 
following example,29 
"Under the GSP rules of origin with respect to 
chocolate and other food preparations containing 
cocoa (CCT heading 18.06) non -originating sucrose 
must not be used and cocoa beans, cocoa paste, cocoa 
butter and cocoa powder cannot exceed 40% of the 
27 Op cit n18, Article 4. 
28 See Nusbaumer "Origin Systems and the Trade of Developing 
Countries:' (1979) 13 JWTL 34. 
29 TD /B/C.5/36 Effects of the GSP on Idc's sharing their special tariff 
advantages, 18. 
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value of the product obtained. Under the Lomé rules, 
non -originating sugar may be used for up to 30% of 
the value of the product obtained. Also non - 
originating cocoa beans, paste, butter or powder may 
be used since the rule of change in BTN heading 
applies." 
In addition to the more liberal rules of origin the ACP benefit 
from cumulative treatment (i.e. when finished products which 
have undergone successive transformations in more than one ACP 
State still enjoy preferential treatment when they are imported 
into the EEC from the country which performed the last processing 
operation).30 The GSP rules accord cumulative treatment to only 
three regional groupings, ASEAN, the Andean Pact and the CACM. 
Until January 1986, this treatment was only partially cumulative, 
however, on January 1 all restrictions on the arrangements which 
went beyond the normal rules of origin were deleted. The new 
rules provide that;31 
" ... materials, parts and components originating in 
one country in a regional group can be used by 
another country in the group and will be considered 
as originating 100% in the latter country when 
subject to processing there." 
The rules will become operational whenever each country 
concerned notifies its compliance to the Secretariat of the regional 
grouping in question. The strict interpretation of the GSP rules of 
origin has the indirect effect of excluding potential preferential 
trade. 
The final limitation on the scope of the GSP imposed by the 
convergence of domestic and ACP pressure is a reflection of the 
non -binding nature of the commitment represented by the GSP. 
30 See Protocol 1 to the third Lomé Convention: The Courier No.89, 68 -108. 
31 TD /B /C.5/ 105 10th General Report on the Implementation of the GSP, 6. 
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This limitation is a general safeguard clause, which acts in 
addition to the safeguard clauses under the various common 
organizaitons established by the CAP. Article 32 of the 1986 GSP 
regulation reads,32 
"Where the Commission finds that imports of 
products benefiting from the treatment provided for 
in Articles 1, 3, 8, 13, 18 and 23 are imported into 
the Community in quantities or at prices which place 
or are likely to place Community producers of similar 
or directly competitive products at a serious 
disadvantage or create an unfavourable situation in 
the ACP States, the levying of customs duties applied 
within the Community may be re- introduced in 
whole or in part on imports of the products in 
question from the country or countries or territory or 
territories which are the cause of such disadvantage." 
Although modelled on Article XIX of the GATT, this safeguard 
provision includes several features worthy of further comment. 
The interests of non -EEC countries (the ACP) may be taken into 
account. The provision does not allow for consultations between 
the EEC and the developing country causing the problems. The 
most interesting feature of the safeguard provision is that it may 
be selectively applied, unlike Article XIX of the GATT. Despite its 
novel features and potential scope of application, the safeguard 
clause has not been invoked with respect to the import of 
agricultural products. 
In its review of the operation of the GSP scheme for the first ten 
years, the Commission recommended that no fundamental change 
should take place in the post -1980 period.33 The scheme for the 
1980's would take equal account of, on the one hand, the need to 
give effective help to the industrial development of developing 
32 Op cit n18, 205. 
33 COM (80) 104 Guidelines for the EC's GSP in the post -1980 period. 
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countries and on the other, the "compelling" requirements of the 
EEC's commercial policy. The basis of the GSP as envisaged by 
UNCTAD seems to have been corrupted by the practices of donor 
countries. This is amply shown by the limitations imposed on the 
scope of the EEC's GSP by both domestic concerns and ACP 
interests. In its recommendations for the post -1980 GSP, the 
Commission recommended that the scheme should be based on 
the following principles,34 
"-it should not involve complete exclusion, neither 
of a beneficiary, nor of a product nor sector; 
- it should provide for a differential allocation of 
the preference according to product and country; 
and 
- it should be aimed at according greater 
liberalization to the least developed developing 
countries." 
These principles may be viewed as a re- interpretation of the 
objectives of the GSP as laid down in Resolution 21(II). The EEC, 
worried by the uneven use of preferential advantages, would seek 
ways within the GSP of promoting the interests of the poorest 
developing countries. Indeed, the fact that the GSP has not really 
assisted the poorest developing countries was one of the many 
criticisms voiced during the 1970's.35 However, this was not by 
any means the major criticism. It is to these criticisms, both 
domestic and international that the next section turns. 
34 Ibid, 2. 
35 Murray "How Helpful is the GSP to developing countries' (1973) 
83 Econ Journal 449, and Behnam "Development and Structures of the 
GSP's," (1975) 9 JWTL 442. 
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An Assessment of the GSP 
The purpose of the GSP, as reflected in Resolution 21(II), was to 
increase the export earnings of developing countries, thereby 
promoting their industrialization and accelerating their rates of 
economic growth. Trade was to be generated by the grant of tariff 
preferences. These preferences would result in trade creation and 
to the extent that competition existed between developed and 
developing country exports, the margin of preference would result 
in trade diversion in favour of developing countries. 
With respect to the EEC the expectations of trade creation and 
trade diversion, through the operation of the GSP, have not 
eventuated. The reasons for this include the following,36 
i. Limited product coverage due to the demands of 
domestic farmers, processing industries and ACP 
States. 
ii. Reductions in the effectiveness of the product 
coverage through inadequate cuts in the tariff level 
and the retention of 'nuisance' tariffs. 
iii. The system of tariff quotas for certain products of 
export interest to the ACP 
iv. Further limitations on the product coverage through 
the use of import calendars and the continued 
presence of the variable levy. 
v. A restrictive series of rules of origin, which limit the 
potential for preferential trade, even taking into 
account the concessions to certain regional groups 
allowing for cumulative treatment. 
vi. The presence of a safeguard clause allowing for the re- 
imposition of the mfn duty should difficulties arise or 
posibly arise on either EEC or ACP markets. 
36 See Weston, Cable and Hewitt The EEC's GSP, Evaluations and 
Recommendations for Chance". McQueen "Trade Preferences for ldc's 
v. 




The above factors indicate that the GSP is at present incapable of 
fulfilling the objectives of Resolution 21(II). Although the 
preferential area will increase as a result of the enlargement of 
the EEC to include Spain and Portugal, the overall effect of this 
enlargement on the GSP will be negative. Both countries have 
production structures similar to some GSP beneficiaries and on 
accession, these structures will benefit from EEC protection.37 
Criticisms of the EEC's GSP scheme revolve around the six factors 
outlined above. For example, although the EEC may be applauded 
for continually enlarging the scope of the agricultural product 
preference margins, those products of especial interest to the least 
developed countries are not included. This frustrates the 
objectives of the GSP which included special help for the least 
developed of the developing countries. Obviously, the product 
coverage needs to be extended. In its 1980 memorandum on the 
GSP for the post 1980 period, the Commission recognising the 
limited product coverage indicated that it could not be improved. 
It noted, 3 8 
"Given the constraints of the CAP and the need to 
safeguard opportunities for access for the ACP 
countries, or in the case of certain products 
opportunities for the Mediterranean countries and 
the possibility of the accession of new countries, it 
would be inappropriate to widen the present product 
coverage." 
The only possible avenue for improvements rests with the depth 
of the tariff cut on existing products and an increase in the level 
of tariff quotas for the five "sensitive products ". This major 
limitation on the scope of the GSP affects the overall utility of the 
37 "The entrants and the EC's Preferential Trade Policies towards 
ldc's° in ed Donges et al The Second Enlargement of the European 
Community, 110, 127. 
38 Op cit n33, 14. 
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scheme. If this factor is added to the complex and 
administratively difficult rules of origin, it is not surprising that 
the rate of utilisation of the EEC's GSP is less than 40 %.39 Although 
the implementation of the GSP has added to the measures the EEC 
may take to aid the process of development, the concentration of 
EEC efforts on the ACP, and the Mediterranean, negates the useful 
effect of the GSP. The results of UNCTAD studies show that the 
percentage of mfn dutiable products covered by the Lomé 
Convention (99 %), compares favourably with the percentage of 
GSP products covered as against mfn dutiable products (22 %). 
With respect to the Maghreb countries, 94% of total dutiable 
agricultural exports are covered by the co- operation agreements 
as against 8% covered by the GSP. These statistics result in the 
following conclusion by one UNCTAD study,40 
"ACP and Maghreb countries face substantial 
competition from other preferential sources in the 
EEC market but have an important competitive 
advantage over a significant amount of mfn imports. 
GSP beneficiaries are the source of the smallest 
amount of this preferential competition." 
Although this conclusion may be interpreted as vindicating the 
role of the ACP in the limitation of the GSP offer, it may also be 
read as proof that tariff preferences, by themselves, are not 
sufficient to stimulate trade. Whereas the Lomé Convention and 
the Mediterranean agreements both involve financial co- operation 
with the EEC, the GSP is merely a unilateral trade arrangement. 
Both the ACP and the Mediterranean benefit from this financial 
co- operation in the process of developing their trade. 
The limited trade impact of preferences and the one -dimensional 
nature of the GSP raises the following question. How helpful is the 
39 Noted in TD/B/C.5/106. 
40 TD /B/C.5/49. Effects of the GSP on ldc's sharing their special 
tariff advantages as a result of the implementation of the system, II. 
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GSP to developing countries? Considering the fact that many 
developing countries export products which enter the EEC duty - 
free under mfn treatment or are excluded from preferential 
treatment under the GSP, the question of the real value of the GSP 
becomes very apposite. Talking about "the dismal picture" 
created by the GSP's efforts to meet its objectives, Murray 
observed,41 
"The crucial question is, how far does the dismal 
picture derive from the fact that ldc's happen to 
export products which are outside the scope of the 
GSP and how far does it derive from an implicit 
stinginess on the part of the donor countries." 
In her answer to the question, Murray stated that both elements 
were important. If this is so, then given these facts, a further 
question deserves consideration. Would the developing countries 
derive greater benefits from mfn tariff reductions than they 
would from the maintenance of GSP preferential advantages? In a 
1977 study of this question, Baldwin and Murray identified three 
important benefits to developing countries as a result of mfn tariff 
reductions.42 
"i. trade creation, mfn reductions on many 
products coming under the GSP would generate 
trade creation which would not be subject to 
quantitive limitation; 
ii. trade expansion, mfn reductions would cover a 
broader range of products than the GSP 
schemes; and 
iii. trade equality; all countries would enjoy the 
benefits of mfn reductions, whereas GSP results 
in trade inequality." 
41 Op cit n35, 454. 
42 "Mfn Tariff Reductions and ldc trade benefits under the GSP." 
(1977) 87 Econ Journal 30, 31. 
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Given these benefits, perhaps the GSP ought to be abolished or, if 
not, substantially reformed. These options form the basis of the 
next section. 
Abolition or Reform? 
The case for abolition of the GSP rests on two pillars. Firstly, the 
potentially positive trade effects which would accrue to 
developing countries as a result of mfn tariff reductions. 
Secondly, the nature of the GSP itself. It has a limited product 
coverage. It has a system of complex and administratively 
difficult rules of origin. It results are unequal, tending to benefit 
the most advanced, rather than the least advanced, developing 
countries. However, outright abolition, in the absence of a 
replacement, does not seem politically feasible. In its 1980 report 
on the EEC GSP, the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities noted,43 
"Tempting though outright abolition may be, the 
political case for continuing a Community scheme, 
however modified seems irrefutable; it may indeed 
be right to accept the argument that the agreement 
in the Tokyo Round to accept the permanent 
legitimation of the GSP, in which the European 
Community concurred, was, in itself, by implication, 
an undertaking to do so." 
Given this conclusion, the only alternative is reform, the purpose 
of which would be to rid the scheme of its weaknesses and 
disadvantages. Two possible reform proposals will be elaborated, 
one internal, working within the confines of the existing scheme 
and the other external, involving a replacement of the present 
scheme. 
43 The Generalized Scheme of Tariff Preferences (61st Report 
1979 -80), 24. 
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Internal Reform. UNCTAD resolutions 77(III) and 96(IV) urge 
donor countries to consider the following improvements of the 
GSP.44 
i. the extension of the coverage of the system to as many 
products of export interest to developing countries as 
possible taking into account their export needs and 
their desire to have all such products included in the 
scheme; 
ii. the extension of the coverage to include all processed 
and semi -processed agricultural products in chapter 1- 
24 BTN; 
iii. to provide duty free and quota free entry to imports 
from all developing countries under the GSP; 
iv. the adoption of as flexible and liberal an application as 
possible of the rules of the operation of the scheme; 
v. the harmonization and simplification of the rules of 
origin; 
vi. resort to safeguard action in exceptional circumstances 
only. Safeguard measures should be subject to prior 
international approval and review; 
vii. the elimination of all non -tariff barriers on products 
covered by the GSP; and finally, 
viii. the adoption of domestic policy measures which 
maximise the benefits of the GSP. 
The adoption of these improvements would significantly affect the 
utility of the GSP and the pursuit of its objectives. However, the 
possibility for the wholesale adoption of these measures by the 
EEC must be doubted. In any internal reform of the GSP, the 
range of factors affecting the scope of the GSP will continue to 
have a dominant role. This is not to imply that efforts cannot be 
made to improve the nature of the EEC's GSP. 
44 See Volume I Part I Action Taken by the Conference; 
Proceedings 
of UNCTAD III (1972) and UNCTAD IV (1976). 
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Although the Commission has ruled out the possibility of an 
increased product coverage, improvements could be effected 
through increases in the depth of the tariff cuts on existing 
products. Two measures can be taken to achieve this goal. Firstly, 
all preferential tariffs of 5% or lower (the so- called nuisance 
tariffs) should be abolished. This would nearly double the 
number of products which would benefit from duty -free entry; 
from 81 products under the 1986 scheme to 156 products. The 
second measure would be the establishment of a percentage 
relationship between the mfn duty rate and the GSP preferential 
rate. If the GSP rate was to be set at 50% of the mfn duty rate, 
substantial trade diversion in favour of the GSP beneficiaries 
would eventuate. Honey with a mfn rate of 27% would have a 
new GSP preferential rate of 13.5% instead of the current rate of 
25 %. Another example is provided by other prepared meats (CCT 
chapters 16.02 B III b)1) which has a mfn rate of 26% would have 
a new GSP rate of 13% instead of the current margin of 17 %. 
Considering the fact that these two products are on the list of the 
ten most important agricultural products covered by the scheme, 
the resulting trade impact could be very beneficial to developing 
country trade.45 If the 50% reduction resulted in the GSP 
preferential rate falling below 5 %, it would become eligible for 
elimination. The trade impact would be further increased. 
Both these suggestions will be implemented only to the extent 
that their implementation does not harm either domestic or ACP 
interests. Given the fact that the product coverage will not be 
substantially extended and the restrictions currently imposed, 
either through import calendars or the variable component of 
levies, will remain the interests of these groups should not be 
detrimentally affected. For those products of special interest to 
the ACP States and currently subject to the tariff quotas, it is 
suggested that the quantitative limitations remain. The tariff 
45 See TD /B /C.5/ 105 for the List of most important agricultural 
products covered by the EEC Scheme. 
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quotas would be recalculated to include a percentage criterion 
which would allow for the annual growth of the quotas. 
The remaining measures which could be taken to meet some of 
the improvements suggested by UNCTAD include the adoption of 
the Lomé rules of origin in replacement for the existing rules of 
origin. As indicated earlier, the process requirements under the 
Lomé rules are not as stringent as those under the GSP rules. The 
adoption of the Lomé rules would stimulate trade within the 
existing confines of the GSP rather than additional trade. The 
effectiveness of the new cumulative rules of origin remain 
unclear. However, the nature of these new rules are closely 
analogous to the cumulative treatment rules under the Lomé 
Convention and so further improvements in this area are limited. 
The final measure would be a purely cosmetic measure, a 
reformulation of the safeguard mechanisms, since the mechanisms 
have never been invoked. In line with the 1979 GATT declaration 
on Differential and More Favourable Treatment for Developing 
Countries, it is proposed that provision should be made for 
consultations before safeguard measures are taken.46 If safeguard 
measures are taken, it is proposed that the EEC should compensate 
the developing country for the withdrawal of the preference. 
The proposals outlined above would encourage greater utilization 
of the GSP. Whether or not, the new GSP system would be less 
complex and more equitable than the current system is a relevant 
question. If the above proposals are incapable of enhancing trade 
creation, expansion and equality, then external, not internal, 
reform is needed. 
External Reform. If the effective implementation of the current 
GSP is hampered by the range of interests which must be taken 
into account, then a case for external reform exists. If the EEC 
46 Op cit n14. See also the proposal for a Code on Safeguard 
Measures, 
Part II sl ch 2 of this paper. 
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could operate an effective system of preferences free from the 
constraints imposed by these interests then such a scheme merits 
consideration. 
If the interests of the ACP (and Mediterranean) exporters are no 
longer to be limitations on the scope of the GSP, it is clear that a 
radical change is proposed. This change will retain the principle 
of preferential treatment and will endeavour to attain the 
objectives set for preferential tariff schemes by UNCTAD 
Resolution 21(II). The new scheme would introduce principles of 
graduation and differentiation, in its attempt to ensure trade 
creation, trade expansion and trade equality. Graduation involves 
the phasing out and elimination of preferential treatment for the 
more advanced developing countries and the progressive phasing - 
in of the generally applicable rules of international trade. The 
principle of graduation was recognised in the 1979 GATT 
Declaration of 1979 on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment for Developing Countries. The purpose of graduation is 
to ensure the fuller participation of the economically advanced 
developing countries in international trade.47 The associated 
process of differentiation would allow developed countries to offer 
different preferential margins to developing countries according 
to the latter's level of development. The new scheme proposed 
below would apply to all developing countries, irrespective of 
whether or not they have concluded an agreement with the EEC. 
The new scheme would operate as follows. Based on IMF or 
World Bank figures, the EEC would establish four categories of 
countries, (a) the least developed, (b) the developing, (c) the 
economically advanced developing and (d) the developed 
countries. The developed countries would benefit from the mfn 
rate of duty unless they had a different arrangement with the EEC 
by virtue of a co- operation /free -trade agreement. The 
economically advanced developing countries would benefit from a 
47 Idem, part 7 of the Enabling Clause. 
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preferential rate of duty established between 60% and 80% of the 
mfn rate of duty. The developing countries would benefit from 
preferential rates set between 40% and 20% of the mfn rate of 
duty. All products from the least developed would enter duty 
free, and the product range would extend to all products of export 
interest to them. The product coverage would be progressively 
reduced. So in the case of developing countries certain products 
of primary importance to the least developed would be excluded 
and in the case of the economically advanced developing countries 
products of especial importance to the least developed and 
developed countries would be excluded. The principle of 
differentiation would be at work. 
If a product is of importance to both the least advanced and the 
developing countries a system of import ceilings on the latter 
group's exports could be enforced. This would be enforced in such 
a way as to prevent the frustration of the objectives of the 
scheme; an annual percentage increase in the level of permissible 
exports could achieve this. A similar system could be operated if 
products of export interest to the least developed and developing 
countries coincide with those of the economically advanced 
developing countries. Under the current GSP certain products 
remain subject to the charge of a levy, additional duties or 
variable charges. This feature of the current system would 
remain. However, depending on the source of imports subject to 
these changes, a percentage of them would be repaid. In the case 
of the least developed all charges would be repaid. The purpose 
of this repayment would be to promote standards, especially those 
relating to packaging and labelling. In addition, a certian level of 
financial aid, perhaps from the existing non -associates budget, 
would be made available to the least developed countries to 
ensure that they derive maximum benefit from the new scheme. 
The developing and economically advanced developing countries 
would receive lower percentage rebates. Financial aid from the 
non -associates budget would be limited to the least developed and 
developing countries. 
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The repayments and the potential aid could be used to ensure that 
beneficiary countries comply with the rules of origin. The 
simplificaiton of the current GSP's rules of origin is already taking 
place through the introduction of the harmonised system. The 
new rules of origin will combine the current List A and List B into 
a single list, which will express the working or processing carried 
out on non -originating materials that confers originating status. 
Any products not listed would automatically be subject only to the 
change of tariff heading criteria.48 Although the need for a 
safeguard mechanism remains, it is suggested that its applicaiton 
be subject to the principle of differentiation. The EEC should 
endeavour not to invoke it against the least developed or the 
developing countries. If it does invoke it, the countries affected 
by the selective application of the mechanism, should receive 
financial compensation to offset the adverse effects of preference 
withdrawal. To apply the principles of graduation the system 
would be reviewed every year to ensure that each country is in 
the proper category. A Committee on Graduation, similar to the 
one suggested by Frank,49 could be established to determine 
whether the economically advanced countries should continue to 
be subject to the system or should graduate into the mfn category. 
The effect of this scheme on those countries presently associated 
with the EEC, either through the Lomé Convention or the 
Mediterranean agreements, would be significant. The margin of 
preferences currently enjoyed by them would be shared with 
other developing countries. The other instruments of co- operation 
in these various agreements would have to be strengthened to 
enable adjustments to be made to the sudden loss of preferences. 
The scheme outlined above constitutes an improvement on the 
48 TD /B /C.5 /103 Transposition of the EC's GSP Origin Rules to take 
account of the introduction of the Harmonised System, 7. 
49 Frank "The 'Graduation' Issue for ldc's'! (1979) 13 JWTL 289. 
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current GSP and offers hope that preferential tariff advantages 
can be used as a tool to aid the process of development. 
A tool for development? 
In outlining the development of the concept of preferential 
treatment for developing countries and the evolution and 
limitations of the EEC's GSP, the limited trade impact of the GSP 
has been noted. Although the principle of preferential treatment 
is now so engrained that the abolition of the GSP is not a 
politically feasible solution to its problems, this does not imply 
that the scheme cannot be improved. 
Two methods of improving the GSP were outlined above. An 
internal option which works within the limitations which affect, 
and will continue to affect, the operation of the scheme. The merit 
of this proposal is that the range of interests currently protected 
by the GSP will continue to be afforded protection. The proposal 
would improve the effectiveness of the scheme, by increasing its 
rate of utilization. However, even this scheme would remain 
subject to the criticisms voiced of the current scheme; limited 
potential for either trade creation or trade expansion; and a 
degree of trade inequality through the unequal distribution of the 
benefits of the scheme. 
For these reasons and the ineffectiveness of the current, or even 
internally reformed, GSP to meet the objectives set for it, a 
proposal involving a new scheme of preferences was made. By 
using the principles of graduation and differentiation the potential 
of the GSP increases. By applying the scheme to all developing 
countries, instead of a limited number of current GSP 
beneficiaries, this potential is further increased and an 
opportunity is afforded for the scheme to meet the objectives set 
for it by resolution 21(II). The radical nature of the scheme, 
compared with the internal reform proposal raises problems. The 
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most significant of these is the erosion of preferential margins 
currently enjoyed by countries associated with the EEC. However, 
given the marginal trade impact of preferential tariff treatment, 
these countries could be "compensated" by an increase in other 
forms of co- operation. It has been noted that,50 
"A substantial extension of the product coverage and 
scope for preferential treatment under the GSP could 
be realized only if the EEC agreed to fundamental 
changes in Lomé policy in areas other than market 
access." 
To some extent the Lomé Convention and the GSP are 
complimentary and mutually reinforcing, reflecting as they do the 
regionalist as opposed to globalist orientation of the development 
co- operation policy debate within the EEC. Given this relationship, 
the proposals made in chapter 3 become apposite. It was noted 
that the ACP should strive for a degree of economic decoupling 
from the EEC. As part of this process it was proposed that greater 
emphasis be placed on measures other than preferences. If 
implemented, this proposal affords the EEC an opportunity to 
reform the GSP. As the European Parliament has noted,51 
"The Community should recognize the rather 
disappointing economic results of the preference 
scheme so far and seek to operate the scheme with 
sufficient flexibility ... so as to integrate the 
preferential system into a true development policy 
rather than limiting action to minor adjustments in 
commercial policy." 
50 Frey Wouters The European Community and the Third World, The 
Lomé Convention and its impact (1980) 182. 
51 EP DOC 1- 545/80 Report on the proposals from the Commission to 
the Council for Regulations fixing the Community's 5 -year scheme of 
generalized preferences for the period 1981 -85, para.17 of a proposed 
Resolution. See also Doc 1- 545/80 /Annex the Opinion of the Committee 
on Agriculture. 
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By adopting the proposal made for the external reform of the GSP, 
the EEC would emphasise the fact that the GSP constitutes a basic 
instrument of development co- operation. A tool, to be used by 
the EEC, to assist the development of all developing countries 
would be created. 
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CONCLUSION: 
In the 1982 Memorandum on the EEC's development policy the 
Commission noted,1 
"As a result of the impetus given by the 1972 Paris 
Summit, the range of Community instruments has 
been increased considerably, but it is still open to 
question today whether Community activity in the 
development field has really acquired the coherence 
and consistency of a policy." 
This part of the paper has concentrated on three areas of "EEC 
activity in the development field ", the Lomé Convention, the 
provision of food aid and the GSP. Recalling the words of the Paris 
Summit the EEC was enjoined to "respond even more than in the 
past to the expectations of all the developing countries ", it is 
relevant to enquire whether the EEC has so acted. 
The Lomé Convention masks one attempt by the EEC to meet the 
expectations of developing countries. The Convention assures the 
ACP of preferential access to the EEC market for the majority of 
their products. Even for agricultural products the ACP have been 
given a level of preference as against all other suppliers. The 
Convention also includes provisions for the stabilization of export 
earnings and a guarantee of access for ACP exporters of sugar. In 
addition to these advantages, the ACP benefit from development 
aid dispersed through the operation of the EDF. The provision of 
food aid undoubtedly contributes to meeting the developing 
countries' need for food products to make up for domestic 
shortfalls. The shift of emphasis to food strategies represents an 
attempt to cure the source of the problem rather than the results 
of the problem. The food aid programme is aimed at the latter. 
The implementation of the GSP has helped several developing 
1 EC Bull Supp 5/82, 8. 
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countries to achieve rapid advances in the process of 
industrialization. Equally, it provides for market access for a 
number of products of export interest to developing countries. 
Despite the impressive liturgy of EEC efforts in the development 
field, the basic question remains unanswered. The EEC has 
responded to the expectations of developing countries, but the 
contributions made have been piecemeal and their 
implementation is a source of discrimination within the 
developing countries. The Lomé Conventions, the major vehicle of 
the development co- operation policy of the EEC, have had a 
marginal impact on the process of development. As Hewitt 
concludes,2 
"But if ... the Lomé Conventions have failed 
significantly to assist the development of the third 
world and provide a workable model even for 
European external policies toward the third world, it 
will have to be concluded that resources have been 
misallocated, policies misdirected and institutional 
learning ignored. If so there will be no Lomé IV." 
The results of Lomé can either validate this conclusion or they can 
provide evidence of the unsuitably of the instruments of the Lomé 
Convention. This paper, after examining the various instruments 
of the Lomé Convention, noted several failings in the instruments 
of co- operation; - the provision of preferences is not sufficient to encourage 
the development of trade; - the provisions of Stabex act as a disincentive to the 
diversification of ACP economics and the production of 
food crops as opposed to export crops; 
2 "The Lomé Convention: Entering a Second Decade:' (1985) 23 JCMS 
95, 114. 
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- the sugar protocol, originally a bold instrument of 
development, has been blunted by the operation of the 
CAP. 
Is it possible to attribute the source of these failings to the CAP? 
To some extent, the divergence of the aims pursued by the CAP 
and the development policy has resulted in a certain negative 
impact on the effectiveness of the latter. In relation to Lomé the 
ACP, primarily exporters of agricultural products, are 
detrimentally affected by the operation of the CAP. The operation 
of the CAP has also blunted the efficacy of the Sugar Protocol, 
restricted the product coverage of Stabex, and the generosity of 
the trade concessions. Critics have often accused the EEC of taking 
away with one hand what it has given with the other, a criticism 
which appears valid in light of the conclusions reached above.3 
The European Parliament state that the main culprit is the CAP. 
They continued,4 
"The two main accusations may be summarised as 
follows, it is protectionist and this hampers the 
agricultural development of developing countries, in 
particular their agricultural export potential; its 
price and guarantee system gives rise to a mounting 
structural surplus in a few key sectors, much of 
which is then disposed of as food aid." 
The CAP hampers the development co- operation policies of the 
EEC. To misquote Claude Cheysson, the EEC is engaging in Sunday 
charity, rather than making development policy part and parcel of 
general policies. 
3 See for example Coopers, Faber and Lof "EC's security of supply 
with raw materials and the interests of developing countries: in ed Von 
Geusau The Lome Convention and the NIEO. 
4 Doc 1- 605/83 Report on the context of the future ACP -eec 
Convention to follow Lomé II, 41. 
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Would a development co- operation policy as part and parcel of 
the EEC's general policies impose too great a burden on the EEC? 
The 1982 Commission Memorandum correctly points out,5 
"The Community is not a multilateral development 
institution; being the expression of a European 
identity the Community's development policy 
embodies geographical preferences; although it is a 
manifestation of solidarity with certain developing 
countries, it also reflects the Communtiy's economic 
interests in the organization of its relations with 
countries on which it depends for the security of its 
supplies and its markets." 
In recognition of the fact that the EEC is not a multilateral 
development institution, the Commission, in its suggestions for 
approaches of EEC policy towards developing countries, 
recommend action to promote self -reliant development. The 
proposals made in this part of the paper reflect this approach. The 
developing countries will have to help themselves, the EEC will 
back up their efforts. For example, it was suggested that the ACP 
should shift the focus of their economic decisions from the EEC to 
other ACP States and other developing countries. It was proposed 
that this economic de- coupling could be achieved through regional 
commodity arrangements or the promotion of producer 
associations. The provisions of Stabex would remain, to allow for a 
smooth transition. It was also suggested that the ACP take 
advantage of the provisions of the Convention not only to promote 
intra -ACP trade and intra -ACP co- operation but also to promote 
food security through the use of food strategies. The food aid 
system currently operated by the EEC would serve as a strategic 
food reserve pending the transition to food security. The changing 
focus of ACP -EEC co- operation and the elimination of the need to 
restrict preferences to take account of the interests of the ACP, 
will allow improvements to be made to the GSP. Building on the 
5 Op cit nl, 12. 
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work of the ACP and using the principles of graduation and 
differentiation, an effective instrument of development co- 
operation would result. 
These new development policies would meet the expectations of 
developing countries; stable and remunerative prices for their 
commodities, through the operation of regional commodity 
arrangements and Stabex; food security, through the 
implementaiton of food strategies; and market access, through the 
operation of the GSP and improved intra -ldc trade co- operation. 
Recalling the fact that the EEC is not a multilateral aid institution, 
it is not possible for it to meet all the expectations of developing 
countries. In multilateral trade institutions the EEC could 
encourage the realisation of the expectations of developing 
countries and contribute to the establishment of a more equitable 
world economic order. 
The geographical focus of the EEC's development co- operation 
policies will remain on the ACP but the advantages accruing from 
the other proposed measures will ensure that this geographical 
focus is not the source of discrimination on the same level as 
before. One question remains to be answered. What impact will 
these changes have on the CAP? 
The criticisms of the European Parliament, noted above, point to 
some potential answers. An amelioration of the protectionist 
nature of the policy and amendments to the price and guarantee 
system to eliminate recurring surpluses. However, one must 
question whether substantial reforms in the CAP will be brought 
about simply to make the development co- operation policies more 
effective. If the demands of the development policy and 
developing countries are not sufficient to effect reform of the CAP, 
other demands also point the way towards reform. International 
criticisms of the CAP, associate countries' complaints and more 
importantly, internal demands for reform, indicate that some 
reforms are required. The process of reform will allow the EEC to 
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ameliorate some of the internal criticisms of the CAP. Equally, it 
provides an opportunity for the EEC to prove that it is serious 
about a number of issues; the harmonious development of world 
trade; the demands of developing countries for greater use of 
commodity agreements; and, the need for genuine association and 
development co- operation policies. One method the EEC can choose 
to tackle these issues is a common agricultural trade policy. It is 
the elements of this policy which the final part of this paper 
addresses. 
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PART V: TOWARDS A COMMON AGRICULTURAL 
TRADE POLICY. 
INTRODUCTION: 
The introduction to this paper noted that the CAP is the most 
visible external symbol of the EEC's existence. The policy affects 
both agricultural exporting and importing countries. Although the 
CAP has been in operation for a considerable period of time, no 
explicitly formulated agricultural trade policy yet exists. But why 
does the EEC need such a policy? 
Various answers may be given to this question. The EEC is one of 
the largest trading blocs in the world. It is a substantial exporter 
and importer of agricultural products. It is the most important 
market for developing countries, for both agricultural and 
industrial products. Its member States have historical, political 
and economic ties with countries on every continent. A certain 
responsibility therefore devolves onto the EEC since its trade 
activities have a profound effect on other countries. Should the 
EEC move towards increased protectionism, in either industrial or 
agricultural trade, this would have damaging effects on other 
countries. Note, the adverse impact the CAP has already had on 
world agricultural trade. 
Should the EEC move towards the adoption of a liberal trade policy 
in agricultural products, the potential for economic growth, within 
the EEC and in many third countries, if realised, would lead to the 
greater development of world trade. However, such a step must 
be carefully considered because the primary responsibility of the 
EEC is its own citizens and especially its own farmers. For this 
reason, it is essential that as the EEC adopts a common agricultural 
trade policy, adaptations should be made to the CAP. This will 
ensure that the successful accomplishment of the task is spread 
equally, not only between the member States and the different 
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market organizations, but also between the various interested 
non -member States. 
Utopian recommendations are not the answer. What is needed is a 
series of integrated policies to ensure the success of the 
evolutionary transition to a more liberal agricultural tade policy. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY. 
A starting point in the adaptation of the CAP is the realisation of 
the need for change. A 1983 Commission document on the CAP 
stated,i 
"The Common Agricultural Policy has had 
considerable success. But Europe must adapt its 
agricultural policy. The adjustment of regulations 
adopted after difficult political compromises will 
require a firm political will. It will demand difficult 
decisions on the part of all the EEC institutions and an 
acceptance on the part of all the social and 
professional groups involved." 
Having realised the need for an adaptation of the policy, the next 
step in the process is to adapt the policy to meet the criticisms 
made of it. As the adaptation of the CAP will be part of the 
adoption of a common agricultural trade policy it is essential that 
external criticisms as well as internal criticisms of the policy be 
taken into account. 
Criticisms of the CAP 
Part I of this paper canvassed some criticisms of the CAP. The 
following criticisms were noted: 
(1). The CAP does not include all agricultural produce listed in 
Annex II of the Treaty of Rome. The incomplete coverage of the 
CAP has resulted in some products of export interest to some 
member States being excluded from the scope of the policy. 
Alternatively, no agreement has been reached on extending the 
CAP to some products (e.g. potatoes). 
1 Adjustment of the Common Agricultural Policy EC Bull Supp 4/83, 1. 
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(2). The operation of the common organizations of the market 
(COM's) gives rise to various inequities. It is maintained that the 
price policy of the COMs benefit northern producers of milk, sugar 
cereals to the detriment of southern producers of olive oil, wine 
and fruit and vegetables. The differences in the COM's reflect the 
nature of the products and the production structures of the 
original six member States. Further criticisms of the COM's relates 
to the absence of regulatory mechanisms which would prevent 
surplus accumulation. The open -ended nature of the intervention 
system allows farmers to produce as much as possible and 
imposes a responsibility on the EEC to buy this production. The 
operation of the price policy also results in the CAP benefitting 
larger producers. As a result, the CAP is a source of social and 
regional inequality within the EEC. These criticisms of the CAP 
stem from the original series of decisions on the nature of the 
policy and especially the decision to support farmer's income 
through prices rather than direct income aids. 
(3). The impact of the CAP on the EEC budget has also been a 
source of criticism. It is maintained that the burden imposed by 
the CAP on public funds is too high in absolute terms and that it 
takes up too large a share of the budget. As a result of this large 
share the development of other common policies has been 
retarded. The consequence of this is an exacerbation of the social 
and regional inequalities caused by the CAP. Another result of the 
large share of the budget devoted to agriculture is that certain 
inequalities between the member States result. An inequality 
which is not lessened by the expenditure of the Community funds 
on ever larger structural surpluses. 
These criticisms of the CAP can be answered. The share of 
agriculture in the EEC budget result from the measures needed to 
implement the objectives of the policy. The burden on public 
funds imposed by the CAP is no larger than the burdens imposed 
on the budgets of other countries by their agricultural policies. 
The concept of fair return does not form part of the EEC's budget 
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politics. The advantages of being a member State cannot be 
measured by subtracting budget contributions from budget 
receipts. However, the fact that these criticisms can be answered 
does not mean that the CAP should not be subject to constraints. 
The Commission has noted,2 
"the adaptation of the policy cannot be made 
according to exclusively budgetary criteria but rather 
with the aim of fulfilling the fundamental objectives 
in the most cost -effective way." 
The fundamental objectives of the CAP as interpreted by the 
Community institutions has resulted in many criticisms, yet these 
institutions do not advocate a re- interpretation of the objectives 
established in Article 39(1). Such a re- interpretation would 
encourage the EEC to examine the methods chosen to implement 
the objectives and the priority given to each objective. It would 
also encourage the EEC to consider the interests of third countries 
and the role these countries could play in the achievement of the 
CAP's objectives. 
The Adaptation of the Policy 
Adaptations to the CAP cannot possibly hope to meet all criticisms 
of the policy, for although the CAP contributes to the problem it is 
not the sole cause of the problem. For example, in the GATT, an 
improvement of the situation in the rules of international trade 
for agricultural products will require the active co- operation and 
assistance of other GATT Contracting Parties. However, 
adaptations to the CAP can play a useful role in this process. 
The parameters for the adaptation of the CAP have been 
established by the Commission. Any adaptation must not question 
2 Idem. 
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the three principles on which the policy is based; common prices, 
Community preference and common financing. The CAP must 
continue to be centred on the following three instruments: - an economic structure based on the market organizations; - structural aids to enable qualified farmers to implement 
measures of adaptation; and finally, 
aids to individuals in marginal cases in which farmers 
cannot adapt and /or it is felt desirable to maintain a 
farming population. 
What is envisaged is the maintenance of the principles of the CAP 
and the past successes of the policy. However, a new principle has 
been introduced which it is hoped will meet some of the criticisms 
of the policy. As the Commission conclude,3 
"... the real benefits of the policy, not only to farmers 
through secure prices and to consumers through 
secure supplies but also to European integration as a 
whole, can and must be maintained through the more 
general introduction of a fourth principle, namely 
some element of financial responsibility of producers 
for the disposal of production in excess of an agreed 
quantity." 
This principle of producer responsibility aims to curb what some 
see as the worst excesses of the policy; the expenditure of 
budgetary resources on ever increasing structural surpluses. The 
principle that producers should bear some responsibility for the 
creation of surpluses is not new. It was first suggested by the 
Commission in 1973 and it has been the basis of the common 
organization of the sugar market since its inception. The 
introduction, and extension, of the principle is a recognition that 
the open -ended nature of the intervention system was imposing a 
financial burden on the EEC that it could not, and would not 
continue to, meet. The purpose of the principle is not to limit 
3 COM (81) 50 Commission proposals on the fixing of prices for 
certain agricultural production and on certain related measures, 2. 
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production levels but establish a threshold on EEC expenditure, 
thereby rationalizing the policy. 
To implement the principle of producer responsibility the 
guarantee threshold concept was introduced. There are five 
variations on this concept, depending on the product concerned. 
They are:4 
(a) limiting the increase in the target or intervention price 
if production exceeds a certain figure; 
(b) reducing the amount of aid available under the CAP if 
production exceeds the threshold; 
(c) imposing an overall limit on the amount of aid payable 
in connection with the market organization; 
(d) asking producers to contribute, via a levy, towards the 
cost of disposing of any additional production (or 
towards the net export costs); and 
(e) imposing a production ceiling on each member State or 
undertaking. 
Each of these variations or combinations of them has been 
employed by the EEC in its effort to exert market discipline on 
producers. 
In the cereals sector, the guarantee threshold is set for each year 
by averaging production in the three previous years. If 
production exceeds the threshold the intervention price is reduced 
for every million tonnes of the excess, subject to a maximum 
reduction. Guarantee thresholds have also been established for 
processed fruit and vegetables, rape seed, sunflower seed, olive 
oil, wine, cotton and certain fruits preserved in syrup. The EEC 
has adapted the guarantee threshold concept to the particular 
needs of the product in over -supply. One product, milk, is 
illustrative of the success of the new fourth principle. The original 
proposal for an element of producer responsibility in the CAP was 
4 See Green Europe No.203. The Guarantee Threshold System, 9 and 
EC Bull Supp 4/83 op cit n 1, 8. 
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directed towards the situation in the milk COM.5 In 1973, taking 
into account the continuing problem of surplus production, the 
Commission proposed that milk producers should pay a temporary 
production levy on deliveries to dairies. In 1977, the Council 
finally accepted the need for producer responsibility in the milk 
sector. The resulting co- responsibility levy was to be used in the 
disposal of surpluses. 
This measure did not have any significant impact on production as 
producers could merely increase production to incorporate the 
penalty imposed by the levy. In an effort to arrest production 
increases the Commission proposed that a super -levy be charged 
on milk delivered to dairies in excess of agreed quantities. In 
1982 the Council adopted this measure, the quantity was set at 
the level of 1981 deliveries plus 0.5 %. If the quantities actually 
delivered exceeded the threshold, the intervention price would be 
reduced the following year by an amount corresponding to the 
excess delivered. This occurred in 1983 when the intervention 
price was reduced by 3 %. Faced with an even greater percentage 
decrease in 1984, the Council adopted a new type of guarantee 
threshold. Instead of an annual guarantee threshold, a five year 
guarantee threshold was established. No provision was made for 
annual increases. This system penalises producers whose 
deliveries to dairies exceed the level of their assigned quotas, 
rather than imposing a standard reduction in the intervention 
price.6 
The introduction of the concept of producer responsibility has 
been accompanied by the use of a prudent (restrictive) price 
policy. This limits the annual increase in the common prices by 
5 See Newsletter of the CAP Special Issue: Memorandum 
Agriculture, 1973 -78, 12. 
6 See Green Europe No.207; Milk. The Quota System for a 
description of past and current efforts to control milk production. See 
also Council Regs.13 -35, 1340/86 OJ L 119/19 1986. 
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taking into account not only the agricultural market but also the 
budgetary situation and other general economic factors. The 
prudent price policy, like the guarantee threshold system, is an 
attempt by the EEC to force farmers to take the reality of the 
market place into account in their decision -making processes. 
The Impact of Adaptation 
The adaptation of the CAP has proceeded along the lines of the 
prudent price policy and the guarantee threshold concept. In this 
way the adaptation has met some of the internal criticisms of the 
CAP. 
A method has been found to keep the budgetary consequences of 
the policy in check. It remains to be seen whether the member 
States and their farmers will abide by the policy goal of limiting 
the costs of the CAP. The CAP has, irrespective of the prudent 
price policy and the guarantee threshold system, reached a 
turning point. A point which demands that a greater role should 
be played by the structural policy. Increased resources will have 
to be devoted to this policy as a result of the 1986 enlargement of 
the EEC. More resources should be devoted to help low- income 
farmers or farmers in less- favoured areas, as it is these farmers 
who need the most assistance. Resources to other common 
policies will also have to be increased as the EEC becomes a less 
homogeneous group. 
The current adaptation of the CAP does not assure its future 
viability. The concept of guarantee thresholds has been criticised 
on a general and particular level. On the general level it is 
maintained that guarantee thresholds serve to freeze the current 
patterns of production. This is similar to criticisms of the effects of 
international commodity arrangements. The particular 
implementation of the concept has also been criticised. For 
example, in the cereals sector the guarantee threshold is 
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established by averaging production in the previous three years. 
Although the intervention price may be reduced if production 
exceeds the threshold in any particular year, this production is 
still taken into account in setting future guarantee thresholds. 
Guarantee thresholds institutionalise structural surpluses rather 
than eradicate the cause of these surpluses. This criticism is 
particularly apposite to the guarantee threshold in the milk sector. 
The level of the quota is set well above EEC consumption, and 
even given exports of milk products, a surplus may still 
accumulate. To counter this criticism and criticisms of 
inflexibility, the 1986 agricultural price negotiations accepted a 
voluntary scheme for buying up quotas and a compulsory 
mechanism to achieve a three per cent reduction in the level of 
the quotas over a two year period. 
The credibility of the prudent price policy and the guarantee 
threshold concept as the method to achieve reform of the CAP was 
called into question during the 1985 price negotiations.The 
reluctance of Germany to accept successive and quasi- automatic 
price cuts to achieve balance in the cereals sector, raises 
questions about the continuing acceptability of this solution. As 
Vasey notes,? 
"It will become increasingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to get agreement in the Council on 
common prices in future as long as these are still 
supposed to serve conflicting purposes: that is, the 
economic function of adjusting supply and demand 
and the social function of guaranteeing a reasonable 
income for small and medium -sized family farms." 
As a temporary measure the adaptation of the CAP through the 
use of a prudent price policy and the concept of guarantee 
thresholds may be acceptable internally. Externally, the situation 
remains as before. The introduction of guarantee thresholds 
7 "The 1985 Farm Price Negotiations and Reform of the CAP" (1985) 
22 CML Rev 649, 670. 
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merely limits the level of budgetary expenditure on agricultural 
products. Recalling the fact that the common organization of the 
sugar market has always had this feature and remembering the 
disruption caused by EEC sugar exports, it must be doubted if any 
significant trade advantages will accrue to third countries as a 
result of this adaptation of the CAP. Indeed, the Commission is 
actually proposing measures which would exacerbate the situation 
third countries are faced with as a result of the CAP. On external 
trade they recommend,8 
- international co- operation with the principal exporting 
countries to prevent the deterioration of world prices; - the development of a policy at EEC level for promoting 
exports on a sound economic basis; - the exercise of the EEC's international rights, particularly 
in GATT, for the revision of the external protection system in 
those cases where the EEC is taking measures to limit its own 
production. 
The Commission envisages increased exports and decreased 
imports, hardly a situation which would meet the external 
criticisms of the CAP. The impact of adaptation has been entirely 
internal. The means chosen reflect the internal criticisms of the 
policy. In this process it is obvious that external criticisms cannot 
be catered for. The process of adaptation cannot take place in a 
vacuum, the internal changes must reflect on the EEC's ability to 
trade with other countries not only in agricultural products but 
also in industrial products. Faced with an increasingly 
protectionist CAP, the impact on the EEC's exports of industrial 
products could be very detrimental to the EEC. There is a need to 
integrate the CAP with the common commercial policy and to 
attune the CAP to the demands of the industrial sector of the EEC. 
It would be the role of the Common Agricultural Trade Policy to 
8 E.g. EC Bull Supp 4/83 op cit n 1, 10. 
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effect this integration, thereby promoting the entire economic 
interests of the EEC. 
The External Environment 
The adaptation of the CAP has been, and will continue to be, 
carried out without regard to the interests of third countries. If 
the adaptation has affected these countries, it has a negative 
impact, decreasing their level of trade with the Community rather 
than increasing it. 
Part II of this paper in the discussion of the EEC in the 
International Arena, noted that international efforts to achieve 
agricultural trade liberalization are based on a misconception. 
This misconception is that liberalization is desirable. By their 
nature domestic agricultural programmes are inherently 
protectionist. If this is so, then future hopes of trade liberalization 
are bleak. The external operation of the CAP reflects the 
protectionist nature of domestic agricultural programmes. 
In relation to the GATT, the following effects of the CAP were 
noted. Deprived of the possibility of the legitimate use of Article 
XI to impose quantitative restrictions on imports, the Community 
has resorted to the use of non -tariff barriers. Whilst the 1979 
Code on Technical Barriers to Trade tackles the problem of non - 
tariff barriers, it is only the start of the process. Given the 
increased importance of these barriers to trade and their role in 
the domestic agricultural programmes of the Contracting Parties, 
the process of liberalization in this area will be a long one. The 
reason is that GATT work in this area constitutes a direct assault 
on an important element of agricultural protectionism. This 
reasoning is also reflected in GATT attempts to monitor the effects 
of export subsidies and to enforce the provisions of Article XVI:3. 
The GATT attempts to make progress in this area have been 
weakened by the prevalence and market relevance of these 
measures. 
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In relation to safeguard measures (Article XIX GATT) a similar 
problem manifests itself. However, this provision holds the key to 
a more effective GATT. The major criticism of Article XIX is the 
need to ensure reciprocity and non -discrimination in the 
application of safeguard measures. These concepts, particularly 
reciprocity, are not appropriate to agricultural trade relations. 
The discussions of the US waiver for its domestic agricultural 
policy indicates that the Contracting Parties and the GATT would 
be better served by employing the concept of "a balance of rights 
and obligations ". The use of this concept could be the basis of 
future advances in the process of liberalization, because it accepts 
the protectionist nature of domestic agricultural programmes. 
Given the desire to have some international framework, it is 
obvious that, despite its failings, the GATT remains relevant. The 
means of progress is to work within the rules laid down and seek 
to improve those rules to achieve a "balance" between the rights 
and obligations of all Contracting Parties. Progress in this area 
will have to reflect, and respect, the economic, social and political 
demands which lie behind domestic agricultural programmes and 
the varying methods chosen by the Contracting Parties to satisfy 
these demands. 
Progress in the area of commodities must also acknowledge the 
influence of these demands. The international consensus which 
launched the NIEO has disappeared. The incentive for developed 
countries to conclude ICA's (the fear that the experience with oil 
would be replicated in other commodities) has proved not to be a 
powerful incentive. Moreover, the rhetoric of the 1970's appears 
anachronistic in the 1980's. The expectations of the developing 
countries that the developed countries would adopt altruistic 
policies towards them were unfounded. The collective, self- reliant 
attitude which bound the developing countries together in the 
1970's has dissipated in the harsher economic climate of the 
1980's. In a sense, developing countries have been the authors of 
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their own misfortunes, by relying too much on their supposed 
"commodity power" whilst ignoring domestic policy changes which 
could have encouraged greater development. 
However, this does not mean that there is no role for ICA's in the 
international trading environment. Such agreements have a 
positive role to play, a role which remained largely unexplored in 
all the rhetoric of the 1970's. These agreements can assist the 
process of development, stabilise international trade and allow for 
the structural adjustment of domestic agricultural policies. The 
impact of the 1970's was to frighten developed countries away 
from their use. So any new arrangement or programme leading to 
the conclusion of ICA's will have to be gradual /evolutionary. 
The gradualism which will mark future ICA's is evident in the EEC 
Development Co- operation Policies. The examination of these 
policies, although showing a convergence of the aims of the 
policies, illustrates a divergence of the methods used to achieve 
these aims. The influence of the CAP on these methods has been 
essentially negative and it constitutes a source of discrimination 
within this group of countries. This aspect of discrimination is 
also evident in the relations established with several developed 
countries. The number and scope of the agreements concluded by 
the EEC gives rise to doubts as to whether or not it is possible to 
have a coherent external policy. These doubts are further 
strengthened by the range of agricultural concessions given to the 
countries who have a relationship with the Community. 
Once again, the protectionist nature of the CAP is at fault. If 
changes to the external impact of the CAP are suggested, what are 
the implications of such changes? The basic position to be 
adopted by the EEC is either Liberalism or Protectionism. The EEC 
has not benefitted externally from the adoption of a protectionist 
stance, and so, it could be argued that it should adopt a liberalist 
stance. However, this argument ignores the reasons for the 
protectionist position; the social, economic and political forces 
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behind the CAP. Any moves towards free trade must take account 
of these interests and the move to a position of reluctant 
liberalism would accomplish this. This position entails the 
adoption of a Common Agricultural Trade Policy which will open 
up the EEC market to exports from third countries and maintain a 
level of protection for domestic producers. Of necessity, the 
implementation of such a policy would be evolutionary. The 
overall purpose would be to achieve a balance between the rights 
and obligations the EEC has to its own farmers and those the EEC 
has to the international community. 
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CHAPTER 2: A COMMON AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
POLICY (CATP). 
The EEC has reached a turning point in its history, with the 
accession of Spain and Portugal the number of member States has 
doubled. A policy drawn up to meet the needs of the six now has 
to contend with the demands of another six member States. The 
process of adaptation has already started to meet internal 
criticisms of the policy. The adoption of a common agricultural 
trade policy will serve to meet the external criticisms. However, 
the aim of this latter policy is not simply to establish "good 
relations" with third countries but to provide a means whereby 
the CAP may be integrated with other EEC policies. By doing this a 
vehicle for economic growth within the EEC and outside the EEC 
will be set in motion. 
Council Regulation on the Principles and Mechanisms 
of the Common Agricultural Trade Policy. 
The Council of the European Communities 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community and in particular Articles 43, 113 and 235 thereof 
Whereas Article 38 of the Treaty establishing the EC provides for 
the establishment of a common agricultural policy among the 
member States; whereas the objectives of this policy enumerated 
in Article 39 of the Treaty establishing the EC have been achieved 
through the use of common organizations of the market; whereas 
the CAP is based on the unquestionable principles of common 
prices, Community preference and common financing; whereas 
problems with the CAP have required the introduction of a fourth 
principle, producer responsibility; whereas the EEC reaffirms the 
objectives and principles of the CAP; whereas the EEC recognises 
that the process of adaptation of the CAP has just started and the 
purpose of this adaptation is to integrate the CAP with other 
common policies, especially the Common Commercial Policy. 
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Whereas Article 110 of the Treaty establishing the EC directs the 
member States to contribute, in the common interest to the 
harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition 
of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs 
barriers; whereas a lack of convergence exists between Article 
110 and the CAP; whereas the EEC recognises the responsibility it 
has in international trade; whereas the EEC reaffirms its 
determination to encourage the development of international 
trade especially in agricultural products. 
Whereas the EEC re- affirms the objectives of the GATT and the 
importance of these objectives; whereas the EEC recognizes that 
the provisions of the GATT do not apply with equal force to both 
agricultural and industrial products; whereas the EEC realises the 
effects which the operation of the CAP has had on the 
implementation of the GATT; whereas the EEC recognises its 
determination to eliminate these adverse effects by adhering to a 
greater extent to the rules of GATT; whereas the efforts of the EEC 
in this area must be reciprocated by other Contracting Parties to 
the GATT. 
Whereas the EEC recognises the problems presented by continuing 
underdevelopment in the world; whereas the EEC reaffirms its 
determination to assist the process of development; whereas the 
EEC continues to work for the full implementation of UNCTAD 
Resolution 93(IV), recognising the valuable role commodity 
arrangements may play in the process of development; whereas 
the EEC remains willing to enter into such agreements, even 
though they may involve adaptations to the CAP; whereas EEC 
efforts to assist the process of development through the Lomé 
Conventions should be continued and strengthened; whereas the 
food aid operations of the EEC should continue and should 
encourage the development of food self- sufficiency; whereas the 
EEC reaffirms its commitment to UNCTAD Resolution 21(II) 
through the continuing operation of the generalised system of 
preferences; whereas EEC efforts in the field of development 
could be better co- ordinated through the adoption of a Common 
Agricultural Trade Policy. 
Whereas the EEC recognises the importance of its historical links 
with the coutries of the Mediterranean; whereas the EEC remains 
resolved to establish wide -ranging co- operation with these 
countries; whereas the EEC realises the importance of its role in 
the Mediterranean and affirms its intention to play this role; 
whereas the recent enlargement of the EEC provides an 
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opportunity to review the EEC's role in the Mediterranean; 
whereas enlargement provides a similar opportunity with respect 
to the countries of Latin America,Asia and EFTA; whereas the EEC 
realises the importance of this opportunity and will endeavour in 
the context of the Common Agricultural Trade Policy to meet the 
aspirations of these countries. 
Whereas the EEC recognises the importance of harmonious 
relations with other developed countries and the impact of the 
CAP on these relations; whereas these relations should be 
promoted in the context of the GATT; whereas the Common 
Agricultural Trade Policy will ease the tensions currently 
experienced in these relations. 
Whereas the adoption of the common agricultural trade policy will 
require adaptations to the CAP; whereas these adaptations should 
not disturb the objectives and principles of the CAP and be carried 
out progressively to ensure the minimisation of disruptions which 
may be caused; whereas the adoption of a common agricultural 
trade policy will encourage the integration of the CAP with other 
EEC policies. 
HAS RESOLVED AS FOLLOWS 
Part I - General 
Article 1- Objectives. 
(1) The progressive alignment of the objectives of the Common 
Agricultural Policy with other EEC policies, especially the 
Common Commercial Policy, shall be achieved through the 
adoption of the Common Agricultural Trade Policy outlined 
in this Regulation. 
(2) The overall objectives of the Common Agricultural Trade 
policy shall be; 
(a) the adaptation of the CAP to allow for greater 
impact of world market conditions; and 
(b) the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products 
through international measures and bilateral 
agricultural concessions. 
(3) The Common Agricultural Trade Policy shall have three 











the organizations of GATT and 
the EEC's development policy; and, 
relations between the EEC and the 
the Mediterranean, EFTA and the 
Article 2 - Safeguards. 
(1) Should the application of the Common Agricultural Trade 
Policy result in serious disturbance in a sector of the 
economy of the EEC or of one or more of the member States, 
the Council may take, or may authorise the member State 
concerned to take, safeguard measures. 
(2) Such safeguard measures shall not be used for protectionist 
purposes or to hamper structural readjustment. 
(3) Safeguard measures shall be restricted to those which would 
least disturb trade between the EEC or the member State 
and the third country concerned. Such measures shall not 
frustrate the objectives of the Common Agricultural Trade 
Policy nor must they exceed the scope of what is strictly 
necessary to remedy the difficultures that have arisen. 
(4) The Commission shall monitor the implementation of this 
Provision. 
PART II. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE CATP. 
Article 3 - Objectives. 
(1) In reaffirming the objectives of the international 
organizations of GATT and UNCTAD, the CATP shall seek to 
achieve 
(a) the progressive liberalization of world trade in 
agricultural products; and 
(b) the achievement of fair and equitable prices for all 
internationally -traded agricultural products. 
(2) In the process of achieving these objectives the EEC 
recognises that reciprocity is an essential element of any 
agreement. 
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Article 4 - The GATT. 
(1) The EEC reaffirms the role of GATT rules and through the 
CATP will endeavour to make these rules more applicable to 
trade in agricultural products. Specific actions are laid down 
in the remaining provisions of this Article. 
(2) In consultation with other Contracting Parties, the EEC 
undertakes to reduce the level of external protection 
afforded to domestic producers through the use of the 
variable levy system. 
(3) In the area of export subsidies, in consultation with other 
Contracting Parties, the EEC urges that the following action 
be taken: 
(a) the establishment within the Subsidies Committee 
of product sub -committees. These committees will 
collect and collate evidence of export subsidisation; 
and 
(b) the reports of these sub -committees shall be used 
in negotiations leading to the reduction of export 
subsidisation. 
No action will be taken by the EEC, within the context of the 
CATP, in relation to export subsidies unless this action is 
part of a reciprocal agreement between the Contracting 
Parties. 
(4) The EEC, in the context of the CATP, will urge the end of 
measures which contravene Article XIX of the GATT. In 
consultation with other Contracting Parties, the EEC shall 
consider adjustments to the provisions of Article XIX which: 
(a) meets the requirements established by the GATT 
ministerial meeting of 1982 for a new safeguard 
code; and 
(b) allows for the use of selective safeguard measures. 
No action will be taken by the EEC, within the context of the 
CATP unless it is as a result of a reciprocal agreement 
between the Contracting Parties. 
Article 5 - Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
(1) The operation of the CATP in multilateral trade negoitations 
should focus on achieving a balance of rights and obligations 
within the framework of the GATT rather than the pursuit 
of full reciprocity. For this reason negotiations should be at 
a similar rate in all product sectors. 
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(2) Multilateral Trade Negotiations should include negotiations 
on Codes of Conduct on the Operation of Domestic 
Agricultural Policies. Such negotiations in the context of the 
CATP would seek to achieve the adaptation of the domestic 
agricultural policies of all Contracting Parties so as to 
minimise distortions in international trade. 
(3) No Code on Conduct shall be acceptable under the CATP 
unless it achieves a balance of rights and obligations within 
the framework of the GATT. 
Article 6 - UNCTAD 
(1) The EEC recognises the value of international commodity 
agreements in the stabilisation of world agricultural 
markets. The following provisions shall govern the CATP in 
this area. 
(2) The EEC shall consult with other countries in efforts to 
promote the following types of commodity agreements: 
(a) Commodity Co- operation Agreements; 
(b) Multilateral Contract Commodity Agreements; and 
(c) International commodity Control Agreements. 
The choice of agreement will be dependent on the objectives 
which are to be promoted. 
(3) All commodities should, if subject to price fluctuations which 
threaten the financial stability of the CAP, be subject to a 
form of commodity arrangement. 
(4) EEC participation in commodity agreements shall serve the 
objectives of the CAP and the development co- operation 
policy. 
PART III: PLURILATERAL RELATIONS. 
Article 7 - Objectives. 
(1) The CATP should seek to achieve a reconciliation between 
the objectives of the CAP and the objectives of the 
development co- operation policy pursued by the EEC. 
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(2) In view of the present development needs the EEC should 
not require equivalent concessions from either the least 
developed or developing countries. Furthermore, the 
provisions of Article 2 of this declaration should not be 
applied against the least developed countries and should be 
invoked only in exceptional circumstances against 
developing countries. 
Article 8 - The Lomé Convention. 
(1) The CATP should continue to recognise the historical links 
between the EEC and the ACP. Future relations between 
these two groups, in the context of the CATP, will be based 
on the following provisions of this Article and Articles 9 and 
10. 
(2) The EEC and the ACP shall conclude either: 
(a) a regional commodity arrangement; or 
(b) an arrangement to support the goals of regional 
producer associations. 
The purpose of these arrangements will be to achieve fair, 
equitable and remunerative prices for ACP commodites. 
(3) The provisions of the stabilization of export earnings system 
will be amended to provide; 
(a) support for the policies outlined in paragraph (2) 
above; 
(b) the development of intra -ACP trade; and 
(c) the development of intra -ldc trade. 
(4) The provisions of Protocol 3 of the first Lomé Convention 
will be amended to allow for the removal of the EEC 
obligation to import ACP sugar. 
(5) This Article and Article 10 shall be the subject of 
negotiations between the EEC and the ACP, with a view to 
entering into effect in 1990. 
Article 9 - Food aid policy. 
(1) The CATP should endeavour to continue the food aid 
operations of the EEC. However, greater emphasis should be 
given to the use of counterpart funds and triangular 
operations. 
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(2) The CATP should encourage developing countries efforts to 
achieve food self- sufficiency through the adoption of 
national or regional food strategies. This policy shall 
concentrate on those countries linked to the EEC by the 
Lomé Convention. 
Article 10 - The Generalised System of Preferences. 
(1) The CATP in relation to the GSP will seek to encourage trade 
creation, trade expansion and trade equality through the 
introduction of the principles of graduation and 
differentiation. The following principles shall govern the 
future of the GSP. 
(2) The GSP will apply to all countries, irrespective of their past 
associations with the EEC. Beneficiaries of the scheme will 
be divided into three groups, least developed, developing 
and economically advanced developing countries. 
(3) Applying the principle of differentiation each group will 
derive differing benefits relating to the depth of the tariff 
cut, product coverage, financial assistance and the use of the 
safeguard provisions. 
(4) Applying the principle of graduation, the economically 
advanced beneficiaries may be excluded from the scheme 
and required to abide by the rules of GATT. 
(5) The implementation of the above proposals is dependent on 
a satisfactory conclusion to the negotiations referred to in 
Article 8(5) of this Regulation. 
PART IV: BILATERAL RELATIONS. 
Article 11 - Objectives. 
(1) The objectives of the CATP in the field of bilateral relations 
is to ensure co- ordination between the objectives of the CAP 
and those of the EEC policies on energy resources, technology 
and political co- operation. 
(2) This part relates to EEC relations with the Mediterranean, 
EFTA and CMEA countries. The operation of the CATP as it 
affects other developed countries (Australia, Canada, New 
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Zealand and the United States) will be effected under Article 
5 of this Declaration. 
Article 12 - The Mediterranean. 
(1) The following provisions shall govern the CATP in relation to 
the Mediterranean. 
(2) The EEC shall establish a forum for the discussion of political 
and energy problems with the Mediterranean and Arab 
States. 
(3) The EEC shall, in consultation 
Mediterranean develop a regional 
shall represent an extension and 
intergrated Mediterranean policy. 
be to promote industrialization 
economies of all States bordering 
with the countries of the 
development policy. This 
improvement of the EEC's 
The aim of the policy will 
and diversification of the 
on the Mediterranean. 
(4) In consultation with the Mediterranean countries and 
mindful of the disadvantages suffered by EEC producers, the 
EEC shall adopt a Mediterranean Trade Policy. The purpose 
of this policy will be to promote complimentarity of 
production. 
Article 13 - EFTA. 
The CATP shall promote the growth of agricultural trade by the 
conclusion of bilateral agricultural agreements between the EEC 
and individual EFTA countries. These arrangements should be 
reciprocal. 
Article 14 - CMEA. 
The CATP shall foster the harmonious development of trade 
between the EEC and the CMEA and ensure that the principle of 
reciprocity is respected in trade arrangements. 
PART V: INTERNAL ADAPTATIONS. 
Article 15 - Objectives. 
(1) Internal adaptation of the CAP shall endeavour to support 
the objectives of the CATP. 
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(2) The Commission shall monitor the implementation of the 
CATP. It shall present an annual report to the Council 
outlining: 
(a) the impact of the policy on domestic producers, 
especially those farmers in the less- favoured areas; 
(b) the impact of the policy on consumers; 
(c) the impact of the policy on budgetary expenditure 
on agricultural products; and 
(d) the measures which could be taken on the EEC level, 
in areas other than agricultural which would 
support the objectives of the CATP. 
Article 16 - Internal Policy. 
(1) The EEC shall maintain the prudent price policy and alleviate 
problems in the agricultural sector by the use of either 
structural policy or direct income aids. 
(2) The EEC shall maintain the system of guarantee thresholds 
and ensure that the system works effectively. 
Article 17 - External Policy. 
(1) The EEC shall adopt a policy to promote the export of 
agricultural products, without excessive reliance on the 
export refund system. 
(2) The EEC shall actively promote the conclusion of multiannual 
supply agreements for agricultural products with those 
developing countries who have expressed an interest in such 
agreements. 
(3) These agreements should be concluded within the 
framework of the CAP and should not encourage the 
development of surpluses. 
Article 18 - Other policies. 
The Commission shall present proposals which would lead to the 
greater co- ordination and harmonization of Member States 
policies which affect the operation of the CATP. Particular 
emphasis should be given to development aid policies, energy 
policies, technology policies and monetary policies. 
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CONCLUSION: UTOPIAN RECOMMENDATIONS OR AN 
INTEGRATED POLICY? 
In 1973, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States 
of the European Community declared,9 
"The EEC, the world's largest trading group could not 
be a closed economic unity. It has close links with 
the rest of the world as regards its supplies and 
market outlets. For this reason the EEC, while 
remaining in control of its own trading policies, 
intends to exert a positive influence on world 
economic relations with a view to the greater well 
being of all." 
In the year's following this declaration, the EEC rather than 
exerting a positive influence on world economic relations has in 
fact exerted a negative influence. The primary reason for this is 
the operation of the CAP. It has acted as a negative influence in 
the institutions of the GATT and UNCTAD. It has frustrated the 
objectives of the Mediterranean agreements concluded by the EEC. 
It has not assisted the process of development either through the 
Lomé Conventions or the operations of the GSP. The adoption of a 
common agricultural trade policy would alleviate the adverse 
impact of the CAP, while leaving the EEC in control of the CAP, and 
at the same time contribute to improved world economic 
conditions. 
An exmaination of the provisions of the policy supports this 
assertion. The overall objectives of the policy will be the 
adaptation of the CAP to allow for greater impact of world market 
conditions and the liberalization of international trade in 
agricultural products. In recognition of the existing protectionist 
nature of the policy, these objectives should be implemented 
9 European Political Co- operation (3rd ed 1977), 69, 71. 
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gradually and the internal adaptation of the CAP should be 
consistent with the new trade policy. For these reasons, Articles 
15 and 16 envisage the re- orientation of the CAP towards a 
structural policy, a re- orientation which is supported by the 
wording of Article 39 EEC. Although price policy for a time will 
continue to dominate the CAP, gradually a system of deficiency 
payments and structural measures will begin to overshadow the 
price policy. During an interim period, the EEC would be able to 
protect its farmers through the use of safeguard measures. 
However, such safeguard measures should neither frustrate the 
objectives of the trade policy nor hamper the process of structural 
adjustment. The gradual re- adjustment of the CAP would be in 
accordance with the conclusions of the 1958 Harberler Report, and 
would encourage adjustments to the international trading 
environment. 
Turning to this international environment, the provisions of the 
policy suggest a new direction for both the GATT and UNCTAD. 
Although the GATT has failed to live up to expectations, it should 
not be dismissed. Reform of the rules is possible and the 
framework of the GATT would continue to be relevant. Article 4 
of the proposal includes several suggestions for achieving a better 
GATT. Each of the proposals made is dependent on a new concept 
of reciprocity. This new concept of reciprocity will involve the 
establishment of a balance of the rights and obligations of the 
Contracting Parties, in relation to all aspects of the work of the 
GATT. By adopting this new concept of reciprocity progress will 
be possible in the area of quantitative restrictions, export 
subsidies and safeguard measures, as the new concept recognises 
the protectionist nature of domestic agricultural policies. To 
supplement changes which will occur in the rules of the GATT, 
Article 5 provides for multilateral trade negotiations. The end 
product of these negotiations would be agreements on Codes of 
Conduct on the Operation of Domestic Agricultural Policies. These 
Codes, in addition to the new GATT rules, would ameliorate the 
current distortions of international agricultural trade. 
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It is not suggested that total free trade should be the purpose of 
the GATT's work. Rather, it is suggested that the GATT should 
recognise the parameters within which it operates, and seek to 
promote the best possible results within those parameters. 
The second aspect of the international operation of the trade 
policy is the EEC policy in relation to UNCTAD and Commodity 
trade. Given the impact of the rhetoric of the 1970s on the 
developed countries perception of ICA's, Article 6 is a 
conservative proposal. The need for a conservative proposal is 
strengthened when the nature of domestic agricultural 
programmes is examined. The suggested means of progress in 
this area is the conclusion of one of three types of agreement; a 
Commodity Co- operation Agreement; a Multilateral Contract 
Commodity Agreement; and an International Commodity Control 
Agreement. Each of the agreements have differing sets of 
objectives and methods to achieve these objectives. In addition 
the suggested progression from CCA to ICCA involves a gradual 
increase in the degree of interference with domestic agricultural 
policies. Only in the final stage of Commodity regulation will there 
be an important element of structural re- adjustment of domestic 
production. The proposal encourages commodity agreements 
whilst alleviating developed countries concerns about the impact 
of these agreements on their domestic policies. 
An important aspect of the Common Agricultural Trade Policy is 
the encouragement it gives to other EEC policies, especially the 
Development Co- operation Policy. In relation to the application of 
this latter policy to the ACP, Article 8 of the proposal advances the 
argument that the ACP should be encouraged to promote their 
own development rather than relying on the EEC to achieve this 
objective. It recognises that developing countries, and especially 
the ACP, can do more to promote this than the EEC can. At the 
same time a role can be found for the EEC. In Articles 8 and 9 the 
EEC performs in the role of insurer. During the transitional period 
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to either economic development or food self- sufficiency, the EEC 
will assist the efforts of the developing countries. A more active 
form of assistance is anticipated by Article 10 in the proposal for 
a new form of generalised preferences. 
The philosophy which pervades Articles 8 and 9 is reflected in 
Article 12 of the proposal, relations with the Mediterranean. In 
recognition of the fact that the labels developed and developing 
are mere convenience rather than reflections of reality, Article 
12(3) suggests that EEC efforts in the Mediterranean should not 
solely concentrate on the non- member States. Provision is made 
for a regional development policy which will encompass some of 
the "poorer" member States. Additionally, the trade policy would 
encourage the development of EEC policies in the area of energy, 
technology, and political co- operation. 
These policies will be important not only in the relationship 
established with the Mediterranean countries but also with the 
countries of EFTA and Eastern Europe. The resources for the 
development or enhancement of these policies will be derived 
from the savings the EEC makes as it reduces expenditure on the 
CAP price policy. If the total domestic costs of the CAP is reflected 
by the addition of the costs to consumers and the costs to 
taxpayers minus the benefit received by producers, then the 
adoption of the proposed trade policy will involve a decrease in 
domestic costs. The price paid for agricultural produce by the 
consumer will decline as domestic production is supplemented by 
overseas production at ever- increasing levels. The costs to the 
taxpayer will decline as less will be spent on price policy and 
more on structural re- adjustment or the deficiency payments 
system. The revenue freed from the adoption of the policy will, as 
noted above, be deployed in other EEC policies. 
The connection between decreasing costs for the CAP and 
increasing revenue for the other policies of the EEC may alleviate 
the burden imposed by the CAP on the EEC budget. The benefits 
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will not however be totally internal. Externally, the policy 
provides that the EEC adopt an active export policy for agricultural 
products, albeit without excessive reliance on the export refund 
system. In addition, the liberalization of agricultural trade will 
have important consequences for industrial trade. The concept of 
reciprocity /balance of rights and obligations will ensure that the 
burden imposed on some countries by liberalising agriculture are 
matched by the benefits they receive as other countries liberalise 
industry. For the EEC, this is an attractive trade -off. 
Is the proposal for a common agricultural trade policy a utopian 
recommendation? To the extent that the adoption of the policy 
represents an imaginative step forward in the adaptation of the 
CAP, it represents a change in the direction of the CAP. Harvey 
has identified four types of reform of the CAP: passive, defensive, 
active or potential.10 The current phase of adaptation reflects a 
defensive type of reform, reacting to the internal inconsistencies 
of the policy. As such ad -hoc solutions are adopted. Note the 
series of measures to deal with the problems of over - supply in 
the milk sector; premiums for slaughtering dairy cows; 
premiums for the conversion of dairy herds to beef production; 
the co- responsibility levy; the super levy; the guarantee 
thresholds and the quota system. Despite these measures, over a 
period of fourteen years, the problems of over - supply in the milk 
sector remain. Current attempts to adapt the CAP represent 
short -term answers to the problems of European agriculture. 
Despite this, the CAP has reached a turning point in its history. 
The nature of this turning point is the realisation that the 
economic, social and political forces, which have for so long 
10 "The Progress so far in CAP Reform:' in ed Denton et al Reform of 
the CAP and the re- structuring of the EEC Budget. (1983). 
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dominated the direction of the CAP, will play a lesser role in the 
future. As Michel Rocard indicated,11 
"The common agricultural policy will be less popular 
because its incentives are more limited and weaker, 
but it should allow Europe to catch its second wind, 
now that it has shown it can put its agricultural 
affairs in order." 
The CAP has embarked on the road to reform, greater emphasis is 
now being placed on structural policy for example. For these 
reasons the proposal for a common agricultural trade policy is not 
a utopian recommendation, rather it affords the EEC an 
opportunity to integrate the CAP with a number of existing EEC 
policies. 
Throughout this paper the conflict between the CAP and the 
external policies of the EEC have been noted. These conflicts 
prevent the proper implementation and success of the external 
policies. Note the conflict between the CAP and the development 
co- operation policy pursued by the EEC through the Lomé 
Convention, concessions of any real value are denied to the ACP as 
a result of the CAP. The adoption of the common agricultural 
trade policy would eradicate these conflicts over time. The 
underlying philosophy of this new policy, that of reluctant 
liberalism, will allow the EEC to exert a positive influence on world 
economic affairs. The CAP, described as the motor of European 
integration by some, will be used to promote the development of 
other common policies. Note the provisions of the policy relating 
to the Mediterranean requires the co- ordination of the CAP with 
energy, technology and political co- operation policies. In this way 
the adoption and development of a common agricultural trade 
policy will assist the development of the EEC in all other areas. 
11 Interview in Herald Tribune, 2 April 1984. 
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As the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities concluded in a 1981 Report on Agricultural Trade 
Policy,12 
"A Common Agricultural Trade Policy would prevent 
agricultural policy from being dictated solely by 
domestic agricultural or budgetary considerations 
without due consideration being given to the impact 
on third countries and hence on the European EEC's 
wider trading interests." 
The Common Agricultural Trade Policy proposed in this paper 
meets the above goals. It will encourage European trade in 
agricultural and industrial products and it will reconcile 
conflicting external policies. 
A Common Agricultural Trade Policy represents a way forward 
not only for the CAP but also for the European Community. It 
presents the EEC with an opportunity it cannot afford to ignore. 
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